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            Abstract 
 
This thesis explores Joyce’s aesthetic enterprise in Ulysses from the perspective 
of ethics, arguing that my psychoanalytic study necessarily points to the entwinement 
of ontology, epistemology and ethics. Joyce’s literary experimentation not only 
revolutionised western literature, writing his name into world history, but also 
inaugurated an emergent subjectivity in modernity. In answering Spivak’s question, 
‘Can the Subaltern speak?’, one of my main theses is that the subaltern can speak 
through the process of self-naming, through the self-invention of a new subjectivity 
and a New Symbolic. 
In Chapter One, I critically review Lacan’s theorisation of the ethical models in 
his long career, engaging in the current debates among Lacanians regarding the 
definition and efficacy of Lacan’s theory of the (ethical) act and the interconnected 
ethico-political theories in the contemparay landscape.  I evaluate Lacanians’ diverse 
stances toward Žižek’s interpretation of Lacan centered on the emphasis of negativity 
and Badiou’s theory of event and truth-procedures.  After offering my own 
theoretical evaluation and intervention into the above-mentioned debates, I also seek 
to foreground the place of love in Lacanian psychoanalysis and to elucidate how love 
manifests itself ethically.   
In my reading of ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ I argue that Joyce, through Stephen’s 
idiosyncratic theory of Shakespeare, articulates his artistic ambition as a work of/for a 
singular universal, endeavouring to transform the human subject by way of writing a 
book of himself, and of making a self out of writing.  
I take Joyce’s literary experiment in ‘Cyclops’ as an arrangement deployed 
through the narrative by the Nameless One that juxtaposes with the rhetorical excess 
of interpolated digressions.  Drawing on Lacan’s theorization of the look and the 
gaze, I contend that Joyce conducts a literary traversal of fantasy, a working through 
of symptomatic nationalism.  The interpretation of ‘fantasmatic’ working offers an 
alternative reading to the historicist approaches and critiques of Gibson and Nolan.  I 
also argue that neighbour love has already prefigured in ‘Cyclops,’ in Bloom’s 
proclamation of the ideal of universal love and in the poetic justice of Bloom’s escape 
from his xenophobic, Cyclopean neighbours.  The psychoanalytically-inspired 
theory of ‘de-activation of the law’ and Badiou’s conception of ideological 
‘subtraction’ are enlisted in my interpretation of neighbour love. 
I read ‘Circe’ as Joyce’s experiment with a sinthomatic construction of 
subjectivity, contending that there is a constant process of unknotting and reknotting 
in the construction of textual subjectivity. I examine whether the sinthomatic 
construction of subjectivity, as it is evidenced in the fantasmatic episodes, truly 
  
invents a new structural stratification of subjectivity and alternative libidinal 
organization. By way of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Žižek’s theory, I argue that 
masochism in ‘Circe’ is not necessarily ethical but can function as a preparatory step 
towards the true ethical act.  Pseudo-messianism and masochism are opposed to the 
true messianism manifested through neighbour love as a genuine ethical act.  
Enlightened by Lacan’s complex theory of the psychoanalytic act and Badiou’s idea 
of new neighbourhood, I try to capture the ethical impact of genuine messianism.  
I interpret Joyce’s modern version of ‘Penelope’ as a sinthomatic writing as well, 
finding this female countersign to be problematic by way of an ethical evaluation of 
the sinthome as a (singularised) sexual relation and an investigation of Joyce’s belief 
in his sinthome.  Furthermore, my ethical reading is also explored through the 
productive tension between what I term ‘sinthomatic eroticism’ and love.  I invoke 
both Lacan’s idea of love as ‘compensaiton’ of the non-existence of sexual 
relationship, and Badiou’s work on love as a way of creatively carving out what I term  
‘the ethical space of love’ as a space (not entirely disengaged from but) distinct from 
the psychoanalytic domain of sexual desires or eros.   
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Introduction 
 
In the era of globalisation, multiculturalism has become the dominant discourse 
of political criticism and cultural studies in both descriptive and prescriptive senses.  
However, the discourse of multiculturalism, with its emphasis on plural identities and 
ethnic multiplicity, can hardly provide entirely effective responses to the strife and 
tensions caused by the rise of modernity, including issues such as imperialism, 
colonialism, nationalism, racism, and capitalism.  In the face of these problems, 
there is on-going debate in which a universalist ethics is polemical in opposition to 
both multiculturalism and the Derridiean-Levinasian ethics of otherness.    
Under the rubric of multiculturalism, critical analysis of power, discourse, 
interests and identity has extended to cover fields including feminism, post-colonial 
studies, cultural studies, queer studies and so on.  The respect for the Other, 
tolerance and celebration of difference typical of multiculturalism takes another cue 
from Derridean-Levinasian ethics.  At the risk of oversimplification, and despite the 
inner discrepancies between their respective modes of thought, the overarching 
principle of this line of ethics is ‘a generalized reference of the other qua other,’1 
                                                     
1 Peter Hallward, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of 
Evil (London: Verso, 2001), p. xxii. 
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which may be encapsulated in the expression—‘tout autre est tout autre.’2  Framed 
in the emphasized priority of ethics over ontology, heteronomy over autonomy,3  
Levinasian ethics is articulated in terms of the subject’s ‘traumatic’ 4  ethical 
experience in confronting the impossible, asymmetrical demand issuing from the face 
of the Other and the consequent responsibility of the subject towards the Other.  The 
traumatic nature of this confrontation with an inaccessible, irreconcilable demand 
emanating from an altogether Other has led Simon Critchley to diagnose ‘the 
Levinasian ethical subject’ as ‘a traumatic neurotic,’ and Slavoj Žižek to identify the 
superego with the infinite demand of an inscrutable Other. 5   The universalist 
                                                     
2 Jacques Derrida, Donner La Mort, quoted in Hallward, ibid., p. xxiv. 
3 As Simon Critchley rightly points out, unlike Kant, in Levinas’ work, the ethical demand coming from 
outside does not correspond to the subject’s autonomy. He says, ‘[e]thical experience is 
heteronomous, my autonomy is called into question by the fact of the other’s demand, by the appeal 
that comes from their face and lays me under an obligation that is not my choosing.’ Simon Critchley, 
Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (London: Verso, 2007), p. 56. 
4 The invocation of trauma in the description of ethical experience can actually find direct textual 
support in Levinas: ‘[t]his trauma, which cannot be assumed, inflicted by the Infinite on presence, or 
this afflicting of presence by the Infinite—this affectivity—takes shape as a subjection to the 
neighbour.  It is thought thinking more than it thinks, desire, the reference to the neighbour, the 
responsibility for another.’ Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings. Eds. A. Peperzack, S. 
Critchley and R. Bernasconi (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 142. 
5 To put it succinctly, Levinasian ethics is carried out in the ethical experience of its subject in 
confrontation with an impossible demand from the superego embodied in the infinite Other. Critchley, 
Infinitely Demanding, p. 61. Slavoj Žižek’s critiques of Levinas and Derrida are scattered around his 
works. For instance, see: ‘Appendix: Ideology Today’ in The Puppet and The Dwarf: The Perverse Core 
of Christianity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 145-71; ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea 
for Ethical Violence’, in The Neighbor (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), p. 135-90. 
Furthermore, in Less than Nothing, the section called ‘Badiou against Levinas’ is an expression of 
Žižek’s continuous scepticism regarding Levinas. Less Than Nothing (London: Verso, 2012), p. 829-31. 
From a broader perspective, although Critchley and Žižek have engaged in an acute dispute in recent 
years and differ from each other in the positions on ethics and politics, violence and resistance, there 
is compatibility at this juncture with regard to their observations on Levinas. Critchley, though, is much 
more sympathetic toward Levinas than Žižek.  After Critchley published Infinitely Demanding, Žižek’s 
critical review ‘Resistance is Surrender’ inaugurated the debate.  See Slavoj Žižek, ‘Resistance is 
Surrender’, London Review of Books, 29/22 (2007), last accessed 1 January 2014, 
<http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n22/contents >. Simon Critchley, ‘Violence Thoughts about Slavoj Žižek’, 
Naked Punch 11 (2008), last accessed 1 January 2014, <http://www.nakedpunch.com> . 
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approach inspired by Lacanian psychoanalysis,6 meanwhile, advocates an ethics 
which derives its momentum and dynamics from the ethical subject’s singular 
individuality, in the direction of the ethics of the Real, or from the evental happening 
at the situated void of the situation in Alain Badiou’s ethics of truth.7  While this line 
of ethics originates from a subject’s singularity and a particular event, its import is 
applicable universally.   
Given the limited space available to me in this dissertation compared to the 
scope and depth of each contending position involved in the debate, I do not attempt 
to cover the diverse arguments exhaustively.  Instead, I focus my project by taking as 
its point of departure Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s classic question in post-colonial 
studies—‘Can the subaltern speak?’  With her deconstructivist-Marxist-feminist 
approach, Spivak examines the power, race and gender dynamics involved in the 
                                                     
6 Mari Ruti names this universalist ethics ‘post-Lacanian,’ and includes the works of Eric Santner, 
Kenneth Reinhard, Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou within this movement. Although I agree with Ruti’s 
inclusion of these figures as proponents of a universalist ethics, I drop the term ‘post-Lacanian’ in my 
own writings for I find the prefix ‘post’ problematically ambiguous. In Ruti’s book, the 
term‘post-Lacanian’ mainly designates positions and attitudes following Lacan, rather than those 
which seek distance from him. However, the term carries connotations of both going 
after/beyond/against Lacan and following Lacan. To avoid ambiguity, I have thus decided not to use 
her term. Another reason for my reservation regarding the term ‘post-Lacanian’ is that although 
Badiou calls Lacan ‘one of my masters,’ he also rightly claims to keep his own position ‘at quite a 
distance from Lacan.’ Ethics (London: Verso, 2002), p. 121. Many of Santner’s and Reinhard’s readings 
are sophisticated combinations of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Judeo-Christianity; Žižek’s writings are 
a mixture of Lacanian psychoanalysis and German Idealism, high theory and pop culture, while 
Badiou’s project draws from Platonism, set-theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis.  As such, Lacan’s 
influence can be keenly felt in Badiou. However, the scope and complexity of his philosophical edifice 
of ontology and ethics apparently exceed psychoanalysis, which, I think, renders the application of the 
term post-Lacanian to him improper. Mari Ruti, The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal 
Within (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012). 
7 It is well-known that Žižek’s and Badiou’s theorisation of ethico-political issues are polemical in 
opposition to both multiculturalism and Derridean-Levinasian ethics. I do not attempt to summarise 
their arguments here, but choose to engage in the related ethico-political issues and arguments at 
opportune moments later in this thesis. 
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abolition of sati, the banning of the self-immolation by widows, who, in her article, 
exemplify the category of the subaltern. 
In Spivak’s thought, the subaltern is epitomised by the case of sati, which is 
represented as ‘the singular and unverifiable margin,’ ‘an unascertainable ethical 
singularity that is not ever a sustainable condition.’8  The obscurity and anonymity to 
which the silenced subaltern has been reduced poses an ethico-political challenge in 
Spivak’s eyes, and her response is a proposal which appears ‘contradictory and 
aporetic.’9  On the one hand, Spivak calls for a critical engagement with the ethical 
singularity of the subaltern.  On the other hand, she also holds that ‘no amount of 
raised-consciousness fieldwork can even approach the painstaking labour to establish 
ethical singularity with the subaltern.’10  Spivak’s position can thus be regarded as a 
combined critical effort, congenial with the basic tenets of multiculturalism with its 
emphatic concern for differences and plurality, and also broadly in alignment with 
Derridean-Levinasian ethics in terms of respect and responsibility for the (inscrutable) 
Other. 
By politicising representation and critically engaging with discursive practices, 
multiculturalism approaches identity politics, cultural diversity and related 
                                                     
8 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Critique of Post-Colonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing 
Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.175 and p. 198. 
9 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Diaspora Old and New: Women in the Transnational World’, in Textual 
Practices 10.2 (1996), p. 25. 
10 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Spivak Reader, Donna Landry and Gerald Maclean (eds.) (London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 269. 
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ethico-political issues from both epistemological and discursive angles.  The 
Derridean-Levinasian approach, meanwhile, revolves around the impossible demand 
from an inscrutable Other, developing an ethics via an 
epistemological-phenomenological orientation.  However, if the Other, subaltern or 
otherwise, appears inaccessible, impenetrable and unrepresentable epistemologically, 
the very being of the Other is undeniable and irreducible, which poses an issue of 
ontological significance yet to be explored and developed.  Such being is already 
perceived and represented phenomenologically, but still awaits possible 
ontologisation.   The distinction between being and what is existent in discourse and 
representation and the impact of this difference on subjectivity call for further 
exploration.  My psychoanalytic approach has convinced me that meaningful 
innovation and sustainable transformation must always be accomplished through 
substantial changes at the subjective level.  Although, as a psychoanalyst, Lacan 
cannot be said to do ontology in the philosophical sense, his theory of subjectivity, 
framed in terms of the entwinement of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, 
implicitly deals with necessity, contingency and impossibility with regard to ontology.  
I therefore seek to articulate and approach an ethics from the ontological level, and 
propose a critical endeavour at the intersection of ontology, epistemology and ethics. 
With this critical background, my dissertation launches a critical reinvestigation 
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of James Joyce’s Ulysses via an intervention into the above-mentioned critical debate 
on ethics.  The aim of this project is to interrogate how the subaltern subject, in this 
case, the Irish subject under ‘semicolonial’ rule by the British empire, deals with 
modern problems such as the crisis of meaning, the decline of paternal authority, the 
crisis of subjectivity and the ethics of the oppressed.  Articulating these issues from 
the perspective of Lacanian psychoanalysis and the fruitful intersection of the ethics 
of the Real and the ethics of truth, I will examine how an emergent subject rises from 
the subaltern status and constitutes an ethical enterprise in the direction of what I call 
‘the singular universal.’  Illuminated by Joyce’s revolutionary literary works, Lacan 
revised his theoretical edifice late in his career, introducing his topological thinking in 
reinventing the concept of sinthome and the unknotting/reknotting of subjectivity.  
This theoretical connection provides a spark for innovation within the study of 
subaltern subjects. 
I thus propose that the investigation of the liberation of the subaltern subject 
should no longer confine itself to the epistemological level of voicing one’s own 
position and rights, or the impossible task of representing the heterogeneous 
altogether Other, but should instead extend to the ontological level of the 
reconstructing/reknotting of subjectivity.  Joyce’s literary experimentation not only 
revolutionised western literature, writing his name into world history, but also 
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inaugurated an emergent subjectivity in modernity.  I argue that the ethics of 
singularity in Lacanian thought finds an expression in Joyce’s works.  Furthermore, 
this ethics of singularity, along with the singularity of subjectivity, are my points of 
intervention into the debate surrounding the prevalent multiculturalism.  I offer an 
account of singular subjectivity and the ethics of singularity in critiquing the 
underlying opposition between particularity and universality prevalent in current 
critical debate, suggesting an alternative avenue for the liberation of the subaltern 
subject.  In answering Spivak’s question, one of my main theses is that the subaltern 
can speak through the process of self-naming, through the self-invention of a new 
subjectivity. 
Another pillar of my dissertation resides in my theorisation of love and my 
investigation into the relationship between love and the ethics of subaltern subjectivity.  
Owing to his anti-philosophical stance, and although there are many discussions of 
love scattered throughout his works, Lacan never offered a systematic account of love.  
Instead, in his indirect approach to love, Lacan appeals to insinuation, fragmentary 
allusion, myth, and poetry.  Despite this, I argue that the seeming lack of a theory of 
love in Lacan’s oeuvre does not result from the impossibility of saying anything 
theoretical about love.  Writing from a Lacanian perspective, I systematically 
foreground the space for love; love and the ethical act designate the restructuring 
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moment of subjectivity at its most fundamental.  In this thesis, I critically mark out 
the place of love in the intersection between love and sexuality, between subjectivity 
and the ethical act, between the act and love, and between love and the sinthome. 
In a long and detailed initial chapter, firstly, in opposition to Aristotelian ethics of 
the master, which is devised as an ethics of the good, an ethics of happiness and virtue, 
inspired by Spivak and Lacan, I attempt to elaborate the ethics of subaltern 
subjectivity in the direction of an ethics of the Real.  Lacan takes into consideration 
the libidinal economy in psychic structuration and advocates an ethics of the Real.   
I trace the different ethical paradigms developed during various phases of Lacan’s 
career and explore the theoretical heritage of Lacanian psychoanalysis in 
contemporary ethical debate.  I critically review Lacan’s theorization of the ethical 
models outlined in four major themes: (1) the ethical paradigm of pure desire as 
exemplified by Antigone; (2) the psychoanalytic act and the traversal of fantasy; (3) 
topological thinking, the Names of the Father, and the notion of sinthome.   
Moreover, while the notion of love itself is subject to clarification, I endeavour to 
investigate the ethical space for love and explore how love works as an indicator or 
testing ground for the ethical efficacy of sinthome and how love impacts on psychic 
structuration and intersubjectivity.  
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The theoretical intervention outlined here is strongly supported by detailed 
textual analysis of Ulysses.  My psychoanalytic study of the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ 
episode addresses the related issues of the fictionality of paternity and the 
inconsistency/non-existence of the Other, arguing that the correlative functioning of 
the sinthome, self-naming, and the singular universal work for the constitution of an 
emergent subjectivity.  Stephen’s peculiar theory of Shakespeare actually serves as a 
self-reflexive declaration of Joyce’s ambition for Ulysses, displaying his ambition of 
self-invention, his endeavor of self-begetting of a new subjectivity and a new 
Symbolic by way of writing the private into the public, elevating the singular to the 
universal.     
In the ensuing chapters, I analyse Joyce’s sinthomatic writing, investigatimg the 
issues of symptomatic nationalism and ethical ideals, exploring the intricacies of love, 
perverse practices, sinthome and sexuality, and evaluating the ethical efficacy of 
sinthome and love.  I read Joyce’s literary experiement in ‘Cyclops’ as an arrangment 
deployed through the narrative by the Nameless One in juxtaposition with the 
rhetorical excess of interpolated digressions.  Drawing on Lacan’s theorization of the 
look and the gaze, the fantasy and its traversal, I contend that Joyce conducts a 
literary traversal of fantasy, a working through of symptomatic nationalism.  In 
parallel with the literary traversal of symptomatic nationalism and anti-Semitism as 
10 
 
 
ideological fantasy, I suggest that ‘transnationalism’ and ‘non-jewish Jewishness’ can 
be detected in Ulysses.  I also argue that neighbour love has already prefigured in 
‘Cyclops,’ in Bloom’s proclamation of the ideal of universal love and in the poetic 
justice of Bloom’s escape from his xenophobic, Cyclopean neighbours at the end of 
the episode.  
Although there has been relatively little criticism which comments on 
sinthomatic writings, or takes literary works to be sinthomatic, I propose to take 
seriously Lacan’s conceptualization of Joyce’s unsubscription from the Unconscious 
and his ability of dispensing the Name of the Father by inventing new master signifers 
and knowing how to organize jouissance, and read ‘Circe’ as Joyce’s experiment with 
sinthomatic construction of subjectivity.  I contend that there is a constant process of 
unknotting and reknotting in the construction of textual subjectivity.  In my ethical 
evaluation, I examine whether the sinthomatic construction of subjectivity, as it is 
evidenced in the fantasmatic episodes, truly invents a new structural stratification of 
subjectivity and alternative libidinal organization.  As my analysis demonstrates, 
pseudo-messianism and masochism should be opposed to the true messianism 
manifested through neighbour love as a genuine ethical act.  
I interpret Joyce’s modern version of ‘Penelope’ as a sinthomatic writing as well, 
arguing that Molly’s countersign is indispensable because Joyce needs the female 
11 
 
 
participation in the construction of sinthomatic eroticism as a repairment to the 
non-existence of sexual relation.   I find the female countersign to be problematic 
and approached the controversial status of ‘Penelope’ by way of an ethical evaluation 
of the sinthome as a (singularised) sexual relation and an investigation of Joyce’s 
belief in his sinthome.  Furthermore, my ethical reading is also explored through the 
productive tension between, what I term sinthomatic eroticism and love. 
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Chapter One 
 
Love and Self-Naming for/in the Ethics of Subaltern Subjectivity 
 
Today the great majority of people do not have a name; the only name 
available is ‘excluded,’ which is the name of those who do not have a 
name. Today the great majority of humanity counts for nothing. And 
philosophy has no other legitimate aim than help find the new names 
that will bring into existence of the unknown world that is only waiting 
for us because we are waiting for it. 
             Alain Badiou, ‘The Caesura of Nihilism’ 
 
 
I.  
The proposal for deriving/devising ethics from/for subaltern subjectivity is not as 
self-evident as it might appear at the first sight.  Ethics, originating with Aristotle’s 
title Nicomachean Ethics, has been deeply rooted in the aristocratic worldview and 
values, thereby introducing the ethical domain in terms of the discourse of the master 
or the ‘function of the master’ (VII, 11, 23).  In Lacan’s reading, Aristotelian ethics is 
addressed to ‘a society of masters,’ aiming to elucidate ‘the essential virtue of the 
master’ (VII, 23).  The training of the group of masters in Antiquity actually points to 
the notion of proper or ideal citizenship, which constitutes ‘a presence, a human 
condition joined in a much less narrowly critical way to the slave, than Hegel’s 
perspective’ (VII, 23).11  Aristotle’s project grounds ethical life in virtue raising, 
                                                     
11 Hegel’s critique famously announces a reversal of the status of the master and mocks the master as 
the ‘heroic brute,’ assigning the slave as the true agent of history. In Lacan’s view, this is evidence of 
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character building and development through education, training, and habit cultivation.  
Certain character formations, which are built into humanity’s ‘second nature,’ are 
considered favourable, as they are able to facilitate a meaningful and happy life.   
If one follows Nicomachean Ethics, one would find the discursive focus moves 
from the ideal of the Good to that of happiness, culminating with contemplation for 
the leisure class of the master as the highest form of happiness.12  As Jonathan Lear 
points out, it is immensely striking that for Aristotle, ethics as a reflection of humans’ 
orientation in the world and an inquiry into the self-other relationship would lead to 
‘the most solitary and ultimate self-sufficient human activity’ and ‘an image of an 
escape from the pressures of ordinary practical life.’13  In other words, in Aristotle’s 
ethics of the master, which amounts to the ethics of the constitution of citizenship, 
‘the fundamental good of ethics is to get as far away from your neighbors as 
possible.’14  It is hard to resist the conclusion that the ideal of the master, which 
culminates in ‘total impracticality,’ 15  is scarcely tenable.  The philosophical 
eloquence and laxity in Aristotelian ethics curiously amounts to an ethical 
                                                                                                                                                        
the decline of the master discourse, manifested in Hegel’s critique at a certain moment in history (VII, 
23). 
12 As Lacan puts it succinctly, ‘the ideal of the master, like that of god at the center of Aristotelian 
world […] seems to avoid work as much as possible […] to leave the control of his slaves to his steward 
in order to concentrate on a contemplative ideal without which the ethics doesn’t achieve its proper 
aim’ (VII, 23). 
13 Jonathan Lear, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life (London: Harvard University Press, 
2000), p. 53. 
14 Ibid., p. 53. Original emphasis. 
15 Ibid., p. 61. 
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bankruptcy 16  which takes consolation in the fantasy of deathlike and godlike 
contemplation and a sense of superiority and isolation.17  
However, according to Lacan, it is striking that such a form of ‘localized’ ethics, 
which is ‘limited to a social type, to a privileged representative of leisure,’ ‘still 
remains full of resonances and lessons’ (VII, 23).  If we take into consideration that 
the ethical project of the training of masters strongly resonates with the construction 
of citizenship in the modern versions of liberalist ideology, we should be cautious of 
the wider range and the prevalent mechanism of the more subtle and complicated 
forms of the inherent aristocratic logic of representation, dominance, and exclusion 
which are arguably responsible for severe social injustice and political aggression.  
Tracing the history and implications of philosophy in politics undoubtedly exceeds the 
intent and scope of the current project; therefore, the focus of this study is limited to 
the analysis of the libidinal economy and the underlying structure of relevant types of 
ethics and politics.  I highlight the preference of psychoanalytic ethics of the Real to 
                                                     
16 These are my own words not Lear’s interpretation and evaluation of Aristotelian ethics. Lear praises 
the character-based ethics to some extent, when he argues that ‘from the moral law it is impossible to 
derive any specific conclusions about how to act in a specific set of circumstances […] For Aristotle, it 
is precisely because it is impossible to specify a set of rules on how to act well that one must turn to a 
psychologically informed account of how to build a good character.’ Ibid., p. 5. 
17 Regarding the logical structure and discursive movement of Nicomachean Ethics, Lear offers a 
powerful critique and argues that Aristotle tries to save his teleological account of ethics ‘by a flight of 
aristocracy’, and the ideal of contemplation is actually a ‘fantasy’ of release from the pressure of life. 
Ibid., p. 42 and 56. In the later section of this chapter, I will come back to Lear’s discussion of 
Nicomachean Ethics and show how Lear demonstrates both Aristotelian ethics and Freud’s theories of 
death instinct betray a teleological point of view that forms the framework of their theories. I will 
demonstrate also how Lear’s exposition points to the ‘not-all’ logic in Lacanian sense and the logic’s 
relation with fantasy and enigmatic signifiers though Lear himself is not a Lacanian.  
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the Aristotelian ethics of idealisation, contrasting the ethics of the subaltern with that 
of the master, critiquing and supplementing the politics of the citizenship construction 
with the ethics of love.   
Truth be told, to posit the category of the subaltern with the dignity of the subject 
of ethics is itself an accomplishment of our contemporary critical legacy.  At the 
other end of dominance and even atrocity, the servant and slave have long functioned 
as instruments of exploitation and a substance upon which socio-political hierarchy is 
established and enjoyed.  This end is chronically and conveniently relegated to 
oblivion and extinction at both the practical and the discursive levels.  Against this 
background, it takes a creative move to mark out the categories of the oppressed, the 
persecuted, the colonised, the silenced, the marginalised, and the victimised in the 
terrain of ethics.  By introducing the subaltern as a category of the subject, ethics is 
transformed both epistemologically and ontologically.  Spivak’s classic essay in 
postcolonial studies, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’, does not only offer due attention to 
the long neglected and persecuted but also highlights the problem involved in 
presenting a political agenda for the subaltern to articulate.  By so doing, it hints at 
the epistemological challenge of reforming the ethical domain.   
There is another stream of contemporary ethical reflections which takes as its 
point of departure the ostentation of the acute suffering of the subaltern in the extreme 
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examples of the creaturely, the Mulselmann, the horrifying figure of the inhuman 
living dead in the concentration camp.18  Encountering the suffering of our inhuman 
neighbour challenges the concept of self-enclosed autonomous subjectivity, thereby 
shaking off the complacency of the self-other relationship and values, radically 
revising the entire domain of ethics.  The subaltern subject is stripped of discursive 
visibility and identity representation at the symbolic level and reduced to anonymity 
at the epistemological level.  Moreover, the bare life of the subaltern suffering 
subject reveals the functioning of biopolitics, laying bare the underside of law, that is, 
the superegoic enjoyment.  The existence of the subaltern at the margin of or even 
excluded entirely from the Symbolic network discloses the fundamental fact that the 
human subject has a body to be hurt,19 manipulated, and enjoyed in a negative way.  
In psychoanalytic terms, this uncanny encounter with the human dimension of my 
(suffering) neighbour points to the materiality, alterity of the Other, and the Thingly 
secret of my fellowman whose strangeness corresponds to the interior foreignness, the 
‘extimate’ at the heart of my own subjectivity.  The Other’s Thingly dimension in the 
acute form of pain and suffering warrants a fundamental ethical call.  In other words, 
                                                     
18 For instance, I have in mind the works of Emmanuel Levinas, Giorgio Agamben, Slavoj Žižek, Eric 
Santner and so on. In the following discussion on the ethical question of neighbour love, all these 
works will be the reference points. 
19 Joan Copjec, Imagine There is No Women: Ethics and Sublimation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2002), p. 217-8.   
17 
 
 
‘[t]hat which exceeds the bounds of my knowledge demands acknowledgement.’20  
The construction of subjectivity and ethics in general emerges from the very 
encounter of otherness.  Ethics, as an investigation of the self-other relation and of 
the values of human life, actions, and orientation in the world, finds at its core the 
ontological question of subjectivity.  From this perspective, the ethical demand 
posited by/from the subaltern is hardly a branch of ethics, but a paradigm of ethics in 
general.  
In my study of Joyce, it is not so much an encounter with the suffering of the 
subaltern that is the issue but rather how the subaltern subject manages to survive and 
emerge in the cultural and ethical terrain.  My primary hypothesis is that Joyce, in 
his writing, provides his own version of the ethics of subaltern subjectivity through 
the very act of self-naming and love, instead of endorsing a reflection model between 
text and life.  I am partly in agreement with Colette Soler when she argues that 
‘Joyce’s work owes nothing to biography’, and ‘[o]n the contrary, his work inverts 
biography—that is, his work is an autography, a life of mere writing, a life of 
words.’21  It is insightful that Soler points out the contribution of words to life 
construction in the case of Joyce.  However, taking a step further, I attempt to save 
Joyce from the pallid image of a writer entrapped in the unreal, self-invented language 
                                                     
20 Simon Critchley. Infinitely Demanding, p. 66. Original emphasis. 
21 Colette Soler, ‘The Paradox of the Symptom in Psychoanalysis’, in Jean-Michel Rabaté (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Lacan (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), p. 99. 
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game, as a life project and survival guide, as implied by Soler’s comments.  I would 
like to contend that in the act of self-naming through ‘a life of words,’ Joyce provides 
in his text an ontological rendition of his own version of subaltern subjectivity.  This 
ontological survival through literary endeavour also helps Joyce to gain a position in 
the literary world and in the struggle for discursive visibility and cultural 
representation.  Since literary creation and subjective survival are both involved in 
the Symbolic level, it is out of the question that Joyce’s writing, however 
idiosyncratic it may appear, can ever be taken as entirely private.  The very singular 
experiences and experiments of Joyce at both the ontological and epistemological 
levels are inevitably correlated with those at the universal level.  More significantly, 
the Lacanian notion of the lack of the Other in the famous aphorisms ‘The big Other 
doesn’t exist’ and ‘There is no Other of the Other’ is structurally correspondent to the 
idea of subject destitution and the authentic subjective act as creation ex nihilo.  
Specifically, by means of his singular action through literary creation, Joyce ‘posits 
the universal, performs a certain operation of universalization.’ 22   Through a 
theoretical review of the Lacanian concept of knotting and reknotting, I will argue that 
Joyce literally converts his own singularity into the universal in the chapter on ‘Scylla 
                                                     
22 Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (London: Verso, 2000), p. 61.  Zupančič’s words 
appear in the discussion of Kant not Joyce. She expresses her penetrating insight in identifying the 
relationship between the universal and the singular in a truly ethical act. However, as I will be arguing 
in the latter section of this chapter and in the extended interpretation of ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ that 
Joyce describes a similar ethical act with his writing.   
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and Charybdis’ entitled ‘Toward the Possibility of the Singular Universal.’  
Furthermore, another major hypothesis of my project is that Joyce explores love 
as an ethical act though his writing.  In other words, Joyce devises the ethics of 
subaltern subjectivity, in which he demonstrates the possibility for the subaltern to 
voice his/her own name and to love as an ethical subject.  In his book, Joyce the 
Creator, Sheldon Brivic proposes that, Joyce, with his atheist outlook, in his writing 
emulates the role of God, the Creator, to stretch out his pen and give freedom and life 
to disparate characters of diverse interests and dispositions, which encompass the 
complexity and totality of life in his paper-made universe.  What is stunning and 
calls for further exploration is that Brivic identifies the cause of love in Joyce’s 
literary creation.  Behind the process of attaining fame by way of constructing a 
multi-mind as the creator, a seemingly schizophrenic manoeuvring, is the view that 
love motivates.  Just as creation negates abyss, ‘[l]ove seeks the region of the 
difficult, the void and the impossible.’23  Moreover, according to Brivic, Joyce read 
Madame Helena Blavatsky, who ‘spoke of the word known to all men as ‘‘an 
unknown word equivalent to the true name of God […] which identifies the 
Unknowable Cause” of the universe.’24 And since these terms are ‘applied to love,’ 
                                                     
23 Sheldon Brivic. Joyce the Creator (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 94. 
24 Ibid., p. 94. In Brivic’s words, ‘Cheryle T Herr observes that Madame Helena Blavatsky, whom Joyce 
read, spoke of word known to all men as ‘‘an unknown word equivalent to the true name of God […].”’ 
Moreover, Brivic is not the only nor the first critic of Joyce to make such a significant argument. 
Richard Ellmann, in his ‘Preface’ to Gabler’s edition, points out that ‘Joyce is of course wary of stating 
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Brivic argues, ‘the process whereby Joyce delivered himself to enter and enrich this 
work was a process of love.’25  
It might take the entire thesis to elucidate the correlation between the cause of 
love and creation even simply through the narrow yet helpful lens of Lacanian theory.  
For the time being, snapshots of three famous episodes in Ulysses regarding the theme 
of love are presented herein.  The first textual reference is that of ‘the word known to 
all men’ which Stephen ponders on three times during the day, as a question if not a 
mystery.  The three occasions appear respectively in ‘Proteus,’ ‘Scylla and 
Charybdis,’ and ‘Circe.’  In ‘Proteus,’ the sentence is embedded in some soft 
romantic imagination, erotic daydreaming in the form of rhetorical question—‘Touch 
me. Soft eyes. Soft soft soft hand I am lonely here. O, touch me soon. What is that 
word known to all men? I am quiet here alone. Sad too. Touch, touch me.’ (U3, pp. 
434-6).  This melodic, erotic daydreaming probably serves as an illustration of 
Lacanian notion of fantasy.  Lacan’s formula of fantasy runs as $<> a, implying that 
the barred subject assumes a relation to the objet petit a, as a materialisation of the 
structural void that is functioning as the cause of desire.  I therefore take fantasy to 
be an unconscious discourse containing the cause of desire as void, thereby making 
the living a substance of the other side of the Symbolic level.  This is a formulation 
                                                                                                                                                        
so distinctly as Virgil does to Dante in The Divine Comedy his conception of love as the omnipresent 
force in the universe.’ p. xiv.   
25 Brivic, Creator, p. 94.  
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of fantasy at the structural level.  Therefore, regardless of whether this discourse is 
represented (in)coherently, (ir)rationally, or in fragments or in an extended, finely 
contrived manner as in elaborate works of arts, customs, and cultures, the descriptive 
feature is not a fundamental criterion for fantasy.  The erotic beseeching melody in 
‘Proteus’ assumes precisely the structure of fantasy for it contains not love put in 
straightforward, positive terms, but circles negativity, a void in the form of a question.  
In Chapter nine of Ulysses, the theme of love appears in the interior monologue 
of Stephen inserted in the conversation in the library.26  It is significant that the word 
‘love’ is indicated directly only once here and followed by the contrived Latin lines 
extracted from Thomas Aquinas’ reflection on love—‘Love, yes. Word known to all 
men’ (U, 9.429-30).  In ‘Circe’, encountering the macabre figure of the mother’s 
spirit, Stephen, in this nightmarish scene, utters his question as if he is searching for 
an anchoring point resisting darkness, death, or nothingness.  Stephen says ‘eagerly’, 
‘Tell me the word, mother, if you know now. The word known to all men.’ (U, 15. 
4191-3).  It is crucial that, in the three instances, although love is repetitively 
claimed as ‘the word known to all,’ the clichéd idea of the universal word is 
                                                     
26 My interpretation relies heavily on the assertion of Gabler’s so-called ‘corrected edition.’ As Richard 
Ellmann points out, Gabler settles down the disputes regarding the interpretation of ‘the word known 
to all men,’ by recovering a passage omitted in the previous editions, but found in the manuscript. 
According to Ellmann, ‘[w]heather Joyce omitted it deliberately or not is still a matter of conjecture 
and debate. Gabler postulates an eyeskip from one ellipsis to another, leading to the omission of 
several lines—the longest omission in the book. These lines read in manuscript ‘Do you know what 
you are talking about? Love, yes. Word known to all men. Amor vero aliquid alicui bonum vult unde et 
ea quae concupiscimus.’ See ‘Preface’ in Ellmann (1986), p. xii.  
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represented in the Symbolic underside, in the form of erotic fantasy, interior 
monologue, meditation, or posited as a question in a nightmarish scene.  Love is 
supposed to signify the ideal, symbolic inter-subjective relation, as the founding 
principle underlying the Symbolic edifice.  However, in the textual instances 
mentioned above, love is revealed by its absence, manifested as a structural void.  
Almost as a dubious alibi, love, as the universal word known to all, is literally put into 
question, rather than put into genuine inter-subjective practice.  It appears more like 
a walking shadow than a positive regulation in the ethical domain of inter-subjective 
relations, tearing a hole in the fabric of text.  Love, in these textual moments, implies 
more negativity than a potent symbolic efficacy. 
In contrast to love in its negative face, in ‘Cyclops,’ Joyce intends to demonstrate 
how love might survive and triumph in adversity.  The pivotal passage runs as 
follows: 
But, it’s no use, says he. Force, hatred, history, all that. That’s not life for men and 
women, insult and hatred. And everybody knows that isn’t the very opposition of 
that that is really life  
What? Says Alf. 
--Love, says Bloom. I mean the opposite of hatred. […] 
--A new apostle to the gentiles, says the citizen. Universal love. 
--Well, says John Wyse. Isn’t that what we are told. Love your neighbor. 
--That chap? Says the citizen. Beggar my neighbor is his motto.  
(U, 12.1481-91) 
The biblical reference to the commandment of ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself’ 
and Saint Paul is vivid here but, partly, in degenerated form, with the referenced 
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elements portrayed as targets of derision.  It is arguable that the barflies are, to some 
extent, representatives of the attitudes and voices of Dubliners at the turn of the 
century.  However, splitting of opinions and quarrels among the group are evident.  
As it is shown in the passage, Bloom announces his mild liberalist humanism and 
appeals for love.  The Citizen brutally negates and mocks Bloom.  John Wyse 
weakly defends Bloom.  What we find here is not a duel between two clearly defined 
opposing parities but cacophonies and ironies.  In addition, the narrator’s comments 
are inserted with ironies, further complicating the issue of love.  In the ferment of 
conflicts and disputes, Bloom confronts his xenophobic adversaries and pronounces 
the task, the commandment of love, assuming the symbolic dignity and efficacy to the 
extent that he rejuvenates the sacred word of love facing corruption and derision. 
Bloom’s presence as a single human being and Bloom’s voicing of love in 
opposition to hatred are of utter importance in the sense that this is the episode in 
which Joyce uses Bloom as a vehicle to pronounce potently the ideal of universal love 
and hence attempts to secure the possibility of the ethics of neighbour love in the 
midst of ironies and parodies.  The ideal of universal love is expressed without really 
being accomplished in human action yet in this episode.  In the ensuing chapters of 
textual analysis, I will try to demonstrate how this ethics of love is actualised in the 
intersubjective relations and actions of major characters of Ulysses and in Joyce’s 
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artistic masterpiece.  Theoretically, it is crucial to point out the ideal of universal 
love will not be effectuated unless it is enacted upon one single human being through 
the work of neighbour love.  It is pivotal for a single subject like Bloom to contribute 
his singular love to fulfill the universal commandment of love.  Without the subject 
taking charge of his ethical responsibility of love, the commandment is nothing more 
than dead letters, linguistic monuments left in decay and derision, corrupted and 
mocked in the invectives of the drunken citizens of Dublin.   
Furthermore, the anonymous, parodic narrator of ‘Cyclops,’ after the dialogue 
given above, comments with a mocking voice, offering a passage of contemplation on 
love ending with God’s universal love.  The passage quoted above is one of the 
famous bewildering interpolations inserted into the realistic setting, dialogue, and 
action of the chapter of ‘Cyclops.’  As a chapter riddled with irony and parody, the 
authority, effect, and critical stance of the mocking narrative voice has long been a 
topic of debate.27  For instance, Phillip Herring held the opinion that ‘[i]t is clear that 
Joyce abhorred the ‘‘Citizen’s’’ political stance and recognized the nobility of the 
liberal humanitarian sentiments of Bloom. But all sociopolitical positions are 
                                                     
27 Phillip Herring, Joyce’s Ulysses: Note sheets in the British Museum (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 
1972). Vincent J. Cheng, Joyce, Race and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995). Emer Nolan, James 
Joyce and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1995). John Nash, ‘“Hanging over the bloody paper”: 
newspaper and imperialism in Ulysses’, in Howard J. Booth and Nigil Rigby (eds.), Modernism and 
Empire (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000), p. 175-88. Christine Van Boheemen-Saaf, Joyce, Derrida, 
Lacan, and the Trauma of History: Reading Narrative and Postcolonialism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1999). I will provide a thorough discussion of the issue on the narrative voice and effect of parody in 
the chapter on ‘Cyclops.’ 
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indiscriminately undercut by Joyce’s use of exaggeration (“gigantism” is the 
technique here) and irony […] it is impossible in this episode to take anything 
seriously.’28  I hesitate to conclude so categorically that Joycean parody leads merely 
to mockery, playfulness, and an utterly skeptical attitude, excluding any potential for 
progressive politics.  On the contrary, I would like to propose an alternative critical 
avenue by investigating the effect of parodied interpolation from the perspective of 
libidinal economy.29  I will demonstrate in the latter part of the discussion how an 
inquiry into the libidinal economy of Joyce’s linguistic and literary practices saves 
Joyce’s text from this skeptical viewpoint and helps us explore the progressive 
political agenda and ethical action in Joyce’s writing.  
 
 
II.  
The task of evaluating the extent to which Joyce’s project in Ulysses is ethical 
warrants a critical exploration of how we define and articulate the term ethical.  
Further, the intervention into the current ethical debates has ventured into the points 
of convergence and difference between clinical ethics and ethics in the history of 
philosophy.  The case made here, as the theoretical exposition proceeds, is that 
                                                     
28 Herring, p. 14  
29 An extended, detailed account of the irony and parody in terms of linguistic libidinal economy will 
be provided in the chapter on ‘Cyclops.’ 
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psychoanalysis has no problem in siding with the Socratic inquiry regarding how one 
should live a life in the tradition of ethics.  Socrates’ concerns with ‘know thyself’ 
and ‘how one should live a life’ have preoccupied humans’ minds long before 
hysterical patients sat on Freud’s couch.  The psychoanalytic approach is compatible 
with Socratic investigation but subjects the old queries to radical redefinition by 
introducing the notion of the Unconscious.  Clinical investigation involves engaging 
intensively with the patient’s fervent passion and troubled symptoms.  A patient’s 
entangled psychological conflicts inevitably lead to a subtler and more complicated 
picture of de-centred subjectivity rather than a picture of a simple combination of two 
minds, i.e. the conscious and unconscious.  This inherent subject-splitting and 
internal alienness is built into the human psychic structure, rendering the two-mind 
model untenable.  Consequently, this new perspective endows ethics with the 
dimension of the Real that is lacking in Aristotelian ethics of the Ideal and of the 
master.  
Lacan’s ethics of psychoanalysis arises from the clinical point of view.  
Psychoanalysis should be faithful to its theorisation of a de-centred subjectivity and 
therapeutic goal.  Clinical ethics outlines how a human subject endeavours to avoid 
insanity, to tackle troubling symptoms and thus acquires mental equilibrium through 
therapeutic action and creativity.  Fascinated and inspired by Joyce’s work and the 
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underlying subjectivity implied in his literary achievement, Lacan in the later stage of 
his career, finds with astonishment and admiration that Joyce achieves the best of 
what psychoanalysis can offer—namely, a subject stripped of the oppressed Other, a 
subject who invents his own symbolisms and symptoms by way of his sinthomatic 
writings. 30  ‘Sinthome,’ Lacan’s neologism for symptoms, refers to a way of 
organising one’s enjoyment, when he/she actively assumes a new subjectivity.  
Lacan devoted his Seminar XXIII to this complex concept, which literally modified 
his theorisation of the ethical goal of psychoanalysis.  
The fundamental question, posed in a rather condensed way, in the current 
project is ‘In what sense is sinthome ethical?’  If with the writing of his oeuvre, 
Joyce writes his own name, becomes/constitutes his sinthome, in what sense can 
sinthome be claimed as an extended, creative ethical act, an ethical act accomplished 
through the laborious artistic enterprise?  To answer this question, it is necessary to 
review Lacan’s conceptualisation of clinical ethics in the different phases of his career.  
I shall critically review Lacan’s conceptualisation of the ethical model at different 
stages of his career, roughly sketched in four major themes: (1) the ethical paradigm 
                                                     
30 Long before he devoted Seminar XXIII to Joyce, Lacan had already discerned the peculiarity in 
Joyce’s writings and expressed high praise. In ‘Lituraterre’, Lacan claims that ‘[f]rom the wordplay that 
we are calling, he [Joyce] would gained nothing from it because he went straightaway, with this a 
letter, a litter, to the best thing that one can expect at the end of psychoanalysis.’ The original French 
text is as follows, ‘Au jeu nous évoquons, il n’y eût rien gagné, puisqu’il allait tout droit, avec cet a 
lettre, a litter, tout droit au mieux de ce que l’on peut attendre de la psychanalyse à sa fin’ (XXVIII, 
113). I follow Cormac Gallagher’s translation here.  
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of pure desire as in the example of Antigone; (2) the psychoanalytic act and the 
traversal of fantasy; (3) the Not-All logic of the Other and sexuation informed by set 
theory; and (4) the topological thinking, the Names of the Father, and the notion of 
sinthome.   
As the title of this chapter indicates, ‘self-naming’ and ‘love’ lie at the heart of 
my approach to unravelling the ethics of subaltern subjectivity.  Strictly speaking, 
these two pivotal concepts are not directly or fully developed in Lacan’s works.  
However, the Lacanian position is that the exploration for ethics of subaltern 
subjectivity in Joyce’s writing can be enriched and deepened with an extended 
elaboration on self-naming along with/through the conceptualisation of the singular 
universal and interrogation of the issue of love and its relation with the ethical act and 
sinthome.  Self-naming and the postulation and constitution of the singular universal 
are intricately correlated to the functioning of sinthome.  Further, while the notion of 
love itself is subject to clarification and definition, it functions as an indicator or 
testing ground for the ethical efficacy of sinthome in the self-Other relationship. 
By now, owing to the fruits of generations of work at the intersection between 
philosophy and psychoanalysis, the fact that psychoanalysis, since the time of its 
founder Freud, never shies away from Eros is commonplace.31  The concept of libido 
                                                     
31 For a detailed account of the connection between libido and Eros, please see Jonathan Lear, Love 
and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale UP, 
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in the economic context and the emphasis on sexuality keep psychoanalysis in line 
with classical philosophy.  However, love, rather than Eros and sexuality, remains 
problematic in psychoanalysis.  First, the word love is used with tremendous 
ambiguity to denote and connote the romantic emotion in general or things pertaining 
to passion, drive, sexuality, and so on.  Lacan himself equivocates sometimes, using 
these terms as synonyms.32  Secondly, when devoted to theoretical conceptualisation, 
Lacan elaborates on narcissistic love and love in transference.  He talks of love and 
hate while referring to the dialectic of self-other manifested in identification and 
aggression, in the mechanism of projection at the level of the imaginary.33  In a 
similar vein, love in transference aims at the functioning of emotional attachment and 
melodrama produced within the framework of fantasy and provoked to reappear in the 
analytic scene.  The two instances mentioned above have received relatively clear 
theorisation and will not be the investigated in the present project.  Therefore, in 
contrast to the well-trodden path, I will try to focus on the moment when love 
manifests itself ethically, when it appears to be truly worthy of the name apart from 
                                                                                                                                                        
1999).  
32 The references are countless. An example is the famous tale of ‘a parakeet that was in love with 
Picasso.’  To make explicit my point, I quote Lacan here to show that the word love is used to refer to 
amorous feeling for someone through the obsession with the dimension of the Imaginary, namely, 
Picasso’s clothes.  According to Lacan, ‘How could one tell a parakeet was in love with Picasso. From 
the way the parakeet nibbled the collar of his shirts and the flaps of his jacket. Indeed, the parakeet 
was in love with what is essential of man, namely his attire […] Clothes promise debauchery […] when 
one takes them off.’ (XX, 6).  
33 For example, In Seminar XX, Lacan invents a neologism ‘hainamoration’ by combining hate and 
love in French, to replace the ‘bastardized one of ‘‘ambivalence’” to describe the interwoven 
phenomenon of aggressiveness and narcissism (XX, 90-1).  
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being entangled with and shackled in other mechanisms, such as projection and 
transference.   
Moreover, insinuation, ellipsis, aphorism, and, sometimes, enigmatic, dense 
qualification seem to be part of Lacan’s strategy of articulating love.  Love seems to 
be ubiquitous in the background since psychoanalysis, after all, addresses the 
subject’s emotional melodrama.  However, the elaboration of love looms sparsely, 
and is arranged in parenthetical manner or by way of indirect approach through 
literature.  Given Lacan’s deliberately peculiar approach to love, some might 
consider that an attempt for a thorough theorisation of love in Lacan risks stepping 
into a blatant trap that should be avoided at all costs.  For instance, following 
Lacan’s attitude to the letter, Jean Allouch argues that ‘Lacan was very careful not to 
produce a theory of love. This abstention is thus a part, almost one of the essential 
traits, of Lacan Love.’34  The strange, awkward, grammatically irregular notion of 
‘Lacan love’ is Allouch’s strategic neologism, designed to avoid a term such as 
Lacanian love or Lacanian theory of love.  He deploys it cautiously, as he states, ‘we 
shall speak of an ‘‘approach’’ to love, rather than ‘‘theory’’ of love: with regard to love, 
Lacan referred not so much to theory or doctrine as to poetry, myth.’35  I do not 
intend to contest the validity of the argument per se.  Instead, I fully acknowledge 
                                                     
34 Jean Allouch, Lacan Love: Melbourne Seminars and Other Works (Ourimbah, NSW: Bookbound 
Publishing, 2007), p. 81. 
35 Ibid., p. 82. 
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and endorse Lacan’s motivation to avoid a theorisation of love.  Nevertheless, with 
all due respect to Lacan and Allouch’s deliberate, elliptical approach, I would like to 
question whether imitating the master’s method/gesture is the only way to be faithful 
to his spirit or whether there is an alternative to supplement what the master has left 
blank or developed through insinuation by using a different approach whilst still 
remaining true to his inspiration.  The pronounced lack of theories on love may be 
seen as an illustration of Lacan’s anti-philosophical stance in his attempt to create an 
explicit incompleteness in the structure of the subject and the concomitant theoretical 
system.  In sharp contrast, my stance at this juncture is that Lacan’s so-called 
insinuation in approaching love does not result from the impossibility of theorising 
love.  Instead of being a fixed and clearly defined category of the structure, as will 
be shown later in detail, the reason for this ellipsis is structural because love is 
situated at the opening of the structure, and is also the fissure in the theoretical system.  
In precise and dynamic terms, love procures the restructuring momentum of the 
structure of subjective and intersubjective relations at the most fundamental level.  
Therefore, I firmly hold that the possibility of formulating the issue of love by 
means of an approach other than the anti-philosophical fragmentary method.  By 
taking into consideration the essential role that love plays in ethics, instead of 
shunning a systematic method, I propose to present a theoretical formulation of love 
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by working from a Lacanian foundation, marking out the place that has been encircled 
by the theorisation of subjectivity, ethics, desire, sexuality, and so on.  From a 
Lacanian perspective, I aim to systematically foreground the space for love.  Love 
and the ethical act designate the restructuring moment of subjectivity at its most 
fundamental level, which is a limit experience36 with radical impact.  I endeavour to 
determine the place of love in the intersection between love and sexuality, between 
subjectivity and the ethical act, between the act and love, and between love and 
sinthome.  My position is that love really happens and love constitutes the most 
life-enhancing, direction-altering, world-reshaping, subjective-transforming, and 
ethically illuminating moments for the human being. 
 
III. 
In Seminar VII, Lacan proposes an aestheticization of ethics.  However, this 
aestheticization should not cause us to take ethics merely as a literary metaphor or a 
fortunate contingent instance.  Rather, it should be emphasised that aesthetic ethics is 
the ethics par excellence.  In his later theorisation of Joyce’s writing in terms of 
sinthome, Lacan revisited, further developing, revising, and radicalising, this 
conception of aesthetic ethics.  It is my claim in this study that Joyce’s work 
                                                     
36 I deliberately use the irregular term of ‘limit experience’ here to denote that it is a cutting-edge 
experience of venturing on borders and of potential restructuration. 
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constitutes a prolonged literary act as an ethical act for subjective transformation and 
cultural revolution.  In the Ethics Seminar, Lacan uses the tragic heroine Antigone as 
a model for the ethics of psychoanalysis.  This reference to tragedy is essential 
because Lacan holds that ‘tragedy is in the forefront of our experiences as analysts’ 
(VII, 243).  He claims, ‘the ethics of psychoanalysis has nothing to do with’ the 
‘prescription’ or ‘regulation’ of ‘the service of goods,’ but rather, ‘ethics implies the 
dimension that is expressed in what we call the tragic sense of life’ (VII, 313).  
Previously, by evaluating Aristotelian ethics and utilitarianism, Lacan has explored 
the functioning of the first barrier of the good that regulates a subject’s enjoyment,37 
which is capable of holding the subject back in the face of ‘the unspeakable field of 
radical desire that is the field of absolute destruction’ (VII, 216).  He then turns to the 
second barrier of the beautiful in warding off the threatening, engulfing Real, which is 
a barrier that only ‘gets closer’ to the danger bordering on the limit (VII, 217).  
Lacan adamantly confronts Hegel’s classic interpretation of Antigone as a drama 
of conflict between contesting discourses (VII, 249-50).38  Hegel sees the collision 
                                                     
37 ‘Enjoyment’ is absolutely involved with libido in psychonanalytic discourses. According to my 
reading experience of Lacanian texts, ‘enjoyment’ is equivalent to the French word, ‘jouissance’. Both 
terms are used interchangeably without much significant distinction. The choice of either term is 
subject to the author’s whim in writing. The legal connotation of ‘jouissance’ is well known and 
emphasized by Lacanians. In Seminar XX, Lacan devotes his first lesson to this topic. He says, ‘[L]aw 
basically talks about […] jouissance’ (XX, 2). That is, law is fundamentally involved with the 
management of enjoyment. In my dissertation, I will preserve this legal connotation of jouissance and 
further investigate its relation to libidinal economy. I will use these two words, enjoyment and 
jouissance interchangeably.  
38 As Lacan points out, Hegel reads Antigone as a conflict of discourses which later reaches a certain 
form of reconciliation. Lacan refutes this notion of reconciliation categorically because as a daughter 
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between Creon and Antigone as a confrontation between the law of the state, interest 
of the common good, right of the public, and the principle of the family, right of the 
private, and sacred right of the dead for a proper funeral.  However, Goethe points 
out that Creon does not present a right, but rather a wrong stance, as implied by the 
excess in Creon’s action and desire.  On the surface, Creon acts as if he is defending 
the law of the state by protecting the rights of the loyal against the traitors, the 
violators of the well-being of the city-state, supporting the common good.  However, 
actually, Creon ‘deviates from the straight path […] in striking at Polynices beyond 
limits within which he has the right to strike’ (VII, 254).  According to Lacan, ‘[h]e 
(Creon) in fact, wants to inflict on him that second death that he has no right to inflict 
on him […] and he thus rushes by himself to his own destruction’ (VII, 254).  The 
battle has been fought and the threat to the safety and welfare of the state is no longer 
there.  Killing a man twice is of no practical benefit—it does not make any physical 
difference to human mortality but reveals a blatant cruelty rather than authority.  In 
other words, the mistake or tragic error actually lies on the part of Creon (VII, 258, 
277).39  With excessive desire and improper edicts as his, a leader becomes a tyrant.   
To resist tyranny, Antigone challenges this wrong with a passion, which is itself 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Oedipus, Antigone is part of a race of incestuous tragedy and pessimism. Lacan implies 
reconciliation is out of the question and artificially imposed.  
39 Lacan says, ‘[t]he mortal fruits that Creon harvest through his obstinacy and in his insane orders is 
his dead son he carries in his arms […] he has made a mistake’ (VII, 277). 
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unique and falls outside the boundary of the right of the family or that of the dead.  
Antigone herself is quite aware of her own motivation and justifies her defiance with 
the ethics of singularity.  Antigone denies categorically that she acts on behalf of the 
Gods or with the support of Zeus by pointing out that Creon makes a mistake by 
understanding her defiance as an outcome of the gods’ law imposed on the mortals.  
She finds her position ‘unassailable’ owing to a certain ‘unwritten’ law but ‘which is 
not developed in any signifying chain or in anything else’ (VII, 278).  To put it 
straightforwardly, two singularities emerge from Antigone’s defiance.  Antigone 
insists on burying her brother out of her singular love for Polynices and his own 
singular being.  This singularity of Polynices is an indestructible being apart from 
the particularities of his deeds once done or of the traits he once bore.  The 
singularity of Polynices is worthy to be defended and acknowledged at all cost.  The 
singularity of Polynices is expressed in Antiogne’s insistence on tautology.  
Antigone’s position is laid bare as follows: my brother may be what you said he is, 
but to me ‘my brother is my brother’ (VII, 278).  Antigone goes so far as to 
emphasize Polynices’ irreplaceable quality by comparing the replaceable status of 
husband and children.  Regardless of what he is and what he has done in history and 
to his society, Polynices, as a linguistic creature on earth, bears a unique singular 
being.  Lacan’s theorisation of human subjectivity centres on the notion of the 
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subject as a speaking being and linguistic creature.  It should be noted that while 
animals are capable of communication through signs and codes, humans are 
distinguished from the animal kingdom by their capacity to signify, i.e. to use 
signifiers apart from codes and signs.  It is well-known that Lacan proposes the 
theory that the unconscious is structured like a language, which is composed not of set 
of codes or signs, but of a chain or system of signifiers.  The effect of signifiers and 
signification plays an essential role in the constitution of human subjectivity.  In 
other words, a human subject, as a linguistic being, is the product of language with 
his/her own unique organisation of jouissance, which is irreducible and irreplaceable.  
For this very reason, his corpse cannot be left unburied as that of an animal in the 
field without his humanity being properly acknowledged and honoured.  The 
singularity of being originates from somewhere beyond language, beyond 
symbolisation.  However, at the same time, singularity pointing to something beyond 
language is itself born with the advent of language.  In the animal realm lie only 
instincts and mortality but not the drive dimension, which comes into existence owing 
to the mark left by signifiers, the punctuation upon human subjectivity left with the 
subject’s acquisition of language.  Lacan points out, ‘[t]hat purity, that separation of 
being from the characteristics of the historical drama he has lived through, is precisely 
the limit or the ex nihilo to which Antigone is attached;’ the singularity of being ‘is 
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nothing more than the break that the very presence of language inaugurates in the life 
of man’ (VII, 279).  In the later investigation of the relationship between Joyce’s 
subjectivity and writing through the concept of sinthome, Lacan demonstrates how the 
singularity of Joyce is (re-)constructed by means of a revolutionary writing, deployed 
through a new relationship with language in Joyce’s ambition for the liquidation of 
the English language and for gaining recognition as a giant figure in world literature.  
The point of singularity and aesthetic ethics in Joyce’s case will be further explored in 
the final section of this chapter and the textual analysis of Ulysses.  
For the time being, let us dwell on the ethics of singularity in Antigone.  
Antigone’s singular love towards the singularity of her brother endows her with a 
savage character, rendering her in ‘the unshakable, unyielding position’ in which she 
is fixed (VII, 279).  Paradoxically, that inflexibility of Antigone’s position is the 
source from which the splendour of her beauty derived.  On the one hand, as a 
punishment for her insistence on a proper funeral for Polynices, Antigone is ordered 
to be buried alive in a tomb, while on the other hand, she embodies structurally the 
place between two deaths, a zone of limit, a place on the other side of the border of 
normal/normative humanity, that of Atè.  In Lacan’s words, ‘Antigone perpetuates, 
eternalizes, immortalizes that Atè’ (VII, 283).  What we encounter at the centre of the 
tragedy is ‘the fascinating image of Antigone herself;’ ‘Antigone in her unbearable 
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splendor’ which ‘attracts us and startles us, in the sense of intimidates us; this terrible, 
self-willed victim disturbs us’ (VII, 247).  The place between two deaths is a twilight 
zone carved out when one is either physically dead with his/her name and his/her 
symbolic value present or when, as in the case of Antigone, the subject has 
transgressed the social boundary sanctioned and supported by the law of the state, 
stepping beyond the limit of the Symbolic domain prior to his/her physical death.  At 
the structural level, the space between two deaths is the register of the Real laid bare.  
Antigone embodies this limit zone and personifies pure desire, which is by definition 
stripped of any particular interests, secular concerns, and particularity of desires.  
She assumes desire in its pure state and form.  In this regard, the lamentation uttered 
by Antigone in the walled tomb, as she rebels against Creon to the point of sacrificing 
her own life without a flinch, is not an eclipse of her stance or courage but rather 
marks out her position even more conspicuously.  It is only when she is between two 
deaths and already on the other side of life that she begins to lament what she could 
have enjoyed: the secular joy of the conjugal bed and that of being a mother and so on.  
It is not a nostalgia for what she used to enjoy but what she could have enjoyed but 
was denied because of her stepping outside of the social, the Symbolic.   
At this point, we have the opportunity to evaluate an ethical paradigm which 
relies on the blinding effect of Antigone’s splendour.  Commentators hold 
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contradictory attitudes toward the efficacy of Antigone as an ethical paradigm for 
psychoanalysis.   
Lorenzo Chieza and Patrick Guyomard exemplify the negative evaluation of the 
paradigm offered by Antigone, and the concomitant conception of pure desire as an 
ethical model.  They both argue that this aesthetic ethic is simply a moment in 
Lacan’s long career that he would later distance himself from, or even reverse.  As 
Guyomard points out, in 1960, Lacan idealised Antigone, ‘in 1964, he held the reverse 
position.  He walked away completely from an idealization of Antigone, and that 
ideal she had represented for the analyst.’40  Guyomard defines the pure desire that 
Antigone embodies as a desire ‘that owes nothing to anything but itself,’ and hence 
‘not far from being the desire for death in its pure state’ actually ‘a madness.’41  
Guyomard associates pure desire with the desire for death and then links this desire 
for death to the death drive.  However, there is no point in equating physical death 
with the tendency to cause a break in the psychic structure, namely the death drive.  
To clarify this critical confusion and theoretical laxity dating back to Freud’s 
explanation of death drive, Lear offers a powerful critique.42  Lear’s point is that just 
                                                     
40 Patrick Guyomard, ‘Patrick Guyomard 2’ in Elain Hoffman Baruch and Lucienne Juliette Serrano 
(eds.), She Speaks, He Listens: Women on the French Analyst’s Couch (New York: Routledge, 1996),  
81-5 at p. 82. 
41 Ibid., p. 83. 
42 Jonathan Lear, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life. 
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as Aristotle introduces a teleological term of contemplation as the highest form of 
happiness to denote his ethics, Freud invents the enigmatic signifier termed as ‘death 
drive’ and thereby introduces a teleological viewpoint to the psychic tendency 
towards simple disruption and destruction of no purpose.  In spite of this theoretical 
laxity, Guyomard’s position has its own merits.  He argues that pure desire as the 
death drive in its pure state amounts to ‘pure repetition,’ which I understand as 
something similar to Freud’s concept of repetition compulsion, and hence, possibly 
leads to ‘the negative therapeutic reaction and finally the failure of analysis.’43  First, 
I argue that Antigone does not seek death for death’s sake but simply wants to grant 
her brother a proper funeral to honour his singularity as a human being who once 
lived on earth.  She does not seek to commit suicide on purpose; her death is simply 
an unfortunate outcome in the face of tyranny.  Secondly, I agree with Guyomard 
that her gesture constitutes a symbolic suicide par excellence, creating a manifestation 
of the death drive.  The splendour of Antigone blazes with the dark flames of the 
tragic, with a suicidal sense in the manifestation of the death drive.   
Chieza launches an even more powerful critique which nearly equates Antigone’s 
deed with an apotheosis of sadism.  As Chieza puts it, with reference to Artaud’s 
comments, ‘Antigone becomes her own name,’ ‘embody[ing] an antagonistic force 
                                                     
43 Guyomard, p. 83. 
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par excellence,’ ‘an antagonistic force of pure negativity, which we may well name 
‘‘death drive’” in contrary to society.44  Antigone’s defiant victory is described as 
‘cruelly ‘‘terrible’” in the spectacle of suffering, with a strong connotation of Artaud’s 
Theatre of Cruelty.  The total separation from the Symbolic identity leads us to a 
‘loss of reality,’ in other words, ‘subjective destitution,’45 which finds expression in 
Artaud’s Theater of Cruelty in various forms of existential catastrophe and horrified 
anguish.  In Chieza’s opinion, ‘Antigone does not cede on her suicidal demand to 
bury Polynices because this is the only way in which she can make desire appear in 
showing the void of pure desire through her splendor, she “saves” desire from Creon’s 
strictly totalitarian attempt to obliterate the ‘Real-of-the Symbolic’.46  At this stage, 
Lacan’s aesthetic ethics is ‘an ontological ethics, an ethics of the preservation of being 
as the void of the Symbolic.’47   
Moreover, Chieza is unsatisfied with this model of pure desire.  According to 
Chieza, Lacan himself identities the negative side of subjective destitution with the 
‘opposite but inextricable deadlock of separation: tragedy and Buddhism.’48  Chieza 
resorts to Lacan’s later insights of the traversal of fantasy and sinthome to explicate 
                                                     
44 Lorenzo Chieza, ‘Lacan with Artaud’, in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), Lacan: The Silent Partner (Verso: London, 
2006), 336-64 at p. 334-5. 
45 Ibid., p. 344-5. 
46 Lorenzo Chieza, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan (MIT Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 2007), p. 178. 
47 Ibid., p. 279. 
48 Chieza, Lacan with Artaud, p. 345. 
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the negative side of the paradigm of pure desire, ending up in subjective destitution.  
The subtlety of this insight is highlighted by the following long quotation:   
More specifically, separation qua first stage of the traversal of the fundamental fantasy 
($<>a) should literally be considered as the detachment of the symbolic (barred) subject 
from the imaginary object of desire. The consequence of this is the emergence of the object 
(cause of desire)—objet petite a—in its real void, which can be led to complementarily 
opposite impasses; either the subject tragically identifies himself with the fundamental 
lack-of-being, his irreducible scission, precisely by overcoming all contingent alienations, 
thus losing the object, or the subject identifies himself with objet petite a, thus ‘turn[ing 
himself]into a mummy’; this nirvanization is by no means ascetic since it péreversely takes 
the void of the object for the Real of the Thing.49 
While subtly pointing out the danger of nirvanization and the subject’s  
mummy-like state, Chieza launches a strong claim.  Chieza’s stance is that Lacan 
does not have a full-fledged theory of the Real yet in Seminar VII, so the 
conceptualisation of the ethical model at the end of psychoanalysis is overshadowed 
by this fact.  In this seminar, Lacan has not yet forsaken the idea of a mythical 
primordial Real as totality, which ‘necessarily entails a postulation of a correlative 
‘‘massive’’ jouissance.’ 50   Chieza’s states, ‘at this stage, Lacan has not yet 
completely overcome the (Sadean; Artaudian) idea that nature is One (differential, 
‘fermenting’) being that enjoys per se: this notion structurally contradicts all 
theoretical (and clinical) elaborations which presuppose the a priori of the barring of 
the Other and the logically concomitant reduction of Nature to the Not-One of the 
                                                     
49 Ibid., p. 345. I, of course, do not think this reference for nirvanization here would correctly interpret 
or exhaust the heavy concept of Nirvana in the Buddhist tradition. I understand Chieza’s reference to 
nirvana as embodying the state of void.  
50 Ibid., p. 352. 
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undead.’ 51   However, progressively, Lacan would come to acknowledge that 
‘“inherent’’ jouissance, in a radical sense is the only jouissance.’52  The concept of 
the Real in terms of a mystical natural force inevitably leads to the Sadean fantasy of 
massive enjoyment through absurd and endless erotic play.  From Chieza’s 
perspective, in the case of Antigone, the images of the corpse, foetus, and mummy 
signify precisely Antigone’s failure to return after crossing the limit, and her act is 
self-destructive.  Articulating from ‘the privileged position of sinthome,’53 Chieza 
re-interprets Lacan’s dictum, ‘do not give up on your desire’ as after disengaging from 
the established symbolic Other, do not give up the dimension of the Other, the 
Symbolic function altogether.54   
Strikingly, Chieza goes on to argue that the terrible beauty embodied by 
Antigone functions similarly to Sadean fantasy by glossing over the lack of the Other, 
providing a spectacle associated with massive jouissance of the primordial Real.55  
Chieza perspicuously points out that the blinding spectacle might function as the last 
barrier to the Real and hence cover up the void of the Other in the Sadean fantasy of 
                                                     
51 Ibid., p. 352. 
52 Ibid., p. 352. 
53 Chieza terms Lacan’s later position in Seminar XXIII as privileged because he thinks Lacan’s theory 
evolves gradually and reaches maturation in this later stage by acknowledging the Real of the Symbolic, 
the inherent jouissance of the Symbolic as the only real we have, fully assuming the dictum ‘There is 
no Other of the Other’. 
54 Ibid., p. 347. 
55 In Chieza’s words, ‘Seminar VII ultimately fails to elucidate the way in which the Lacanian ethics of 
‘‘pure’’ desire from the Sado-Kantian anti-ethics of ‘massive jouissance.’ Chieza, Subjectivity and 
Otherness, p. 177. 
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perversion for the reader of the tragedy.  I am in agreement with Chieza’s insight at 
this point.  In my opinion, it is not merely Sadean fantasy of perversion that has such 
a function of masking the lack of the Other.  The very function of every fantasy, 
including normal neurotic fantasy, is to cover the hiatus, the lack of the Other, to make 
the Other appear full, cogent, and competent.  I also agree with Chieza on the 
negative effect of mummification in the embodiment of the void during subjective 
destitution.  However, I would like to emphasize that Antigone is not a perverse 
figure nor a Sadean heroine.56  I therefore depart from Chieza’s negative evaluation 
on Antigone at this point; this distances Antigone’s position from the tragedy in 
Antigone.  The tragedy of Antigone is a sublime drama, inflamed by the dazzling 
splendour of its protagonist’s beauty.  It successfully presents the audience with an 
image larger than themselves of normal, law-abiding citizens, arousing pity and 
blinding the audience with this aesthetic effect as the last barrier against the 
nothingness of the Real.  The lack of the Other is thus disclosed and hinted by 
Antigone’s defiance as well as covered immediately by the sublime beauty as 
portrayed in the tragedy.  Furthermore, I argue that Antigone’s act differs crucially 
from Sadean fantasy, as the latter is commanded by the Other and, as Lacan contends, 
                                                     
56 Of course, Chieza does not say Antigone is perverse straightforwardly. He implies the perverse 
connotation through nirvanization.   
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Sade’s career is a prolonged courting of the law.57  The subjective position of 
Antigone is fundamentally different from that of the play and its effect on the 
audience.  Antigone does not have the emotion of pity and fear and simply provokes 
emotional purging in the audience.  As Zupančič points out, ‘while Antigone is a 
sublime figure, she is not by any means a subject who experiences the feeling of the 
sublime.’58 She does not observe her own death through the lens of fantasy, but ‘she 
enters, so to speak, into her fantasy.’59  I would also argue that Antigone’s act is not 
an enactment of fantasy, but an act stripped of fantasy, an abrupt and inevitable act 
without a subject.  Antigone does not perform an act within a preexistent 
unconscious fantasy; she simply identifies with his own act, disappearing into the 
very act, falling into the void, becoming objet a.  When the previous subjectivity 
comes undone, Antigone becomes a selfless subject.  In later sections of this chapter, 
I will offer a detailed account of this act of subjective destitution in terms of the 
traversal of fantasy and the subjectless act that ethically subjectifies the subjects in my 
discussion on the intersection between Lacan and Badiou.  In this regard, I contend 
that Antigone’s position is far from perverse and the spectacular beauty of Antigone 
does not constitute a fantasy.  I have devoted a long section on Antigone not merely 
                                                     
57 Lacan explicates the structure of Sadean fantasy with a diagram in ‘Kant with Sade.’ Ecrits. Trans. by 
Bruce Fink (London: Norton, 2006), 645-68. 
58 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, p. 253. 
59 Ibid., p. 253. 
46 
 
 
to elucidate an essential moment in Lacan’s long-term development of ethics but also 
to put emphasis on Antigone’s act and underscore its distance from the sublime art 
and the drama of Sadean perversion.  This distance prefigures my theoretical stance, 
thereby underlying my distance towards the practice of perversion later in my 
investigation of ‘Circe’ and the perverse drama presented in Nighttown in Dublin.  
In recent years, the evaluation of Antigone as the ethical paradigm of pure desire 
has provoked vehement debates, in which some critics interpret Lacan through their 
skepticism and critique of Žižek.  Žižek’s pronounced valorisation of radicality, 
negativity, and destructiveness in Antigone’s ‘No’ as an essential criterion for the 
ethical act has been severely criticised.  I offer several passages from Žižek in order 
to capture his critical stance.  Žižek states recurrently that an act is always ‘an act of 
annihilation, of wiping out—we don’t know what will come of it, its final outcome is 
ultimately even insignificant, strictly secondary in relation to the No! of the pure act’ 
(EYS, 44).  On another occasion, similar accounts appear—‘Antigone […] risks her 
entire social existence, defying the socio-symbolic power of the City embodied in […] 
Creon’, ‘[f]or Lacan, there is no act proper without the risk of such a ‘‘momentary 
suspension of the big Other;’’ an authentic act occurs only when the subject risks a 
gesture that is no longer ‘‘covered up’’ by the big Other’ (TS, 263-4).  In response to 
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this extremism, Yannis Stavrakakis accuses Žižek of ‘absolutisation’60 of the suicidal 
act of pure desire, which might lead to aporia or inertia in politics.  Žižek’s appraisal 
of Antigone’s act of pure desire in correlation with his notion of divine, ethical 
violence enormously restricts true ethical acts to nearly suicidal radical acts.  At the 
same time, he vehemently criticizes resistances in terms of pragmatic-strategic 
political actions as futile because they can be easily absorbed into the ideological 
hegemony and the established socio-symbolic framework.  This view led Critchley 
to portray Žižek as ‘a Slovenian Hamlet, utterly paralyzed but dreaming of an 
avenging violent act,’ ‘an absolute, cataclysmic revolutionary act of violence.’61 
Critchley therefore contends that Žižek has left us ‘in a fearful and fateful deadlock, 
both a transcendent-philosophical deadlock and a practical-political deadlock.’62  In 
addition to this critical appraisal of Žižek in terms of political efficacy, Russell Grigg 
challenges the very notion of an ethical act of pure desire as an absolute negativity 
itself from a clinical perspective.  He takes Antigone as a clinical case, diagnosing 
her drastic action as that of a hysterical woman, who acts not out of defiance towards 
the law per se, but ‘in conformity with her family destiny.’63 According to Grigg, 
                                                     
60 Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘The Lure if Antigone: Aporia of an Ethics of the Political’, in Geoff Boucher, 
Jason Glynos and Matthew Sharpe (eds.), Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Response to Slavoj Žižek 
(Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005), p. 180.  
61 Simon Critchley, ‘Violence Thoughts about Slavoj Žižek’, Naked Punch 11(2008), last accessed 1 
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through his ‘idealized view of desire,’ Žižek ‘overestimate[s]’ Antigone’s act.64  
Instead, he argues that ‘far from creating the absolute freedom to which Žižek refers,’ 
Antigone’s act of ‘both defiance and sacrifice’ is ‘initially ambiguous in its status’ and 
binds her to ‘her family destiny and paternal law.’65  She defies ‘the law of her city 
in the name of her (Oedipal) law’, and ‘her no-saying reveals an allegiance to the 
autochthonous law of the father that is the source of her motivation.’66  
In response to Grigg’s counterargument, Žižek points out that Lacan avoids 
psychoanalysing Antigone with ‘no mention of repression, of the formation of the 
unconscious, of incestuous desire’ in his reading of Antigone.67  Moreover, given 
that ‘the Oedipus family’ is ‘the incestuous family’ Lacan contended that ‘the Oedipus 
family, precisely was not Oedipal, and Oedipus did not suffer from the Oedipus 
complex.’68  In my opinion, Žižek is right in pointing out that Antigone acts not out 
of her being born into a peculiar family of incestuous bond, but rather out of her 
unique singular love in fidelity towards the singularity of the being of her brother.69  
The singularity is disregarded in Creon’s law, and Antigone’s act is ‘ex-timate’ in the 
sense it intervenes into the void, ‘the ‘‘symptomal torsion’’ of this [established] 
                                                     
64 Ibid., p 130, 131. 
65 Ibid., p. 129. 
66 Ibid., p. 129, 131.  
67 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Concesso Non Dato’, in Geoff Boucher, Jason Glynos and Matthew Sharpe (eds.), 
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network.’70 
Regarding the suicidal tendency and negativity that is strongly critiqued in his 
so-called extremism or absolutisation, Žižek highlights the structural role of 
negativity rather than the shades of destructiveness in Antigone’s act.  Žižek’s 
position can be summarised in two points: First, the ethical act exemplified by 
Antigone is structurally excessive in the sense that ‘it is only through an act that I 
effectively assume the big Other’s non-existence, that is, I enact the impossible: 
namely, what appears as the impossible within the co-ordinates of the existing 
socio-symbolic order’ (I, 80).  The act may appear negative, yet the symbolic 
consequence is profound—‘only such an ‘‘impossible’’ gesture of pure expenditure 
can change the very co-ordinates of what is strategically possible within a historical 
constellation.’ (I, 81).  Secondly, Antigone’s gesture is ‘not simply a pure desire for 
death—had it been so, she could have directly killed herself and spared the people 
around her all the fuss.  Hers was not a pure symbolic striving for death, but an 
unconditional insistence on a particular symbolic ritual’ (I, 81).  In a more recent 
account on Antigone, it is no longer the pure negativity of the Real that is recurrently 
highlighted by Žižek, but that of ‘the pure signifier’ is (LN, 84).  In her insistence on 
the proper burial of her brother, ‘Antigone does not stand for some extra-symbolic 
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realm but for the pure signifier—her ‘‘purity’’ is that of a signifier.  Hence, although 
her act is suicidal, the stakes are symbolic’ (LN, 84).   
I generally endorse Žižek’s defence but would like to point out the stakes are 
high when he re-imports the pure signifier into his much-avowed emphasis of pure 
desire in terms of negativity.  That is, at the limit-experience of between two deaths, 
a master signifier is introduced which encapsulates Antigone’s very singular being 
and functions as the source of her ethical act.  In this regard, an ethical paradigm 
based on the Real of pure desire no longer stands because the act is ‘contaminated’ 
with the ‘impure’ signifier.  It seems that another dimension, the Symbolic 
dimension of ethical act, is re-introduced.  I would like to cite a passage near the end 
of Seminar XI to present my stance on the debate here.  After proposing the idea of 
the traversal of fantasy earlier, Lacan concludes this Seminar with remarks in 
reference to the analyst’s desire: 
This crossing of the plane of identification is possible. Anyone who has lived 
through the analytic experience with me to the end of the training analysis knows 
that what I am saying is true […] after the mapping of the subject in relation to the a, 
the experience of the fundamental phantasy becomes the drive (XI, 273). 
The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a 
desire which intervenes when, confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, 
for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it. There only may limitless love 
emerge, because it is outside the limits of law, where alone it may live (XI, 276) 
The fact that Lacan states the analyst’s desire is not pure desire implies his 
abandonment of his previous position where he posited pure desire as an ethical 
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paradigm, thereby shifting his emphasis from desire to drive.  Indeed, given the 
inherent complicity between desire and law, Lacan seems to move away from his 
praise of Antigone’s transgressive act in terms of pure desire to a more confined 
understanding of desire in differentiation from the drive in the later periods.  This 
stance has made some critics judge Antigone’s act and the notion of pure desire to be 
surpassed by Lacan himself.71  Ed Pluth interprets the passage cited above even more 
radically—the concept of subject as void is rather untenable, and at the most 
fundamental level, the subject is always an effect of the signifier.  Pluth’s position is 
implied in the following rhetorical question: ‘[w]hat crossing the plane of 
identification, traversing of fantasy or an act amounts to is a return to an original 
position, one in which a subject is first subjected to a signifier.  Does this not also 
mean to the moment at which a subject is first produced by a signifier?’72  In sum, 
Pluth wants to give credit to Žižek’s distinction between ‘the subject as such’ and the 
‘‘subjectivized’’ subject, the ‘subject subjected to a signifier;’ he also adds a nuance to 
it by emphasising that ‘the two are actually part of the same whole,’ something Žižek 
himself endorses but does not admit all the time.73  In light of this concept of the 
subject inherently being an effect of the signifier, Pluth argues that just as the subject 
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need not be conceived in terms of void, an ethical act does not need to be 
conceptualised in purely negative terms.  Instead, Pluth proposes that an ethical act 
can use signifiers in an alternative way without the presence of the Other as authority 
and law.74  An act transforms the subject as well as the Other by way of unleashing 
new signifiers into the world.  As Pluth puts it, ‘a subject in an act disjoins from the 
Other as a site of knowledge, as a subject-supposed-to-know, and joins itself to that 
which resists this Other, which means that it joins itself to a fundamentally ‘‘barred’’ 
or ‘‘split’’ Other, an Other incapable of providing recognition for meaning or 
identity.’75  In similar vein, Mari Ruti shares this critical attitude toward Žižek’s 
overemphasis on negativity of the ethical act as pure desire and subjective destitution, 
pointing out that Žižek ‘does not sufficiently distinguish between the symbolic order 
as a hegemonic structure and the signifier as a tool of resistance.’76  It is not by 
accident that both Ruti and Pluth turn to Badiou’s theory of truth-process in search for 
a more ‘positive’ account of an ethical act to counter the emphasis of negativity in 
Žižek’s reading.  I use the term ‘positive’ here not as a moral judgment but to mean 
the act’s involvement with positivization, with the usage of signifiers.  As Adrian 
Johnston observes, Žižek’s project, in alignment with the psychoanalytic act of 
working through, of traversing, designates the process from [psychoanalytic] act to 
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[revolutionary] event, while Badiou’s project sets out from [a breakthrough] event to 
[an ethical] act [of fidelity to the truth, in order to carry out the truth-procedures].77  
In this line of reasoning, sinthome, when read with Badiou, is regarded as an extended 
ethical act in its alternative usage of signifiers and innovative organisation of 
jouissance with new signifiers.78   
However, does Lacan’s passage in the last page of Seminar XI really cancel out 
his previous position on ethics entirely?  I think not.  While in normal functioning 
of subjectivization, the subject necessarily takes on identities and meanings 
guaranteed by the Other, at the moment of traversing fantasy, the subject strips off the 
previous identification, confronting the fundamental signifier that he/she has assumed.  
That is to say, the subject undergoes a limit/borderline experience and he/she becomes 
situated at the interstice between negativity and primary postivization, implying 
subjectivization between the Symbolic and the Real.  A minimal yet ‘absolute 
difference’ is introduced and acknowledged precisely by way of the analyst’s impure 
desire.  The subject dwells neither completely in the abyss nor does he/she cling to 
the master signifier or glue his/her being to the concomitant identities that he/she 
previously lived with.  Negativity may designate this crucial distance from previous 
postivization, subectivization, and identification.  The subject, indeed, undergoes 
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destitution when all the identities are crossed.  It is by going through such kind of 
traversal, the breakthrough moment of negativity, that a profound transformation and 
further invention of new master signifiers become possible.  In Lacan’s concept of 
the psychoanalytic act, ‘after passing through a “true act,” the subject emerges 
transformed, that this authentic gesture modifies the very configuration of 
subjectivity.’79  In this regard, the concepts of the subject as void and subjective 
destitution are not entirely unsustainable.  Meanwhile, the subject’s inherent 
involvement with the signifier, as a product of the signifier, can be subjected to 
renewal and new re-invention with this knowledge of the Real having experienced the 
traversal of fantasy.   
In conclusion, my position is that Antigone’s act does embody subjective 
destitution.  Her act manifests the disappearance of subjectivity once framed by a 
given Symbolic expression.  This indeed is a symbolic death, a death of the 
Symbolic together with the subject.  However, the disappearance of the subject, 
which is deadly, tragic, and suicidal in Seminar VII, harbours a truth that Lacan does 
not want to forsake entirely.  The subject’s identification of/through/with the Real act 
as a negativity carves out the space and momentum of negativity that Lacan would 
continue to explore in later work, for instance, through the notion of surplus 
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enjoyment or in his invention of the concept of objet a in the effort to capture the 
functioning of the Real.  Negativity, in this light, does not denote something bad but 
only presents the nothingness, the Real dimension, as radically different from 
representation, the Symbolic level.  Lacan might have abandoned the model of 
Antigone as the paradigm of ethics, but he does not altogether forsake negativity, to 
which the image of Antigone gives form.  I hold that in Seminar XI, articulating the 
paradigm of ethics, the psychoanalytic act within the parameter of the traversal of 
fantasy, Lacan neutralizes this negativity by stripping it of the tragic, suicidal, and 
deadly connotation, endowing the moment of pure negativity with a shade of 
emancipation, of breakthrough.  Later, in Seminar XXIII, when elaborating on 
sinthome, Lacan elaborates on this negativity, defining it only as a moment not as a 
destiny, as a necessary point with the topological thinking of unknotting and 
reknotting.  Unknotting is not an end in itself, but rather a presumed fundamental, 
structural, or logical moment.  In there is no unknotting without the consequent 
reknotting, every reknotting necessarily presupposes an unknotting.  It is true that 
Antigone does not return from the place between two deaths, but her act does make 
the void of the Other apparent, thereby carving out a space for the possibility of 
further political/ethical action.  If we articulate from Badiou’s concept of political 
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event and truth procedures,80 it is arguable that Antigone’s act, suicidal as it may 
appear, might well function as an event, which requires the later declaration of truth 
and work of fidelity to re-inscribe this act/event into the Symbolic dimension.  
Antigone’s work is half done and the truth remains untold.  As a consequence of the 
truth-procedure after the event, this re-inscription might lead to possible revolution of 
the Symbolic dimension itself.81  
 
 
IV. 
In addition to Antigone’s act and splendour as the tragic paradigm for an ethical 
act, Lacan in Seminar VII provides an alternative avenue for ethics, namely the 
imperative of neighbour love.82  These two paradigms may seem contradictory at the 
first sight, but are in fact the continuation of Lacan’s reflection on the ethics of the 
                                                     
80 Ethics and ontology have been the two major pillars of Alain Badiou’s theoretical project. Badiou’s 
ethical theorization centres largely on an extended exploration of the event, fidelity, truth procedures, 
and the concomitant subject of truth, which have figured pervasively in most of his works. For 
instance, please refer to Conditions, Trans by Steven Corcoran (New York: Contiuum, 2008), Ethics: An 
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57 
 
 
Real.  While Antigone posits an act regardless of the social interaction (her suicidal 
gesture of Symbolic death itself equals to a death of the Symbolic), neighbour love 
appears to be a commandment aiming at regulating the social interaction.  However, 
Lacan’s juxtaposition of these two paradigms in the same seminar is far from 
accidental.  On the one hand, Antigone exemplifies how a subject confronts her 
singularity, the strangeness within, and assumes her unwavering fidelity to it.  On the 
other hand, neighbour love deals with a subject’s responsibility in the face of the 
uncanny, strangeness in her neighbour.  Lacanian psychoanalysis holds firmly that 
the intersubjective framework is fundamentally inscribed into subjectivity because a 
human child is born into an intersubjective framework and his/her subjectivity is an 
effect of the signifier and intersubjective relations.  Neighbour love will both modify 
the intersubjective relations and transform the subjective structuring.  Lacanians, in 
recent years, have attempted to bring to the fore what Lacan hints at in Seminar VII, 
making great efforts to present neighbour love as an ethical paradigm in light of 
Lacan’s concept of the traversal of fantasy and his exploration of love in terms of the 
not-all logic.   
In the lecture on ‘the Paradox of Jouissance,’ Lacan first comments on the 
Freudian myth of the primal father in the lesson of ‘The Death of God’ and in the 
following lesson ‘Love of one’s neighbour,’ endorsing this biblical imperative.  It is 
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hardly by chance that the two lessons are adjacent for, paradoxically, Lacan seems to 
think that the commandment of neighbour love supplements the predicament of the 
death of the Father/God.  Divine love, the love of God is coupled with the love of 
one’s neighbour as a widely known principle in both Jewish and Christian doctrines.  
In Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism, Freud presents a story of the 
instalment of the law originating from the murder of the primal father.  Without 
hesitation, Lacan regards it a Freudian myth, dubbing it as ‘the only myth that the 
modern age was capable of,’ and ‘a myth of a time for which God is dead’ (VII, 
176-7).  The Freudian myth can be briefly recapitulated as follows: The Father of the 
primal horde has it all.  The father embodies complete jouissance without castration 
by way of enjoying all the women and denying the rest of men access to women.  
The band of brothers revolt against and murder the father.  However, instead of 
acquiring the desired, once-denied enjoyment, the brothers, out of love for the father 
and guilt for the crime, elevate the father to a prohibitive agency in his name.  The 
physical death of the father fails to displace the father’s function symbolically.  The 
father rules after his death more effectively and severely through his name.  The 
half-told truth83 in the Freudian myth is that the Father as a ‘structural operator’ (XVII, 
123), ‘the agent of castration’ (XVII, 124), represents the Symbolic founding gesture 
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of naming.  The entire myth of the primal father is but a fantasmatic sleight of hand 
to turn the impossibility of full jouissance into a prohibition (XVII, 123-5).  In 
Lacan’s words, ‘if for us God is dead, it is because he always has been dead and that’s 
what Freud says.  He has never been the father except in the mythology of the son, in 
that of the commandment which commands that he, the father, be loved […]’ (VII, 
177, emphasis added).  With the assistance of the diction developed by Lacan in later 
stages, the figure of the primal Father and his murder ‘in the mythology of the son’ is 
nothing more than the fundamental fantasy shared by those who had undergone 
castration successfully.84  Therefore, Lacan straightforwardly refutes the Nietzschean 
celebration of the demise of God and Dostoevosky’s notion in Brothers Karamazov 
that ‘if God is dead, everything is permitted,’ asserting that since God as the authority 
figure functions as the agency of prohibition, once God is dead, we are far from 
liberation, but ‘[n]othing is permitted anymore’ (XVII, 119-20).  
Lacan detects ‘a certain atheistic message in Christianity’ in the doctrine of the 
commandment to love God by way of loving one’s neighbour, advocating that ‘the 
pinnacle of psychoanalysis is well and truly atheism’ (VII, 178; XVII, 119).  Freud 
identifies the crisis of authority prevalent in modernity, while in the meantime 
salvages the patriarchal function.  His ‘patriarchal civility’ is a nostalgic gesture for a 
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60 
 
 
good father (VII, p. 177).  For Lacan, this nostalgia is certainly to be discarded, 
leading inevitably to an atheist view.  Authority, law, the Father, and God are nothing 
but names, representing the Symbolic function of naming and its tarrying with 
negative owing to the logic of not-all, whose operation is the proper domain of the 
Unconscious.  In Seminar XI, against the views of both Freud and Nietzsche, Lacan 
proclaims the definition of atheism tersely, ‘[f]or the true formula of atheism is not 
God is dead […] the true formula of atheism is God is unconscious’ (XI, 59, original 
emphasis).  Paradoxically, Lacan’s atheist formula, ‘God is unconscious,’ reveals the 
category of God is indispensible and structurally essential like the Unconscious itself 
in human subjectivity.  ‘The God hypothesis will persist’ (XX, 45), and the God issue 
remains one of Lacan’s major preoccupations throughout his career.85  Lacan’s 
tackling of God’s intricate relation with the functioning of authority/law/signifier in 
subjectivity and the Utnconscious from an atheist view is a persistent endeavour.  In 
the final stages of his career, he lays bare his position on this issue, arguing that God’s 
existence is not merely a product of cultural discourse, nor does it merely depend on 
the subject contingent choice to believe in God or not.86  Lacan states,  
It is evident that God exists, but not any more than you do! That doesn’t get us very 
far […]. What is it that really interests us in this ‘there exists,’ with respect to the 
                                                     
85 Just follow the indexes of each seminar, the category of God is amply recurrent and sometimes 
figures centrally in Lacan’s studies at different periods of his career. A famous example is seen in 
Seminar XX, where Lacan discusses God and its relevance to feminine jouissance (XX, 64-77).  
86 Kenneth Reinhard, ‘Toward a Political Theology of the Neighbor’, The Neighbor: Three Inquires in 
Political Theology (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 53, 73. 
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signifier? That is that there exists at least one for whom that business of castration 
doesn’t work, and it is because of this that what is called the Father has been 
invented. That’s why the Father exists at least as much as God, which is to say, not 
very much […]. Inasmuch as there exists one, it follows that all the others can 
function, that is with reference to this exception, to this ‘there exists.’87 
This passage presents an analytic interpretation of Freud’s myth, signalling that 
at the level of the signifier and hence the human unconscious, there exists at least one 
signifier situated at the exception, where the primal Father and God are structurally 
located.  What is situated at the exception is not submitted to the law of castration, 
and somehow becomes the agency for the instalment of law and regulation of 
jouissance.  God and the Father represent the general logic of legal functioning 
within the dialectic of exception and totality, which later Lacan would equate with the 
male logical formulation in sexuation in Seminar XX.  In recent years, scholars take 
seriously the joint issue of Christianity’s atheist message and the psychoanalytic 
atheist stance in elucidating neighbour love, the relation between law and love, and 
even the constitution of the singular universal.  Žižek is one of the most avowed 
contributors whose opinions are in consonance with this atheist view, especially in his 
works The Monstrosity of Christ and The Puppet and the Dwarf, claiming that this 
atheist stance captures the true spirit of Christianity.  Badiou takes Saint Paul as an 
ethical paradigm for truth from an atheist stance by calling Saint Paul’s example a 
fiction and ‘a fable’ (SP, 5).  Eric Santner and Kenneth Reinhard discuss several 
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figures in Judaism on the convergence of biopolitics and psychoanalysis without 
emphasising on atheism.  Instead, they are in line with a contemporary position 
advocating that a religious vision can function as a ground for our investigation into 
the political and ethical issues in our ‘postsecular’ era (N, p. 133).88  Here, I would 
like to emphasize that the reference to the engagement of atheist motifs in both 
Christianity and psychoanalysis in recent scholarly literature is less of an involvement 
with the aged-long debate of God’s (non)existence than an endeavour to think through 
the psychoanalytic stance that ‘God is unconscious.’  My critical stance is to 
investigate and unfold what it means for the subject to assume ethically, to confront 
actively the irreducible lack, and to take responsibility accordingly when the 
inconsistency of the Other is fully acknowledged. 
Freud, with his sympathetic Aristotelian concern with the good, stops short at his 
comments on the commandment of neighbour love.  In Civilization and Its 
Discontents, Freud states that the commandment imposes a challenging puzzle and 
lists various reasons against this biblical imperative.  In summary, Freud argues that 
‘owing to the scarcity of my love and fairness for my family and friends, I should not 
squander it to strangers simply because they inhabit earth;’  ‘Worse than this, the 
strangers might deserve my love;’  ‘Worse still, the strangers who happen to come by 
                                                     
88 Eric Santner, ‘Miracles Happen: Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Freud and the Matter of the Neighbor,’ The 
Neighbor: Three Inquires in Political Theology. (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2005), 76-133. The page 
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might be evil and carry pernicious intentions towards me and my community.’89  
Where Freud stops short, Lacan proposes his own way out.  He attempts to 
demonstrate how neighbour love supplements the death of God by unshackling and 
intervening in the entangled libidinal economy governed by law, the Father’s rule.  
Lacan’s argument centres on his interpretation of St Martin’s encounter with the 
beggar.  The fact that the beggar is naked probably reveals that he not merely intends 
to demand clothes to be covered and food to be fed but also requests that ‘Saint 
Martin either kill him or fuck him’ (VII, 186).  In other words, something 
‘fundamentally evil’ (VII, 186) is manifested in the confrontation with the neighbour.  
Further, the core of the problem is presented as follows, ‘what is more of a neighbor 
to me than this heart within which is that of my jouissance and which I don’t dare to 
go near?’ (VII, 186)  The overlapping of the perplexing, disturbing jouissance of 
oneself and the neighbour as a stranger blatantly marks out the fact that ‘[i]n any 
encounter there’s a big difference in meaning between the response of philanthropy 
and that of love’ (VII, 186).  While philanthropy and humanitarian help may function 
as a complacent, secure means to keep my neighbour at arm’s length, love is far more 
risky and radical in the subject’s encounter with his/her neighbours.  Neighbour love 
is truly ethical for it manages to open and to re-structure the space of the overlapping 
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zone of my jouissance and the foreign jouissance of my neighbour, and consequently 
reshape the intersubjective field in constituting a new neighbourhood.  This capacity 
of genuine openness to ‘the alterity, the uncanny strangeness of the Other’ and of 
myself functions precisely as ‘the very locus of a universality-in-becoming.’90 
In this section, my investigation will follow Lacan’s advancing of his 
theorisation of the Real in the years ensuing Seminar VII.  Indeed, it is the shifting 
conceptualization of the Real which ultimately leads to a new ethical paradigm.  The 
inscrutable, monstrous, yet persistent nature of the drive leads Lacan to encircle it in 
terms of the Thing (Das Ding) with emphasis on its apparent non-verbal, 
anti-signifying, recalcitrant character in Seminar VII.  As Chieza succinctly indicates, 
Lacan oscillates and equivocates at certain moments regarding the questions of the 
Primordial Real and the Real-of-the-Symbolic.91  Theoretical equivocations of this 
sort and Lacan’s later abandonment of pure desire as his ethical paradigm 92 
demonstrate that a full-fledged theory of the Real had not yet been forged at the 
moment of the Ethics Seminar.  Retrospectively, Lacan’s conceptualization of the 
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(Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2001), p.5. 
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Real is an on-going process, a work-in-progress that takes years of seminars to evolve 
and mature.  The Thing-like quality of the Real is later re-interpreted as disruptive 
and traumatic.  Borrowing from Aristotle, in Seminar XI, Lacan proposes the 
dichotomy between touché and automaton to represent the dichotomy between the 
Real and reality, which assumes a ‘dissymmetrical,’ ‘circular’ causality without 
‘reciprocity’ between the system and its ‘unassimilable’ factor (XI, 207, 253).  
According to Paul Verhaeghe, ‘the systematically determined chain of signifiers […] 
determines what cannot appear in the chain […].  From another point of view, this 
associative chain can only contain systematically determined series of signifiers, on 
the condition that there is a gap present in the chain itself.’93  The system of 
automaton and the emergence of the negativity of touché are mutually decided.  
Lacan argues that the encounter with the Real is always a ‘missed encounter’ (XI, 55) 
for the Real indicates precisely the trauma, the disruptive element emerging at the 
impasse, and the stumbling block where the system fails.  
With this causality in mind, what then is the Real?  This is probably an issue 
whose potentiality will never be exhausted because Lacan’s defines the Real in terms 
of negativity, of what is neither the Symbolic nor the Imaginary.  The effort to grasp 
and encircle the Real inevitably becomes an endless project.  Despite this, a brief 
                                                     
93 Paul Verhaeghe, Beyond Gender: From Subject to Drive (New York: Other Press, 2001), p. 77.  
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presentation of the Lacanian Real is still in order for further discussion.  How do we 
conceive the engendering process and functioning of the Real?  How do we 
articulate the theoretical moment prior to symbolization without looking back at the 
concept of the primordial Real, which as Chieza successfully argues is a 
Sado-Kantian fantasy?  In Seminar XI, when interpreting the origin of the drive, 
Lacan posits the intriguing myth of the lamella to emphasize on the unreal and 
shapeless character of the Real.  In Lacan’s own words, ‘this lamella, this organ, 
whose characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an organ […] is the 
libido’ ‘as pure life instinct,’ ‘immortal life,’ ‘irrepressible life,’ ‘indestructible life’ 
(XI, 197-8).  Libido is conceived by Lacan ‘as an organ, the inhuman-human 
‘undead’ organ without a body, the mythical presubjective ‘‘undead’’ life-substance’ 
as well as ‘the reminder of the life-substance which has escaped the symbolic 
colonization’ (N, 167).94  The object a is ‘merely its representatives, its figures.  
The breasts […] as an element characteristic of the mammiferous organization, the 
placenta for example […] certainly represents that part of himself that the individual 
loses at birth and which may serve to symbolize the most profound lost object’ (XI, 
198).  Lacan, with his myth of the presubjective lamella, seems to be arguing for a 
                                                     
94 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’, The Neighbor: Three 
Inquires in Political Theology (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2005), 134-90. Žižek likes to interpret objet 
a as organ without a body and even dedicates a whole book to this Lacanian concept of the Real in his 
critical engagement with Deleuze. Please see Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences 
(New York: Routledge, 2004).  
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material base for the Real.  This myth refers to a biological fact: while non-sexual 
reproduction implies the principle of eternal life, sexual reproduction implies death 
and ‘a primordial loss which precedes the loss involved in the chain of signifiers.’95 
In other words, there is a fundamental a priori incompatibility between the Real and 
the Symbolic.  With this myth, humans are situated at the same level of zoological 
classification of other sexually reproducing biological entities.  However, the 
Lacanian view holds firmly that human subjectivity and sexuality would never be the 
outcome of a smooth development through the process of maturation, but an 
after-effect of symbolization, a result of the interaction with the Other and the 
Unconscious.  That is to say, the autoerotic stimulation, genital sensation, of the 
human child takes on a traumatic connotation precisely because ‘from the perspective 
of given symbolic configurations,’ ‘jouissance is alien and unable to be named.’96  
While the instinct is animalistic in nature, the drive falls into the properly human 
domain.  Taking fetishism as a telling example, sexuality is intimately entangled 
with fantasy and drive.  Although sexuality is commonly associated with the 
beast-like qualities of mankind, it is actually the most humane one because the driven 
characteristics, through the detours of fantasy and artifice, in sexuality clearly 
distinguish humans from the rest of the animal kingdom from a psychoanalytic point 
                                                     
95 Verhaeghe, Beyond Gender, p. 81. 
96 Pluth, Signifiers and Acts, p. 77. 
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of view.   
The subject’s encounter with the alterity of the Other is a moment of pivotal 
importance.  The premature birth of a human child renders the child absolutely 
dependant on the adult caregivers, who feed the child’s needs with the accompanying 
introduction of enigmatic messages invested with their sexual desires.97  On the road 
to the construction of subjectivity and sexuality, Otherness is installed through the 
superimposition of two lacks, the subject’s lack and the lack of the Other.  Jean 
Laplanche interprets this superimposition of two lacks in the following 
words—‘internal alienness’ is ‘held in place by external alien-ness; external alien-ness 
[is], in turn, held in place by the enigmatic relation of the other to his own internal 
alien.’98  In Lacan’s words, ‘[a] lack is encountered by the subject in the Other;’ ‘[i]n 
the intervals of the discourse of the Other, there emerges […] something that is 
radically mappable, namely, He is saying this to me, but what does he want?’ (XI, 214)  
In the attempt to decipher the mysteries of the Other’s desire, the child resorts to 
incessant ‘whys’, i.e. ‘all the child’s whys reveal not so much an avidity for the reason 
of things, as a testing of the adult, a Why are you telling me this?’ (XI, 214)  Facing 
                                                     
97 As Jean Laplanche points out, ‘women unconsciously and sexually cathect the breast, which appear 
to be natural organ for lactation.’ The situation is ‘an encounter between an individual whose 
psycho-somatic structures are situated predominantly at the level of need, and signifiers emanating 
from an adult. Those signifiers pertain to the satisfaction of the child’s need […] and those other 
messages are sexual […] I refer to them as the sources objects of drives.’ New Foundations for 
Psychoanalysis, trans. David Macey (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 126, 130. 
98 Jean Laplanche, Essays on Otherness, ed. John Fletcher (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 80.  
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the profoundly ambiguous status of the Other’s desire, the subject gets agitated, 
‘ex-cited’ by these enigmatic signifiers, and embarks on the ‘never-ceasing work of 
symbolization and failure at symbolization, translation and failure of translations, that 
constitutes […] signifying stress’ (N, 91-2).  
The underlying mechanism for handling the signifying stress is the formation of 
fantasy in answering in the questions relating to Che Vuoi.99  In this light, fantasy can 
be viewed as the means for the organisation of jouissance or the process of 
metabolising the signifying stress, a construction based on the void, encircling the 
remainder at the fissures and failures of discourse.  In a single move, fantasy is a 
defensive manoeuvre to both avoid and contain the traumatic and disruptive Real.  
Lacan’s formula for fantasy is $<>a, read as the barred subject’s correlation to objet a, 
the gap and surplus of the discourse, the remainder and reminder of the Real.  The 
word ‘correlation’ is deliberately chosen to represent the fact that fantasy is not the 
product of imagination nor is it constructed by a transcendental subject or ego entity 
but rather is ‘the kernel of the subject’s being’ (EYS, 162, original emphasis).  
Subjectivity itself is constructed through fantasy; one’s fundamental fantasy is that of 
being par excellence.  Consequently, the subject’s encounter with his own fantasy 
                                                     
99 Lacan devises the graph of desire in order to explain the correlation between desire, signifier, voice, 
and fantasy formation with the question of Che Vuoi.  See ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the 
Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’, Ēcrits: A Selection, trans by Alan Sheridan (London: 
W.W. Norton, 1977), 292-325. 
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causes a disappearance of the (conscious) subject/ego.  Žižek describes this 
existential drama of subjective fading as follows: ‘[t]he subject can confront this 
extimate kernel [fantasy] only at the price of his temporary aphanisis’ (EYS, 162).100  
This process accurately describes the fact that the traversal of fantasy leads to the 
subject’s existential dissolution, subjective destitution.  By the end of Seminar XI, 
Lacan proposes the traversal of fundamental fantasy as his new ethical paragon for 
psychoanalysis.  Without the support of the subject supposed to know to guarantee 
the consistency of the Other and to maintain the fantasy framework in which the 
subject dwells, ‘the permanent liquidation of that deception,’ sustained by 
transference, is effected and the ‘crossing plane of identification is possible’ (XI, 267, 
273).  Lacan mentions a new formulation for the end of analysis, ‘after the mapping 
of the subject in relation to the a, the experience of the fundamental phantasy 
becomes the drive’ (XI, 273).  Instead of clinging to certain identities, the subject 
now comes to assume the nothingness of the drive, which opens the possibility of 
further identifying with his self-invented sinthome as his peculiar way of drive 
organisation.  After Seminar XI, Lacan continued his search for the model for 
subjectivity by/after the end of analysis.  Lacan, in the final stages of his career, 
                                                     
100 There is confusion in Žižek’s equivocation between the ego and the subject, as Pluth points out.  
Žižek uses the term subject ‘in traditional sense to refer to a conscious reflecting individual, and he 
also uses the term subject to refer to the fantasy itself: the fantasy is the truth if the subject, it is what 
the subject really is.’ Signifiers and Acts, p. 85. 
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inspired by Joyce, ventured into the extended account of the conceptualisation of 
sinthome. 
It is of vital importance to bear in mind that is the ‘radical ambiguity of objet 
petit a in Lacan, which stands simultaneously for the imaginary fantasmatic 
lure/screen and for that which this lure is obfuscating, for the void behind the lure’ (N, 
177).  Objet a thus represents (1) the object framed in fantasy as the matheme $<>a, 
and (2) the void, the nothingness of the Real stripped of the fantasy.  In other words, 
objet a signifies both the nothingness of the Real and the semblant disguising this 
nothingness.101  With this usage, in fantasy, the subject maintains a relation with 
objet a.  On traversing the fundamental fantasy, the subject equates objet a, the void, 
and the nothingness.  Fortunately, this ambiguity is not extremely difficult to clarify 
with a careful reading of the context.  When necessary, my own view will be 
supplied accordingly. 
At the collective, cultural level, fantasy functions to consolidate the rule of law 
and dominant ideology, including the inherent antagonism of society by holding its 
subjects in the fantasmatic thrall of superegoic enjoyment.  Later in this project, in 
the reading of ‘Cyclops,’ I will demonstrate how Joyce describes Dubliners of his 
time—they turned to various kinds of ludicrous fantasies, indulging in symptomatic 
                                                     
101 Lacan dedicates the entire Seminar XVIII: On the Discourse which is Not a Semblant to advance and 
theoretically clarify the issue on semblant.  
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nationalism for consolation when finding themselves beset by imperial invasion and 
humiliation and enduring continuous frustration within the Symbolic project of Irish 
Nationalism.  I will also argue how Joyce accomplishes his literary work by using 
the symptoms in the early twentieth century, laying bare the moments when objet a is 
encapsulated in or stripped off fantasy. 
By now, it should be clear that human subjectivity and sexuality are constructed 
through the correlated acquisition of language, installation of the Symbolic, and the 
organisation of jouissance.  The same structural mechanism applies to the institution 
of law in general.  In his extended study on Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben 
highlights the fact that the operation of power always works ‘at the intersection 
between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical’ levels.  According to 
Agamben, ‘the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if 
concealed—nucleus of sovereign power.  It can even be said that the production of a 
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.’102  Carl Schmitt’s 
works Political Theology (1922) and The Concept of the Political (1932) have 
become key references when examining the law at its origin and at the moment of the 
state of emergency.  Schmitt argues that the essence of the politics is centred on the 
distinction between the friend and enemy, and ‘the political enemy need not be 
                                                     
102 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans, Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998), p. 6. Original emphasis. 
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morally evil or aesthetically ugly’ nor does it need to be ‘an economic competitor.’103 
The demarcation between friend and enemy and the declaration of war against certain 
nations or groups of people therefore do not necessarily rely on necessity or logical 
reasoning but on the contingent decision by the God-like sovereign.  For Schmitt, the 
sovereign power implies that the modern politics of the state is a secularisation of 
theology.  The sovereign is a borderline concept functioning at the limit of law.  
Just as God performs miracles as a deviation from the law of nature, so the sovereign 
executes the power to suspend the law in the state of emergency (N, 14).   
The sovereign is positioned at the point of ‘inclusive exclusion,’ located in 
‘the zone of indistinction’ between the inside and outside of law because the 
sovereign’s rule ‘applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from 
it.’104  The normal functioning of positive law does not apply to chaos.  The locus 
of normal order and the condition for regulation are situated between law and chaos, 
where the sovereign is empowered to establish, sustain, or suspend a law.105  It is 
crucial to highlight that the sovereign’s decision to declare a state of emergency is not 
so much an expression of the capriciousness of the will of ‘a subject hierarchically 
superior to all,’ but rather a structural necessity of inscribing exteriority into the body 
                                                     
103 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 
1996), p 26-7.  
104 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 7, 6, 18. 
105 Ibid., p. 16. 
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of law ‘that animates and gives it meaning’ and consistency.106  At the structural 
level, there is something lawless at the limit and foundation of the law, which is 
epitomised by the inclusive exclusion of sovereignty.  In modern(ist) classic 
examples of this sort such as The Trial and The Castle, Kafka’s protagonist is thrown 
into the labyrinth of modern bureaucracy at the empirical level.  The character’s 
situation may be interpreted at the structural level as a confrontation with the law’s 
validity over its efficacy, an encounter with legality’s impotence in its obscene 
underside of superegoic enjoyment.  This is how a law appears to be ‘in force 
without significance.’107  In religious terms, in a well-known letter to his friend 
Walter Benjamin, Gershom Scholem interprets Kafka’s world as ‘a state in which 
revelation appears to be without meaning, in which it still asserts itself, in which it has 
validity but no significance […] even though it is reduced to the zero point of its own 
content.’108  In the state of emergency, the sovereign’s rule conspicuously reveals the 
excess of authority over efficacy and of validity over meaning. 
Furthermore, Agamben’s contribution resides largely in drawing out the 
topological localisation of the sovereign as well as in marking out its counterpart 
homo sacer in the parallel positioning of the structure.  In ancient Roman texts, 
                                                     
106 Ibid., p. 26. 
107 Ibid., p. 51. Original emphasis.  
108 Gershom Scholem, The Correspondence of Walther Benjamin, 1932-1940, trans. Gary Smith and 
Andre Lefevre (New York: Schocken, 1989), p. 142. 
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homo sacer is the figure who can be murdered without punishment and cannot be 
included as an object of sacrifice either.  Doubly excluded from the divine and 
secular law, homo sacer is thus doubly captured, presenting ‘the originary figure of 
life taken into the sovereign ban.’109  Both situated at the limit zone of indistinction 
between the inside and outside of law, the sovereign and homo sacer are two 
symmetrical figures.  The former is the actor of law in its pure form, pure ban; the 
latter embodies the bearer of this originary violence and the power of law.  However, 
this symmetry should be understood in structural terms.  That is, ‘the sovereign is the 
one with respect to whom all men are potentially hominess sacri, and homo sacer is 
the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.’110  Modernity marks an era 
in which biopolitics expands at the very origin of law, ranging from the extreme 
example of the concentration camp to the hedonistic ways of life in our contemporary 
permissive society. 111   Biopolitics becomes the rule and everybody potentially 
becomes homo sacer.  Precisely, ‘on the level of [symbolic] law, we are treated as 
citizens, legal subjects, while on the level of its obscene superego supplement, of this 
empty unconditional law, we are treated as Homo Sacer’ (WD, 32).  
On reading Agamben through a psychoanalytic lens, the biopolitical aspect 
                                                     
109 Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp. 82-3. 
110 Ibid., p. 84. 
111 Ibid., p. 119-89. Cases of modern biopolitics include disciplinary medical measures on sexuality 
and sanity studied by Foucault, the politicization of death in the case of overcoma, and so on. See also 
Žižek’s account on the permissive society in The Neighbor. 
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belongs to the domain of the drive and the law’s superegoic rule.  The sovereign 
occupies the same position of the primal father in the Freudian myth, the father who 
sets the limit of the law for the sons while exempting himself from stricture and 
restriction.  From the perspective of the sons, whilst subjected to the law and 
castration, the male subjects (sons) remain in awe of the Father and dream of 
becoming the exceptional sovereign figure, the Father, who enjoys complete 
jouissance.  To put it succinctly, the law reigns with its inherent transgression.  
In this regard, the superego in psychoanalysis does not represent the symbolic 
agency that interpellates our social identities and mandates.  Rather, the superego 
represents the surplus of ‘the signifying stress left over’ from symbolic interpellation 
(N, 103).  Fantasy is the ‘congealed excitation’ or idiosyncratic (dis)tortion of the 
drive formation which constitutes the thing-like strangeness of a being, i.e. ‘the matter 
or materiality at the heart of the neighbor’ (N, 104, original emphasis).  While 
negativity represents the nothingness of the Real, materiality points to the 
psychosomatic frontier, implying a creaturely density induced by the signifying stress, 
which is derived from exposure to the enigma of the Other’s desire, a meta-juridical 
dimension of the law.  Materiality marks the embodiment of peculiar drive 
organisation through the construction of fantasy in response to the ‘undeadening’112 
                                                     
112 Santner, Psychotheology, p. 43. 
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agitation of the signifying stress.  Materiality takes on the creaturely, inhuman, 
undead, thing-like uncanny quality, as it is built around the void of symbolic 
discourse.  Materiality points to the surplus in excess of meanings and positive traits 
or social identities, which are basically the signified effect of symbolization.113  
Inhumanity and undeadness actually describe the strangeness at the core of our being 
and that in the neighbor figure.  The negative prefixes, ‘in’ and ‘un’ indicate the 
monstrous dimension of the internal excess of subjectivity.114   
What we find indigestible or unbearable in our daily encounter with the 
neighbour is this monstrous Thing, the Other in his mode of irreducible singularity, 
which defies symbolization.  In this light, as a figure doubly excluded from secular 
and divine regulations and as an archetypal bearer of sovereign violence and power, 
homo sacer is reduced to the ‘zero-degree of social existence’ (N, 100) in the zone 
between two deaths.  Homo sacer literally becomes ‘the direct embodiment of 
signifying stress’ (N, 100).  I would like to highlight that, precisely because of this 
embodiment, homo sacer assumes the status of the neighbour at the core of 
jouissance.  The faceless presence of the Muselmann in the concentration camp is 
                                                     
113 In his study on the Jewish thinker Franz Rosenzweig, Santner explains the difference between 
personality and character. In Rosenzweig’s language, the former represents the positive traits or 
identities subjected to symbolic exchange and substitution following the logic of B=A; the latter 
denotes the metaethical dimension of the self, the excess of one’s peculiar drive density, which refuses 
substitution, following the logic of B=B. Ibid., p. 71-81. 
114 As Žižek puts it, ‘the “undead” are neither alive nor dead; they are the monstrous “living dead”’. 
The same goes for inhuman, ‘‘He is not human’’ is not the same as ‘‘he is inhuman.’’ He is not human 
means he is external to humanity […] while ‘‘he is inhuman’’ means […] he is marked by a terrifying 
excess’ (N, 159). 
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the emblematic figure of the neighbour reduced to homo sacer, exemplifying the 
subaltern in the most drastic condition.  Deprived of social identities, symbolic 
positions and human dignity, Muselmann gives expression to the terrifying 
inhumanity, uncanny materiality, and creaturely existence at the receiving end of 
sovereign power, at the originary limit of law.  Considering the faceless nature of the 
Muselmann and fully endorsing the psychoanalytic weight of the shapeless character 
of jouissance, Žižek strongly critiques the Levinasian ethical edifice based on the 
subject’s responsibility to the demand made from the Other’s face, which functions as 
an ultimate non-linguistic reference for human authenticity (N, 142-51).  From the 
vantage point of psychoanalysis,115 Levinas is far from radical because he fails to 
recognize that the face is always already ‘a fetish’, a fantasmatic lure, and a 
gentrification of ‘the raw reality of flesh’, a layer over of the terrifying excess of the 
Real (N, 146).  As Žižek points out, the survivor of the Shoah directly inhabits the 
abyss of catastrophe without a minimal safe distance to maintain the Symbolic 
                                                     
115 I would like to point out that not everyone holds that there is radical incompatibility between 
Levinas and Lacan. For instance, Critchley poses an alternative view. He takes into consideration that 
both Lacan and Levinas take seriously, in their ethical projects, the impact of the subject which the 
impossible demand the Other imposes. Critchley, therefore, provides a ‘psychoanalytically 
reconceived account of the Levinasian ethical subject’ and argues for a ‘homology between Lacan and 
Levinas.’ See ‘On the Ethics of Alain Badiou’, in Alain Badiou: Philosophy and Its Conditions (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 219. Regarding the critical discrepancy on the role played 
by the face, Ruti puts it as follows: ‘if the post-Levinasian ethics tends to emphasize the ethical call of 
the face, the post-Lacanian ethics tends to stress the terror-inducing strangeness of the face.’ Ruti, p. 
189. However, Ruti thinks that the post-Lacanian skepticism to Levinas is ‘partially mistaken’ and the 
Levinasian face is more than ‘an imaginary lure’ as Žižek points out. She cites Levinas to make her 
point. Levinas defines a face as ‘a being beyond all attributes’ and as ‘the very identity of being’, which 
‘manifests itself in it in terms of itself, without a concept’ (Qtd in Ruti, p. 191). In this light, the 
Levinasian face points towards singularity and the Real dimension beyond the Imaginary.   
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framework, which renders the Muselmann a tragic witness, one whose testimony is 
impossible to present in front of the Other in an effective Symbolic field (N, 161).  
To remedy this predicament, articulating from the Lacanian perspective, Žižek 
proposes acknowledging the fact that ‘there is no Other.’  Consequently, the ethical 
avenue out of this modern horror encapsulated in the concentration camp and 
embodied in the Muselmann moves from homo sacer to the neighbour (WD,  
112-34).  It is vital to release homo sacer from the limit zone of indistinction by 
reaching out to them in neighbour love.  
In Judeo-Christian tradition, what is ethical is the ‘obligation to endure the 
proximity of the Other in their ‘‘moments of jouissance,’’ the demonic and undying 
singularity.’116  Neighbour love is an ethical command that can be used to confront 
and disentangle the uncanny inhumanity in the Other, to unleash the congealed energy 
in fantasmatic schema at the subjective and intersubjective levels, and to convert this 
excess to life in a new way of being together.  According to Santner, the 
Judeo-Christian ethical project goes beyond the superego, aiming at ‘a deanimation of 
undeadness’117 and an ‘unplugging’ which need ‘not signify a radical break with 
social relations, with the rule of a community’s law’ but ‘a suspension of the undying, 
‘‘undead’’ supplement of the law: a ‘‘sabbatical’’ intrerruption not of work per se but 
                                                     
116 Santner, Psychotheology, p. 82. 
117 Ibid., p. 65. 
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of a surplus, fantasmatic labor at the core of the sovereign relation.’118   
In his famous essay, ‘On the Concept of History’, Walter Benjamin presents an 
allegory in which the puppet called historical materialism is to win the chess games 
only ‘if it enlists the service of theology.’119  The idea recurrently presented in 
Benjamin’s work is that theological service is the messianic motif in Judaism.  
Benjamin elaborates his understanding of messianism in his reading of Kafka, arguing 
that the hunchback, a cringe figure, will disappear ‘with the coming of Messiah, who 
(a great rabbi once said) will not wish to change the world by force but will merely 
make a slight adjustment in it.’120  What might this slight adjustment, this messianic 
gesture, mean?  Through a Lacanian lens, Santner creatively interprets the 
materiality of historical materialism in terms of the symptomatic cringe induced by 
the signifying stress.  He further argues that messianism works to intervene in the 
uncanny materiality, pointing out that, for Benjamin, ‘a miracle signals not the state of 
exception, but rather its suspension, an intervention into this peculiar topological 
knot—the outlaw dimension internal to law—that serves to sustain the symbolic 
function of sovereignty’ (N, 103).  How could a miracle work in Benjamin’s 
messianic thinking?  Both Santner and Agamben evoke the intelligibility or 
                                                     
118 Ibid., p. 64. 
119 Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, trans, Harry Zohn, in Walter Benjamin: Selected 
Writing, vol 4, 1938-40 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uinversity Press, 2003), p. 389. 
120 Walter Benjamin, ‘Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death’, Trans by Harry Zohn, in 
Selected Writing, vol 2, 1927-34 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uinversity Press, 2001), p. 811. 
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recognisability of revolutionary timing through Benjamin’s concept of the now time 
and the dialectical image.121  Benjamin’s famous passage deserves to be cited at full 
length, and later I will refer back to this fragment in commenting on the manifestation 
of neighbour love in Ulysses: 
Each now is the now of a particular knowability. In it, truth is charged to the bursting point 
with time […] It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present 
its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a 
flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is dialectic at a standstill, 
For while the relation of the present to the past is temporal, the relation of what has been to 
the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but imagistic.122 
Santner argues that the missed opportunity for revolutionary intervention or action for 
neighbour love might lead to collective symptoms such as the furious outburst of 
violence in the Kristallnacht programmes. 123   In other words, the collective 
symptoms are ‘not so much forgotten deeds, but rather forgotten failures to act’, 
‘failures to suspend the force of the social bond’ of the dominant ideology (N, 89).  A 
dialectical image takes on the messianic tincture when the missed opportunity for 
revolution and neighbour love is recognised and rendered legible and the ethical 
action fully assumed.  
In this light, neighbour love aiming at a suspension of law at the point of 
exception manifests a radical structural difference and a huge distance from the 
                                                     
121 For the reference of Santner, please see his article in Neighbor, 83-90. Also see Giorgio Agamben, 
The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: 
Stanford Uinversity Press, 2005), 138-45.  
122 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Intro. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Howard 
Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 463. 
123 Santner refers to Žižek’s comments on Kristallnacht (WD, 23). 
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dominant trend of cultural politics in our contemporary critical terrain, namely 
multiculturalism and the celebration of plurality and differences in identity politics.  
While the latter functions in the Symbolic domain of the community’s law, 
participating in the proliferation of signifiers, with limited negotiation at the level of 
meaning making and representation, the former attempts to disrupt the law from its 
underside, attempting to work through transgressive, fantasmatic supplementation.  
Instead of negotiating with the discursive hegemony of signification as exemplified in 
multiculturalism, Santner interprets the messianic project in the Judaism of the first 
third of the last century as a project aimed towards a miraculous unbinding of the 
signifying stress.  If we take symptom or symptomatic cringing as ‘a locus of some 
sort of disorganization’ of the drive, then the ethical project of neighbour love can be 
viewed in a ‘reflexive sense as a disorganization of a disorganization’ (N, 114).  To 
pose a radical challenge to the status quo, the symptomatic disorganization of law 
cannot be left intact.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. 
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Figure 1 
 As early as in Seminar XI, Lacan adumbrated a crucial distinction between 
the phallus and objet a: ‘[t]he objet a is something from which the subject, in order to 
constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ.  This serves as a symbol of lack, 
that is to say, of the phallus, not as such, but in so far as it is lacking’ (XI, 103).  
Upon closer scrutiny, Lacan seems to suggest objet a is an algebraic expression that 
represents ‘the ever-impossible representation of a radical lack’,124 a primordial one 
prior to the phallus, which comes to represent the radical lack.  Paul Verhaeghe fully 
acknowledges the implication of this remark, underscoring that it contains something 
outside/beyond sexuality.  Sexualisation and gender formation in terms of 
‘phallicization’ within the Imaginary and the Symbolic dimensions function as a 
‘defensive elaboration’ retroactively interpreting the first radical lack, the primordial 
loss.125  In the classic Oedipal scenario, the overwhelming and incomprehensible 
desire of the (M)other is interpreted in the phallic terms as the name(s) of the Father 
                                                     
124 Paul Verhaeghe, Beyond Gender, p. 80. 
125 Ibid., p. 80, 129. 
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and ‘the impossibility of jouissance’ is replaced by ‘the prohibition of enjoyment.’126  
In this light, the Lacanian concept of symbolic castration is far from a paternal threat 
to the child’s access to jouissance but creates the possibility of pleasure.  The sense 
of never having enough jouissance ‘has to do with the jouissance that is supposed to 
lie beyond the phallic pleasure,’ which is ‘asexual,’ ‘situated outside the Other of the 
signifier, more exactly in the place where the Other is not whole.’127  Lacan terms 
this non-phallic jouissance as the Other jouissance, the psychotic jouissance, the 
jouissance of the being or that of the Other.  The Other jouissance represents the 
after effect of the insufficiency left by the Other of the signifier, which tries to 
establish a totalising effect by means of the One of the phallic signifier.  In Lacanian 
terms, the Other jouissance ‘ex-sists within phallic jouissance.’128  In Lacan’s later 
elaboration of sexuation, the Other jouissance is synonymous with the feminine 
jouissance, whose ‘ex-sistence’ we shall explore in this section. 
The lack or loss plays an indispensible, constitutive role in Lacan’s 
conceptualisation of subjectivity.  Lacan’s theory evolves through the years without 
displacing the previous one but reworking it in a retroactive manner.129  Around the 
time of Seminar XI, there is the dialectic between the Real as touché and the 
                                                     
126 Paul Verhaeghe, ‘Enjoyment and Impossibility: Lacan’s Revision of the Oedipus Complex, in Justin 
Clemens and Russell Grigg (eds.), Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006), p. 37-8. 
127 Verhaeghe, Beyond Gender, p. 102. 
128 Ibid., p. 108. 
129 Ibid., p. 66. 
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Imaginary and the Symbolic together as automaton.  By the time of Seminar XX, this 
dichotomy develops and transforms as the opposition between ‘a phallic jouissance 
and a jouissance of the body.’130  In other words, in Lacan’s theorisation of sexuation, 
‘[t]he impossible relation between the subject and its drive reappears in the impossible 
relation between a man and a woman on the one hand, and the not-whole part of 
woman on the other.’131  
Lacanians tend to distance themselves from the emphasis on gender identities or 
gender politics prevalent in academia.  First, the most fundamental sexual difference 
is built into subjectivity itself and cannot be reduced merely to the symbolic 
construction of gender identities.  As Žižek puts it, ‘[s]exual difference is thus 
ultimately not the difference between the sexes, but the difference which cuts across 
the very heart of identity of each sex, stigmatizing it with the mark of impossibility’ 
(LN, 760).  Contrary to Judith Butler’s view, Žižek remarks,  
[T]here is indeed ‘gender trouble,’ but not in Judith Butler’s sense: the point is not 
only that the identities of each sex is not clearly established, neither socially nor 
symbolically or biologically—it is not only that sexual identity is a symbolic form 
imposed onto a fluid and polymorphous body which never fits the ideal—the 
‘trouble’ is rather that this ideal itself is inconsistent, making a constitutive 
impossibility. Sexual difference is not simply particular difference subordinated to 
the universality of human genus/gender, but has a stronger status inscribed in the 
                                                     
130 Ibid., p. 66. In Lacan’s text and Lacanians’ works, the jouissance of the body is related or even 
synonymous with the Other jouissance, i.e. feminine jouissance. In the following exposition and 
discussion, these terms may be applied interchangeably.  
131 Ibid., p. 132. Verhaeghe here follows Bruce Fink’s translation of Seminar XX, translating ‘pas toute’ 
as ‘not-whole’. As will be shown later, some Lacanians use ‘not-whole’ while others prefer ‘not-all’ to 
designate the anti-totalization feminine logic that Lacan elaborates in Encore without substantial 
difference in meaning. 
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very universality itself: a difference which is the constitutive feature of the universal 
species itself, and which, paradoxically for this reason, precedes 
(logically/conceptually) the two terms it differentiates between: ‘perhaps, the 
difference which keeps apart one [sex] from the other belongs neither to the one nor 
to the other’ (LN, 759). 
Moreover, Lacanians hold skepticism toward the plurality or sexes as a symbolic 
construct.  For instance, Miguel Bassols argues against the prevailing contemporary 
grain, ruthlessly repudiating the radical potential of the promotion of ‘the sexual 
continuum’ or the ‘infinite multiplication’ of sexes and gender-related identities and 
considers such formulation to be nothing more than ‘a ‘‘morphing’’ of the phallus’, i.e. 
‘the function of phallus in its multiple transformations, conversion of the organ into a 
signifier by its concealment in so many other ‘‘simulacra.’”132  Bassols contends that 
the ‘drag queens’ and ‘drag kings’ are nothing more than caricatures in phallic 
morphing. 133   Alexander Stevens even detects the ‘adaptive’ tendency of ego 
psychology that Lacan once severely attacked in identity politics.134  The whole 
process of the democratic discursive debates and ‘choice of a collectivizing identity’ 
amounts to a communitarian demand for the subject to be adaptive to reality.135  The 
succinct explanation of the logic underlying identity politics is that ‘the 
community-making identification’ includes just another category, be it gender or sex 
                                                     
132 Miquel Bassols, ‘The (a) Sexed Object’, Psychoanalytic Notebooks 11 (Place: publisher, 2003), 
131-9, at p. 131 and 133. 
133 Ibid., p. 134. 
134 Alexandre Stevens, ‘Love and Sex Beyond Identifications’, in Véronique Voruz and Bogdan Wolf 
(eds.), The Later Lacan: An Introduction (Albany, NY: Suny Press, 2007), p. 210-21. 
135 Ibid., p. 213. 
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in plural, for further proliferation along with other signifiers of contention, such as 
‘Puerto Ricans, blacks, Jews, steelworkers unions, and so on’, as showcased in the 
United States.136  These categories or signifiers for discursive contention constitute 
‘communitarian demand[s],’ requesting visibility, rights, and so on, serving ‘as 
lobbies, as pressure groups in the same way.’137 Under the banner of identity politics, 
Stevens exposes gender politics’ ‘fundamentally adaptive’ logic because all the 
discursive efforts procure nothing more than the fact that ‘now one can choose one’s 
Other before adapting oneself to.’138  It would be unwise to deny entirely the cultural 
change effected through the discursive practice and contention at the representational 
levels.  However, the trend of gender politics harbours a position inherently in 
enmity with Lacanian psychoanalysis because it stands/stops at the threshold of the 
Real in its focus on participating and competing cravingly at the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary levels in manufacturing more signifiers, thereby contributing to the endless 
morphing process of the phallus.  In clear contrast, Lacan’s sexuation does not 
concern biological organs or gender identities but rather represents the masculine and 
feminine structures as ‘psychosexual position[s],’ ‘two jouissances,’ ‘women and men 
are ‘‘in’’ the symbolic differently,’ with ‘a different relation to the Other.’139  That is 
                                                     
136 Ibid., p. 213. 
137 Ibid., p. 213. 
138 Ibid., p. 213. 
139 Verhaeghe, Beyond Gender, p. 101; Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrtis Closely 
(Minneapolis MN: Minnesota Uiversity Press, 2004), p.158; Suzan Bernard, ‘Tongues of Angels: 
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to say, sexuation attempts to arrive at the heart of the problem of the subject’s 
structural positioning in the entwinement between the Real, the Symbolic, and the 
Imaginary. 
While Lacan’s early theorisation of sexuality reflects on the Symbolic inscription, 
by which the masculine subject and the feminine subject are respectively considered 
‘to have’ or ‘to be’ the phallus, Lacan’s later theorisation is deployed at the Real level, 
through the different positions that the masculine and feminine subjects take with 
regard to the phallic function   The upper part of the table of sexuation consists 
of four formulae, which consist of the contradictions between universal statement 
( ) and existential exception  by way of negation.  The male 
psychosexual position is structured around the dialectic between totality and 
exception.  Specifically, all of the subjects that are taken to be male fall into the same 
category by submitting entirely to the phallic function on condition that there is at 
least one who is not subjected to the phallic function (XX, 79).  The inclusive 
exception represents precisely the father function in the Freudian myth, the primal 
father whose unlimited jouissance and name circumscribe the boundary for male 
subjects.  The male structure follows the ‘democratic principle par excellence’ since 
every man is ‘equally’ ‘represented and limited by a single universal law’ of exception 
                                                                                                                                                        
Feminine Structure and Other Jouissance’, in Suzan Bernard and Bruce Fink (eds.), Reading Seminar XX: 
Lacan’s Major Work on Love, Knowledge, and Feminine Sexuality, (Albany: State Uiversity of New York 
Press, 2002), p. 172. 
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(N, 52).  An obvious, structural parallel between Schmitt’s political theology and the 
male subject can easily be detected.  The sovereign, like the primal father, is situated 
exactly at the margins of his regime where he regulates with exemption.  As Kenneth 
Reinhard brilliantly discerns, the subjective decision on the male part is ‘the choice 
not to choose’ (N, 56), for he, on the one hand accepts the phallic law of castration, 
while, on the other, continues fantasizing about an exceptional position free of 
castration.  With ‘a conditional universal,’ ‘a particular (particularized) universal 
particular’140 based on exception as its ‘end-point’ (XX, 80), the primal father is 
arguably the fundamental fantasy of the male subject in support of the functioning of 
law. 
In the lower part of the table of sexuation, Lacan further represents the masculine 
subject by $, propped by Φ as a signifier, also incarnated in S1.  How does this 
barred subject $ desire?  Lacan argues that the male subject is ‘unable to attain his 
sexual partner, who is the Other, except inasmuch as his partner is the cause of this 
desire’ (XX, 80), through fantasy $<>a.  Rather than a meeting between two subjects, 
the relationship between the self and the Other is deployed in the loop of the fantasy 
on the part of one party.  In Lacan’s words, ‘[t]he act of love is the male’s 
polymorphous perversion’ (XX, 72).  This closed circuit of fantasy in the phallic 
                                                     
140 Alenka Župančič, ‘The Case of the Perforated Sheet’ Sexuation (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 
2000), p. 285. 
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jouissance on the side of man leads Lacan to describe the mechanism of male desire 
as ‘the impotence of masturbation’ and ‘the jouissance of the idiot’ (XX, 81).  It is 
dubbed idiotic because ‘[t]he man enjoys through the organ and at the same time the 
organ enjoys all by itself,’ which makes ‘the jouissance of the One’ and poses ‘an 
obstacle for access to the Other.’141  The One always turns back to itself, ‘as idiotic 
as speaking to oneself.’ 142  This reflects one of the reasons why Lacan proposes the 
famous dictum that ‘there is no sexual relation(ship).’  
Is there a possibility to transcend desire’s confining circuit of fantasy and attain 
the dimension of existence and hence the possibility for a subject-to-subject 
relationship?  Commenting on Kierkegaard’s Diary of a Seducer, Lacan identifies 
that ‘by castrating himself, by giving up love,’ Kierkegaard is aiming at ‘this desire 
for a good at one remove, a good that is not caused by a little a’ (XX, 77).  Does 
Kierkegaard succeed in his endeavour or is his manoeuvre simply a fantasy of 
transcendence?  Lacan responds with an ambiguous ‘perhaps’, more in the direction 
of a positive attitude because he remarks, ‘why not? Regina too existed […] perhaps it 
was through Regina that he attained that dimension [of existence]’ (XX, 73).  What 
stimulates me to take this point further lies less in judging Kierkegaard’s success or 
failure than in highlighting that the dimension of existence beyond desire and sex 
                                                     
141 Pierre Naveau, ‘Man’s Approach to Woman: A Logical Pathway’, Psychoanalytic Notebooks 11 
(Place: publisher, 2003), pp. 167-75, at p. 174. 
142 Ibid., p. 174. 
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seems to hover over Lacan during the course of his theorisation of sexuation and 
conceptualisation of love.  As we shall see later, this dimension of existence captured 
and maintained in the subject-to-subject relationship is what Lacan seems to think 
love is aiming at. 
Regarding the female side of sexuation, Lacan presents his famous ‘not-whole’ 
or ‘not-all’ logic.143  The subject under the banner of woman is qualified by the 
negation of the universal statement, rendering woman as ‘not-whole.’  What does not 
wholly being situated in the phallic function mean?  It represents the fact that 
without a conditional exception as a limit to delineate a whole, to render woman as a 
closed set, a totalised category does not exist.  In other words, there is no name (of 
the Mother or of Woman) or a boundary concept to (re)present woman as unified 
category of whole.  This underlies Lacan’s famous or notorious proverb, ‘Woman 
doesn’t exist.’  In his own words, ‘Woman can only be written with a bar through it.  
There is no such thing as Woman, Woman with a capital W indicating the universal.  
There’s no such thing as Woman because in her essence […] she is not-whole’ (XX, 
72-3).  This notion of the barred woman, I think, should be thought together with the 
notion of the barred subject.  As Copjec points out, ‘the proposal that there is no 
                                                     
143 ‘Pas tout(e)’ is translated by Bruce Fink in his rendition of Seminar XX as ‘not-whole.’ As far as I can 
tell, Lacanians utilize ‘not-whole’ or ‘not-all’ as a choice of personal tastes in translation without much 
conceptual difference. ‘Not-whole’ or ‘not-all’ designates the female logic of a system or a set without 
totalisation.  
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whole, no ‘‘all’’ of a woman, or that she is not One, is fundamentally an answer not 
just to the question of feminine being, but to being as such.  It is not only feminine 
being, but being in general that resists being assembled into a whole.’144  In this light, 
the Encore seminar is not merely Lacan’s revisiting of Freud’s theorisation of 
feminine sexuality but rather his rethinking of the question of being, subjectivity, and 
ethics in general.  The critical task in the present project is therefore partly to distil 
the intimate relation between the ethical and the feminine position in Lacan’s thinking, 
which I shall explore shortly. 
Given that woman cannot be counted as a whole, how would woman under the 
signifier ‘woman’ constitute herself and participate in the set named woman?  In 
Seminar XXI: Les Non-dupes Errent, Lacan further elucidates this subject: ‘there is no 
such thing as the Woman, which is, namely that there are only […] different ones, and 
in some way, [they enter] one by one, and that all that is […] dominated by the 
privileged function of this, nonetheless, that there isn’t one to represent the statement 
that interdicts, namely the absolutely no.’145  There is no democratic principle of 
equality between women; each woman exists in her own singularity; each stands next 
to another in an endless series without contributing to a totality but to an infinite, open 
set under the banner of woman.  This results in another form of non-relation.  Pierre 
                                                     
144 Copjec, Imagine There is No Woman, p. 6, emphasis added. 
145 Seminar XXI, unpublished transcript May 14, 1974. I follow Reinhard’s translation (N, 58). 
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Naveau accurately discerns, each woman is ‘all alone;’ ‘[t]here is an unbridgeable gulf 
between the one and the other;’ ‘[t]he non-relation is not only the mark of sex, it is 
also the mark of the Other sex, the feminine sex.’146  
The not-whole concept of woman has structural consequences in the theorisation 
of feminine jouissance.  Succinctly, ‘[w]hile man is coupled to the Other via object a, 
woman is ‘‘twice’’ related to the Other—coupled via the phallus and ‘tripled’ via 
S(the barred A), the signifier of the lack of the Other.’147  This triple coupling to the 
Other on the female part betrays another reason underpinning the sexual non-relation 
since a man becomes ‘the means for a woman to reach this Other jouissance, the 
jouissance beyond [the phallus], the one which separates her from him, which makes 
her not-all his, which means that she ends up being alone.’148  In capturing the 
female mechanism, Lacan proposes an Other jouissance, a feminine jouissance that is 
‘a supplementary jouissance compared to what phallic function designates by way of 
jouissance’ (XX, 73).  This Other jouissance apparently signals a jouissance beyond 
the phallus, ‘a jouissance that belongs to that part of the Other that is not covered by 
the fantasy of the ‘‘One”’—that is, the fantasy is sustained ‘in the repetitive circuit of 
drive’ by the positing of the phallic exception.149  In Seminar XX, Lacan ventures to 
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develop the Other/feminine jouissance further by terming it the en-corps, an ‘enjoying 
substance’ which insists the body is beyond its sexual being (XX, 23). 
The Other jouissance beyond the phallic one poses a theoretical challenge, 
spawning critical puzzlement and vigorous debates.  Bruce Fink150 once tried to 
unpack the reasoning not without perplexity:  
All the jouissance that do exist are phallic (in order to exist, according to Lacan, 
something must be articulable within our signifying system determined by the 
phallic signifier); but that does not mean there cannot be some jouissance that are 
non phallic. It is just that they do not exist; instead, they ex-sist. The Other 
jouissance can only exi-sist, it cannot exist, for to exist it would have to be spoken, 
articulated symbolized. […] the other jouissance must be ineffable […] mystic […] 
inarticulable.151  
At certain points in Seminar XX, Lacan seems to gesture towards a line of reasoning 
supportive of this ex-sistence of the Other/feminine jouissance, suggesting that it can 
only be captured in experience when he refers to the ecstasy of Mother Teresa and the 
intimate link between woman and one of God’s faces (XX, 76-7).  However, he also 
makes it enormously clear and states that ‘[i]t is not because she is not-wholly in the 
phallic function that she is not there at all, she is not not at all there.  She is there in 
full.  But there is something more’ (XX, 74).  In order to solve this paradox or even 
contradiction, let us turn to Lacan’s formulation of the double negation in the 
                                                     
150 Bruce Fink is only one of the illustrated figures who argue for the traditional, standard view of the 
feminine jouissance as that beyond or outside the phallic one. On the other side, Žižek, Chieza, and 
Bernard hold the position that there is no outside and not-all needs not to be conceived as a mystic, 
inarticulable beyond.  
151 Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrtis Closely (Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Uiversity 
Press, 2004), p.161-2. 
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existential statement of the feminine subject.   
If the masculine structure is built upon the dialectic of totality and exception as 
limit, the female logic is centred on not-all or not-whole and infinity.  The notion of 
infinity carries immense importance in Lacan’s understanding of feminine jouissance 
and demands further elucidation.  It would amount to a theoretical disaster if Lacan 
were to commit a serious logical error in the seemingly glaring contradiction between 
the double negation of the existential formula, ‘there does not exist a single woman 
that is not subjected to the phallic function,’ and the negation of the universal 
statement, ‘woman is not-wholly subjected to the phallic function.’  The ostensible 
logical contradiction is considered resolved by Lacan when it applies to the situation 
of the infinity set.  In a key passage often cited, Lacan states, 
One can write ‘not-every (pas tout) x is inscribed in Φx,’ one deduces by way of 
implication that there is an x that contradicts it. But that is true on one sole condition, 
which is that, in the whole or the not-whole in question, we are dealing with the 
finite. Regarding that which is finite, there is not simply an implication but a strict 
equivalence […] But we could […] be dealing with the infinite […] When I say that 
woman is not-whole and that that is why I cannot say Woman, it is precisely because 
I raise the question of a jouissance that, with respect to everything that can be used 
[encompassed] in the function Φx, is the realm of the infinite. (XX, 102-3)  
The double negation and the absence of exception can inhabit an infinite set without 
logical contradiction.  Zupančič offers a cogent explanation:  
Lacan does not deny every existential consequence (or implication) of the not-all; 
what he denies is the existential consequence of an exception at the level of this set 
that he calls not all. Instead of negating the first jouissance and positing the second, 
noncastrated jouissance, one takes away from the first jouissance its exception (the 
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non-castrated jouissance), which maintained it within the finite set. This is what 
opens up the space of the other jouisssance. […] Infinite jouissance is not a 
jouissance so great or intense that the words fail to express it […] ‘infinite’ refers to 
the structure or topology of enjoyment and not to its quantity (or quality).152   
Infinity results from the sheer absence of exception, the dissolution of totality; it does 
not result in a mysterious outside or beyond.  This feminine logic of not-all inspires 
contemporary thinkers to further investigate Pauline love and neighbour love, which 
we shall revisit shortly.  For the time being, it should be clear that ‘in the feminine 
libidinal economy, [t]here is no Outside, no Exception to the phallic function, for that 
very reason a woman is immersed in the symbolic order more wholly than a 
man—without restraint, without exception’ (PD, 68).  For clarification, the feminine 
not-all neither indicates that ‘not all women are under the law of the phallus’ and that 
some may escape castration nor that ‘not all of a woman’ is not castrated and some 
part of her body ‘remains unscathed’ (N, 59-60).  
If there is still ambiguity in the concept of the feminine/Other jouissance in 
Seminar XX, by the time of Seminar XXII and Seminar XXIII, Lacan gradually solves 
and clarifies this problem by way of the Borromean knots.  In the figures below, 
Lacan uses JA and J(A barred) to designate Other/feminine jouissance.  
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Clearly, JA is situated ‘outside the ring of the Symbolic, but it is not outside all the 
rings,’ hence ‘feminine jouissance remains indirectly related to the Symbolic: the 
feminine not-all is ultimately both different and dependent on the phallic Symbolic, 
Graph 1 
Graph 2 
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precisely insofar as it stands as the not-all of the Symbolic, its constitutive point of 
exception.’153  Chieza is probably one of the most relentlessly rigorous critics in his 
support of Lacan’s notion ‘there is no Other of the Other.’  Tracing the meandering 
paths of Lacan’s theoretical development through decades, he keenly identifies 
moments of oscillation or theoretical lapses in Lacan’s long-term striving for truth and 
theoretical consistency.  In his exposition and comments on Seminar VII, Chieza 
points to Lacan’s wavering between the hypothetical Primordial Real and the Real in 
the Symbolic, contending that he sometimes comes close to a perverse Sado-Kantian 
position.  Now, Chieza points out again the problematic nature of a notion of JA (a 
jouissance that is in plenitude without being barred at all) as the feminine jouissance.  
Since there is no outside guarantor of the Other even in the form of primordial 
jouissance, it is against theoretical integrity to posit an Other jouissance in full, 
without being barred.  This lapsus is revamped by Lacan himself when JA is 
rectified and replaced with J(Abarred) in Seminar XXIII.  Chieza presents his 
exegesis brilliantly: ‘JA cannot stand for the jouissance of the ‘‘real Real’’: in other 
words, there is no Other jouissance given that there is no Other of the Other’; ‘J(A 
barred) is therefore a (form of) jouissance of the impossibility of JA.’154 
                                                     
153 Lorenzo Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2007), p. 186. Graph I appears in Seminar XXII: R.S.I. (unpublished) lessons, 14 and 21 January 
1975. I rely on Chieza’s rendition. Graph II appear in Le Seminaire XXIII Le Sinthome, p. 55.  
154 Ibid., p. 186, 187. 
99 
 
 
Although this concept of the feminine Other jouissance, derived from the double 
negation and indirectly connected with the Symbolic, does not embody a mysterious 
plenitude of some form of primordial uncastrated Real and a lure of transcendental 
beyond, it does point to a certain kind of corporeality beyond meaning, which is not 
entirely outside the language effect.  This effect of textual corporeality opens up 
another dimension of materiality with revolutionary potential which figures later in 
our analysis of Joyce’s literary experiment.  As Suzan Bernard argues, the double 
negation in the feminine logic ‘works to effect a kind of affirmation, a strange form of 
positivity.  The feminine subject inhabits the symbolic in this form not as a simple 
absence but as a kind of presence that emerges from ‘‘beyond the veil’’ of phallic 
presence.’155  This presence embodies traces of jouissance in what Lacan terms as 
en-corps, enjoying substance (XX, 23), which is connected with Lacan’s peculiar 
concept of the poiesis.  As Bernard indicates, textual materiality is a convergence of 
love and poetry—‘the something com[es] from nothing—that Lacan links to the 
contingency of being and ultimately, to the path of love.’156 In his explanation of the 
mechanism of male desire as polymorphous perversion, Lacan makes a distinction 
between desire and love, between the act of love and literary making love.  In 
Lacan’s words, ‘To make love (faire l’amour) as the very expression indicates, is 
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poetry.  But there is a world between poetry and the act’ (XX, 72).157  Poetry, with 
its emphasis on aesthetic enjoyment and the surplus in excess of meaning making, 
reveals a strange kind of materiality at the intersection of the Symbolic and the Real.  
Why would the feminine logic of not-all provide readier access to this materiality?  
Bernard argues that, ‘[w]ithout the constitutive illusion of the phallic exception as 
limit, the symbolic becomes, in a sense, real.  One way of conceptualizing feminine 
jouissance, consistent with this claim night be to say that in feminine jouissance, the 
real finds a signifier.’158   
I would like to highlight that in this movement of the Real finding a signifier, the 
Symbolic getting very Real harbours a conception prefigured in the direction of 
sinthome, by which Lacan is primed to further elaborate on the subject’s savoir-faire 
of one’s jouissance, of approaching the Real with the experimentation of the 
self-invented Symbolic.  Marvelling at and intrigued by what Joyce accomplishes 
through his works of art, Lacan moves his aesthetic ethics of the Real inspired by 
Antigone to a new level, to the extent that his entire theorisation of the end of analysis, 
the ethics of psychoanalysis, is radically rewritten.  The current project attempts to 
evaluate how, at the strange convergence of love and poetry and intersection of 
negativity and materiality, along with peculiar materiality and textual corporality, 
                                                     
157 As Fink’s Note 25 reads, l’acte d’amour implies ‘the act of love-making,’ equivalent to l’acte sexuel, 
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158 Bernard, p. 179. Emphasis added. 
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Joycean poetics contributes to ethics. 
 
 
VI.  
Before advancing to the subject of sinthome and ethics, I would like to briefly 
discuss an ethical evaluation of love and desire.  It has been demonstrated that 
sublimation deployed in the formula of the elevation of an object to the dignity of the 
Thing, assumes the structure of fantasy.  Idealisation or over-evaluation by way of 
sublimation is a common procedure in triggering desire.  However, this mechanism 
also reveals the fact that phallic jouissance thus pursued is nothing more than the 
functioning of fantasy, and hence, through ‘masturbatory,’ ‘autistic’159 enjoyment.  
Through fantasy, the subject uses his/her partner as a prop, who assumes the status of 
a semblance of objet a as cause of desire to fulfil his/her enjoyment.  As Lacan 
makes explicit in the first lesson of Encore, ‘[p]hallic jouissance is the obstacle owing 
to which man does not come (n’arrive pas).  I would say, to enjoy a woman’s body, 
precisely because what he enjoys is the jouissance of the organ’ (XX, 7).  This is one 
of the underlying reasons for the sexual non-relation.  How would love be conceived 
theoretically to transcend this dilemma of non-relation and pose to a Real love and a 
truly intersubjective relation?  Fink, on one occasion, ponders over the possibility of 
                                                     
159 Stevens, p. 217. 
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‘a love beyond desire, gesturing toward a movement from the homosexual formula of 
$<>a<>$ to that for love as $<>$.’160  Although Fink chooses to put his question and 
schematization of Lacan’s proposal of love as a subject-to-subject relation in a modest 
footnote, this proposal actually functions as a point of departure in my search for the 
model for love.  My stance in the present study is to endorse such a line of reasoning 
for an intersubjective relation of love.  As I previously proposed in section II of this 
chapter, it is love at the moment when it is ethically figured that will be the focus of 
my critical interest.  Lacan’s ethical paradigm of pure desire, the model of 
Antigone’s singular love, and the paradigm of neighbour love have shed great light on 
how love manifests ethically at the intersection of subjectivity and the ethical act.  At 
this juncture, considering Fink’s proposal, we reach the intersection between love and 
sexuality.   
By approaching sexual difference from the dimension of the Real, Lacan’s theory 
of sexuation provides a very bleak view of human sexuality, ending up in a sexual 
non-relationship.  However, Lacan himself seems also to gesture towards a notion of 
love as transcendence over desire.  He postulates the aphorism of love as a 
                                                     
160 Fink, Lacan to the Letter, p. 186, note 38. I cite his words here, ‘If we think of phallic jouissance as 
the satisfaction that corresponds to desire—and the terms $ and a that form fantasy […] it would 
seem to point to a love beyond desire—equivalent to what Lacan jokingly refers to here as a 
jouissance beyond the phallus. This form of love might correspond to love of the Other or to what 
Lacan qualifies in the last chapter of the seminar as a ‘‘subject to subject’’ relationship’ (XX, 144) in 
which the object seems to drop out; we might schematize this latter relationship as follows ($<>a<>$) 
[hommosexual desire]( $<>$) [love]. ‘Hommosexual’ is Lacan’s neologism to refer to the two-man 
relation, as man in French is ‘homme.’ 
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compensation for the lack of a sexual relation without exhausting the implication of 
this formula. 161   What does Lacan mean in this thought-provoking, enigmatic 
aphorism?  In recent years, Lacanians have sought to clarify and elaborate on it.  
The importance of Lacan’s aphorism resides in whether love is postulated as a 
‘consoling illusion’ or ‘the union of disjunctive elements in a new whole’ to 
compensate for the failure of sex with some value vaguely called love or whether 
‘there is something real in love, correlative to the impossibility of the sexual 
relationship, but nether identical to it nor to its dissimulation’ (N, 51).  It would be 
catastrophic for Lacan’s edifice if love were to amount to nothing but one of the 
former two positions, i.e. either an ‘illusory consolation’ or ‘a union’, and this 
proposal of love would appear to be nothing more than the illusory mirage of love at 
the Imaginary level sneaking in from the backdoor.  Only the third position of 
conceptualising love as Real is tenable from a rigorous Lacanian point of view and 
qualifies love as an ethical act.  I take Reinhard’s proposal for the third position of 
Real love to mean that while it is situated at the same level of the impossibility of the 
sexual relationship, love emerges from this negativity of the Real impasse as 
something positive and palpable, yet at the same time remaining in excess of the 
representation at both the Imaginary and the Symbolic levels.  My stance in this 
                                                     
161 Lacan mentions this formula on several occasions in Seminar XX. For instance, he says, in the 
lesson ‘Love and Signifier’; ‘What makes up for the sexual relationship is, quite precisely, love’ Seminar 
XX, p. 45. 
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current project is that for love to be ethically manifest, it must consist of a Real act 
and an intersubjective relationship.  This is undoubtedly a key subject which invites 
experiments of tentative propositions and whose potential, I believe, is still far from 
exhaustion.  Bearing this in mind, the current attempt to theoretically foreground the 
space for love as an ethical manifestation can be considered part of the on-going work 
on love.  I propose to pursue several avenues to approach the ethical issue of love in 
the study of Ulysses.   
Firstly, since the functioning of fantasy obfuscates the intersubjective relation, 
for love to figure ethically, it is reasonable to posit a transcendence of masturbatory 
enjoyment, the traversal of fantasy.  Previously, in the section on neighbour love, I 
explained how love as an ethical act functions in miraculously breaking through the 
thrall of fantasy.  Love manages to work through the law by suspending the 
underlying superegoic enjoyment, disorganising the framework of fantasy, and 
unleashing the inherent libidinal energy.  Moreover, the radical impact of the 
traversal of fantasy on subjectivity can hardly be overemphasised.  It is not simply a 
common daily experience of disillusionment and the learning of practical wisdom in 
handling worldly affairs.  The transcendence of fantasy is a life-shattering and 
subject-transforming event of existence at the ontological, epistemological, and 
ethical levels.  Fantasy manages to produce objects of desire through the cause factor 
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of objet a for the subject and is itself the core being of the subject.  Undergoing the 
traversal of fantasy not only endows us with more freedom and flexibility in choosing 
objects but also opens ‘the possibility for new possibilities.’ 162   The entire 
coordination of the subject’s perception and approach toward his/her life and the 
world is drastically changed and his being both at the conscious and unconscious 
levels points to the direction of re-construction.  A new possibility is opened at the 
most fundamental level for the subsequent new possibilities to appear and take shape 
in this life and world.  The traversal of fantasy therefore is a Real event for the 
subject, with the explicit connotation of an event of the Lacanian Real.  In this Real 
event, the subject confronts the core of his being and its dissolution.  After this 
existential drama of subjective destitution, the subject is literally at the threshold of a 
brand new world.  It is no exaggeration that love alters life and reshapes the world 
both from the phenomenological vantage of experience and the theoretical point of 
view.  
 
                                                     
162 For a detailed account of the working through and the consequent new opening, please see 
Jonathan Lear, Therapeutic Action: An Earnest Plea for Irony (New York: Other Press, 2003). 
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VII. 
Lacan’s neologism sinthome, distinct from symptôme, has a major theoretical 
importance.  First presented at the 1975 James Joyce Symposium, Lacan’s paper was 
termed as ‘Joyce le symptôme’ and changed to Le Sinthome in his twenty-third 
seminar on Joyce.163  Joyce le symptôme is supposed to be read ‘as a single unit, like 
a name.’164  The singularity inherent in a name, in a symbolic nomination, is 
maintained and highlighted.  Lacan’s critical sensitivity to names and naming in 
Joyce’s work and subjectivity remained vivid even later in his seminar on Joyce.  
With the new title Le Sinthome, Lacan does not aim to demonstrate his erudition in 
etymology but wishes to introduce a new concept on symptoms, singularity, and 
subjectivity.  This theoretical innovation in psychoanalysis should be appreciated in 
the long-term evolution of Lacan’s thinking.  From Seminars XIX and XX held in the 
seventies, a conspicuous shift of logic can be detected.  A ‘dialectical logic’ on the 
relation between the three registers in terms of oppositions in the earlier period 
gradually gives way to ‘a triangular or three-dimensional logic’.165  The topological 
thinking of knots is introduced when conceptualising the ‘non-hierarchical,’ 
‘intermingling’ relationship among the three registers of the Imaginary, the Real, and 
                                                     
163 According to Roberto Harari, sinthome was how symptom spelled in the incunabula produced 
around the end of the 15th century to the beginning of the 16th century. How James Joyce Made His 
Name, Trans by Luke Thurston (New York: Other Press, 2002), p. 23. 
164 Ibid., p. 22. 
165 Stijin Vanheaule, The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), p. 151. 
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the Symbolic in formulating human subjectivity.166  Jouissance is organised by the 
interlocking of the three rings of R. S. I.  A different nomination is employed to 
account for ‘a distinct psychic formation,’ ‘a new structure in psychoanalysis where 
number four will be decisive’ through its transforming of the Borromean knot in the 
topological thinking of unknotting and reknotting.167  Lacan critically investigates 
the relationship between Joyce’s work and his subjectivity and life, which entails ‘a 
consideration of how the subject had been undone, and how it was refounded in 
language.’168  The radical consequence of the subjective-transformation through 
Joyce’s ambitious literary experimentation is a thorough cultural revolution in the 
attempt to ‘liquidate the English language.’169  It is no exaggeration that after Joyce, 
fiction writing was no longer the same, and his critics’ incessant works are part of 
Joyce’s project of cultural revolution, both in linguistic and literary terms. 
The analytic goal is reformulated in this later development of theory.  The 
subject enters into the clinic with his symptoms, with a belief in the meaning of his 
symptoms and a supposition that the analyst will be able to know the true reason 
behind his symptoms.  Since ‘it is only through the liberation of the Symbolic 
constellation that the Real of the drive appears,’170 the subject is obliged to work 
                                                     
166 Ibid., p. 154. 
167 Harari, p. 24. 
168 Ibid., p. 25. 
169 Ibid., p. 25. 
170 Paul Verhaeghe and Frédéric Declercq, ‘Lacan’s Analytic Goal: Le sinthome or the Feminine Way,’ in 
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through the Symbolic to achieve the aim of changing one’s relation with the Real.  
This is the foundation of legitimizing the psychoanalytic practice because the subject 
can change his relation with the drive by means of talking cure.  Psychoanalysis is 
therefore capable of creating a new subject.171  After transferences are dissolved and 
interpretations exhausted, the subject may come to a stage of giving up his previous 
supposition of the Other, becoming aware of the inconsistency between the Other and 
the traversal of fantasy.  The subject thereby reaches the point of the end of analysis 
understood in terms of dehystericization, desexualisation, desubjectivization, 
expressed in the notion of subjective destitution.  At this juncture, I think, the subject 
is faced with an ethical decision par excellence.  That is to say, in the confrontation 
with ‘the primary signifier’ which he/she has been subjected to (XI, 276), the subject 
is provided with sufficient information about his/her own symptomatic patterns or 
peculiar organisation of the drive.  He/She is therefore in a better position ‘to assess 
his [/her] stance toward this drive-fixation and eventually either change or keep that 
stance.’172 
No longer entrapped by the veil of fantasmatic formation nor bothered by the 
Other’s desire as its de-centred cause, the subject may come to assume the position of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Luke Thurston (ed.), Re-inventing the Symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan (New York: Other Press, 
2002), p. 64. 
171 Ibid., p. 64. 
172 Ibid., p. 64. 
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‘the saint,’ ‘who causes itself, becomes its own cause’ (AF, 79).  The reference to the 
saint is far from accidental.  Lacan, in his later teachings, accentuates the shift from 
the Other-filtered symptoms to the self-made ones and coins the neologism 
‘sinthome.’  He plays with homophony, as he uses the term sinthome to represent a 
combination of symptôme, ‘saint homme’ (holy man), and ‘sinthomadquin’ (Saint 
Thomas Aquinas), who does not believe in the Other and seeks the Real Thing (XXIII, 
14).  Lacan elevates Socrates to the level of a saint because in his choice for death, 
Socrates steps beyond the normal human repertoire of choices and manifests his 
distinguished singularity through this act of choice.  As Lacan puts it, ‘I must say 
that Socrates is not human for he is willing to die for the city life.  He accepts it; 
that’s a fact’ (XXIII, 14).173  Lacan further compares the singularity exhibited in 
Socrates’ act of choice with the woman’s refusal in response to certain sexual request: 
‘all, but not that (tout, mais pas ça)’ (XXIII, 14).  Socrates’ act and the insistence of 
‘all, but not that’ are examples of the sinthome.  In other words, the sinthome is a 
‘purified symptom,’ ‘stripped of its symbolic component,’ whose existence is based 
on the decision of this neosubject.174  The subject becomes the cause of himself by 
indentifying with the sinthome and providing an answer to the Real, rather than to the 
Other; the subject accomplishes a creation ex nihilo, as a suppletion for the lack of the 
                                                     
173 Lacan remarks that ‘il faut dire que Socrate n'est pas homme, puisqu'il accepte de mourir pour la 
cité vive. Il l'accepte; c'est un fait.’ My translation. 
174 Verhaeghe and Declercq, p. 66.  
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Other.175  An alternative concept of the end of analysis is provided: the aim is ‘to 
succeed in enabling the subject to suture stitch, unstitch—that is, to tie or untie 
something, to retie things otherwise.’176  The underlying premises are that ‘there is 
no subject without a symptom,’177 and ‘there is no unknotting without reknotting and 
vice versa;’ ‘[a]nalysis proposes not enjoyment through the symptom, but enjoyment 
through sinthome.’178  The new paradigm of the end of analysis is encapsulated in 
the promotion of identification with the sinthome.  
How do we appreciate and capture the knowledge in the identification of the 
Real?  Stijin Vanheule observes, ‘at the basis of this change [from dialectical logic to 
triangular logic], Lacan’s view of the functioning of language shifts somewhat.’179  
In other words, language does not merely evacuate jouissance and introduce holes 
into the Real but also functions as a means of jouissance: ‘language not merely 
structures the Real, the Real also affects the Symbolic.’180   Concepts such as 
‘lalangue’ and ‘parlêtre’ are devised to capture the libidinous aspect of language, or 
better, the intermingling of the Symbolic and the Real in language and subjectivity.  
Lacan also points out the distinction between the signifier and the letter to explicate 
                                                     
175 Ibid., p. 69-75. 
176 Harari, p. 107. 
177 Verhaeghe and Declercq, p. 66. 
178 Harari, p. 108. 
179 Vanheule, p. 152 
180 Ibid., p. 158. 
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this form of real knowledge.181  The letter designates ‘the drive-kernel of the 
signifier, the substance fixating the real jouissance,’ while the signifier, in contrast, is 
now ‘a letter that acquired a linguistic value.’182  The inscription of the letters 
without meaning inscribes the jouissance as well the knowledge of this jouissance.  
This line of thinking entails radical implications in terms of subjectivity and 
poetry.  The concept of sinthome is in line with such a theoretical development.  
The notion of writing as sinthome and lettering as littering of enjoyment leads Lacan 
to a forceful conceptualisation of poetry as prophesy.  Prophesy partakes of the 
dimension of pure saying (le dire).  As Soler points out, ‘[i]t is the least stupid 
saying, since only poetry (or prophesy) manages to say something new, even unique, 
using old and worn-out signifiers.  Poetry produces new meanings, and with this new 
meaning, new perspectives on reality.’183  Lacan observes a novel interdependence 
of the inventiveness of poetry and the subjectivity in Joyce’s writing.184  Joyce 
devotes his life to writing because he has disinvested from the Unconscious.  The 
cancellation of his subscription to the Unconscious means he is no longer divided and 
hence has become an individual, probably a holy one, who knows how to make do 
with his own jouissance.  Moreover, the suspension of the Unconscious indicates 
                                                     
181 Veronique Voruz, ‘Acephallic Letteras a Phallic Letter’, in Luke Thurston (ed.), Re-Inventing the 
Symptoms: Essays on the Final Lacan. (New York: Other Press, 2002), p. 113-5.  
182 Verhaeghe and Declercq, p. 67. 
183Soler, p. 96.  
184 Harari, p. 359. 
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that the subject has no Other to resort to but to invent his own name as an act of 
self-nomination to work with, to name the terrifying Real with alternative 
suppletions.185  For Joyce, the artifice of writing as sinthome bears the ambiguity or 
even convergence of meaning and being and, in a sense, ‘determines the credibility of 
being.’186  
The explanation given above is undoubtedly dense, condensing several notions 
of ultimate importance and requiring further theoretical unpacking.  Joyce’s 
self-naming through his art makes up for the deficiency of the working of the Name 
of the Father.  As Lacan puts it, ‘his art is the real warrant of his phallus’ (XXIII, 
15).187  The expanded notions of foreclosure and pluralisation of the Name(s) of the 
Father, which essentially revise Lacan’s theory of madness and the end of 
psychoanalysis, are fundamental to Lacan’s exposition of Joyce’s nomination in 
contrast to the functioning of the traditional paternal metaphor.188  In Seminar III on 
Psychoses, Lacan proposes that the foreclosure of the Name of the Father, distinct 
from the neurotic repression and the perverse disavowal, is a specific and necessary 
mechanism for psychoses.  In the long course of his theoretical development, he 
                                                     
185 Harari offers detailed and extended account of Joyce’s disinvestment from the Unconscious and 
the mode of Joycean suppletions and nomination. See especially the comparative tables in ibid., p. 
241, 263, 282, 352 to get a thorough idea of the distinction between neurotic symptom and the 
Joycean sinthome, the functioning of the paternal metaphor and Joyce’s nomination. 
186 Ibid., p. 228. 
187 ‘c’est son art qui a supple à sa tenue phallique.’ I follow Gallagher’s translation here. 
188 Massimo Recalcati, ‘Madness and Structure in Jacques Lacan’, trans. Jorge Jauregui, Lacanian Ink 
32 (Place: publisher, 2008), 97-121. 
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gradually extends the notion of foreclosure to represent the general phenomenon in 
which ‘something is radically lacking’ or where ‘the gap in question is irreducible.’189  
In interpreting this tendency of conceptual generalisation, Roberto Harari follows the 
view of Claude Conté, contending that the various Lacanian aphorisms of il n’y pas 
actually represent the various forms of foreclosure. 190   The cases of the two 
aphorisms, ‘there is no meta-language’ and ‘there is no sexual relation,’ indicate 
respectively a foreclosure of the existence of a meta-language and a foreclosure of 
signifiers which are capable to write (to prescribe/describe) the relationship between 
the sexes.   
This conceptual expansion of foreclosure not merely successfully dislodges the 
mechanism of foreclosure from the exclusive connotation of psychosis but also 
reveals Lacan’s thorough theoretical rigor in support of the notion, ‘there is no Other 
of the Other.’  The lack/incompleteness/inconsistency of the Other is a general 
structural fact, which cannot be remedied through any transcendental guarantor.  
Lacan’s various aphorisms of il n’y pas are precisely articulations of this structural 
void from different angles.  When Lacan highlighted the capacity of the Name of the 
Father to name, substitute, and negate the Desire of the Mother, the paternal law was 
regarded implicitly as a transcendent Other to remedy the lack of the Other and 
                                                     
189 Harari, p. 285, 286. 
190 Ibid., p. 284-9. 
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totalise the Symbolic field.  In other words, to put it aphoristically, ‘there is an Other 
of the Other.’191  With the paternal metaphor as a transcendental guarantor, the 
Symbolic field becomes self-enclosed and all encompassing, while the primordial 
Real, the Real in its pure state, lies outside/before Symbolization.  It is of little 
wonder that with the rejection of the paternal metaphor, the foreclosure of the Father’s 
Name, the subject necessarily falls prey to psychoses and risks being invaded by the 
overflowing of jouissance.  However, Lacan gradually shifts his position.  He 
neither situates the paternal metaphor ‘in a beyond’ and nor does he take it as ‘a 
transcendence’ or ‘a signifier of signifiers.’192  He regards it as ‘an ‘‘organizer”’ 
although ‘still a ‘‘privileged’’ signifier.’193  The Name of the Father no longer 
totalises the Symbolic in an all-encompassing way; instead, Lacan ‘relativizes the 
function of the Names of the Father, and from the early 1960s, speaks of the 
Names-of-the-Father.’194  As Chieza puts it, ‘when there is no Other of the Other, the 
Symbolic of the individual subjects itself sustains the universal structure in a 
particular (phallic) way.’195  Chieza’s rendition does not only make explicit the 
relativization and pluralisation of the ‘particular’ paternal phallic function but also 
reveals that the universal Symbolic functioning requires the support and participation 
                                                     
191 Chieza, Subjectivity and Otherness, p.107-15. 
192 Ibid., p. 116. 
193 Ibid., p. 116. 
194 Ibid., p. 117. 
195 Ibid., p. 116. 
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of the individual, and this prefigures and paves way for the concept of the Singular 
Universal in the processes of an ethical act and self-naming.  Harari elucidates 
Lacan’s later position by pointing out the capability of the Name of the Father to 
name the Desire of the Mother that is always conditioned by the Mother in her 
discourse.196  Therefore, the paternal metaphor used in substitution for the Mother’s 
desire is not derived from the structural necessity, but rather from a cultural or social 
contingency.  Following this logic, there is the nominative function that can be 
‘unconditioned’ and hence, ‘the father as name’ and ‘the father who names’ can be 
distinguished.197  Lacan further argues that the paternal metaphor is nothing other 
than a symptom in that it functions to manage or organise jouissance.  Lacan makes 
a strong claim, which may shock the readers of early Lacan, contending that ‘[t]he 
Oedipus complex is itself a symptom’ (XXIII, 22).198   
The fourth element of self-naming, ‘the unconditioned Name-of-the-Father’ is an 
instance of ‘suppletion’ (suppléance). 199   Suppletion or suppléance is another 
neologism which, according to Copjec, is actually ‘plucked from the 
eighteenth-century French rhetoric’ used to designate ‘a term that substitutes itself not 
[…] for another prior term, but for an absence.’200  Joyce’s nomination, his sinthome, 
                                                     
196 Harari, p. 237-8, 240. 
197 Ibid., p. 239, 238. 
198 In Lacan’s words, ‘Le complexe d'Oedipe est comme tel un symptôme.’ My translation. 
199 Harari, p. 239, 29. 
200 Joan Copjec, ‘Gia Savoir Sera: The Science of Love and the Insolance of Chance’, in Gabriel Riera 
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is different from the conventional Name of the Father substituting the Desire of the 
Mother; in contrast, the self-nomination as suppletion is simply an artifice working 
with/on the structural void without metaphorising or negating anything.  Harari 
interprets this idea as follows: ‘it is not a replacement of anything else, but sets itself 
up for and by itself at the site of reparation where the “slip” or lapsus has occurred.  
The metaphor remains within the order of the signifier, whereas nomination works by 
means of the letter.’201  
The paternal deficiency leads Joyce to bypass the metaphorisation of the Name 
of the Father and therefore unsubscribes from the Unconscious (XXIII, 164-66).  
Because of the disinvestment from the Unconscious, Lacan detects the structural 
difference between the symptom caused by repression and the self-invented sinthome 
caused by the working of self-naming.  In the case of Joyce, the suppletion of his 
proper name makes up for the lack of the proper functioning of the Name of the 
Father.  As Lacan puts it, ‘[i]t is not just Joyce le symptôm, Joyce has, if you like, 
unsubscribed to the unconscious’ (XXIII, 164).202  With the symptoms, the subject 
still holds his/her trust in authority, in the Name of theFather, in the subject supposed 
                                                                                                                                                        
(ed.), Alain Badiou: Philosophy and Its Conditions (Albany, NY: State Uiversity of New York Press, 2005), 
at p. 123. Although the context of Copjec’s article discusses the possibility to make up for the lack of 
sexual relation, with the generalisation of foreclosure in Lacan’s later thinking, I think, it is arguable 
that suppletion is also generalised in the theorisation of the sinthome and in the nominative 
suppletion of the lack of the traditional, conditioned Name-of-the-Father. 
201 Harari., p. 241. 
202 ‘Ce n'est pas seulement Joyce le Symptôme, c'est Joyce en tant que, si je puis dire, désabonné à 
l'inconscient.’ My translation with a slight modification. 
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to know, in the meaning of his/her symptoms.  The Sinthome caused by the 
unsusbscription from the Unconscious does not seek meaning and authority in the 
Other; instead, the undivided neosubject, which Lacan terms as the ‘individual’ (XXIII, 
168), takes responsibility of the expertise to organize his/her jouissance.  In a 
passage encapsulating his understanding and admiration for Joyce’s work of art, 
Lacan proclaims in the fourth lesson of Seminar XXIII: ‘one can be responsible only 
in the extent of his know-how.  What is know-how?  It is art, artifice, which is 
capable of outstanding value because there is no Other of the Other to enact the Last 
Judgment’ (XXIII, 61).203  In light of his topological thinking, the sinthome is the 
fourth ring in the reknotting of the unknotted rings of the Symbolic, the Real, and the 
Imaginary as illustrated in the following diagram: 
                                                     
203 Lacan says, ‘On n'est responsable que dans la mesure de son savoir-faire. Qu'est-ce que c'est que 
le savoir-faire? C'est l'art, l'artifice, ce qui donn à l'art dont on est capable une valeur remarquable, 
parce qu'il n'y a pas d'Autre de L'Autre pour opérer le Jugement dernier.’ I follow Cormac Gallagher’s 
translation with a slight modification. 
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Figure 2 
 
Joyce’s art, as his sinthome, plays the role of the fourth ring precisely (XXIII, 
37).  The path that Joyce takes should be distinguished from that usually taken by a 
neurotic subject.  In the case of the neurotic subject, it is ‘a question of going 
through the Symbolic and the symbolically determined symptoms to the Real;’ the 
neurotic has to ‘find answer to the Real of the drives and sexuality’ after the working 
through of fundamental fantasy.204  For the psychotic subject as well as for Joyce, it 
is ‘a question of going from the Real to the Symbolic,’ of limiting jouissance by ‘a 
fabrication of a symptom, which Lacan in Joyce case named sinthome.’205  Now, the 
crucial question is whether Joyce is mad.206  Lacanians have different opinions on 
                                                     
204 René Rassmussen, ‘On Joyce and Psychosis’, Psychoanalytic Notebooks 13 (place: publisher, 2005), 
45-53 at p. 50-1. 
205 Ibid., p. 50. 
206 Lacan himself raises this question without directly answering it, but circles and ponders this 
question. He remarks, ‘Joyce était-il fou?’ (XXIII, 77) ‘Ce que je soulève comme question dans ce 
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this rather fundamental issue.  Rene Rasmussen dubs Joyce as ‘psychotic, but in a 
stabilized way.’207  Darian Leader takes him to be a ‘non-triggered psychotic’ who is 
‘initially ‘‘in between’’ neurosis and psychosis and subsequently manages to produce 
a partially (individualized) symbolic.’208  Chiesa takes Joyce to be neither neurotic 
nor psychotic, saying that being already separated from the Symbolic, and without 
having to traverse the fundamental fantasy, Joyce creates his founding master signifier, 
that is, his own proper name as a writer.209  According to Rik Loose, in Seminar 
XXIII, Lacan deliberately raises this question while avoiding giving a positive answer 
by saying that ‘about whether or not Joyce was mad? Why should he not have been 
mad? It’s not a privilege.’210  Loose therefore argues that he does not know whether 
Joyce was psychotic, neurotic, or perverse, but he only knows that his writing 
effectively ‘administrates’ his jouissance.211  
The divergence of perspectives is far from trivial because it implies Joyce’s case 
surpasses the traditional categories of clinical structures and Oedipal drama, which 
Lacan inherits from Freud and remains faithful to in his early works, especially the 
extended discussion of psychoses in Seminar III.  Lacan uses the Borromean knot 
                                                                                                                                                        
jaspinage, à savoir si oui ou non Joyce était fou, peut trouver ici à se repérer. Fou, pourquoi aprè tout 
Joyce ne l’aurait-il pas été? Ceci d’autant plus que ce n’est pas un privilège…’ (XXIII, p. 87).  
207 Rassmussen, p. 46. 
208 Chiesa, ‘Lacan with Artaud’, p. 357. 
209 Ibid., p. 357. 
210 Rik Loose, ‘Joyce’s Administration’, Psychoanalytic Notebooks 13 (2005), 83-91 at p. 85. 
211 Ibid., p. 89. 
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and topological thinking to explore the structuring of human psyche, arguing that 
there is no reknotting without unknotting and that Joyce’s ego is the fourth ring that 
ties together the three circles, the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary, to keep them 
from falling apart and from the consequent madness. 212   Lacan talks of the 
dissolution of the Imaginary in explaining the topological regression that Judge 
Daniel Paul Schreber experienced.213  Schreber’s breaking away from the Symbolic 
has inevitably ‘affected his actual flesh as much as his image,’ and therefore he turns 
to the subsequent delusion with the attempt at restoring ‘the Imaginary dimension 
through the re-libidinalization of his body image.’214  While Yasmin Grasser argues 
that ‘the Imaginary is disjointed from the Symbolic does not signify its disappearance’, 
Rasmussen directly radicalizes the insight by claiming that ‘the lack of the third knot, 
of the imaginary’ would lead Joyce to resort to his writing to create ‘an ego in 
language’ as ‘a replacement for the missing Name of the father.’215  With reference 
to the famous episode in which Stephen temporarily loses his ego like a fruit divested 
of its soft ripe peel in A Portrait, Loose provides an account of Joyce’s exile by 
                                                     
212 Bogdan Wolf, ‘Joy, Joys, Joyce. How to Work with the Sinthome?’ Psychoanalytic Notebooks 13 
(place: publisher, 2005), 55-62. Pierre Skriabine, ‘Does the Father say Knot?’ Psychoanalytic Notebooks 
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interpretation.  
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indicating that Joyce exiled himself not because of his hostility toward Irish 
Nationalism, Catholic morality, and Irish language or culture, but 
because he lacks a fundamental fantasy, which provide him with an ego and 
sufficient identity to be able to withstand the command of the cultural super-ego of 
his nation. Joyce’s solution for this lack of ego was his sinthome, namely, his 
identity of being ‘more writer than the writers.’ This phrase captures the essence of 
Joyce ego, his identity, a fourth ring in the Borromean knot.216  
With the cancellation of the Unconscious, Joyce makes a reknotting with the 
self-made ego as the fourth ring, marking his proper name as a writer.  As 
Rasmussen points out, Lacan, in the discussion of Joyce, deliberately avoids using ‘le 
moi’ to indicate the imaginary formation and entity, but chooses the word ‘the ego’; 
Joyce’s ego is used ‘as a replacement for the missing Name of the Father.’217  
Thurston cautions us stating, ‘the writing of the knot cannot be situated in symbolic 
structure, psychological meaning or the mute insistence of the drive; in other words, 
the knot is itself irreducible to the registers it inscribes.’218  In Lacan’s reading of 
Joyce, while epiphany marks itself as ‘the falling away of the imaginary from the knot 
to reveal something forbidden and unrepresentable in language’ and signals the 
‘meaningless punctum where body and speech, symbolic and real collide;’ the 
sinthome ‘intervenes to prevent the psychotic unraveling of the knot.’219   
So, is Joyce mad?  My stance in this study is that Joyce is hardly mad.  Joyce 
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has successfully supplemented the defective functioning of his paternal metaphor with 
his name as a writer.  In this regard, ‘the name ‘‘Joyce’’ literally embodies a 
subjective placeholder for the lack of the Other;’ ‘[t]he name ‘Joyce’ is a “singular 
universal.’”220  Furthermore, it is my claim that the sinthome, as self-naming and 
know-how of organising jouissance, constitutes an extended ethical act because the 
neosubject fully acknowledges the non-existence of the Other and takes responsibility 
for the artifice of self-invention, for the subjective making and transformation.   
Now, the crucial question should be shifted: If the sinthome distinguishes itself 
from the neurotic symptoms with the emphasis on self-naming, self-inventiveness, 
and singularity, how would this singularity influence culture, politics, and society?  
To communicate and produce social and cultural impact demands shared master 
signifiers, and common fantasmatic ground; then, how can ‘the individual naming of 
the Real’221 achieve universality and accomplish revolution?  The postulation of the 
Singular Universal manages to answer this question.  The subject’s role is 
constitutive in the postulation of the universal.  As Chieza points out,  
Insofar as the symbolic structure is universal only through a particular contingent 
Master-Signifier that hegemonizes fundamental fantasies, the subject’s encounter with 
the real lack beneath his ideological fundamental fantasy forces him to assume the lack 
in the universal. Conversely, the resymbolization of lack is therefore, by definition, 
always carried out at the level of the particular. More precisely, insofar as this is 
nothing but the specific moment at which the subject realizes that particularity is 
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necessary if there is to be universality, it is here that the particular is turned into the 
individual.222 
The unknotting and reknotting process of the individual implodes the convention, 
raising the individual to the Universal when the conventional version of the Universal 
is challenged and traversed step-by-step.  Chieza further proposes two avenues for 
assuming the Singular Universal and accomplishing subjective transformation and 
cultural revolution in a single move through self-naming and artifice—that is, the 
subject may either ‘become his own name’ or ‘name a movement.’223  This is indeed 
what Joyce has done through his writing.  He becomes his own name by naming 
himself and renaming the literary legacy by writing his own proper name into the 
history of literatures.  In the later chapters on Ulysses, I will endeavour to analyze 
how Joyce achieves literary working through of cultural symptoms, produces new 
ways of writing, and paves the way for new master signifiers through his literary 
experiments.  A cultural unknotting and reknotting is at work in parallel with a 
subjective untying and retying.  I would also like to point out that with the invention 
of the word ‘Joycean’ and the flourishing of the industry of Joyce’s study, Joyce 
scholars actually participate in constructing the cultural innovation under the name of 
Joyce as a Singular Universal.  While Joyce’s singularity is written into the 
Universal, the singular critical contribution of every critic of Joyce constantly renews 
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and refuels the momentum and meaning shaping of this Singular Universal.  In light 
of Badiou’s diction of the truth procedure, Joyce’s art may very well fall on deaf ears 
and blind eyes or may very well undergo distortion and betrayal if Joyce’s critics are 
unable to recognize his innovation as a genuine artistic event and unable to extend 
their fidelity to this event through the truth-process of acknowledging Joyce’s art.  
The present study is a modest effort to be faithful to this artistic event in the name of 
Joyce and to keep alive its revolutionary spirit while intervening into the critical 
legacy and relevant cultural debates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
           My Own Private Shakespeare: 
   Toward the Possibility of a Singular Universal in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ 
           
          
                        ‘We can’t change the country. Let us change the subject.’  
                                                        Ulysses, 16.1171            
‘Il croit aussi qu’il y a un book of himself. Quelle idée de se faire être un livre.’  
                                                  Jacaues Lacan, Le Sinthome, p. 71 
                                                   
 
                                                                         
I. 
By the end of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Stephen Dedalus 
pronounces his own self-appointed mission and identity as an artist.  By evoking the 
mythological figure of father-artificer, Stephen heroically exclaims, ‘Welcome, O Life! 
I go to encounter for the millionth time of the reality of experience and to forge in the 
smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race’ (P, 390).  This youthful 
aspiration is less a form of romantic(ist) ambition and narcissistic projection than an 
independence earned through constant disillusionment with authority, an outcome of 
an excruciating process of working through the shackles of ideological fantasies.  As 
Shelley Brivic points out, having triumphed over the church’s authority, the sinful kiss 
and the Eucharist in the first three chapters successively, ‘the new identity Stephen 
seizes at the end of each chapter turns out in the next one to be hardly more than a 
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fantasy.’224  Just pages earlier, the nature of the artist’s manifesto as an unborn 
conscience of his race, a distancing from the dominant forms of ideology, is laid bare 
in Stephen’s dialogue with Cranly;  
You have asked me what I would do and what I would not do. I will tell you what I 
will do and what I will not do. I will not serve that in which I no longer believe, 
whether it call itself my home, my fatherland, or my church. And I will try to 
express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and as wholly as I can, 
using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use, silence, exile, and 
cunning. (P, 385) 
If we regard silence and exile in terms of Stephen’s refusal to lend his voice and 
strength in direct support of political engagement with various forms of Irish 
nationalism in confrontation with British imperialism, and his exile in terms of his 
physical exile abroad and symbolic exile from home, state and church, our 
qualification of the meaning and means of cunning remains unsettled and begs for 
subtler and more creative critical interpretation. 
In his dialogue with Bloom regarding paternal lineage and national tradition, 
Stephen finds himself cast in the role of son, but betrays his treacherous intention in 
challenging both paternal and national authorities:  
--You suspect, Stephen retorted with a sort of half laugh, that I may be important 
because I belong to the faubourg Saint Patrice called Ireland for short. 
--I would go a step further, Mr Bloom insinuated. 
--But I suspect, Stephen interrupted, that Ireland must be important because it 
belongs to me.  
          
                                                     
224 Shelly Brivic, Joyce Through Lacan and Žižek: Explorations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 
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  --What belongs, queried Mr. Bloom bending, fancying he was perhaps under some  
  mis-apprehension. Excuse me. Unfortunately, I didn’t catch the latter portion. What    
  was it you . . .?      
  Stephen patently crosstempered, repeated and shoved aside his mug of coffee or    
  whatever you like to call it none too politely, adding: 
         --We can’t change the country. Let us change the subject.  (U, 16.1160-71) 
This little skit is usually identified by critics as a failed communication between 
Bloom (the father) and Stephen (the son), or as an aborted ritual of transmitting 
paternal legacy, legitimacy, a nullified attempt at securing, restoring or 
re-inaugurating genealogy figuratively.  Such a failure is of vital importance since 
after a prolonged wander into the night the two male protagonists finally have the 
opportunity to sit down and engage in conversation.  Under such circumstances, 
what meaning or defiance of meaning can be derived from this encounter?  The 
reversal of conventional subsumption/relationship between an individual and his/her 
father/fatherland in implied hierarchical terms reveals that Stephen’s ambition targets 
something beyond the classic notion of the anxiety of influence explicated by Harold 
Bloom in 1970s.  Bloom's major concern resides in how a poet may find his own 
voice and position in literary history by engaging a complex struggle with the tangled 
relationships he has with poets who preceded him.  Every poet is necessarily 
indebted to the achievement of previous generations when he is inspired to write due 
to his discovery of what it means to be a poet when reading another poet's poetry.  A 
poet will thus be inclined to produce work derivative of existing poetry, and to render 
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his creation consequently weak under the shadow of masters and giants.  However, 
in order to guarantee his survival into posterity, to make sure that future readers will 
remember his name and his unique contribution, a poet must strive to concoct an 
original poetic edifice to distance himself from his literary fathers.  In other words, 
every poet in the making lives with the anxiety of influence from his former masters.  
Framed in terms of the Oedipal struggle, a son poet endeavours to shed off the 
influence of his literary fathers, overcoming his ancestors’ shadows by claiming his 
succession to the crown, the literary authority.  What is left intact in this picture of a 
power struggle is the peaceful functioning of paternal authority in the literary domain, 
the founding efficacy of the Name of the Father in Lacanian terms. 
However, the task that Joyce assigns to himself and to his surrogate figure 
Stephen is much more radical than any kind of Bloomian/Oedipal warfare.  The 
reversal addressed by Stephen aims at a Symbolic subversion.  Instead of the 
subject’s submission to and reliance upon the efficacy and authority of the 
Father/fatherland, the Father/fatherland as a symbolic entity depends on the subject.  
With this motif of subversion in mind, when Stephen impatiently ends the dialogue by 
suggesting they change the subject because they cannot change the country, this 
response opens to a varity of interpretations.  At the most common-sensical level, the 
sentence can undoubtedly mean that ‘we can’t choose or change our native land, 
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which is tormented by coercion, humiliation and injustice, and burdened with 
paralysis; so let us not talk about it and choose another topic.’  However, I intend to 
look critically awry at this sentence, performing an act of interpretive anamorphosis 
by taking the word ‘subject’ as a pun.   Rather than shifting the topic, it is the human 
subject that is to be shifted, to be transformed.  With this pun, it is not merely that 
the meaning of the sentence is drastically modified, but that an utterly new dimension 
is summoned and demands to be unfurled.  If Joyce’s aloof attitude toward politics 
leads him to adopt a controversial distance from direct engagement and support of 
Irish nationalism, it stands to reason that his self-proclaimed (through Stephen) 
cunning by means of art targets the subjective transformation on the cultural 
landscape.  It is the transformation of the subject that, I argue, harbours the 
possibility of a new singular universal, a new Symbolic. 
In Stephen’s theory of Shakespeare, paternity is fundamentally undermined and 
declared to be a ‘legal fiction’ (U, 9.844).  From this perspective, Joyce’s cunning 
transcends the drama of projection, emulation and renovation within the rite between 
father and son, gesturing toward a ‘broader engagement with questions of 
subjectivity,’ a ‘complex interpretation and subversion of traditional literary and 
philosophical ways of articulating the self,’ and the concomitant radical restructuring 
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of a new Symbolic.225  The very conception of a new Symbolic requires further 
qualification.  Lacan’s early work has devised a sophisticated account of how 
subjectivity comes into being through the child’s encounter with the Other, who is 
simultaneously a desiring being, a network of language/discourse and a specular 
image.  The subject thus encounters the Other in the dimensions of the Real, the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary.  The essentially intricate and entangled relationship 
between the subject and the Symbolic makes it a daunting challenge to conceive the 
subject’s freedom from the effect of a nearly all-encompassing Symbolic.  In 
consequence, it appears extremely difficult to achieve a genuine cultural revolution, 
for a true revolution necessarily requires the breaching and restructuring of the 
existing Symbolic order. 
To push this line of reasoning to the extreme, it follows that a genuine cultural 
and social change must necessarily be correlative with the subject’s own ontological 
transformation in terms of self-creation.  Herein, I propose an account of the 
convergent moment of subjective transformation and symbolic revolution through 
Lacan’s reading of Joyce’s literary experimentation.  The designation of a new 
Symbolic can be truly worthy of such a designation only when artists not merely 
make new aesthetic objects to refresh and enrich the existing culture, but when they 
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work to shift the ground of the cultural edifice by changing these aesthetic parameters 
and the subjectivity that the very works of art assume.  This is precisely the effect 
that Joyce’s art achieves.  As Colin MacCabe puts it,  
[f]or readers of English literature, both adjective and noun are immediately thrown 
into doubt, it is Joyce’s texts which serve to focus and emphasize the changing 
attitudes to language and representation […] After Joyce it should be difficult not to 
write differently to our future and to read differently into our past; to admit, in all its 
embarrassing reality, the ‘‘heciten[t]’’ (FW, 119, 18) nature of any subjectivity.226 
In grasping Joyce’s revolutionary endeavour, Lacan’s encounter with Joyce does not 
amount to an application of psychoanalytic knowledge to Joyce’s work, but rather an 
investigation of the mutual engagement of Joyce’s writing in its author’s constitution 
of the self and the Symbolic.  Joyce’s writing entails ‘the sweeping away of the 
subject’s constitution in language […] [and] a consideration of how the subject had 
been undone, and how it was refounded in language.’227  In the face of flawed 
paternity, ‘instead of honoring or rendering homage to his father,’ Joyce ‘makes into 
his life goal the effort to honor his proper name.’228  In this chapter, by means of a 
theoretical detour into later Lacan and a detailed textual analysis of the ‘Scylla and 
Charybdis’ episode, I attempt to demonstrate how Joyce’s honouring of his proper 
name, through elaborate self-naming devices, gestures toward the constitution of a 
new Symbolic disengaged from the dominance of the Name of the Father. 
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In the library episode, this peculiar relationship between father and son points to 
a re-interpretation of the relationship between two giants, between Shakespeare and 
Joyce.  That is to say, Shakespeare cannot merely be a rival in the competition for 
immortality.  One of the major insights of early Lacan was that the projection and 
identification of the Imaginary needs to be rewritten with the Symbolic for the subject 
to function normally.  Since the efficacy of the Symbolic hinges on the proper 
assumption of the paternal metaphor, the Name of the Father therefore becomes the 
essential guarantor underlying the framework of the subject’s identification, 
projection and transference in the Imaginary domain. 229   In the absence of 
transference and projection supported by the underlying functioning of the Name of 
the Father, what Joyce seeks in Shakespeare cannot be formulated in terms of the 
anxiety of influence, of a crisis, in which an aspiring artist confronts an overwhelming 
presence of paternal legacy, striving ‘to outdo his rival in some infantile phallic 
competition.’230 In other words, we should not only concentrate on the Imaginary 
level, ‘where the egos of Joyce and Shakespeare meet in a spectacular and eminently 
visible clash of literary mastery,’ but must try to ‘account for naming itself as an act 
that ruptures the barrier between the symbolic and the real, an instance of 
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transgressive poesis that is always in excess of meaning-laden ego.’231  Instead, as 
Luke Thurston argues, the convergence of the two figures lies in the revelation and 
reworking of the monstrous literary thing disclosed in the very gaps of representation, 
the void marked by the flawed paternity.  The dialectic of the literary thing and the 
(re)constitution of subjectivity as the speaking being, parlêtre in Lacan’s words, finds 
expression in Shakespeare’s tragedies, especially in Othello, Hamlet and Macbeth, 
and in Joyce’s frequent, enigmatic references to Hamlet, King Hamlet’s spirit, and the 
grotesque representation of the monstrous character of Iago.   
Seen in this light, we are in a better position to unravel Stephen’s idiosyncratic 
theory of Shakespeare as an interrogation of paternal authority.  We are also able to 
explain why its starting point would be Hamlet’s encounter with the King’s ghost, for 
it embodies a sinister opening of representation, of meaning-making, a hole in the 
fabric of the Symbolic, an uncanny encounter with the Real which derails reality at 
the epistemological level and constitutes a narcissistic wound at the ontological level.  
What Stephen finds so urgent in the parallel experience of Shakespeare is precisely 
how the epistemological crisis and the ontological wounds may be successfully dealt 
with in the artist’s writing of his wounds into his works.  Marking one’s name thus 
appears to be a highly drastic measure for survival, both on the personal, existential 
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level and on the public, symbolic level.  Once disillusioned by the decline of 
paternity, and deprived of ideological fantasies, to sign one’s name corresponds to the 
inauguration of new master signifiers on the way to constructing of a new Symbolic.  
The central thesis of the present chapter is that in the act of self-naming, Joyce’s 
cunning resides in the writing of the singular into the universal, epitomised by 
Stephen’s private theory of Shakespeare, by investigating how life transforms into art 
and how a national bard gives birth to himself through appropriating his life in the 
construction of representative masterpieces.  That is to say, the self-naming process 
of the singular subjectivity of an artist corresponds to the naming of a new Symbolic.  
Joyce’s ambition gestures toward the possibility of a singular universal. 
Firstly, I would like to clarify the notion of ‘singular universal’ by distinguishing 
it from the underlying relationship between particularity and universality in 
multiculturalism’s tolerance and celebration of difference.  The ideology of 
multiculturalism is betrayed in its emptied gesture of enriching the cultural field with 
difference through the incorporation of particularity.  This incorporation is null 
because at the same time the privileged version of certain particularities still maintain 
a universal status.232  In short, in multiculturalism the functioning of the Symbolic 
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Other remains intact, even solidified, while the challenge of the particular is 
neutralised in service of the existing universal. 
Secondly, I take the assumption of a singular universal as a necessary ethical act 
if we try to follow the logical consequence of the thesis that the Other doesn’t exist.  
On the one hand, the notion of a singular universal designates that the singular is 
elevated to the universal.  On the other hand, the universal comes into being or 
renews itself only through a singular being’s contribution.  Underlying this 
conception of a singular universal is that the subject’s acknowledgement of the 
non-existence or inconsistency of the Other would force him to traverse fantasy and to 
encounter his own being as nothingness, namely, to assume the destitution of his own 
being.  The subsequent theoretical moment next to this enlightenment can be 
conceived as bifurcated; the subject either falls back to the previous Symbolic and 
subjective arrangement, or enacts a leap of faith into the ethical act of assuming full 
responsibility by providing new master signifiers to respond to the lack of the Other.  
Instead of waiting to be given a name by symbolic authorities, the subject takes 
responsibility for making his own names, his own version of the master signifiers. 
This act of self-naming is truly an ethical breakthrough, for the subject no longer 
                                                                                                                                                        
or her privileged position. In other words, multiculturalism is a racism that empties its own position of 
all positive content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist, he or she does not oppose to the Other 
the particular values of its own culture), but nonetheless retains this position as the privileged empty 
point of universality from which one is able to appreciate properly other particular cultures—the 
multiculturalist’s respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority’ 
(AF, 96). 
136 
 
 
submits to the existing authorities as guarantors of the meaning of his existence and 
his action, no longer lives and acts on the behalf of the Other.  Instead, the subject 
breaches the seemingly all-encompassing Symbolic, taking the lack of the Other as 
his cause, embarking on the task to restructure the Symbolic.  It is ethical because 
the subject manages to take responsibility at the most fundamental level; it is a 
breakthrough because the Symbolic foundation is subjected to a radical reworking.  
The subject writes his/her singularity into the universal, renewing both the public and 
the personal domains, essentially restructuring the ontological paradigms and the 
epistemological parameters, achieving subjective transformation and cultural 
revolution in a single act.  I suggest that Joyce, through Stephen’s Shakespeare 
theory, attempts to produce an account of the singular universal as a possible solution 
to navigating the problematic cultural politics of his time, rather than offering another 
particular version in confrontation with the dominant version of Shakespeare as one of 
the many alternatives among various forms of ideology, including imperialism, 
nationalism, Irish Revivalism and so on. 
 
 
II. 
First, I trace how the process of constituting a new Symbolic embodied in a 
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singular universal requires Joyce to work from and work through the historical 
materiality of cultural politics and the psychological materiality of paternity. 
It is far from accidental that Stephen chooses Shakespeare in his intervention in 
the cultural scene in turn-of-the-century Dublin, where the struggle for recognition, 
cultural capital and authority is pervasive among people from different camps.  The 
Shakespeare controversy is a vehicle for representing the historical disputes between 
Edward Dowden and W. B. Yeats regarding Shakespeare criticism and their different 
stances toward the Irish renaissance.  In this regard, Stephen’s private theory of 
Shakespeare may be taken as the third alternative, a way of steering between Scylla 
and Charybdis, represented by Dowden and Yeats respectively, and, broadly speaking, 
through imperialism and nationalism in competition for cultural capital.  As Andrew 
Gibson points out, the meaning of the chapter title has long been disputed, almost to 
the extent that it appears ‘indeterminable.’233  However, the very denotation of 
‘opposition or fissure’ is present and ‘perceptible everywhere,’ which indicates that 
the central problem for Stephen and for Joyce is ‘how to steer between contending 
opponents recur[ring] in the Irish writing of the 1890s and 1900s.’234 
Joyce’s attempt ‘to read within the then dominant criticism’ is part of ‘the subject 
matter of Ulysses when Stephen voices his interpretation of Shakespeare in the 
                                                     
233 Andrew Gibson, Joyce’s Revenge: History, Politics, and Aesthetics in Ulysses (Oxford: Oxford 
Uiversity Press, 2002), p. 60. 
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National Library.’235  Despite his denial of belief in his own Shakespeare theory in 
response to Eglinton’s query, Stephen’s seriousness and investment are betrayed by 
his formal gesture of sending a telegram to Mulligan to call attendance to his own 
speech.  In the course of the dialogue, Stephen remarks silently: ‘See this. 
Remember [...] Listen’ (U, 9.294), and later says that ‘in the future, the sister of the 
past, I may see myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that which then I shall 
be’ (U, 9.383-5), as well as observing Eglinton’s body language, notably when he is 
‘leaning back to judge’ (U, 9.152).  Stephen frames the library dialogue in 
self-reflective terms and is concerned about how his own speech is perceived and 
judeged by his audience.  For Stephen, it is hardly a casual daily conversation among 
literates, but a slice of history that he deliberately extracts to be remembered.  
Stephen’s private theory of Shakespeare should not be a whimsical pasttime of a 
young intellectual, but a significant publicly-staged intervention into the Irish cultural 
scene of Joyce’ time.  Moreover, this speech is staged for the gaze of his audience of 
the present as well as for the future.  The impact of an intervention into the present 
cultural scene is supposed to be appreciated in the light of later day development.  In 
this regard, I argue that Stephen’s Shakespeare speech is like a manifesto gesturing to 
a future possibility, the possibility of a singular universal that is yet to be realized and 
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developed.  In the context of Ulysses, the experimentation of a concrete singular 
universal is to be explored in my textual analysis in the ensuing chapters.     
Stephen’s dismal situation is staged in the episode.  He is literally excluded and 
his Shakespeare theory falls on deaf ears.  For instance, while George Russell 
collects works from young poets, Stephen is left out of consideration.  Russell even 
departs in the middle of the speech.  Eglinton refuses to publish his speech in Dana 
and teases Stephen about his quest for monetary reward for writing.  Mulligan and 
Haines are invited to the gathering, centred on George Moore, while Stephen is 
excluded from the circle.  The self-aggrandising feeling and complacent tone of the 
Revivalists is echoed in sentences such as ‘we are becoming important, it seems’ (U, 9. 
311-2) and ‘Are we going to be read? I feel we are’ (U, 9.322-3).  Moreover, when 
Stephen, as an artist, tries ‘to forge in the smithy of [his] soul the uncreated 
conscience of [his] race,’ his invisibility and insignificance are reaffirmed by 
statements such as, ‘Our national epic has yet to be written, Dr Sigerson says. Moore 
is the man for it’ (U, 9.309-10).  Faced with such public humiliation, Stephen 
murmurs pensively, identifying his exile among his countrymen, ‘Cordelia. Cordoglio. 
Lir’s loneliest daughter’ (U, 9.314). 
The telegram episode signifies another kind of rejection and exclusion that 
Stephen faces. Stephen’s telegram to Mulligan cites Meredith’s definition of the 
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sentimentalist as ‘he who would enjoy without incurring the immense debtorship for a 
thing done’ (U, 9, 550-1).  According to John Nash, this piece, on the one hand, 
betrays ‘a complex denial of sentimentality for the loss of readership,’ for the 
telegram is ‘the only circulated piece of Stephen’s writing to be received and read by 
another.’236  On the other, the line of the telegram refers to both Haines and Mulligan, 
for they ‘would irresponsibly ‘‘enjoy’’ while ignoring their political debts: for Haines 
‘‘history is to blame’’ while for Mulligan there is no blame.’237  This irresponsibility 
is physically displayed in Haines’ absence, his having gone to purchase Hyde’s 
Lovesongs of Connacht, and Mulligan’s belated arrival with the manners of a jester.  
Therefore, the telegram hints at ‘the refusal of responsibility by an English 
audience.’238 
It is in such an unwelcome context that Stephen attempts to formulate his 
Shakespeare theory and steers through the troubled waters of cultural politics.  At the 
end of the library episode, Stephen remarks, ‘My will: his will that fronts me. Seas 
between’ (U, 9.1202).  According to Robert H. Bell, there is a pun, ‘a twinning of 
two distinct discourses’ in the sentence, ‘referring literally to the struggle between 
himself and Buck Mulligan, and metaphorically to his invention of “my will,” his 
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version of Shakespeare.’239  Stephen is to demonstrate his distinct will through his 
own version of Will Shakespeare.  As Stephen’s Shakespeare theory will show, his 
intervention in cultural politics, though deployed in an attempt for recognition, does 
not merely amount to an Oedipal struggle and cannot be solely contained in reductive 
hegemonic competition with British Imperialism and Irish Revivalism, represented by 
Dowden and Yeats.  To put it more precisely, Joyce did not simply write the library 
episode to take revenge on the group who had once ignored him on in Dublin.  His 
version of ‘will’ is not merely a will to symbolic capital and cultural power, but aims 
at a radical subjective and symbolic transformation. 
 
 
III.  
Stephen proposes his private theory of Shakespeare, gesturing how a new poet 
and a new Symbolic might be created in a single move in response to Eglinton’s 
lament that ‘Our young Irish bards […] have yet to create a figure which the world 
will set beside Saxon Shakespeare's Hamlet though I admire him, as old Ben did, on 
this side idolatry’ (U, 9.43-5).  It is noteworthy that the father makes his presence 
known as a ghost; ‘Hamlet, I am thy father's spirit’ (U, 9.170).  Why this 
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arrangement?  And what is a ghost?  Stephen replies with a precise definition: 
‘What is a ghost? Stephen said with tingling energy. One who has faded into 
impalpability through death, through absence, through change of manners’ (U, 9. 
47-8).  Thurston suggests that this appearance of the ghost is related to the central 
question of how Joyce approaches subjectivity.  He makes explicit that the central 
problem in Joyce is ‘that of the ‘‘I’’ understood not simply as a character in the 
Freudian psyche but as an enigmatic problem of epiphany or apparition,’ and that the 
use of an apparition is ‘associated not with the unconscious […] but with the 
uncanny.’240 A ghost is someone who is excluded, exiled, out of joint.  A ghost or an 
apparition is something unreal because it tears a hole in the fabric of reality.  Its 
uncanny presence is an intrusion into the normal functioning of the social-symbolic 
plane and disturbs the representational framework.  A father reveals his presence to 
the son as a ghost only when he betrays his (mal)function as the Name of the Father.  
The father’s symbolic efficacy in designating/metaphorising the desire of the mother 
is thus put into question.  In Hamlet’s encounter, and what Stephen detects in 
Shakespeare’s world, is a dramatisation of ‘the destitution of paternal authority.’241  
The appearance of a ghost father itself constitutes paternity’s own ‘flawed 
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embodiment,’ and works as ‘a linguistic remainder.’ 242   In Stephen’s eyes, 
Shakespeare’s world is one marked with the decline of the father: 
the theme of the false or the usurping or the adulterous brother or all three in one is 
to Shakespeare, what the poor are not, always with him. The note of banishment, 
banishment from the heart, banishment from home, sounds uninterruptedly from 
The Two Gentlemen of Verona onward till Prospero breaks his staff, buries it certain 
fathoms in the earth and drowns his book. (U, 9.997-1002) 
Shakespeare and his characters are burdened with a troubled legacy which renders the 
father/son rite problematic.  Stephen would argue that such a dramatisation of 
distorted national history/family romances results literally from the author’s writing 
his life into his work: 
Is it possible that that player Shakespeare, a ghost by absence, and in the vesture of 
buried Denmark, a ghost by death, speaking his own words to his own son's name 
(had Hamnet Shakespeare lived he would have been prince Hamlet's twin) is it 
possible, I want to know, or probable that he did not draw or foresee the logical 
conclusion of those premises: you are the dispossessed son: I am the murdered 
father: your mother is the guilty queen, Ann Shakespeare, born Hathaway?  (U, 9. 
174-80). 
Before commenting on the relationship between life and work, I would like to 
emphasise the radical impact that the malfunctioning of the Name of the Father may 
leave on representation, subjectivity, fantasy and jouissance.  The Name of the 
Father is what intervenes in the symbiotic relation between the child and the mother, 
providing a metaphorisation of the desire of the mother, mediating the jouissance both 
of his/her own bodily enjoyment and that of the (m)Other.  The Father’s Naming is 
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to name the lack of the (m)Other, and ‘in referring to nothing with concrete 
embodiment, to no empirical organ, the Phallus belongs to the domain of the 
signifier.’243  The Name of the Father hence is the necessary third term to render the 
subject’s life liveable, providing master signifiers and their concomitant instalment of 
fantasy.  The Symbolic rewrites the Imaginary duality with the third term of the 
paternal metaphor.  As Harari puts it, ‘[s]ignification is necessarily phallic.’244  The 
decline of paternal metaphor necessarily entails the shattering of the fantasy plane too, 
and ‘[w]hen the fantasmatic frame disintegrates, the subject undergoes a ‘‘loss of 
reality’’ and starts to perceive reality as an ‘‘irreal’’ nightmareish universe with no 
firm ontological foundation’ (PF, 66).  Reality, representation and fantasy are on the 
same side.  The dichotomy does not lie between reality and fantasy, but between the 
Real and reality with representation and fantasy as support underneath.245  The 
decline of paternity would thus necessarily lead to the breakdown of symbolic 
efficacy in representation and disturb the subject’s sense of reality and enjoyment. 
In the case of Stephen Dedalus, the transmission of legacy from father to son is 
problematic in the very ritual of transferring his name.  Richard Brandon Kershner 
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comments on Stephen’s process of becoming disillusioned, saying that ‘[a]t each 
significant stage of the development of Stephen’s consciousness, he undergoes a 
period of painful sensitivity to ‘‘raw’’ language, language that seems in some respects 
to lack denotation.’246  The appearance of raw language, I argue, designates the 
moment in which the Symbolic loses its efficacy in its function of meaning-making, 
gesturing toward the point of unknotting.  As Joyce’s detailed account shows, 
Stephen’s sense of reality is broken.  He passively encounters the intrusion of the 
Real in the instance of so-called raw language. 
In A Portrait, Stephen was led by his father to Queen’s college to be shown the 
trace of a name with the identical initials ‘S. D.’, shared between father and son, 
carved on the desk, but only to encounter the strange word ‘fetus,’ which intrudes and 
disturbs the field of vision, shattering his sense of reality.  After this encounter, 
Stephen’s own repressed desires and fantasies leak and seize him overwhelmingly. 
The following extract demonstrates the uncanny, macabre nature of this experience: 
They passed into the anatomy theatre where Mr. Dedalus, the porter aiding him, 
searched the desk for his initials. Stephen remained in the background, depressed 
more than ever by the darkness and silence of the theatre and by the air it wore of 
jaded and formal study. On the desk he read the word fetus cut several times in the 
dark stained wood. The sudden legend startled his blood. He seemed to feel the 
absent students of the college about him and to shrink from their company [...] But 
the word and the vision capered before his eyes as he walked back across the 
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quadrangle and towards the college gate. It shocked him to find in the outer world a 
trace of what he had deemed till then a brutish and individual malady of his own 
mind. His monstrous reveries came thronging into his memory. They too had sprung 
before him, suddenly and furiously, out of mere words. He had soon given in to 
them, and allowed them to sweep across and abase his intellect. (P, 252) 
The gruesome appearance of the raw language of ‘fetus’ marks the intrusion of 
the Real and leaves Stephen puzzled and flooded with jouissance without the 
protection of a sound framework of reality supported by the potent Symbolic. The 
gaping stain of the word ‘fetus’ constitutes precisely a blot, the Lacanian gaze in the 
field of vision, breaching reality and the representational plane.  Such an uncanny 
experience necessarily puts the authority of the father into question and undermines 
Stephen’s sense of reality and identity.  His father’s instructions sound hollow and 
meaningless, resonating feebly with repetitious words: ‘I mixed with fine decent 
fellows […] But we were all gentlemen, Stephen—at least I hope we were—and 
bloody good honest Irishmen too. That’s the kind of fellows I want you to associate 
with, fellows of the right kidney’ (P, 253-4).  These lines are less wise advice than 
embarrassing prattle.  The voice of the father is finally reduced to a pathetic ‘sob,’ 
which itself embodies the presence of the Lacanian voice.247  This confrontation with 
the father’s irrationality, impotence and enjoyment in the failure to pass on authority 
and assume his symbolic mandate has drastic consequences for Stephen’s subjectivity.  
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147 
 
 
Stephen experiences the existential vertigo of unreality without the shield of the 
fantasmatic frame, lost in the hole of the fabric of the Symbolic.  Joyce describes 
Stephen’s loss of reality as follows: 
He heard the sob passing loudly down his father’s throat and opened his eyes with a 
nervous impulse. The sunlight breaking suddenly on his sight turned the sky and 
clouds into a fantastic world of sombre masses with lacelike spaces of dark rosy 
light. His very brain was sick and powerless. He could scarcely interpret the letters 
of the signboards of the shop. By his monstrous way of life he seemed to have put 
himself beyond the limit of reality (P, 254). 
That is to say, the malfunctioning of the paternal metaphor renders Stephen lost 
between two deaths, leading him to experience his black Sabbath of existence in terms 
of horror and unreality contra Antigone’s splendid version of being between two 
deaths portrayed by Lacan in Seminar VII.  In a similar vein, Maud Ellmann, 
commenting on this episode and the text of A Portrait as a whole, identifies how 
naming itself becomes ‘maiming,’248 arguing that the portraiture that Joyce devises is 
not so much a representation and remembrance of a well-rounded character as a 
‘disremembering’ process, by which the subject undergoes ‘fading,’ ‘dissolving into a 
nameless scar.’249  Ellmann claims that A Portrait ‘conceives identity as a scar 
without an author, without an origin, and at last without even a name.’250 As a double 
scar of the subject and of the text, A Portrait is ‘radically opposed to the tradition of 
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the human subject and the orthodox conception of the subject matter of the text.’251  
The subject that emerges is more like a form of punctuation, like ‘the silence woven 
into music, the absence woven into vision,’ or ‘the pulsation of the unconscious.’252 
How does Stephen cope with this drastic existential crisis, the ontological vertigo 
in the face of the eclipse, or better, the annulment of the Symbolic?  Significantly, 
Stephen strives to drag himself out of the horrifying derailment by relocating himself 
in a social and geographical context, namely, by re-anchoring himself in the Symbolic 
through renaming.  Stephen pronounces, ‘I am Stephen Dedalus. I am walking 
beside my father whose name is Simon Dedalus. We are in Cork, in Ireland. Cork is a 
city. Our room is in the Victoria Hotel. Victoria and Stephen and Simon. Simon and 
Stephen and Victoria. Names’ (P, 254).  This gesture of re-anchoring oneself back 
into the established Symbolic through existing names shows the intricate relationship 
betweem symbolization and subjectivity, displaying the pivotal roles name and 
naming play with regard to the construction and maintainence of subjectivity.  It is 
not yet a creative self-naming yet in the direction of constructing a new Symbolic, but 
a desperate attempt of inscribing oneself back into established Symbolic framework to 
avoid existential crisis.  
In ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ Stephen again encounters the crippled father figure 
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and feels extremely isolated from his father: ‘[H]urrying to her squalid deathlair from 
gay Paris on the quayside I touched his hand. The voice, new warmth, speaking. Dr 
Bob Kenny is attending her. The eyes that wish me well. But do not know me’ (U, 
9.825-7).  There is little hope for the successful transmission of paternal legacy.  
Right after this brief piece of memory concerning the father, Stephen spells out his 
famous speech on paternity as legal fiction: 
A father, Stephen said, battling against hopelessness, is a necessary evil [...] 
Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man. It is a mystical 
estate, an apostolic succession, from only begetter to only begotten. On that mystery 
and not on the madonna which the cunning Italian intellect flung to the mob of 
Europe the church is founded and founded irremovably because founded, like the 
world, macro- and microcosm, upon the void. Upon incertitude, upon unlikelihood. 
Amor matris, subjective and objective genitive, may be the only true thing in life. 
Paternity may be a legal fiction. Who is the father of any son that any son should 
love him or he any son? (U, 9.828-45, emphasis added) 
Paternal metaphor, the phallic signification built on void, is nothing but a necessary 
evil, a necessary fiction of legality.  The entire Symbolic edifice and subjectivity are 
centred on the void, the nothingness, the pure negativity.  The Name of the Father is 
to acknowledge properly and necessarily the lack of the Other, to temporarily stabilise 
enjoyment through this naming.  As Rabaté points out, ‘[p]aternity points to the void, 
the unconscious of origins, the unconscious hoarding of signs or letters, and yet it 
remains the model of any creative gesture.’253  The notion of connecting Joyce with 
God, with creator, is heavily concerned with the naming function of the Father upon 
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the void and the possibility of creating something out of nothing through naming.  
Artistic inspiration finds its roots in divine creation: ‘to speak is to act, to name is to 
create: the logos of God, the fiat lux of the Creator Father, effects what it 
proclaims.’254  It is thus paternity as an ‘act of authoring,’ a notion of ‘literary 
creation ex nihilo rather than human creation with the help of a woman’ that is at stake 
in Joyce’s self-naming.255  Joyce becomes his own father, fathering his world in 
making his own proper name part of the world of literature and in creating a fictional 
world within the Symbolic cultural terrain. 
The radical quality of Joyce’s naming and creation cannot be encapsulated by the 
typical oedipal struggle for recognition of established authority in the Other, nor can it 
be interpreted as merely another example of the anxious, adolescent scenario of 
rebellion against the accepted categories of identity as Kent Baxer contends.  By 
interpreting naming as an adolescent tension between the father and the son, Baxer 
suggests the latter fails to transcend the confinement imposed by the authority and 
genealogy of the father.  He remarks that:  
Desire is inscribed in the very (im)possibility of the proper name itself. The 
adolescent attempts to renounce the name of the father and claim his own name and 
identity, but names are always already part of a genealogy, are always already the 
name of the father. The adolescent’s attempt to make a name for himself is both 
facilitated and frustrated by the ‘double law of the name’ that creates the illusion 
that the proper name signifies an individuality, but always expresses this 
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individuality in reference to the name of the father.256 
Baxer seems to claim that using the father’s surname amounts to falling into the 
constraint of genealogy and that nothing fundamentally challenges the established 
authority of the father.  Moreover, Baxer holds that what Stephen and other 
adolescents do in their rebellion and search for an identity and name is no more than a 
choice among the established categories accumulated in the cultural terrain.  It 
therefore follows that when Stephen plays with his surname and renders it ‘a Greek 
bastardization,’ it merely demonstrates ‘how Stephen has taken a name from an 
existing system of meaning and made it meaningful to himself.’257  In Baxer’s 
reading, naming for oneself or inventing one’s own name is neutralised as it remains a 
choice among the existing categories; the question is only directed to ‘which 
father?’258  Joyce’s agenda is not apropos of opting for this possibility and excluding 
others in the current situation, but rather introducing and inventing one that has never 
existed.  Baxer’s account implicitly rules out the possibility that a fundamentally 
new avenue might be introduced under a new name.  He therefore misunderstands 
Joyce’s endeavour and underestimates the radical nature of his achievement. 
Joyce’s strategy for building his own subjectivity defies and transgresses this 
classic categorisation and Lacan’s encounter with Joyce leads him to revise his 
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theories about the end of psychoanalysis in clinical practice.  Instead of the 
destitution of the subject and the traversal of fantasy as the end/aim of analysis, Lacan 
proposes the concept of identifying with the sinthome as an alternative outcome.  
Here, we can detect a relativisation of the Name of the Father in Lacan’s thinking.  
Rather than the singular Name of the Father, we now have plural Names of the Father 
by way of symptoms.  As Chiesa cogently argues, later Lacan would radically revise 
his thinking regarding the ethics of psychoanalysis to avoid the entrapment of the 
tragic path taken by Antigone and the Buddhist dwelling on nothingness, advocating a 
third mode of identification with the newly-invented, self-manufacturing sinthome.259  
Commenting on the analytic goal, Paul Verhaeghe and Fredric Declercq remark that 
‘[t]he symptom is what defines mankind, and as such it cannot be rectified or cured. 
This is Lacan’s final conclusion: there is no subject without a symptom.’260  This is 
precisely Joyce’s way of making his own name; by inventing his own sinthome, 
inscribing it into the Symbolic and hence contributing to his own version of a cultural 
revolution. 
In Joyce’s world, paternity is defective, and the subject inevitably faces the 
existential task of surviving.  Whereas the normal neurotic subject assumes the 
paternal authority with doubt, Joyce keenly perceives the Symbolic to be mere fiction 
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covering over a void, over nothingness.  This insight emerges at the 
convergence/intersection of epistemology and ontology, whereupon an 
epistemological revelation coincides with an ontological battle for survival.  Thus, a 
key question here would be how Joyce avoids madness and becomes an individual, as 
Lacan likes to say.  Joyce’s literary ambition is not a game of Oedipal rivalry; his 
aesthetic practice is not for decorative pleasure, but an ontological struggle toward 
survival and self-assertion, not within the existing cultural framework, but in a fight 
against existential abyss. 
Rather than the ‘cunning Italian intellect’ based upon the fiction of the Madonna, 
Joyce betrays the fictional status of the Symbolic, this very foundational lack of the 
Other.  For his subjectivity to survive and for a new Symbolic to be established, 
Joyce invents new names to replace the declining Name of the Father.  Honouring 
one’s father would amount to ‘a way of linking up with symbolic debt,’ something 
which Joyce would like to avoid.  As such, ‘instead of honoring or rendering homage 
to his father,’ Joyce ‘makes into his life’s goal the effort to honor his proper name.’261 
In place of paternal metaphor, Joyce cunningly inserts his own name. As Chiesa 
puts it, 
the name “Joyce” literally embodies a subjective place-holder for the lack of the 
Other; and it does so by means of a particular way of writing. The name of “Joyce” 
is a ‘‘singular universal’’: Joyce reaches a substitutive version of the Name of the 
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Father—thus individualized and individuated and anti-ideological by 
definition—precisely by writing his jouis-sens.262 
Lacan designates Joyce as an individual precisely because of his ability to achieve a 
new Symbolic through the instalment of a singular universal and his know-how in 
dealing with his own jouissance.  Chiesa summarises this point succinctly: 
Joyce is ‘‘the individual’’ for Lacan in so far as he succeeds in subjectivising himself  
by (partially) individuating objet petit a, the lack of the Symbolic; the individual is 
not the ideological One but stands for another modality of the One, another 
(non-psychotic) way of inhabiting the Symbolic, ‘‘starting’’ from its real lack.263 
The assumption of a singular universal betrays the structural correspondence of the 
subject’s act in place of his subjective destitution.  In the state of the subjective 
destitution, the subject’s status as void and the inconsistency of the Other are duely 
acknowledged.  The Other relies on the subject’s authentic act, the subject’s 
participation to make it function properly.  Žižek argues for the formula of ‘A(the 
Other) = a (objet a as a symbol for the subject’s act)’ (IR, 144-7).  On the one hand, 
he claims that ‘it is the very supplement of my ‘‘subjective’’ act of decision […] 
which changes the dispersed, ‘‘not-all’’ collection of signifiers into the ‘‘objective’’ 
order of the big Other;’ on the other hand, Žižek also states ‘in so far as the big Other 
functions as the guarantee of the meaning-to-come, the very fact of the big Other 
involves the subjective gesture of precipitation.’264  For the universal functioning of 
the law, the operation of the Symbolic, to be effective, there must be the assumption 
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of the subject, the singular contribution from the subject.  As Zupančič cogently 
argues, ‘[t]he reason why the subject cannot be effaced from the ‘‘structure’’ of the 
ethical’ lies in the fact that ‘the gesture by which every subject, by means of his action 
posits the universal, performs a certain operation of universalization.’265 
As I have explicated at length in the previous chapter regarding my theoretical 
intention underlying this dissertation, while the normal neurotic subject strives to 
undergo the traversal of fundamental fantasy and procure the freedom to assume an 
individualised new Symbolic, Joyce does not need to undertake this traversal in the 
very beginning.  On the contrary, he is ‘already separated from the Symbolic; instead, 
he needs to create his founding Master Signifiers.’266  The individualised master 
signifier that Joyce is to assume and endorse is nothing more than his own proper 
name as an internationally acclaimed author.  As Jacques-Alain Miller remarks, 
‘[Joyce’s] authentic Name-of-the-Father is his name as a writer [...] his literary 
production allows him to relocate himself within the meaning he lacked.’267 In lieu of 
the defective Father, the name of ‘Joyce’ ‘literally embodies a subjective place-holder 
for the lack in the Other, and it does so by means of a particular way of writing.’268  
The name ‘Joyce’ thus becomes a master signifier, transcending neighbourhood and 
                                                     
265 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, p. 61.  
266 Chiesa, ‘Lacan with Artaud’, p. 357.  
267 Miller, quoted in Chieza, ibid., p. 358-7. 
268 Chiesa, ‘Lacan with Artaud’, p. 358. 
156 
 
 
participating in the cultural capital to circulate worldwide.  The name ‘Joyce’ 
assumes the status of ‘the singular universal’ : ‘Joyce reaches a substitutive version of 
the Name-of-the-Father—thus individualized and individuated and anti-ideological by 
definition—precisely by writing his jouis-sens.’269  Joyce’s literary act of inventive 
writing is an ethical act for he actively takes up the responsibility of constructing the 
Other, rather than passively submitting to existing authority, by gesturing toward a 
singular universal. Consequently, we can easily detect that behind Joyce’s half-joking 
ambition to keep academics busy for centuries in deciphering his works looms large 
his endeavour for subjective survival, his anxiety to be recognised symbolically 
through his name as a writer inscribed in the Other, through creating and becoming a 
master signifier.  This is Joyce’s peculiar way of writing his own version of a 
singular universal. 
 
 
IV.  
The structural dissolution caused by the deficiency of the Name-of-the-Father, 
requires a re-constructing of the unchained knots at the three levels of the Imaginary, 
the Symbolic and the Real.  Joyce as a writer is his newly invented image, his newly 
devised ego upon which his subjectivity essentially relies.  When Joyce writes, his 
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identity and his entire existential weight are at stake and his writing is his means to 
carry out his ethical act in constructing an existence for his subjectivity.  Seen in this 
light, we can now better appreciate and interpret the peculiar relationship between 
work and life in Joyce’s writing and in Stephen’s private theory of Shakespeare.  
Russell protests and refutes Stephen’s idiosyncratic, biographical reading of 
Shakespeare:  
Interesting only to the parish clerk, I mean, we have the plays. I mean when we read 
the poetry of King Lear what is it to us how the poet lived? As for living, our 
servants can do that for us, Villiers de l'Isle has said. Peeping and prying into 
greenroom gossip of the day, the poet's drinking, the poet's debts. We have King 
Lear: and it is immortal.’ (U, 9.184-8) 
Russell’s impatient refutation actually bears its own merit and can be regarded as 
an advocacy of the New Critics’ ‘intentional fallacy’ avant la lettre.  However, the 
relationship between life and work that Stephen presents is not that of reflection.  
Nor does he aim at an anecdotal, biographical, historicist approach to art.  There is, 
rather, a peculiar avenue for recognition other than reflection that Stephen strives to 
make explicit.  Stephen has his own agenda for subjective and symbolic constitution 
when he makes efforts to incorporate as many biographical elements as he can in 
interpreting Shakespeare. Right at the beginning of his lecture, Stephen says to 
himself: ‘Local colour. Work in all you know. Make them accomplices’ (U, 9.158).  
In addition to the current Shakespeare motifs, namely, ‘the theme of the false or the 
usurping or the adulterous brother’ (U, 9.997-8), Stephen argues that Shakespeare 
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hides and scatters his brothers’ names in real life when composing his masterpieces: 
‘He had three brothers, Gilbert, Edmund, Richard.’ (U, 9.894), continuing to point out 
that ‘[i]n his trinity of black Wills, the villain shakebags, Iago, Richard Crookback, 
Edmund in King Lear, two bear the wicked uncles' names. Nay, that last play was 
written or being written while his brother Edmund lay dying in Southwark’ (U, 9. 
911-4). 
Readers can detect how seriously Joyce takes Stephen’s private theory of 
Shakespeare, as the manoeuvres Stephen identifies in Shakespeare become common 
practice in Joyce’s own writings.  Critics would hardly miss the fact that Joyce: (1) 
playfully scatters autobiographical and literary allusions throughout his works; and (2) 
constantly smuggles in proper names and plays with sounds, letters and senses.  The 
former is part of Joyce’s project of turning himself and his real life acquaintances into 
fictional characters which he can return to time and again to reshape, revamp and 
re-evaluate.  Readers of Ulysses easily find themselves cast in the similar and 
sympathetic position of Stephen with his idiosyncratic reading of Shakespeare, 
encountering autobiographical references, in-jokes and self-reflexive commentary 
everywhere.  For some critics, this mixing of life and work by the author himself is 
frustrating and confusing.  According to Robert Adams, Joyce intrudes frequently by 
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inserting autobiographical facts which are ‘beyond fictional explanation.’270  Joyce is 
‘present’ everywhere ‘as an unexplained animus; he omits, arranges, and juxtaposes 
elements and occasionally, to remind us of his power, he appears as an agent of 
confusion, bafflement, and deliberate frustration.’271 
Other critics have celebrated this practice in the name of ‘Joyicity’ as a 
demonstration of Joyce’s comic presence.  Joyce’s allusions in Ulysses reveal an 
‘antic’ Joyce ‘clowning around.’272  As Bell argues, Joyce metamorphoses into many 
narrative guises: ‘Joyicity thus illustrates a version of personal identity, affording us 
glimpses of its author, nowhere to be seen, everywhere present, like Shakespeare ‘‘a 
ghost, a shadow now.’”273  Bell detects in Joyce’s comic play with autobiographical 
allusions a serious agenda of identity-making.  He quotes Roland Barthes, saying ‘it 
is the work which affects life, not the life which affects the work.’  Bell claims  
‘[w]hatever happened to the actual James Augustine Joyce, this purveyor of joyicity is 
subject to the laws of folly, drawing all things down and up: in this sense the author 
becomes a series of parodic “selves,” perpetually sacrificed and redeemed.’ 274  
Instead of reflecting life in art, the attempt to write life into his work aims to achieve a 
symbolic and subjective function, to produce an identity effect.  This effect can only 
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be conferred by the work’s effect upon life, not the other way around. 
In contrast to Adams’ position and in agreement with Bell’s argument, I contend 
that in the library chapter, through the idiosyncratic theory of Shakespeare, Joyce 
launches his own theory of the intimate connection between life and work which is 
more than a case of mere representation or reflection.  It is thus less a work which 
reflects autobiographical facts than a life constructed through the writing of the work 
on a life.  The function of Joyce’s writing as his sinthome is of fundamental 
ontological importance.  To put it succinctly, Joyce ‘devotes his life to it [his writing], 
because it is his life.’275  With the aid of the conception of know-how (the subject’s 
savoir-faire of his jouissance) and the singular universal, the relation between life and 
work is cast in a new light.  Therein lies one of the basic claims of my position: as a 
subject unbounded by the Name of the Father, the traditional privileged signifier in 
organising our culture and normal neurotic subjectivity, Joyce’s writing is his way of 
constructing his life, his enjoyment and his meaning of life.  The ontological stakes 
are thus extremely high.  It is not that he bases his writing on his life or that his work 
reflects his biography or historical facts.  Rather, he is his writing; his life, his 
subjectivity depends on his work, his assumption and practice of being a writer.  
That is, in gesturing toward the possibility of the singular universal, the subject’s 
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work on life, the subject’s savoir-faire of his jouissance harbours his freedom, his 
ethical choice, and decision.  In his work on and invention of his life, his ontological 
being at the most fundamental is at stake. 
Joyce establishes his subjectivity and the world upon the void.  In his oeuvre, 
we encounter the recurrent artist-god motif and Joyce’s ubiquitous presence in his 
work, the consubstantiality between the author and the characters, the 
consubstantiality between the father and the son, between Bloom and Stephen and so 
on.276  Stephen contemplates: ‘So in the future, the sister of the past, I may see 
myself as I sit here now but by reflection from that which then I shall be’ (U, 9. 
383-5).  Joyce is here aware that the artist to be is in the making.  Joyce only 
becomes Joyce by creating his masterpieces.  Brivic praises this endeavour, 
remarking that ‘Joyce respected God sufficiently to suspect that the Deity might value 
his honest emulation more than his slavishness.’277 
Joyce is in accord with Lacan in that both of them acknowledge language’s 
function in shaping subjectivity and the world.  As Brivic puts it, ‘[f]or Lacan, 
consciousness is made up of language that aims at an object it can never reach, while 
Joyce developed as a model of life the idea of writer projecting words into a world he 
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can never occupy.’278  Furthermore, Joycean literary experiment expands beyond 
what is known of/as the world, venturing into new perspectives of world formation 
through his ‘sinthome as a symptom cultivated as an artistic activity.’279  As a subject 
disinvested from ideological fantasies and unsubscribed from the Unconscious, 
writing for Joyce is not merely an aesthetic practice for detached pleasure but an 
existential endeavour to constitute subjectivity by manufacturing his own name.  
That is to say, by writing his life into his own works and becoming an indispensible 
master in literature for the future generations, Shakespeare functions for Stephen as a 
master figure/signifier working his way into eternity through the constitution of a 
singular universal in the symbolic.  Stephen blatantly pronounces Shakespeare’s 
practice of writing as an act of self-naming in the following passage:  
When Rutlandbaconsouthamptonshakespeare or another poet of the same name in 
the comedy of errors wrote Hamlet he was not the father of his own son merely but, 
being no more a son, he was and felt himself the father of all his race, the father of 
his own grandfather, the father of his unborn grandson. (U, 9.866-9) 
While the awkward name of ‘Rutlandbaconsouthamptonshakespeare’ condenses and 
mocks the controversial debate over the identity of the poet, the legacy that Stephen 
identifies and reads into the name of Shakespeare is his assumption of a singular 
universal by honouring his own proper name, by making his own proper name a 
master signifier in literature. 
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As Stephen points out, ‘[h]e has hidden his own name, a fair name, William, in 
the plays, a super here, a clown there, as a painter of old Italy set his face in a dark 
corner of his canvas. He has revealed it in the sonnets where there is Will in overplus’ 
(U, 9.921-4).  According to Thurston, this ‘cryptonymy’ offers a figure of 
Shakespeare ‘radically influenced by the personal, by the singular instance of identity 
and desire.  If the plays are one long signature, the name itself becomes an enormous 
pun, a polysemic node binding together insisture and testament, self-institution and 
self-perpetuation.’280  Since ‘insisture’ is resonant with insistence, signature, and 
institution, I understand Thurston’s neologism ‘insisture’ as the artist’s insistence, his 
will to sign his own name in the literary institution.  In consequence, this artistic 
insistence through signature constitutes a form of symbolic recognition. 
This is one of Joyce’s unique practices in writing his version of the singular 
universal.  Thurston explains, ‘Joyce defines insisture as the performative instance of 
the name in the literary institution, its alchemical conversion of the particular instant 
to the timeless universal.’ 281   Moreover, ‘Joyce’s readings and raidings of 
Shakespeare turn on the name and its poesis, on name-making and inscribing the 
name into the world created: insisture [...] is always a name-play that both shapes the 
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universe and distorts it with particular will, with an illegitimate signature.’ 282 
Insisture is also where the creative act as an ethical act in language lies, for the subject 
takes the responsibility to name him/herself, to insisture oneself, rather than being 
institutionalised by the existing authorities.283 
The practice of stuffing/distorting/imploding words is concerned with the famous 
or notorious play with words and with names, which leads us to Joyce’s 
self-nomination at the level of the Real.  Name-play is a significant device for 
Joyce’s attempt to write the singular into the universal.  Joyce playfully and 
deliberately distorts the proper names, thereby defying the law of proper names and 
drawing upon a clutter of biographical information to rename Shakespeare as 
‘Rutlandbaconsouthamptonshakespeare.’  This distorted/perverted proper name is 
too long and hence unabashedly defies linguistic and cultural convention.  The 
obesity of the newly-invented name gives rise to a certain density, pointing to the 
singularity of Shakespeare. 
Similarly, Joyce scatters his biographical details and plays with his own name 
and the names of his characters throughout his entire oeuvre.  Joyce’s deliberate 
conservation of the historicity of setting and names of Stephen’s interlocutors serves a 
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peculiar literary purpose rather than pure autobiographical interest.  As Clare Hutton 
identifies,  
[i]n this chapter of Ulysses, more than in others, Joyce insists on the historicity of 
his setting […] characteriz[ing] real historical figures—George Russell (1867-1935), 
T. W. Lyster (1855-1922), John Eglinton a.k.a. William K. Magee (1868-1961) and 
R. I. Best (1872-1959)—giving them real names and their real-life intellectual 
interests and thus marginalizing their fictionality’.284 
This differs from ‘his more usual aesthetic practice of characterising real 
historical figures and giving them fictional names’ as in the cases of Haines and 
Mulligan.285  In short, Joyce intends to emphasise that those people were once there 
and populated Dublin and its cultural territory, which not only constitutes the 
historical materiality of Ulysses, but also contributes to his process of unknotting and 
re-knotting through re-naming others to accompany his own self-naming.  It is 
arguable that if Joyce allegorises Haines and Mulligan, he singularises those 
interlocutors in the library episode.  Joyce achieves a quasi Benjaminian messianic 
gesture to save the historical moment and figures from oblivion by keeping their 
names and writing their actions into Ulysses, elevating the singular into the universal.  
Furthermore, Joyce plays with the singular when constituting the universal.   Instead 
of changing their names, Joyce plays with the interlocutors’ real names through 
distortion and perversion.  For instance, we encounter ‘John sturdy Eglinton,’ (U, 
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285 Ibid., p. 132. 
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9.600), ‘Mr. Secondbest Best’ (U, 9.714-5), ‘Besteglinton’ (U, 9.728), ‘Steadfast John’ 
(U, 9.737) and so on.  I would like to point out that, on the one hand, the adjectives 
‘sturdy,’ ‘Steadfast,’ ‘Secondbest’ and ‘Best’ are words utilised to betray the qualities 
and traits of his characters.  On the other hand, when Joyce inserts these adjectives 
into names as a middle name, or capitalises them to form a new proper name, Joyce 
turns adjectives into nouns, into names.  In this way, Joyce elevates distinctive traits 
into proper names to capture the singularity of these historical figures.  In the 
meantime, by perverting the names of the historical figures, Joyce also plays with 
these singularities, making them resilient and flexible to suit his construction of the 
fictional world of Ulysses, which ultimately serves his own self-designation as a new 
master in world literature. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Laughter in the Dungeon: 
Symptomatic Nationalism and the Ethical Ideals in ‘Cyclops’ 
 
    History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake. 
                Ulysses, 2.377 
 
 
I. 
Critics have long puzzled over the bewildering, kaleidoscopic display of stylistic 
changes and digressive interpolations in the ‘Cyclops’ episode.  In a cave-like setting, 
the realistic portrait of the gathering of the barflies at Barney Kiernan's pub is 
interlaced with digressive insertions of different styles.  These interruptions 
constitute   ‘rhetorical excess,’286 appearing in the text ‘at random, spawned by an 
association, generated by an aspect of the story, a word used by a speaker, a historical 
analogy to an event, or merely a rhetorical figure.’287  They consist of exhaustive 
lists of titles, saints, names, trees and fishes, fragments of romanticised episodes of 
Irish national heroics, descriptions of the ‘legendary beauty’ (U, 12.1442) of an Irish 
facecloth, places and scenes of Irish nationalist self-identification, journalistic reports 
of a natural disaster (U, 12.1858-96), boxing (U, 12.960-87), a high-fashion wedding 
(U, 12,1266-95) and so on.  The narrative voice, which supposedly frames and 
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reports the activities among characters, is itself besieged by the rhetorical force of 
these thematic digressions.  Moreover, the narrative voice, which traditionally is 
attributed to a single character with a unified set of memories or to a totalising author, 
lapses into drastically diverse styles, which include, among others, biblical reference, 
Homeric epithet, mock-romantic narratives and journalistic reportage.  Joyce here 
deploys ‘a polyphony of voices,’ 288  presenting ‘an assemblage in place of a 
total/totalising narrative, an open system of narrative resonances in which 
experimentation and proliferation replace the authority of the singular eye.’289  As 
Karen Lawrence observes, ‘[t]he story appears to be told twice, once in the single 
voice of the narrator, once in the parodic forms of various literary and subliterary 
styles.’290  The ‘realistic’ narrative and interpolations of rhetorical excess undercut 
each other. 
Approaches to the anonymous, first-person narrator are mainly divided into two 
camps.  First, unreliability and intention to distort reality and facts can be detected in 
the narrative.  The ‘realistic’ narrative is told by an unreliable anonymous, 
first-person narrator conventionally called the Nameless One, who is a‘[c]ollector of 
bad and doubtful debts’ (U, 12.24-5), having a job ‘regarded in Ireland as the lowest 
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of occupations, almost as bad as a career in petty crime.’291 The narrator is not 
hesitant to let others ‘have the weight of my tongue’ (U, 12.3-4).  In stark contrast to 
the lyricism of introspective monologues by Stephen and Bloom, the vulgarity and 
unreliability is more than evident in the reportage of the Nameless One, who is 
inclined to abusive denunciation and is metaphorically a Cyclops figure due to nearly 
losing his eyesight.292  The unreliability of the Nameless One’s representations is 
hinted at in the very beginning, for they come from a Cyclopean persona.  Enda 
Duffy proposes to read the Nameless One as a suspicious informer, and the story he 
reports as a product to feed the colonial surveillance.293  Duffy argues that the 
Nameless One knows dirty secrets about everyone, heaping gossip, pouring censure 
and reporting troubles such as the fracas between Bloom and the Citizen.294  In short, 
the desire of the Nameless One distorts facts and reality, producing a realistic yet 
partial representation tarnished with anti-Semitism and staged for the colonial gaze of 
surveillance. 
While the first approach as exemplified by Duffy’s criticism contends that the 
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narrator is apparently untrustworthy in representing reality, some other critics 
emphasize the narrator’s very ability to recount and report events, to tell stories 
although these stories might bear on ambiguities, blurring the distinction between 
fiction and facts.  The second approach identifies the narrative as a ‘realistic’295 or 
‘naturalistic’296 mode of representation.  What has been termed as the ‘initial style’ 
of the first nine episodes by Joyce, which consists of interior monologue and a third 
person narration, is replaced and ‘turned inside out’ by ‘figurative language in parodic 
trappings’ and ‘a colloquial first-person narrator.’297  The second approach does not 
negate the discussion about reliability, but puts emphasis on the idea that the narrative 
is still deployed in a ‘realistic’ representational model, which assumes an 
epistemological structure in terms of the linear perspective of a picture.  The 
elementary structure between the subject and the object, between the viewer and the 
picture, between the reader and a story remains intact.  A voice, reliable or dubious, 
is still reporting an event, telling a story, presenting a picture to the audience.  
Framed by the realistic model of representation, it is only a secondary consideration 
that this represented object might be contaminated by the intention or desire of the 
narrating subject.  The question of reliability represents a moral judgment centring 
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on authentication, not an epistemological investigation involving subjectivity, object, 
representation, and so on.  The question of unrealibility does not necessarily 
challenge the realistic mode of representaton. 
In ‘Cyclops,’ I argue, the radical subversion of the realistic mode of 
representation and the underlying subject/object relation is deployed through the clash 
between the realistic narrative and the interpolations, as well as the implosion from 
within the digressive interpolations themselves.  The self-centred narration by the 
Nameless One is ‘defused’ and ‘euphemised’ through the insertion of discourses with 
‘the appearance of objective narrative though this objectivity is shown to be an 
illusion by their uncontrolled parodistic development (what Joyce called the technique 
of gigantism).’298  In short, Joyce's textual experiment is a twofold disruption.  It is 
an outspoken challenge to the realistic mode of representation, undermining the 
underlying epistemological assumption.  Realistic representation is built upon a 
traditional concept of authority, a personalised image of either an author or a narrative 
voice attributed to a character, of a totalising subject in the face of his object.  In 
‘Cyclops,’ the supposedly transparent visuality of realistic representation is first 
invoked and then deliberately obfuscated, the subjectivity of a centred discourse 
subverted.  In this chapter, I will explore how this subversion of realistic mode of 
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representation and its concomitant subjectivity is achieved aesthetically.  
Joyce's textual experiment in ‘Cyclops’ is a state of narrative disarray of 
digressive interpolation in dialogue with a realistic mode of representation of the 
Nameless One.  The experience of reading this chapter can be roughly outlined as 
follows.  The reader sets out with conventionalised representation of diegetic reality, 
and suddenly his/her expectation is deliberately shaken when he/she repeatedly 
encounters stylistic changes and thematic digressions.  The reader is thus taken away 
from diegetic reality to wild imaginary or fantastic worlds, epitomised in instances of 
fetishistic lists, romanticised pseudo-epics or heroic legends.  To borrow from 
Christine Van Boheemen-Saaf, the reader encounters narrative ‘rhetorically excessive 
of (realistic) representation.’299  While the reader is wandering around the digressive, 
imaginative reality and wondering about the function and the meaning of these 
insertions, he/she cannot but burst into laughter at the very excess of this rhetorical 
digression.  That is, the ‘rhetorical excess’ tends to run out of control not simply with 
regard to the realistic mode of representation, but also in relation to the fantasised 
rhetorical excess itself.  Rhetorical excess implodes from within and shatters the 
closure of enjoyment in the fantasised world initially established by the rhetorical 
excess itself.  In summary, Joyce's narrative experiment is triple-layered: (1) realistic 
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representation; (2) narrative interpolations rhetorically excessive to representation; 
and (3) the implosion of rhetorical excess when the excess runs out of control. 
After grasping the narrative (dis)array in ‘Cyclops’ as roughly sketched above,  
I propose an alternative critical avenue by investigating the effect of parodied 
interpolations from the perspective of libidinal economy.  I will attempt to 
demonstrate how an inquiry into the libidinal economy of Joyce’s linguistic and 
literary practices will help us to explore the potential for a progressive political 
agenda and ethical action in Joyce’s writing.  Namely, the critical focus should not 
merely be put on what is being mocked in parodies, but on how Joyce does this as an 
exorcism of the fantasmatic enjoyment of the political agendas.  I will argue that 
prior to the emergence of a post-colonial subjectivity, Joyce enacts a literary working 
through of a drunken version of cultural nationalism to pave the way for an emergent 
subjectivity. 
As indicated above, narrative (dis)array in the form of rhetorical excess harbours 
a twofold critique: an epistemological challenge to representation, and an ontological 
subversion to centred subjectivity.  I hence propose to read this narrative 
(de)formation by way of the Lacanian theorisation of subjectivity and the 
epistemological model of the look and the gaze.  I will utilize Žižek's dialectical 
revision of psychoanalytic insights, which clarifies the relationship between the 
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domains of private, personal pathology and public, ideological politics.  The 
psychoanalytic-minded theories on ideology also shed light on the relationship 
between symptomatic nationalism and anti-Semitism.  In the final section of this 
chapter, meanwhile, I offer a critical assessment of the ethico-political ideals 
purveyed in ‘Cyclops’ in opposition to the symptomatic nationalism which Joyce has 
represented and distanced himself from by means of literary working through. 
 
II. 
Let us begin our investigation of rhetorical excess with its capacity to violate 
realistic representation of the world by adding the opacity of fantasised reality, which 
is a flagrant antithesis to the sordid, vulgar reality presented by the Nameless One.  
This fantastic reality intrudes abruptly, emerging as an alternative mode of discursive 
visibility, of diverse style, and arguably another mode of imagination with which to 
organise enjoyment.  For instance, while making their entrance into Barney 
Kiernan’s, the characters are introduced with parodies of Irish legends.  Bloom is 
portrayed in heroic terms: ‘O’Bloom, the son of Rory: it is he. Impervious to fear is 
Rory’s son: he of the prudent soul’ (U, 12.216-7).  Alf Bergan, Denis Breen and 
Breen’s wife are depicted as follows: ‘a godlike messenger came swiftly in, radiant as 
the eye of heaven, a comely youth and behind him there passed an elder of noble gait 
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and countenance, bearing the sacred scrolls of law and with him his lady wife a dame 
of peerless lineage, fairest of her race’ (U, 12.244-8).  Similarly, the Citizen, who is 
generally acknowledged as a figure modelled on Michael Cusack, founder of the 
Gaelic Athletic Association and representative of aggressive nationalism who attacks 
Bloom with a diatribe and physical violence, is described in mock-Homeric gigantism 
and Revivalist Irish heroism.  He is thus comically rendered as ‘a broadshouldered 
deepchested stronglimbed frankeyed shaggybeared widemouthed largenosed 
longheaded deepvoiced barekneed brawnyhanded hairylegged ruddyfaced 
sinewyarmed hero’ (U, 12.152-4).  The modern Dubliners are displaced 
imaginatively into another discursive-laden reality, painted in archaic, romanticised 
language as if they were creatures from an ancient time and space. 
The landscape is also subjected to a similar process of romanticised rewriting.  
Esoteric and nostalgic in its style, the mundane setting, the quarter of Dublin through 
which the characters pass, is re-cast as a lampoon of the nineteenth-century translation 
or revision of Irish poetry, myth, and bardic history or legend, which mocks the styles 
of Lady Gregory and James Clarence Mangan.300  The Dublin Corporation Fruit, 
Vegetable and Fish Market is referred as ‘the shining palace’ (U, 12.87);  the traffic 
and Dublin inhabitants are replaced by ‘warriors and princes’ (U, 12.70), ‘[l]ovely 
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maidens’ (U, 12.78-9), ‘heroes [...] from afar’ (U, 12.83), ‘the peerless princes of 
unfetterd Munster and of Connacht’ (U, 12.83-4) who populate the fertile landscape 
with ‘fishful streams’ (U, 12.71), ‘lofty trees’ (U, 12.75), and ‘innumerable’ herds (U, 
12.102).  In this interpolation, readers are also given a taste of Joyce’s use of lists or 
runs for the first time.  The richness and fertility of this imaginary land is depicted in 
terms of extravagant lists of trees, fish and herds.  This use of ‘runs’ is one of Joyce’s 
techniques for parodying the Revivalist imitation of the bards’ techniques.301 
Instances of exhaustive lists are abundant in ‘Cyclops:’ a saint-run (U, 12. 
1689-1712), a tree-run describing guests at John Wyse Nolan’s wedding (U, 12. 
1269-79), a clergyman run (U, 12.927-38), a fish-run (U, 12.71-4, 81-2), a run for 
‘Irish heroes and heroines of antiquity’ (U, 12.176-99), and so on.  These lists 
command fascination, perplexity and frustration in the reader. These lists are 
themselves a combination of triviality and gigantism.  For example, the long list of 
Irish tribal heroes and heroines are trivialised, for they are no more than decoration 
represented on the stones dangling from the Citizen's girdle.  However, this triviality 
acquires inflated grandiosity by simply becoming too long (U, 12.176-199).  It 
functions less like an objective description than a grotesque, indigestible object 
inserted into the narrative.  Legendary heroism is thus ruthlessly mocked and 
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undermined.  Despite the seeming precision, catalogues such as these stick out in the 
text and vitiate the flow of the narrative. 
Furthermore, the name list starting with the Irish tribal heroes, kings, priests and 
patriots such as ‘Cuchulin, Conn of hundred battles, Niall of nine hostages,’ ‘Father 
John Murphy,’ ‘Henry Joy M’Cracken’ (a leader of the United Irishmen) and so on 
gradually runs astray, giving way to non-Irish figures such as ‘Christopher Columbus,’ 
‘The Woman Who Didn’t,’ ‘Benjamin Franklin,’ ‘Napolean Bonaparte,’ ‘Julius 
Caesar,’ ‘Muhammad,’ ‘the Queen of Sheba,’ ‘Patrick W. Shakespeare,’ ‘Brian 
Confucius,’ ‘Tristan and Isolde,’ and ‘Ludwig Beethoven’ among others.  
Inconsistency is thus introduced in the representation of Irish heroism.  The 
seriousness of this catalogue evaporates when the reader meets with an irremediable 
breach consisting of absurd obfuscation and mirthful fascination in this object-like list.  
Ideological anamorphosis is achieved when the name-run roams ludicrously awry, 
thereby placing obtrusive, indigestible non-sense in the middle of discourse. 
The psychological operation of this reading experience can be concisely outlined 
as follows.  First, there is a lapse from the visuality of realistic representation into a 
fascination with the objects, which tends to entail fantasised indulgence in the form of 
romanticised, legendary rendition and gigantism.  Then, this indulgence is shaken by 
a catastrophic reversal of an object of plenitude into a pure void, a stain or blot in the 
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view, and the reader is woken up from the ‘drunkenness’ of the text.  This visual 
experience is precisely what Lacan describes in his conception of the gaze as a partial 
object which functions as the structural void, or the surplus in the scopic field.  In 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues for the splitting of 
the look and the gaze, and the primacy of the later over the former (XI, 67-119).  The 
so-called function of the look designates the viewer's, the subject's, ordering of 
visuality according to the subject's accustomed codes of representation.  Hence, the 
look belongs to the domain of the Symbolic.  In parallel to the Lacanian dichotomy 
between jouissance and symbolisation, between tuché and automaton, we have the 
dichotomy of the gaze and the look.  The gaze as a partial object is the form or the 
embodiment of the leftover of a prephallic jouissance, that is, a surplus-jouissance 
exceeding symbolisation.  Breasts, faeces, the gaze and the voice constitute Lacan’s 
four specimens of the object-cause of desire, the corporeal embodiments of the logical 
consistency of the inherent nothingness in the structure of the split subject and of the 
Other.302  The dichotomy between the gaze and the look should be taken as inscribed 
originally in the splitting of the subject, and that is why there is the precedence of the 
gaze over the eye. 
                                                     
302 Jacques-Alain Miller observes a shift in Lacan’s understanding of objet a from the corporeal 
expression toward a pure logical function, condensed in notation or algebra. For a more detailed 
account, please see the theory chapter of this thesis. ‘A reading of the Seminar From an Other to the 
other’, Lacanian Ink, 29 (2007), 7-61, at p. 13. 
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The returned gaze emitting from the side of the object points to anxiety and lack 
rather than power.  The subject/object antithesis is temporarily suspended and the 
subject’s scopic reign is subverted from within and momentarily put into question.  
In the encounter with the returned gaze, the meaningless stain, the non-discursive 
rupture of representation, the subject experiences inconsistency in its ability to 
structure and represent the world in rational terms.  As Lacan puts it, ‘[t]he gaze is 
presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency […] as the thrust of our 
experience, namely the lack that constitutes castration anxiety’ (XI, 72-3).  
Psychoanalysis holds that the ‘objectivity of reality’ relies on ‘a libidinal 
disinvestment,’ or, in Lacan’s words, ‘extraction of objet petit a.’ 303  The 
normal-neurotic experience is established in the elision of the gaze.  The experience 
of the Lacanian gaze therefore bears on a psychotic flavour, as shown in Lacan’s 
famous illustration of the gaze: a sardine can floats at the sea, looking back at him, 
mocking him [Lacan] as ‘nothing on earth’ (XI, 96).  Lacan puts the experience as 
follows: ‘it was looking at me at the level of the point of light, the point at which that 
looks at me is situated—and I am not speaking metaphorically’ (XI, 95).  Lacan 
draws up a schema composed of two superimposed triangles to indicate the splitting 
of the eye and the gaze (XI, 91, 106): 
                                                     
303 Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘The Prisons of Jouissance’, Lacanian Ink, 23 (2009), 36-55, at p. 49. 
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Figure 3 
As the schema above indicates, the mode of the image, of the picture, pertains to 
the eye, the look, and the space of light belongs to the gaze.  The schema is designed 
to make clear that ‘the geometrical dimension’ is only ‘a partial dimension in the field 
of the gaze,’ and that as a seeing subject, one is ‘literally called into the picture, and 
represented here as caught’ (XI, 88, 92).  Lacan highlights that ‘the world is 
all-seeing,’ and ‘the pre-existence of the gaze—I see only from one point, but in my 
existence I am looked from all sides’ (XI, 75, 72).  Reality, objectivity and 
subjectivity are thus challenged with the uncanny experience of the returned gaze, as  
the subject finds her/himself called into the picture precisely at the non-sensical point 
of representation, the non-discursive blind spot, acknowledging his/her self-inclusion.  
As Lacan famously puts it, ‘No doubt, in the depths of my eye, the picture is painted. 
The picture, certainly, is in my eye. But I am in the picture’ (XI, 96).304 
                                                     
304 The original French reads as follows: ‘Sans doute, au fond de mon oeil, se peint le tableau. La 
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This self-inclusion of subjectivity in the picture is of utmost importance for it not 
merely undermines the epistemological framework of realistic representation, which 
presupposes the exteriority of the subject in front of the object, but discloses both the 
primacy of the gaze over the look and that the subject is originally and structurally 
inscribed into the picture.  Given that the subject itself falls into the picture, the 
subject literally dwells in the constructed reality.  The point is less to leave the 
realistic representation model altogether than to recognise the unconscious dimension 
of the gaze, of fantasy construction, and the self-inscription of the subject in the 
fantasy.  Fantasy is not merely projection or daydreaming on the part of the subject, 
fantasy is what the subject is; fantasy is that through which the subject constitutes 
her/his world to inhabit.  As Žižek puts it,  
as a transcendental subject I am the always already given horizon of all reality, but 
at the same time, I am in the picture: I exist only through my counterpoint or 
counterpart in the very picture constituted by me; I as it were have to fall into my 
own picture, into the universe whose frame I constitute. (LN, 706) 
This ‘world-structuring’ function and ‘worldliness’ of fantasy demonstrates that 
human subjects are ‘essentially engaging the world,’ and ‘we reveal what and who we 
are in the nature of our engagements.’305  Consequently, it is not merely that the 
prejudice of the subject might distort reality, but that there is no hard reality to which 
                                                                                                                                                        
tableau, certes, est dans mon oeil. Mai moi, je suis dans le tableau’ (S11, 111). Alan Sheridan 
mistranslated the final line as ‘But I am not in the picture’ (XI, 96). 
305 Jonathan Lear, Therapeutic Action: An Earnest Plea for Irony (New York: Other Press, 2003), p. 
196-7. 
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to return.  The moment the gaze returns and breaches representation marks out the 
subject-shattering experience, and the subject dissolves once the 
constructed/fantasised reality disintegrates. 
To fully appreciate the structuring function of fantasy, we also have to explore 
the intersubjective dimension of fantasy.  As Copjec points out, a thorough 
understanding of the Lacanian gaze in its relation to fantasy should be read in light of 
Lacan's ‘graph of desire.’306  Lacan's graph of desire is divided into two levels: the 
level of meaning, identification and symbolisation, and the level of enjoyment and 
fantasy.  Lacan's idea is that symbolisation itself inevitably entails a surplus of 
enjoyment.  Psychoanalytic insight is basically centred upon how human subjectivity 
is entangled with the troubled surplus enjoyment.  In Žižek's words, ‘the trouble with 
jouissance is not that it is unattainable, that it always eludes our grasp, but rather, that 
one can never get rid of it, that its stain drags along forever’ (GV, 93).  Lacan argues 
that the subject encounters this surplus-enjoyment in the gaps of language which 
designate the Other's lack or inconsistency, the pure desirousness in the Other's 
discourse, which exceeds and eludes symbolisation.  Consequently, the subject 
endeavours to cover up the Other's lack with an invented answer, an unconscious 
discourse which is by definition fantasy.  Fantasy here is conceived as an indication 
                                                     
306 Joan Copjec, Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p. 
32. A detailed exposition of the ‘Graph of Desire’ can be found in Lacan’s ‘The Subversion of the 
Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’ (É, 671-702). 
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of the impossibility or the failure of total interpellation or symbolisation and its 
concomitant remedy.  In confrontation with every identity interpellation, the subject 
simultaneously encounters doubt about the Other's call.  In short, the subject would 
ask, ‘why am I what you tell me to be?’ and ‘what do you (the Other) want from 
me?’-- the so-called ‘Che Vuoi?’ question.  Fantasy is the subject's answer to this 
doubt.  The intersubjective structure of fantasy should be highlighted here;  my 
desire is not directly phrased in terms of ‘what do I want?’ but rather framed by the 
more original question of ‘what do the others want from me?’, ‘what do they see in 
me?’ and ‘what am I for the others?’ (LN, 686).  This can be one of the meanings of 
the famous aphorism of Lacan—‘Human desire is the desire of the Other.’  The 
splitting of the subject is transposed into the intersubjective structure of fantasy.  The 
Real gaze as a void in structure is translated into the imagined gaze of the Other, 
around which the subject’s fantasy is organised. 
The importance of the world-structuring function cannot be overemphasised, for 
this insight helps us appreciate Joyce’s narrative manoeuvre as a literary working 
through of fantasy.  Seen from this perspective, Joyce does not attempt to present a 
‘truer’ Irish reality in contrast to the fantasised version provided by Irish cultural 
nationalism, and the Irish Revivalism.  Gibson’s reading of ‘Cyclops’ as an 
investigation of the construction of historiography helps to shed further light on the 
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scope of symptomatic nationalism represented by the various parodies present in the 
episode.  Gibson observes that gigantism and the mythologised, romanticised 
Anglo-Irish307 Revivalist historiography stands as one of the main targets of Joyce’s 
parody in ‘Cyclops,’ and argues that ‘the new nationalism’ presented by Arthur 
Griffith and the Citizen shares the historiography adumbrated by the former.308  The 
agenda of the Anglo-Irish Revivalists, according to Gibson, is to ‘unearth an 
authentically Irish past with which they might identify, to consolidate their position in 
the unsettling wake of Catholic emancipation’ and to produce ‘cultural fusion and 
regeneration’ between Irish and Anglo-Irish cultures.309  Joyce suspects this goal for 
union or syncretism perpetuates ‘dispossession and subordination’ because it is a 
forced and forged union, and cites ‘English approval’ in support of this position.310 
To this extent, I entirely agree with Gibson’s evaluation. 
Gibson therefore comes to the conclusion that the realistic mode of 
                                                     
307 As Gibson and other critics have noted, the Celtic Revivalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century are genteel, mainly Anglo-Irish, opting for Oisin rather than Patrick, for the ‘authentic’ heroic 
past rather than Irish Catholic tradition. L.H. Platt summarizes Joyce’s attitude toward this Irish 
Revivalism as follows: ‘First, there is the charge that the Revival's indifference to the achievements of 
the early Irish Church produces a false historiography of Irish culture. Second, Joyce makes a clear 
distinction between national culture and Anglo-Irish culture, thus refuting the Revival's enunciation of 
its own ancestry. Finally, and perhaps most radically, Joyce refuses to accept the view that an 
authentic national culture, protected and cultivated by an Anglo-Irish intelligentsia, had managed to 
survive and even flourish in adversity beyond the eighteenth century. For Joyce the Gael was dead 
and beyond resurrection, except on Joyce's own terms.’ L. H. Platt, ‘Joyce and the Anglo-Irish Revival: 
the Triestine Lectures’, James Joyce Quarterly, 29.2 (1992), 259-66, at p. 159. 
308 Gibson, p. 102-26. Gibson identifies the similarities between the Revivalist historiography, Griffith’s 
The Resurrection of Hungary and the Citizen’s discourse, such as habits of imprecision, exaggeration, 
inclination to myth, repeated demands for purity and so on, p. 123-5.  
309 Ibid., p. 103. 
310 Ibid., p. 103-4. 
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representation used by the Nameless One serves as a clear critique of the 
interpolations of rhetorical excess, posing ‘liberating comic relief’ amidst ‘the whole 
[Revivalist] mode of the historical imagination.’311  As ‘an Irishman, living in 
history,’ the Nameless One ‘has and represents an irreducible, unregenerate, vulgar 
and vital presentness’ that demands acknowledgment.312  The reality presented by 
the Nameless One certainly can function as a critical opposition to the version 
represented by the Revivalist mode, as encapsulated by the interpolations of rhetorical 
excess.  However, I would like to argue that it takes more than the juxtaposition of 
two realities and modes of representation to dispel the ideological fantasy constituted 
by the Revivalist mode of representation, since there is no hard or true reality to return 
to and fantasy is itself world-structuring.  The point is to disengage the subject’s 
libidinal investment in world/reality constituting fantasy by eroding the fantasmatic 
structure the subject inhabits from within.  That is why, I argue, Joyce deploys a 
more complex aesthetic scenario to undermine symptomatic nationalism from within, 
inserting implosion within the interpolations of rhetorical excess themselves in order 
to achieve true subversion and emancipation. 
In The Subaltern Ulysses, Duffy targets the imperialist representation of the 
                                                     
311 Ibid., p. 126. 
312 Ibid., p. 126. 
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‘spectacle of the native,’313 commenting on the sharp juxtaposition between the 
realistic representation and the interpolations, emphasising the interpellative power of 
discourse and stereotypes.  Duffy argues that the conflict between Bloom and the 
Citizen should be appreciated in terms of the split stereotypes of the colonised (Ariel 
versus Caliban, civilian versus barbarian, gentleman versus terrorist), and the 
concomitant stylistic collision between the realistic reporting of the Nameless One 
and the glorified style of interpolation which belongs to Bloom’s class.314  Duffy first 
draws attention to a medical skit cast in Victorian portraiture, in which a grotesque 
image of an Irishman with a lump in his neck is represented, a figure of deformity and 
unkempt dress.  This image or spectacle of the native is ‘horrifying’ because ‘the 
pose is that of a gentleman, but the connotations are those of a beggar.’315  Duffy 
contends that it is the imposition of these opposed stereotypes of the native between 
Ariel and Caliban, civilian and barbarian that renders the image grotesque, and hence 
calls for a splitting of the two and a further ‘interpenetration’ or intermingling of the 
opposed poles to subvert the stock images that the colonists impose upon the 
colonised.  Duffy argues that the ‘transgress[ion],’ ‘interruption’ or ‘interpenetration’ 
of the duality between the split stereotypes and styles may unlock the shackles of the 
                                                     
313 Duffy dedicates a chapter to ‘Cyclops’ in the book, which bears the title ‘“And I Belong to a Race”: 
The Spectacle of the Native and the Politics of Partition in “Cyclops”’, p. 93-129. 
314 Ibid., p. 93-121. 
315 Ibid., p. 93-5. 
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interpellative power of colonial discourse and assist the birth of a new, post-colonial 
subject.316 
Although I am sympathetic with Duffy’ supposition that writing ‘Cyclops’ during 
the period of the War of Independence, Joyce may have been working towards an 
emergent post-colonial subject, it is far from clear how and what kind of new subjects 
may come about by such an interpenetration of discourses.  What is implied by this 
methodology is that if one stereotype takes on the traits, or uses the discursive 
elements or methods of the other, it can subvert the rigid, stock images and their 
interpellative power.  The so-called interpenetration or ‘transgression’ in Duffy’s 
words means that one may employ the techniques of the other.  For instance, the 
Nameless One’s narrative is replete with references to documents, and the barfly 
refers to newspaper accounts when criticising the brutality of British imperialism.  
However, upon a closer look, Duffy’s dichotomy appears too neat.  For instance, 
while Duffy assigns the style of parodies roughly to Bloom’s class in contrast to that 
of the Nameless One, it is questionable whether the dichotomy can be sustained since 
Bloom doesn’t seem to share the Irish Revivalist aspiration for Irish purity, which is 
one of the main targets parodied in the interpolations.  Moreover, the interpenetration 
or transgression does not necessarily produce subversion or contribute to the 
                                                     
316 Ibid., p. 116. 
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construction of a new subject.  Quite the contrary, transgression or interpenetration 
of discourse between the two stereotypes under the colonial gaze may well suggest 
that both types inhabit a common ideological fantasy, shared symptomatic nationalism, 
which struggles to fight against colonialism while its efficacy is put into question 
through various parodies in ‘Cyclops.’ 
As mentioned above, Gibson has pointed out that the nationalism represented by 
the Citizen, whom Duffy places in the category of stereotyped terrorists, actually 
shares the Revivalists’ historiography, such as the example of the ‘gentleman’ 
stereotype in Duffy’s dichotomy.  The insurgencies of Irish nationalism are thus 
framed or supported by the genteel discourse of Irish Revivalist historiography and 
myth-making of Irishness.  Transgression and interpenetration between the two 
stereotypes and stock discourses merely indicate how the symptomatic nationalism 
saturates both poles of the dichotomy, rather than undermining the stereotypes.  
Transgression or interpenetration of stereotypes does not, therefore, necessarily 
provide an emancipated image with which an emergent post-colonial subject can 
identify.  A scathing satire is cast in the interpolation about ‘the really marvellous 
exhibition of cynanthropy’ by the Citizen and his dog Garryowen (U, 12.712-38), 
which relentlessly mocks both the ‘terrorist’ Citizen and the genteel Irish Revivalism 
with their cult of bards and legendary heroism.  It is a transgression of a stereotype 
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portrayed via the comic, ridiculous notion of a ‘genteel terrorist,’ which does not stray 
very far from the imposed image of the native as the ‘gentleman beggar’ identified by 
Duffy.  This certainly gives rise to questions as to how liberating such an image, 
provided by the interpenetration of stereotypes can be in service of fighting against 
Imperialism and fabricating a new subjectivity for an emergent post-colonial country.  
In Duffy’s reading of the interpellative power of imperialism and the stereotypes of 
the colonised, the entangled influence of symptomatic nationalism is completely left 
out.  For a new post-colonial subject to emerge, more is required than directly 
opposing imperialism via the transgression of stereotypes.  Subjective transformation 
demands the subversion of symptomatic nationalism by uncoupling the subject’s 
libidinal investment from certain fantasmatic frameworks of ideology. 
Let us now turn to the textual analysis to see how Joyce achieves a critique of 
symptomatic nationalism.  Once the subject is capable of recognising the gaze that 
he/she imagines unconsciously in the Other and confronts the Other’s failures, the 
ideological subject is transformed into ‘a politicized and free subject.’317  The gazes 
exchanged between Ireland and Europe frame the long digressive passage about Irish 
forestation deployed as ‘the fashionable international world’ attends ‘the wedding of 
the chevalier Jean Wyse de Neaulan’ (U, 12.1266-95).  The long list of the guests’ 
                                                     
317 Todd McGowen, The Real Gaze (Alba ny, NY : State Univeristy of New York Press, 2007), p. 17. 
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names (trees) at the wedding is inserted between the phrases ‘Europe has its eyes on 
you’ (U, 12.1264) and ‘our eyes are on Europe’ (U, 12.1296).  The Irishness (forests, 
in this case, decimanted by colonialism, symbols of ‘natural purity’ of indigenous 
Irish), under construction is fundamentally posed for the sake of the imagined gaze of 
the Other.  In the context of a fashionable wedding, the list of trees serves as a 
blatant satire, in which Joyce mocks relentlessly that the characteristic of Ireland 
imagined to be most lovable to the European gaze is a grotesque mixture of genteel 
style and forestation.  Laughable as this comic image may appear, it poses a serious 
political critique by questioning how such fantasmatic construction, such symptomatic 
nationalism, which absorbs the patriotic energy of Joyce’s time, can be of any 
practical use to those seeking national independence or emancipation from British 
colonialism.  By exposing the absurdity of this mixed image at the core of the 
ideological fantasy, the subject may unhook his/her libidinal investment from it.  As 
such, in working through fantasy, the subject comes to acknowledge what specific 
gaze he/she has supposed in place of the Real gaze, the void of the structure and how 
he/she has derived enjoyment from the concomitant ideological fantasy. 
In addition, in a hilarious account of the execution of Robert Emmet, which 
parodies a newspaper’s report, Joyce constructs a fabulous farewell party, a pompous 
carnival.  It is a scathing critique of violent nationalism because if the attendance of 
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‘the picturesque foreign delegation known as the Friends of the Emerald Isle’ (U, 12. 
554) hints that the armed rebellions might appear as entertainment in the eyes of the 
foreign powers, it also betrays that Irish people participate in this patriotic carnival, 
deriving considerable pleasure from the romanticisation of martyrdom.  The 
execution becomes a street carnival when ‘the York street brass and reed band’ 
performs on the scene (U, 12.536), and ‘the children of the Male and Female 
Foundling Hospital’ are described as being ‘delighted with this unexpected addition to 
the day’s entertainment’ (U, 12.447-9).  The introduction of the executioner is 
depicted in the manner of a famous performer entering the stage: ‘[q]uietly, 
unassumingly, Rumbold stepped on to the scaffold in faultless morning dress and 
wearing his favourite flower,’ and to welcome him or the performance of execution, 
‘the viceregal ladies wav[e] their handkerchiefs in their excitement while the even 
more excitable foreign delegates cheered vociferously in a medley of cries’ (U, 
12.592-3; 598-60).  By exposing the fantastic framework of violent nationalism and 
making explicit the hidden enjoyment that silently pervades society, Joyce attempts to 
break the ideological spell of symptomatic nationalism.  The symptomatic 
inconsistency is most conspicuously exhibited at the moment when Emmet’s fiancée 
immediately accepts a proposal from ‘a handsome young Oxford graduate, noted for 
his chivalry towards the fair sex, stepped forward and, presenting his visiting card, 
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banknote and genealogical tree, solicited the hand of the hapless young lady’ (U, 12. 
658-60).  This farcical arrangement unveils the idea that violent nationalism remains 
shackled by the colonialist ideology, aspiring after English values.  
Any ideological formation includes two levels: the level of interpellation and 
symbolisation, and the level of enjoyment in the form of fantasy.  Ideology thus 
contains symbolic discourse and shared enjoyment.  In the case of nationalism, 
national identification operates both on the level of symbolic identity and that of ‘a 
shared relationship toward a Thing [...] toward the Nation qua Thing’ (TN, 201).  
Usually this shared national Thing is embodied in national memories, national 
treasures, or specific ways of life.  However, we should be aware that the shared 
practices and memories do not necessarily constitute a national Thing.  Quite the 
contrary, it is nationalism as symbolisation and identification which turns the practices 
into a shared Thing, essentialising and homogenising these practices in terms of 
national purity.  In On Belief, Žizek points out that the place of Muslims in Bosnia's 
national identity actually emerges from imposed political programming, which 
declares Muslims as an ethnic community rather than merely a religious group.  In 
response to this political artifice, Muslims actually answered this call of nationalism 
and started to perceive themselves as a nation, ‘systematically manufacturing their 
tradition’ (Belief, 28).  Consequently, the essentialising tendency in nationalism 
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should be seen in a new light.  The discourse-oriented analysis of essentialism in 
nationalism only captures half of the truth. Certain traditional features or 
characteristics may be incorporated as national symbols and points of national 
identification not merely in the domain of symbolic discourse, but also at the level of 
nationalism as fantasy, as shared enjoyment.  Nationalism does not need the 
positivity of traditional features to function as national essence, but requires them as 
empty gadgets around which the shared enjoyment, the national Thing, is organised. 
In the case of Irish nationalism, the obsession with national roots, a legendary 
past, heroism, language, forestation, landscape and so on in the name of Celtic 
Revivalism, as well as the campaign for Gaelic sports (U, 12.889-912), are less 
symbolic discourse than the gadgets of collective enjoyment in the form of a national 
Thing.  The un-Irish may well be conflated with the Irish as the reader finds that the 
list of Irish national heroes extends absurdly from ‘Cuchulin’ to ‘Brian Confucius,’ 
‘Tristan and Isolde,’ ‘Ludwig Beethoven,’ and ‘the Last of the Mohicans’(U, 
12.176-199).  The lists and categories of names, titles, saints, and trees are the 
gadgets of enjoyment, insubstantial elements giving body to surplus-enjoyment 
around which symptomatic nationalism as ideological fantasy can be organised.  The 
function of the items in the list is thus purely formal and inclined to proliferation 
because these items are less positive entities than mere semblants of the Lacanian 
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partial objects, which elude and exceed symbolisation. 
When the lists of names run on too long and lapse into absurdity, they constitute 
a stain, an indigestible blot, or meaningless lacuna within the framework of the 
interpolated representation; that is, the rhetorical excess of these interpolations runs 
out of control and implodes from within.  The Real gaze is rendered palpable in the 
undisciplined extension of these lists, and in the stealthy distortion of the names.  
Overstuffing itself constitutes a sense of void and ridiculousness; for instance, the 
gigantism of the list of tribal heroes is mocked and deflated when non-Irish names are 
included.  In another example, in the list of the names of the foreign delegation 
attending Robert Emmet’s execution, Joyce supplements the sarcastic meaning of the 
names by reducing them to sounds, to nonsense such as ‘Herr 
Hurhausdirektorpresident Hans Cuechli-Steierli’ and ‘Nationalgymnasiummusem- 
sanatoriumandsuspensoriumordinaryprivatedocentheneralhistoryspecialprofessordoct
or Kriegfried Ueberallgemein’ (U, 12.566-9).  Joyce also makes fun of saints by 
including ‘S. Thomas Aquinas’ alongside ‘S. Anonymous and S. Eponymous and S. 
Pseudonymous and S. Homonymous and S. Paronymous S. Synonymous and S. 
Laurence O'Toole’ (U, 12.1703; 1696-8).  These apparently invented names, titles 
and saints deflate the significance of the lists and categories within which they are 
included.  It is significant that such lists are the convergent points of signifiers of 
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symbolic mandate and empty gadgets as Lacanian partial objects of enjoyment.  
Joyce therefore aims at two targets with a single strike, assaulting the Symbolic order 
at the pivotal points of master signifiers by turning the names of saints into voice, or 
better, noise.  He also subverts the Symbolic order by exposing the formal character 
of symbolic mandate, as in the case of the saint list.  It is as if sainthood is nothing 
more than a letter ‘S.’ added to names.  To put it more precisely, Joyce exposes the 
underside superegoic enjoyment of symbolic mandate by way of revealing the status 
of saints as empty gadgets of enjoyment in the form of fantasy.  With a stroke of 
genius, Joyce attacks ideology from its underside by subverting meaning and 
expelling fantasy at the same time.  In a single move, the subject’s complacency 
regarding epistemological faculty and subjective stability is subverted. 
It is crucial that this implosion induces bursts of laughter.  Rhetorical excess 
first leads the reader to step into the domain of fantasy and then wakes him from 
fantasy by imploding the excess from within.  Joyce's triple-layered narrative 
manoeuvre is paralleled by the process of psychotherapy.  When representation 
breaks down318 into rhetorical excess, the reader is led to Irish nationalism in the 
form of ideological fantasy, bearing witness to or even acting out the Dubliners’ own 
lapse into fantasy, enjoying Irish nationalism despite all the frustration in 
                                                     
318 Jonathan Lear, in Freud, offers a telling distinction between ‘virture and neurtue’ to explicate how 
the neurotic inhabits fantasy and transference and breaks away from reality. Freud (London: Routledge, 
2005), p. 151-53. 
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confrontation with the British colonial power.  The laughter caused by the implosion 
of the text designates precisely the breakthrough moment when fantasy is breached 
and symptom worked through.319  Why do we need this double break to achieve a 
therapeutic effect?  Rather than holding the fantasy projection at arm’s length, the 
subject literally inhabits the world-structuring fantasy in transference.  The 
therapeutic action lies in the ironical epiphany, ‘the lucky break,’ happiness in terms 
of ‘happenstance,’ opening ‘the possibilities for new possibilities.’320 The moment of 
breakthrough is the point at which the world itself shifts.  Breaking through 
designates an ethical act, a crucial moment when the subject goes through the fantasy, 
which is a covering-up the Other’s inconsistency. 
In bursting into laughter, the subject becomes aware of the Other’s lack and his 
own implicated enjoyment of ideological fantasy, which supports ideology.  In a 
single move, the subject realises/percieves his/her own subjective destitution and the 
truth that there is no Other of the Other.  As Todd McGowen puts it, ‘our ability to 
contest an ideological structure depends on our ability to recognise the real point at 
which it breaks down, the point at which the void that ideology conceals reveals itself. 
Every authentic political act has its origin in an encounter with the real.’ 321  
                                                     
319 For a detailed account of the theory surrounding the clinical conception of breakdown and break 
through, please see the chapter ‘The Remainder of Life’ in Jonathan Lear's Happiness, Death, and The 
Remainder of Life. 
320 Lear, Happiness, p. 29; Therapeutic Action, p. 137-78. 
321 McGowen, The Real Gaze, p. 17. 
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Moreover, this burst of laughter should be distinguished from the pernicious, 
suffocating superegoic laughter and enjoyment epitomised by the barflies’ cynical 
laughter at Bloom and the fantasmatic enjoyment of the comic stylistic/linguistic 
digression and boundary crossings. Therefore, those readings which assume the 
inherent subversion in dialogism or heteroglossia, or which celebrate too readily the 
liberating potential in ‘the postmodern pastiche,’322 should be questioned as they are 
no more than the superegoic underside of the same dominant ideology and discourses.  
This critical stance also underlies my distance from Emer Nolan’s comments on 
‘Cyclops’ in James Joyce and Nationalism.   In her book, Nolan identifies the 
tension between modernism and nationalism and criticizes the related tendencies of 
rendering Joyce apolitical and praising the modernist project while castigating Irish 
nationalism.  She argues that there is a critical potential in the community of 
language which works for Irish nationalism and that Joyce’s attitude toward it is not 
dismissive, but arguably sympathetic.  That is, Joyce makes an effort to represent 
and release the critical energy embeded in Dublin’s community of language by way of 
parody, satire and even invective, in fighting against what Nolan calls ‘the leveling 
modern discourse.’323   
Nolan points out the inadequacy of criticism based on ‘the opposition between 
                                                     
322 Emer Nolan, James Joyce and Nationalism (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 118. 
323 Nolan, Nationalism, p. 85-119. 
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Bloom and the citizen as one between multivocal dialogism and a monolingual 
monocular bigot,’324 suggesting that ‘Bloom himself is no less a ‘monologist’ than 
the citizen.’325  She holds that ‘[t]o deny the citizen any success […] can result in a 
restatement of the familiar stereotype that centuries of English investigation of Irish 
culture had been concerned to promote,’ further arguing ‘[i]t seems strange and 
inconsistent […] to conclude that Joyce’s massive creative effort in “Cyclops” should 
ultimately be read as proposing the idea of the barbarism of the Irish, the hoariest 
stereotype in all of Irish colonial history, and one which he very frequently publicly 
attacked.’ 326   In addition, after deploying a shift from ‘the citizen’ and ‘his 
discourse’327 to ‘the citizens’ and ‘they,’328 Nolan begins to articulate the group as a 
community of language.  Nolan moves on to pose a contrast between the leveling 
modern discourse, which is represented ‘primarily through the figure of Bloom,’ and 
which demystify[ies] and seculariz[es] other kinds of “high” styles or language’ and 
the community of language presented by the citizens.329   She contends that ‘the text 
cannot parody the citizen […] for his language of violence is its language as well. His 
discourse, in its relentless parody and destructive energy, resembles the modernism of 
                                                     
324 Ibid., p.96. 
325 Ibid., p.97. 
326 Ibid., p.104. 
327 Ibid., p. 107. 
328 Ibid., p. 109. 
329 Ibid., p. 107 
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sheer textual production exemplified by the interpolations.’330  As Nash points out, 
Nolan’s comments do not really stand at least in three aspects. First, ‘Joyce’s 
coincidence of language with the citizen is brief;’ second, the dichotomy between the 
levelling modern discourse and the community of language is ‘a false dichotomy’ for 
this is merely ‘a convenient myth from which to distinguish a supposedly 
authoritative language.’331  Most important of all in our concern here, ‘[t]he citizen 
draws on an anti-imperial newspaper parody […] while also being himself a mocking 
parody of xenophobia.’332 
Furthermore, taking Joyce’s artistic enterprise in ‘Cyclops’ as a literary working 
through of symptomatic nationalism, I argue that Nolan seems to confuse Joyce’s 
creative manoeuver by way of irony and parody in critiquing this community with the 
linguistic community’s own capacity to manipulate its language actively and 
consciously for self-critique.    Against Nolan, it stands to reason that Joyce might 
have drawn literary energy from the vernacular and invective circulating in the 
community of language, but his creative endeavour far exceeds his cultural sources. 
Through irony, hyperbole and parody, Joyce’s attitude is hardly sympathetic with the 
language community.  He might be sympathetic with the rights of the oppressed, and 
                                                     
330 Ibid., p. 107. 
331 John Nash, ‘“Hanging over the bloody paper”: Newspaper and imperialism in Ulysses’, in Howard J 
Booth and Nigel Rigby (ed.), Modernism and Empire (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000), p. 178-9.   
332 Ibid., p. 179. 
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is amused with the linguistic energy, but it is absurd to claim that he takes in it 
without critical evaluation.  Moreover, even though it is arguable that Joyce 
creatively employs stylized archaic language, hyperbole or irony in interpolations, it 
is untenable to claim that the community of language can manipulate the linguistic 
enjoyment as an autonomous ego.  That is to say, what Nolan cancels out is precisely 
the Unconscious dimension of the language community.   In this section, I have 
contended that these interpolations are fantasmatic expressions of symptomatic 
nationalism, rather than active manipulation of conscious, rational discourse by 
autonomous egos.  The fantasy lives its subjects.  The subjects dwell in the fantasy 
without entirely knowing what they are doing and talking. 
 
 
III. 
Thought and discourse are structurally entangled with surplus-enjoyment.  
Racism, anti-Semitism in our case, is to be explored by way of the mutual imbrication 
between discourse and enjoyment.  This section aims to investigate racism as an 
ideological fantasy, and the correlation between symptomatic nationalism and 
anti-Semitism.  Long before Bloom makes his physical entrance in the book, 
anti-Semitism has overshadowed the textual space.  Bloom is therefore stepping into 
and further entrapped in a pre-given discursive network of anti-Semitism.  For 
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instance, Haines, ‘a Britisher,’ enunciates glaring anti-Semitism: ‘I don’t want to see 
my country fall into the hands of German Jews. That’s our national problem, I’m 
afraid, just now’ (U, 1.666-68).  In ‘Nestor,’ Deasy, a Unionist, echoes the 
anti-Semitic invective of contamination and conspiracy by proclaiming,  
[m]ark my words, Mr. Dedalus [...] England is in the hands of the jews. In all the 
highest places: her finance, her press. And they are the signs of a nation’s decay. 
Wherever they gather they eat up the nation’s vital strength. I have seen it coming 
these years. As sure as we are standing here the jew merchants are already at their of 
destruction. Old England is dying’ (U, 2.345-51). 
Deasy’s malevolence goes further in rendering the Jews as devilish and innately 
corrupt: ‘[t]hey sinned against the light [...] And you can see the darkness in their eyes. 
And that is why they are wanderers on the earth to this day’ (U, 2.361-3).  His 
anti-Semitism reaches its apex with an implication of total exclusion333 when he 
remarks: ‘Ireland, they say, has the honour of being the only country which never 
persecuted the Jews’ (U, 2.437) ‘[b]ecause she never let them in’ (U, 2.443-4).  With 
this poisonous joke, Joyce depicts the enjoyment that Deasy derives from his 
anti-Semitism: ‘A coughball of laugher leaped from his throat dragging after it a 
rattling chain of phlegm. He turned back quickly, coughing, laughing, his lifted arms 
waving to the air’ (U, 2.433-50).  With his culturally deemed otherness in his native 
land, Bloom is to confront anti-Semitism as a discourse muddled with symptomatic 
                                                     
333 Although there are relatively few Jews in Ireland compared to other European countries. However, 
Ireland did let the Jews in. As Davidson points out, ‘Dublin had a three-century-old Jewish community, 
and that very April, 1904, the Limerick anti-Jewish riot had occurred.’ Neil R. Davidson, James Joyce, 
Ulysses, and the Construction of Jewish Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 197. 
From now on, this text will be identified as Construction. 
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enjoyment and to negotiate his status of being an (un)Irish Jew. 
With regard to the stereotypes cast upon the Jews, Marilyn Reizbaum observes 
two tendencies.334  Contradictory properties are attributed to Jews.  Among these 
clichéd characterisations, in mythologised panegyric, the Jewish people are praised 
for their perseverance in suffering and their strenuous effort to survive and arise 
prominently from adversity in the postexilic experience.  However, detestable 
images of moral degeneration and religious and political traitors are assigned to Jews 
once they are encountered locally as individual citizens existing in civil society.  
Jews undergo denigration and persecution ‘because Jews are dirty, greedy, 
mendacious, because they wear ear locks, speak jargon, do not want to assimilate, and 
also because they do assimilate, cease using their jargons, are nattily dressed.’335  
That this image of Jewishness produces contradiction betrays the performative 
character of ideology, leading us to an anti-descriptive view of naming, the dimension 
of the arbitrary intervention of the Symbolic Other.  In accounting for the problem of 
determining what sustains the identity of the designated object through naming, Žižek 
invokes the Lacanian retroactive effect of naming: ‘it is the name itself, the signifier 
itself, which supports the identity of the object. That “surplus” in the object which 
                                                     
334 Marilyn Reizbaum, James Joyce’s Judaic Other (Stanford: Stanford University Prrdd, 1999), p. 9 and 
p. 19.  
335 Sander Gilman L., Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 2. 
203 
 
 
stays the same […] is “something in it more than it”, that is to say the Lacanian objet 
petit a’ (SO, 95).  Positive traits in reality offer no guarantee to sustain the unity of 
an object under a certain name.  Symbolisation is itself ‘a radical contingency in 
naming,’ and meaning is therefore ‘supported by some “pure,” meaningless “signifier 
without signified”’ (SO, 97).  The named object/figure/entity is simply ‘an 
objectification of a void, of a discontinuity opened in reality by the emergence of 
signifier’ (SO, 95).  In anti-Semitism, the word ‘Jew’ as a name does not refer to a 
cluster of particular features in reality, but is grounded on a tautology which says 
‘they are like that, because they are Jews’ (SO, 96).  The objective features attributed 
to the discriminated Other are apparently false; it is something else, ‘something in it 
more than it,’ that constitutes the identity of the racial Other. 
The bifurcation in Jewish stereotyping finds expression in how Arthur Griffith, 
an editor of the United Irishman and founder and leader of Sinn Fein, responds to the 
Dreyfus affair, the Limerick affair and Zionism.336  In an article dated April 23, 1904 
in the United Irishman, Griffith publicised his anti-Semitism: 
The Jews of Great Britain and Ireland have united as is their wont, to crush the 
Christian who dares to block their path or point them out for what they 
                                                     
336 The Dreyfus affair was an anti-Semitic political scandal which divided France in the 1890s and 
1900s in which Alfred Dreyfus, a French artillery officer of Alsatian Jewish descent, was convicted of 
treason for the false accusation of communicating French military secrets to Germany. Despite the 
evidence of forged documents, Dreyfus was convicted as guilty twice and sentenced to life 
imprisonment once for the alleged treason. For a detailed account of Griffith’s attitude and Joyce’s 
response, please see Davidson, Construction, p. 61-82. Violent attacks and boycotts in Limerick flared 
up in 1904, aroused by Father Creagh’s belligerent sermon in which he accused Jews of being Christ 
murderers and moneylenders and usurers, designating them religious and economic traitors. 
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are—nine-tenths of them—usurers and parasites. In this category we do not include 
the Zionist minority of the Jews, who include those honest patriotic Jews who desire 
the re-establishment of the Hebrew nation in Palestine—the last thing on earth the 
majority desires. Attack a Jew—other than a Zionist Jew—and all Jewry comes to 
his assistance. Thus, when France condemned a Jew, Captain Dreyfus, to perpetual 
imprisonment for high treason, all Jewry combined to ruin France […] Precisely the  
same tactics are being followed in regard to Father Creagh in Limerick […] The Jew 
in Ireland is in every respect an economic evil.337 
Griffith supports Zionist Jews as he takes Zionism to be a version of nationalism for 
an oppressed and dispossessed people.  The Irish, the Jewish and the Hungarian are 
thus united in their search for independence and autonomy from oppression.  In this 
respect at least, the Jewish people participate in the Symbolic fiction of nationalist 
statism in correspondence with the nationalist project of Sinn Fein.  However, 
Griffith also casts racist slurs by stigmatising Jews as ‘usurers and parasites’ and ‘an 
economic evil.’  In response to Griffith’s anti-Semitism, Joyce comments in one of 
his letters that ‘[w]hat I object to most of all in his paper is that it is educating the 
people of Ireland on the old pap of racial hatred whereas anyone can see that if the 
Irish question exists, it exists for the Irish proletariat chiefly’ (LII, 167).  In 
‘Penelope,’ Joyce incorporates Griffith’s endorsement of the Limerick boycott and his 
anti-Semitism through Molly’s words when she says that Bloom ‘was going about 
with some of them Sinner Fein lately,’ and ‘that little man he [Bloom] showed me 
without the neck is very intelligent the coming man Griffiths is he well he doesnt look 
                                                     
337 Quoted in Reizbaum, p. 40. 
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it thats all I can say still it must have been him he knew there was a boycott’ (U, 18. 
383-7). 
What is divulged in Griffith’s representation is the divided positioning of Jews in 
the structure of nationalist ideology.  The Symbolic fiction of nationalism includes 
Jews as glorified signifiers, while the underside of this, the unwritten code of 
anti-Semitism, treats Jews as the sublime object of racism-as-ideological-fantasy.  If 
ideology is to sustain itself, it has to come to terms with the nonsensical kernel of 
enjoyment, which turns out to be the ‘last support of the ideological effect,’ beyond 
the discursive mechanism of the Symbolic fiction (SO, 124).  On the ideological 
plane, the traumatic experience of what Ernesto Laclau calls ‘social antagonism,’ 
which Žižek regards as the counterpart of the inconsistency of the Other in Lacanian 
theory, tempts the subject into racism to mask the inherent inconsistency of the 
ideological fantasy.  Ideology at the level of the Symbolic fiction tends to conceive 
the society, nation, or culture as an organic whole, a healthy image and a potent 
signifier for identification.  Consequently, some way to suture the gap between the 
fantasy of the unified entity and its inherent absence has to be found. 
It is precisely at this point that racism as ideological fantasy becomes apparent.  
The trick of racism resides in the way in which it intertwines the logic of exclusion 
with the transference of guilt, which turns out to be a pseudo-account, a covering-up 
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for the failure and inherent inconsistency of society.  As Žižek puts it, ‘[s]ociety [the 
Other] doesn’t exist and the Jew is its symptom’ (SO, 125).  Social antagonism is 
displaced and directed toward the Jews as a corrupting or corroding force, an 
embodiment of negativity.  A logic of inversion underlies anti-Semitism; the truth is 
of course that ‘[f]ar from being the positive cause of social negativity, the “Jew” is a 
point at which social negativity as such assumes positive existence’ (SO, 127).  The 
signifier ‘Jew’ condenses a cluster of contradictory features.  That the Jew is 
assigned to the structural position of a socially constructed embodiment of negativity, 
a figure around which the ideological fantasy is centred, further elucidates this 
phenomenon.  Paradoxically, at the empirical level, a specific Jew as an individual is 
under erasure precisely because he/she unwittingly comes to occupy the position of 
‘the conceptual Jew’ operative in anti-Semitism as ‘a mere ‘positivization of a void’ 
(PF, 76).  The conceptual Jew is thus ‘a filler holding the place of some structural 
impossibility, while simultaneously disavow[ing] that impossibility’ (PF, 76).  
Ideological anamorphosis occurs at the moment when the sublime object of ideology 
is recognised as an embodiment of ‘negative magnitude.’ 
The displacement of guilt to the demonised Other, the enemy who opposes us, 
may help us understand the operation of scapegoating; ‘when in doubt persecute 
Bloom’ (U, 15.976-77).  Scapegoating works with the Jewish conspiracy theory as 
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an ideological fantasy, one which evidently figures in Haines’s, Deasy’s, and 
Griffith’s words, rendering Jews as vampire-like, parasitic figures responsible for the 
decay and corruption of the nation, the empire or the world; ‘And they are the signs of 
a nation’s decay. Wherever they gather they eat up the nation’s vital strength’ (U, 2. 
347-9).  It has been commonplace in anti-Semitic discourse to claim that Jews aspire 
to world dominance by manipulating economic, political and even media power 
behind the scenes.  This theory of Jewish conspiracy is intimately connected with the 
stereotypes and false accusations to which Jewish people have been subjected, and 
these two dimensions fuel each other.  The stereotypes of being moneylenders, 
usurers, Shylock figures and swindlers are repetitively applied to Jews.  In Ulysses, 
the gentile Reuben J. Dodd is associated with Bloom in ‘Hades’ on the basis that he is 
a moneylender, considered a Jewish occupation (U, 6.250-95); in ‘Cyclops,’ the 
Canada swindle case (U, 12.1084-93), an immigration swindle, is depicted as a proof 
of the Jews’ typical financial infidelity since it was a case in which both the convicted 
and victims were Jews.  As Reizbaum points out, this is ‘less a matter of false 
accusation than a confirmation of the Jew as thief and swindler.’338 
At this juncture, I attempt an alternative interpretation of the association with 
Bloom as the source of Griffith’s The Resurrection of Hungary (1904), taking it as an 
                                                     
338 Reizbaum, p. 15. 
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expression of the theory of Jewish conspiracy.  John Wyse Nolan indicates that ‘it 
was Bloom gave the ideas for Sinn Fein to Griffith to put in his paper all kinds of 
jerrymandering, packed juries and swindling the taxes off of the government and 
appointing consuls all over the world to walk about selling Irish industries’ (U, 12. 
1574-77).339  Griffith’s project draws inspiration from the Hungarian nationalists’ 
success in establishing a dual monarchy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
anticipating that Ireland would become a dual state with Britain through passive 
resistance. 340   The Hungarian-Irish parallel had been ‘part of Irish republican 
thinking since at least 1848.’341  Therefore, the association between Bloom and 
Griffith is untenable, a bit whimsical, if not utterly enigmatic. 
Joyce may utilise Bloom’s association with Sinn Fein to connote Bloom’s 
enthusiasm or support for Irish autonomy.342 The gossip about Bloom’s involvement 
is derived from Bloom’s Hungarian background and the rumour about Griffith’s 
                                                     
339 Joyce uses ‘anachronism’ in this incidence for ‘Sinn Fein was a name first used at the end of 1904’ 
(Reizbaum, p. 43) and the event narrated in ‘Cyclops’ took place on June 16 of that year. It should be 
noted that Joyce’s attitude toward Griffith and Sinn Fein is quite complicated. As Gibson indicates, it is 
‘by no means primarily critical,’ Gibson, p.122. Dominic Manganiello holds that Joyce may find some 
appeal in Griffith’s moderate policy to gain home rule through passive resistance. But Joyce apparently 
objects the principle of physical violence in Fenianism, and criticizes the moderate procedures mixed 
with violent rhetoric in the philosophy of Sinn Fein, which might still breed extreme Sinn Feiners who 
advocate for violent nationalism. Joyce’s Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Books, 1980), p. 
137-8. 
340 Richard Davis, Arthur Griffith (Dundalk: Dundalgan Press, 1976), p. 11. 
341 Gibson, p. 119. 
342 This is not the sole reference to Bloom’s nationalist enthusiasm.  For instance, in ‘Lestrygonians,’ 
Bloom nearly gets beaten up in a protest against Joe Chamberlain, who is an aggressive imperialist 
siding with the English policies in the Boer War and an enemy of Home Rule (U, 8. 423-6). 
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having a Jewish adviser-ghost writer.343  But, if this is founded, why would Joyce 
employ authorship under erasure in Bloom’s association with Sinn Fein, why was 
there a rumour of a ghost-figure behind the scenes?  According to Duffy, the notion 
of ‘giving the idea for’ betrays a ‘discounted’ authorship, ‘a displaced, double 
affair.’344  I suggest that this arrangement of authorship under erasure betrays that the 
stereotype of Jewish conspiracy not only operates within the mechanism of 
postivising the negative, but also points to the idea that the conceptual Jews are not 
the authority figures or master signifiers of the symbolic fiction, but occupy a 
structural position of spectral presence, a kind of uncanny double of the public 
authority ‘act[ing] in the shadow, invisible from the public eye, irradiating a 
phantom-like, spectral omnipotence’ (LN, 683).  While the Italian Irish Joseph 
Patrick Nannetti was accepted as a public figure, representing Dublin’s College Green 
in the Irish Parliament in 1904, anti-Semitism marks Bloom, a Jewish Irish/an Irish 
Jew, as a spectral presence with an elusive, ‘fantasmatic ex-sistence’ (LN, 683).  
After Martin Cunningham confirms Wyse’s claim about Bloom’s contribution to Sinn 
Fein, Bloom is still perceived as suspicious and referred to as ‘perverted,’ as a ‘wolf 
in sheep’s clothing,’ a ‘Virag from Hungary!’ and ‘Ahasuerus [...] [c]ursed by God’ (U, 
12.1635-7). 
                                                     
343 Gifford, p. 366. 
344 Duffy, p. 118. 
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In addition to this, the Jewish Diaspora is incorporated into the stereotype of 
implied political infidelity.  For example, the Jews are slandered as ‘Jerusalem (ah!) 
cuckoos’ (U, 12.1571-2).  Moreover, when John Wyse asks ‘why can’t a jew love his 
country like the next fellow?’, J. J. Molloy replies, ‘Why not? [...] when he’s quite 
sure which country it is’ (U, 12.1628-30).  The Dreyfus affair may well serve as an 
example of the how Jews were viewed as permanent outsiders and potential traitors. 
Furthermore, racism is unfailinfly surrounded by the fantasmatic speculation 
about the genitalia, sexuality and the bodily traits or enjoyment of the Other.  This 
obsession with the Other’s secret enjoyment reveals what the racists truly target in 
their diatribes and violence is nothing but the ‘unbearable surplus enjoyment 
contained in the Other,’ the ‘unfathomable traumatic element that “bothers us” in the 
Other,’ which fantasy attempts to circle and contain (GV, 105).  In ‘Cyclops,’ the 
prevalent anti-Semitism finds expression in denigrating references to the Jews such as, 
‘circumcised,’ ‘a bit off the top,’ ‘a prudent member and no mistake,’ or ‘a sort of a 
queer odour’ (U, 12.19; 20; 437; 453).  It is noteworthy that Bloom’s dubious 
masculinity (or indeed the femininity notoriously attributed to male Jews in 
stereotypes) can become a source not only of derision but also of the Citizen’s 
vehement vilification for a justified murder: ‘Lying up in the hotel Pisser was telling 
me once a month with headache like a totty with her courses. Do you know what I’m 
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telling you? It’d be an act of God to take a hold of a fellow the like of that and throw 
him in the bloody sea. Justifiable homicide, so it would’ (U, 12.1658-1662).  
However, since hatred and violence aim at the ‘real kernel of objet a, “what is in the 
object more than itself,”’ the object of racist violence, be it verbal or physical, is in 
fact ‘indestructible’ (GV, 107).  In the same manner that the Irish national Thing is 
organised around fetishism of national heroes, trees and fishes, these features of 
repulsion and fascination designate for the Lacanian ‘something in the object more 
than itself’ around which the racist fantasy of the Other's enjoyment being stolen or 
kept away from us is derived and organised. 
Given the fact that the subject is structurally split, and that anti-Semitism as an 
ideological fantasy is an inherently intersubjective construction, the projection thesis 
in which the racist ‘projects’ or ‘externalises’ his/her inner conflicts onto the target of 
discrimination is not sufficient (LN, 686).  Rather, Lacan’s formula for fantasy ($<>a) 
reveals a ‘self-referential inclusion’: ‘the transcendental I, $, is “inscribed into the 
picture” as its point of impossibility’ (LN, 707).  As Lacan remarks, ‘[t]he picture, 
certainly, is in my eye. But I am in the picture’ (XI, 96).  Applying this Lacanian 
formula of self-inclusion in fantasy, Žižek reverses Hitler’s anti-Semitic verse, ‘[w]e 
have to kill the Jew within us,’ by demanding acknowledgment that ‘he, the 
anti-Semite, in his identity, is also in the Jew’ (ET, 135-6; LN, 707).  The subject is in 
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the picture of ideological fantasy of anti-Semitism.  To strip away (anti-Semitic) 
fantasy dissolves the racist’s subjectivity.  In other words, what the anti-Semite 
attributes to the figure of the Jew betrays his/her own symptomatic being that he/she 
refuses to recognise.  An investigation into the mixed features contained within the 
anti-Semitic conceptual Jew as an embodied negativity would thus help to reveal the 
symptom of the society itself. 
 
 
IV. 
Let us reflect on the ethical ideals announced both through Bloom’s mouth and 
through the poetic justice of Bloom’s hilarious flight in a passage of parodic biblical 
prose (U, 12.1910-8).  Besieged by the superegoic enjoyment of the entangled 
symptomatic nationalism and anti-Semitism, Bloom utters his definition of nation, 
asserting both his Irish and his Jewish identity: ‘What is your nation if I may ask? 
says the citizen. -- Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland’ (U, 12.1431-2); 
‘And I belong to a race too, says Bloom, that is hated and persecuted. Also now. This 
very moment. This very instant’ (U, 12.1467-8).  It appears that Joyce here places 
the issue of being Irish together with being Jewish, thereby condensing and 
problematizing the ethico-political question of what it means to be an Irish Jew or a 
Jewish Irishman.  In bantering with other denizens of the pub, Bloom continues to 
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summon the Judeo-Christian commandment to neighbour love as an ethical paradigm.  
Finally, Bloom acknowledges his ‘non-Jewish Jewishness’345  with a jocoserious 
assertion of his Jewish identity through a whimsical list of Jews, which ends with 
‘Your God was a jew. Christ was a jew like me’ (U, 12.1808-9). 
Joyce deliberately problematises the definition of being a Jew by complicating 
Bloom’s Jewish identity.  Bloom was born in Ireland and is three-fourths Jewish in 
lineage, and never circumcised (U, 13.979-81).  He is an assimilated Jew, and not a 
Zionist.  In ‘Ithaca,’ Joyce records Bloom’s assimilation history: 
To Master Percy Apjohn at High School in 1880 he had divulged his disbelief in the  
tenets of the Irish (protestant) church (to which his father Rudolf Virag (later 
Rudolph Bloom) had been converted from the Israelitic faith and communion in 
1865 by the Society for promoting Christianity among the jews) subsequently 
abjured by him in favour of Roman Catholicism at the epoch of and with a view to 
his matrimony in 1888. (U, 17.1634-40) 
Bloom’s identity as a Hungarian-Irish baptised Jew may illustrate that racial and 
cultural hybridity was a common social and historical fact among assimilated 
European Jewry, which puts into question the dichotomy of purity and otherness.  
This hybridity, which has not yet been properly represented on the cultural scene, 
constitutes ‘the very image of Ireland’s unacknowledged ethno-cultural hybridity.’346 
Moreover, Jewishness itself is a cultural, textual assemblage of prevalent thematics 
                                                     
345 Davidson, Construction, p. 218. 
346 Joseph Valente, ‘Joyce’s Politics: race, nation, and transnationalism’, James Joyce Studies. Ed. Jean 
Michel Rabaté (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 73-96, at p. 76. 
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and poetics associated with the figure of the Jew.347  ‘Non-Jewish Jewishness’ 
therefore designates an alternative conception of being a Jew.  In this section, I will 
explore the notions of ‘transnational’ national identity and ‘non-Jewish Jewishness’ in 
light of the relationship between the Lacanian conception of the subject as void and 
the construction of national identity. 
The ethico-political ideals of nation and universal love proposed by Bloom 
deserve to be quoted in full in the service of an analysis of their ethical significance: 
--A nation? says Bloom. A nation is the same people living in the same place.  
--By God, then says Ned, laughing, if that’s so I’m a nation for I’m living in the 
same place for the past five years. 
So of course everyone had the laugh at Bloom and says he, trying to muck out of it: 
--Or also living in different places. 
--That covers my case, says Joe. 
--What is your nation if I may ask? says the citizen. 
-- Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here Ireland […] And I belong to a race too, says 
Bloom, that is hated and persecuted. Also now. This very moment. This very instant 
[…] Plundered. Insulted. Persecuted. Taking what belongs to us by right. At this 
very moment. This very instant.  (U, 12.1422-1469) 
 
--Are you talking about the new Jerusalem? says the citizen. 
-- I’m talking about injustice, says Bloom […] Force, hatred, history, all that. That’s 
not life for men and women, insult and hatred. And everybody knows that it’s the 
very opposite of that that is really life. 
--What? says Alf. 
--Love, says Bloom. (U, 12.1473-1485) 
 
--A new apostle to the gentiles, says the citizen. Universal love. 
--Well, says, John Wyse. Isn’t that what we’re told. Love your neighbour. 
--That chap? Says the citizen. Beggar my neighbour is his motto. Love, moya! He’s 
a nice pattern of a Romeo and Juliet. 
                                                     
347 Reizbaum, p. 35-88. 
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Love loves to love love. Nurse loves the new chemist. Constable 14A loves Mary 
Kelly. Herty Mac Dowell loves the boy that has the bicycle. M. B. loves a fair 
gentleman. Li Chi Han lovey up kissy Cha Pu Chow. Jumbo, the elephant, loves 
Alice the elephant […] His Majesty the King loves Her Majesty the Queen. Mrs 
Norman W. Tupper loves officer Taylor. You love a certain person. And this person 
loves that another person because everybody loves somebody but God loves 
everybody.  (U, 12.1489-1501) 
   
Bloom’s highly democratic definition of a nation as ‘the same people living in 
the same place,’ or ‘also living in different places’ is mocked and his nationality 
immediately questioned.  Upon closer scrutiny, it is noteworthy that what is 
challenged is not the democratic ideal of the nation as such, but its efficacy.   
Previously, by means of an analysis of symptomatic nationalism, I have shown how 
the Symbolic ideal for national autonomy and independence is contaminated by and 
entangled with the superegoic enjoyment exemplifed in various fantasmatic 
construction around the national Thing.   The Symbolic law operates with the 
ideological fantasy.  Insofar as the Symbolic law of the liberalist ideal is underpinned 
by the exception/transgression of law in the form of ideological fantasy, the 
superegoic underside enjoyment of symptomatic nationalism and anti-Semitism, for 
the Symbolic law to really take effect, the suspension of the superegoic underside is 
required.348  This procedure can be approached in two ways.  In the first place, the 
law, the Symbolic ideal (represented in the liberal ideal at this juncture) must be taken 
                                                     
348 For a more detailed account of the relationship between the Symbolic law and its underside 
superegoic support, see Chapter One on the Lacanian theorization of the function of fantasy. 
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seriously and literally; the letters of the law as the embodiment of justice, equality and 
democracy must be realised and practiced without treacherous, obscene fantasy or the 
insidious enjoyment instanced in the unwritten code of racism, xenophobia or sexism.  
Approaching this matter from another angle, a working through or deactivation of the 
fantasmatic support, or a sustained operation of law/regulation devoid of the 
superegoic enjoyment, is therefore inevitably in order.  Since, in parallel to the 
literary traversal of ideological fantasy, Joyce inserts the aspiration to universal love 
and the liberal ideal of nationhood, it is our task to explore the relationship between 
these ethical ideals, ideology and law, to see how ethical ideals might render ideology 
and law inoperative and transformed. 
Despite his garbled expression, Bloom’s definition of a nation is as simple as it is 
true.  Countless brutal wars and atrocities arise precisely because of the failure of 
really honouring this rootless, colour-blind, pristine, liberal Symbolic law.  As Žižek 
puts it, ‘the truly subversive thing is not to disregard the explicit letter of Law on 
behalf of the underlying fantasies, but to stick to the letter against the fantasy which 
sustains it’ (PF, 29, original emphasis).  Bloom is capable of upholding and 
pronouncing this Symbolic ideal because he does not share the symptomatic 
nationalism and its concomitant fantastic mode of enjoyment.  On the contrary, the 
cynical laughter of the barflies is derived from their shared symptomatic nationalism 
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and coded enjoyment, which simultaneously support and undermine this Symbolic 
ideal.  In Lacanian terms, the law works side by side with its transgression, with its 
superegoic underside enjoyment; in the words of Agamben, the law works with its 
exception, with its inclusive exclusion, with its state of emergency built into the 
structure.  As discussed above, the shared fantasmatic enjoyment centred around the 
national Thing and the fear of the Other’s theft of our enjoyment all contribute to the 
transference of guilt and social antagonism to the discriminated Other.  Bloom’s 
remarks sound offensive to the nationalist ear precisely because they refute the 
unwritten superegoic law and challenge the shared coded enjoyment in national 
fantasy and racism. 
Joyce deliberately fragments Bloom’s discourse on his nationality and proposal 
of universal love with the inserted digression of extravagant praise for ‘the much 
treasured and intricately embroidered ancient Irish facecloth’ (U, 12.1438-9).  The 
long paragraph on the facecloth continues for twenty six lines (U, 12.1438-64), which 
not only praises the legendary beauty of the cornerpieces’ of the cloth as ‘the acme of 
art,’ (U, 12.1442) but also includes all the ‘moving scenes’ (U, 12.1461-2) associated 
with the Irish landscape.  It is this culturally contrived enjoyment of symptomatic 
nationalism around the National Thing, in this case the landscape and traditional 
handcrafted art, that abruptly obfuscates the flow of the narrative as well as frustrating 
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Bloom’s ethical ideals.  By identifying how Bloom’s ideal of nationhood is ridiculed 
and who participates in this derision, I argue that it is the efficacy not the validity of 
this proposal that is in jeopardy.  For those who do not share the superegoic 
enjoyment of symptomatic nationalism that might cripple and debilitate the Symbolic 
ideals, the validity is taken seriously and without irony. 
Furthermore, Joyce’s own ‘transnationlism,’ to borrow Joseph Valente’s term, 
should be read with Bloom’s democratic definition of nation in mind.  In the face of 
the tension between a ‘vigorously post-colonial’ Joyce and ‘an acerbic anti-nationalist 
cosmopolitan’ Joyce, Valente traces Joyce’s attitudes toward nationalism over the 
years, arguing that the transnationalism developed in exile grows out the ‘sublation’ of 
the principles of his ‘anti-nationalism’ in his Irish years.349  Valente identifies several 
causes for Joyce’s ‘anti-patriotic posture’350 toward both Griffith’s Sinn Fein political 
agenda and the cultural nationalism of Irish Revivalism.  Joyce’s hostility toward the 
dominant political and cultural discourse of Irish nationalism of his time is 
undoubtedly derived from his uneasiness with ‘Gaelic exclusionism,’ which valorises 
Irish purity in race, culture and language, disregarding the ‘ethnocultural hybridity’ of 
Ireland and breeding hatred.351  In contrast to ‘Gaelic exclusionism,’ Joyce, Valente 
                                                     
349 Valente, p. 73. 
350 Ibid., p. 74. 
351 Ibid., p. 75-76. Other reasons identified by Valente for Joyce’s disapproval of Irish Revivalism 
include Joyce’s cult of Parnell, the Irish propensity for self-betrayal, and the intellectual banality of the 
Irish cultural nationalism in subordinating all cultural standards to promoting ethno-national identity. 
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contends, espouses ‘Irish exceptionalism,’ ‘grounded not, as in revivalist doctrine, on 
a unique collective identity, but rather on a singular degree of collective 
self-alterity.352  In explicating this ‘self-alterity’ and ‘exceptionalism,’ Valente cites 
Joyce’s famous lines in response to Griffith’s race baiting agenda and support of the 
Gaelic revival: ‘If the Irish programme did not insist on the Irish language I suppose I 
could myself be a nationalist’ (SL, 125).  This astringent remark discloses not so 
much Joyce’s scorn for the motivation of the entire project of Irish nationalism as his 
acerbity about constructing the nationalist agenda around the conception of a certain 
notion of ‘Irishness,’ the Irish language included.353 
Through a Lacanian lens, I would like to argue that Joyce’s ‘self-alterity’ or 
‘exceptionalism’ aims less at an outright rejection of nationalism than at a radical 
gesture of stripping off the national Thing, the ideological fantasy of symptomatic 
nationalism.  Ireland should seek identity or solidarity not in purity based on 
exclusionism, but in self-exceptionalism, which suspends exclusionism as superegoic 
                                                     
352 Ibid., p. 90. 
353 Critics tend to unearth different tendencies in Joyce’s controversial attitude toward cultural 
nationalism. In this chapter, I have touched upon some of these. For instance, Gibson argues that 
Joyce employs the gigantism in parodied interpolations to mock the Irish Revivalists romanticized 
historiography, while Nolan in James Joyce and Nationalism tries to argue for Joyce’s positive attitude 
toward Irish nationalism. Regarding cultural nationalism, Seamus Deane points out that Joyce is 
‘himself a dominant figure in that movement [of Irish Revival],’ sharing with the Revivalists ‘the same 
linguistic anxieties’ and the aspiration for an Irish national literature to be born through experimenting 
with the English language, yet dismissing the ‘folkish’ or ‘folksy’ elements of Revivalist agenda, 
warning against the representation of ‘pseudo-Irishness,’ the preserve of ‘the stage-Irishman of the 
nineteenth century England.’ Joyce seeks to gain distance from this shortcoming, attempting to 
achieve his own version of ‘literary independence.’ Seamus Deane, ‘Joyce the Irishman’, The 
Cambridge Companion to James Joyce, ed. Derek Attridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p. 28-48. 
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enjoyment of ideological fantasies.  I would therefore draw an affinity between 
Joyce’s ‘self-alterity’ and ‘exceptionalism’ and Agamben’s ‘exception’ from the law’s 
exception, the ‘suspension of suspension,’ an ‘unplugging’ from the reified mode of 
enjoyment on which Santner and Žižek have commented extensively.  This 
exceptionalism is further complicated by Joyce’s revised notion of Sinn Fein, the 
name in Irish meaning ‘we ourselves,’354 hinting at a distance from ‘essentialist 
orthodoxies,’ subverting the inherent binarism of the Revivalist logic with a 
‘transnationalist objective of opening the borders of national(ist) identity’ to 
acknowledge the hybridity in race, language and culture, in ‘a nonetheless 
Irish-affirmative mode.’355 
As Valente remarks, ‘since romantic or revivalist nationalism centred on 
determining what was proper or improper to the “imagined community,”’ Joyce uses 
Sinn Fein for subversion.  In other words, ‘[t]he slogan, “ourselves alone,” with an 
emphasis on the multiplicities of selves, comes to name an Irish exceptionalism based 
on Ireland/Irishness as exceptions to themselves.’356 Thus the phrase ‘We ourselves’ 
takes on a new tenor, signifying a new mode of being-togetherness: We are ourselves 
alone, being together here and now without being burdened or tarnished with the 
                                                     
354 It has been pointed out that Sinn Fein means, ‘we, ourselves;’ yet it is often translated as 
‘ourselves alone.’ 
355 Valente, p. 91. 
356 Ibid., p. 91. 
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ideological fantasy of purity.  Being-togetherness itself constitutes ‘we ourselves.’  
Transnationalism is built on this revised notion of ‘we ourselves,’ advocating a project 
to ‘transvalue the present state of ambivalence and self-division into a constructive 
cultural perspectivism by refuting all romantic fictions, unionist or separatist,’ thus 
preparing Ireland ‘to become a modern trans-nation, characterised by cultural 
inmixing within its borders.’357  Valente refers to Joyce’s much quoted lines on the 
acknowledgement of multiplicity in support of his conception of Joyce’s 
transnationalism.358  For instance, Joyce states, ‘[o]ur civilization is a vast fabric, in 
which the Nordic aggressiveness and Roman law, the new bourgeois conventions and 
the remnant of a Syriac religion are reconciled. In such a fabric, it is useless to look 
for a thread that may have remained pure and virgin’ (CW, 161); before going on to 
say ‘What race, what language [...] can boast of being pure today? And no race has 
less right to utter such a boast than the race now living in Ireland’ (CW, 165). 
Although, on the surface, Valente’s rhetoric regarding Joyce’s transnationalism 
seems to resonate with the celebration of hybridity, multiplicity, and difference which 
is so prevalent in post-colonial criticism and multiculturalism, a crucial concept 
distinguishes his approach from others. Valente attempts to read Joyce’s 
transnationalism through the lens of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, namely, through the 
                                                     
357 Ibid., p. 90. 
358 Ibid., p. 89. 
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operation of the ‘transvaluation’ and ‘transubstantiation’ of 
nation/nationness/nationalism.  This critical gesture is of vital importance.  
Regardless of whether Valente is fully conscious of it or not, transnationalism born 
out of a thorough transvaluation is less a version of multiculturalism than a founding 
gesture to create the possibility for the coexistence of difference.  Prior to the 
negotiation of tolerance, hybridisation or pluralisation in the site of discursive 
hegemony, transnationalism helps to make negativity and nothingness appear.  At 
this juncture, I would like to call attention to the parallel work of transvaluation and 
transubstantiation.  That is to say, transvauation can accomplished in company with 
transubstantiation and vice versa.  Without traversing fantasies and de-animating the 
fixed drive formation at both the personal and collective levels, the tolerance of 
difference and the celebration of multiplicity simply extends the field of domination 
through incorporation, while leaving intact the functioning of law or the Symbolic 
structure based on the sovereign exception and the internal exclusion of homo sacer. 
Tolerance and the celebration for plurality, hybridity certainly remind us of the 
parlance of post-colonial criticism.  To just give one example from Joyce criticism, 
Vicent J. Cheng, throughout his book Joyce, Race and Empire repetitively identifies 
the aggressive nationalist logic of domination and exclusion based on a hierarchical 
binary opposition between the oppressor and the oppressed.  To counter binarism, 
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Cheng advocates tolerance and differences, hybridity and plurality.  This contention 
finds typical expression in his interpretation of the tension between the Citizen and 
Bloom.  The former represents the tendency of essentializing nation(ness) and the  
exclusion of what is deemed the other/outsider based on a binary opposition, ‘the need 
to demarcate the Self and the Other as polar enemies marked by absolute difference; 
of limited, one-eyed vision.’359  By contrast, ‘by defining a nation simply as a people 
generally within a geographical location, Bloom’s answer refuses either to hierarchize 
or to “imagine” an essentialized community, but rather allows for personal or ethnic 
difference and heterogeneity.’360 While the violence of hierarchical binary opposition 
is invoked and repudiated in the above argument, it is conspicuous that the argument 
itself is deployed through a dichotomy, an opposition between two polarities.  
Strictly speaking, upon more cautious reflection, dichotomy, dialectic and binary 
opposition is elementary in language and human thinking and it hardly constitutes a 
crime itself.  However, without the working of ‘transubstantiation’ in terms of the 
traversal of fantasies, and the de-activation of the structure of law and its exception, 
the structural imbalance is not necessarily shaken or defused with the celebration of 
heterogeneity, difference and plurality.  This partly betrays the inadequacy of 
multi-culturalism in approaching hybridity and plurality.   
                                                     
359 Vincent J. Cheng, Joyce, Race, and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 201. 
360 Ibid., p. 212. 
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There are at least two ways to conceive hybridity and plurality.  One is to 
enclose difference as independent and individual one in each, separate political entity; 
the other is to manufacture hybridity by way of appropriating otherness and 
heterogeneity into a new syncretism.361  In the latter case, hybridity may well work 
to serve the incorporation of otherness and differences while omitting autonomy and 
subjectivity of diverse elements.  In this light, transnationlism plays a crucial role, 
preparing the ground for a nation devoid of particularities, a nation rigorously 
honoring the Symbolic law without being sustained by the attachment to the national 
Thing and the various ideological fantasies.  If the notion of transnationalism is to be 
put into words, Bloom’s ideal of a nation offers a pristine draft for it.  I therefore 
would like to claim that transnationalism can afford a conceptual extension to a nation 
without nationalism, commonly built upon imagined homeland, history and 
community.   
In a similar vein, transnationalism may also shed light on Joyce’s attitude 
towards Zionism.362  Zionism as a secularised messianism aimed at establishing an 
                                                     
361 Chaoyang Liao, ‘Untigering the Tiger: Together as Many, or Hybridized as One’ Chung-wai Literary 
Monthly, 21.3 (1992), 48-58. The original Chinese title is ‘是四不像，還是虎豹獅象？：再與邱貴芬談台灣文化.’ 
I follow the author’s own translation of the title here. 
362 Joyce’s attitude toward Zionism and Judaism is complex and encompasses various aspects, 
including the political, the linguistic, the religious and the cultural. Please see Ira Bruce Nadel, Joyce 
and the Jews: Culture and Text (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1989), p. 69-84. Joyce’s Trieste and 
Zurich libraries harboured Theodor Herzl’s Der judenstaat, Harry’s Scher’s collection, Zionism and the 
Jewish Future, Edouard Dujardin’s Le Source du fleuve chrétien, subtitled Histoire critique due 
Judaisme acien et du christianisme primitive: Le Judaiseme. Nadel thinks that Joyce is skeptical about 
the aggressive nationalism lurking behind Zionism, yet finds inspiration in Herzl’s liberalism and 
Dujardin’s ideas of intermixing language and culture. Joyce’s circle, especially during the years abroad, 
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Israeli state posed an alternative for European Jewry faced with the exacerbated 
anti-Semitism of Joyce’s time.  After broaching his idea of the nation, Bloom 
champions love, not Zionism, as a possible avenue of ameliorating injustice in reply 
to the Citizen’s query, ‘are you talking about the new Jerusalem?’  It is the 
Judeo-Christian ideal of universal love, not the state of Israel, for which Bloom opts.  
In Ulysses, Bloom’s attitude toward Zionism is epitomised by his response to the 
advertisement for Agendath Netaim.  Joyce transforms a real-life friend, Dlugacz,363 
into a ‘ferreteyed pork-butcher’ (U, 4.152) who wraps the goods Bloom has purchased 
in a paper containing an advertisement for Agendath Netaim, which, as a result, 
triggers Bloom’s pondering over the planting project in Palestine: ‘You pay eighty 
marks and they plant a dunam of land for you with olives, oranges, almonds or 
citrons’ (U, 4.194-5).  Bloom passes judgment on this project: ‘Nothing doing. Still 
an idea behind it’ (U, 4.200). 
The turn of the twentieth century witnessed the parallel rise of Irish nationalism 
and Zionism.364  Arguably, while rejecting the practicality of Zionism, Bloom does 
                                                                                                                                                        
included figures such as Moses Dulgacz, an ardent Zionist, a Rabbi and wholesaler, and Ottocaro 
Wiess, an informal promoter of Zionism and brother of Italy’s first psychoanalyst, Edouardo Weiss. 
Among them, most important of all, Ettore Schmitz (Italo Svevo), a Hungarian-Jewish, avant-garde 
novelist and Joyce’s student, becomes a reader and critic of Joyce’s work, helping Joyce finish A 
Portrait. As Davidson argues, his person, and the characters of his own novels join Joyce’s construction 
of Bloom’s ‘Jewishness.’ Davidson, Construction, p. 155-84. 
363 Nadel, Joyce and the Jews, p. 71 
364 George Bornstein, ‘The Colors of Zion: Black, Jewish and Irish Nationalisms at the Turn of the 
Century’, Modernism/Modernity, 12.3 (2005), p. 369-84. Bornstein regards the prevalent inscription of 
Zionism in Ulysses as a literary representation of the parallel development of Black, Jewish and Irish 
nationalisms in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, reading Zionism as the common 
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not refute the underlying aspiration for deliverance from bondage and the enterprise 
for autonomy and independence.  For Bloom (and arguably Joyce), Zionism should 
be situated within the larger framework of revolution and the demand for 
democracy. 365  However, Bloom descends further into a distressing imaginary 
digression:  
A barren land, bare waste. Sodom, Gomorrah, Edom. All dead names. A dead sea in a dead 
land, grey and old […] The oldest people. Wandered far away over all the earth, captivity 
to captivity, multiplying, dying being born everywhere. It lay there now. Now it could bear 
no more. Dead: an old woman’s: the grey sunken cunt of the world.’ (U, 4.219-23) 
Davidson argues that Bloom’s refusal of ‘the hope [of Zionism]’ is a symptom of his 
intensified sense of isolation and an outcome of his introjected self-image, even a 
self-hatred of anti-Semitic stereotypes such as ‘the shadow of Weininger’ and ‘the 
feminized Jew.’366 According to Davidson, ‘he is not accepted as an Irishman by 
others, and he will not accept himself as a Jew [...] His negative vision [of Palestine 
and Zionism] thus ends in an image of female decrepitude.’367 I disagree with 
Davidson at this point because he explains Bloom’s attitude in terms of a political 
inaction resulting from psychological paralysis.  My stance is that there is a deeper 
cause for Joyce to make Bloom maintain his distance from Zionism.368 
                                                                                                                                                        
motive of different nationalist demands for emancipation. 
365 Alain Badiou, ‘The Question of Democracy.’ Lacanian Ink 28(2006), p. 59. 
366 Davidson, Construction, p. 203. 
367 Ibid., p. 203. 
368  Although it is common-sensical for critics today not to conflate the attitude of characters with 
that of their authors, it is also well-known that Joyce’s detachment from politics find ample 
expression in his biographical and critical writings, and his novels. My argument in this chapter is that 
through Bloom, Joyce articulates his skepticism toward the state and politics and calls for an ethics in 
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The refusal of Zionism as a feasible solution to anti-Semitism is further 
evidenced in ‘Ithaca.’  Bloom literally burns the advertisement: Bloom ‘produced 
from his waistcoat a folded page of prospectus (illustrated) entitled Agendath Netaim, 
unfolded the same, examined it superficially, rolled it into a thin cylinder, [and] 
ignited it in the candleflame’ (U, 17.1324-6).  It is noteworthy that Bloom’s rejection 
of Zionism takes a different path from that of Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew, author 
of Der Judenstaat (The State of the Jews or The Jewish State) and a Zionist leader.  It 
stands to reason that those who endorse the establishment of a Jewish state merely 
dream of displacing the internal conflict with geographical distance without actually 
resolving the problem caused by the intricate collusion between symptomatic 
nationalism and anti-Semitism.  To untangle this issue, Joyce enlists the ethical ideal 
of universal love. 
Bloom’s proposal of universal love is immediately ridiculed by the Citizen. 
Whenever the sense of irony surfaces, breaking in the flow of the narrative, the reader 
should be cautious not to dismiss the validity of the proposed idea too rapidly.  With 
more careful inspection, it is arguable that it is not the ideal of universal love per se 
that is challenged in the parodied digression, but its degenerate vulgarisation in terms 
of mundane erotic or romantic love.  It is this vulgar version of fantasy expressed in 
                                                                                                                                                        
place of politics. 
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the materiality of language that obfuscates both the flow of narrative and the efficacy 
of the ideal of universal love.  The idiosyncratic, non-sensical line, ‘Love loves to 
love love,’ is actually a parody of St. Augustine’s description of his indulgence in 
sexual desire before he discovered Divine love as the true and ultimate love.369  My 
stance does not endorse an outright rejection of erotic love or worldly love in general, 
but allows room for a conception of love, divine, true or otherwise, to be able to 
account for an ethical act which might transform the libidinal economy of jouissance.   
The commandment of neighbour love may function as an ethical act able to deactivate 
the commonplace fantasmatic investment or mundane organisation of erotic 
enjoyment.  In this regard, the notion of love as invoked by Joyce is not a humanist 
or humanitarian sentiment, but a weak messianic gesture in the Benjaminian sense, 
the purpose of which is to render law and its underside superegoic enjoyment 
inoperative and hence to rectify the situation and complete the law. 
In the context of ‘Cyclops,’ what is under scrutiny is not erotic, romantic love but 
the nationalist passion engendered by empires or states to further their political 
agendas.  Joyce never lived to witness the independence of the state of Israel, but his 
aloofness and distance from state politics and aggressive nationalism, be it Irish or 
pro-Israeli, demands critical reflection.  The danger inherent in Zionism resides in 
                                                     
369 Gifford, p. 364-5. St Augustine, Confessions 3:1: ‘Not yet did I love, though I loved to love, seeking 
what I might love, loving to love.’ 
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the way that the nation-state instrumentalises the Holocaust, legitimising political 
measures through victimhood and so on (V, 96).  As Arthur Koestler warns, ‘if 
power corrupts, the reverse is also true; persecution corrupts the victims, though 
perhaps in more subtle and tragic ways’ (quoted in V, 102-3). Commenting on the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, Badiou offers a profound insight: 
The founding of a Zionist State was a mixed, thoroughly complex, reality. On the 
one side, it was an event which was part of a larger event: the rise of great 
revolutionary, communist and socialist projects, the idea of founding an entirely 
new society. On the other hand, it was a counter-event, part of a larger counter-event, 
colonialism, the brutal conquest by people who came from Europe of the new land 
where other people lived. Israel is an extraordinary mixture of revolution and 
reaction, of emancipation and oppression […] It has to become the least racial, the 
least religious, and the least nationalist of States. The most universal of them.370 
Žižek arrives at a similar proposal when he argues for the ‘transnational universality’ 
inherent in the Western Enlightenment.371 Since both the Jews and the Palestinians 
share the same ‘diasporic experience,’ they should attempt to come together ‘not on 
the ground of occupying, possessing or dividing the same territory, but of both 
keeping their shared territory open as a refuge for those condemned to wander,’ ‘a 
place for those with no place’ (V, 122; 109).  Utopian as these proposals may appear, 
they actually harbour a serious attempt to unravel and dismantle the chronic political 
malady of the nation-state, imperialism, colonialism, and even law in general. 
On this point, Freud’s contemplation of the two kinds of universalism may help 
                                                     
370 Badiou, ‘The Question of Democracy’, 54-9 at p. 59. 
371 I have engaged with the question of universality and the related issues of singular universality and 
universal singularity in previous chapters, and will elaborate further in the chapter on ‘Circe.’ 
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us understand the logic underlying the dichotomy between state politics in alignment 
with nationalism and imperialism and the Judeo-Christian ideal of universal love.  In 
Moses and Monotheism, distinguishing two versions of monotheism, the ‘Pharaonic’ 
and the ‘Jewish’, Freud remarks; 
In Egypt […] monotheism grew up as a by product of imperialism: God was a 
reflection of the Pharaoh who was the absolute ruler of a great world-empire. With the 
Jews, political conditions were highly unfavorable for the development from the idea 
of an exclusive national god to that of a universal ruler of the world. And where did 
this tiny and powerless nation find the arrogance to declare itself the favorite child of 
the great Lord?372 
The God for all in the Pharaonic version is a reflection of the power of Pharaoh. 
Therefore, it constitutes a ‘particularized universal[ism],’ a ‘progressive 
extension/universalization of the reign of this God,’ which obeys ‘the logic of 
imperialistic conquest.’373 This conquest follows the masculine/sovereign logic of 
‘inclusive exclusion.’374   The universalism, meanwhile, always depends on and 
defines itself with a privileged exception, ‘an exception that “proves the rule;”’ the 
conqueror sets the standardised particular to be universalised, hence a ‘particularised 
universalism.’ 375   In ‘Cyclops,’ the violent nature of the ‘Pharaonic,’ imperial 
                                                     
372 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud (SE 23). Trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), p.65. 
373 Copjec, Imagine, p. 155. 
374 I invoke here the male logic of all and exception that Lacan expounds in his formula of sexuation. 
Agamben’s extended account of the political theology, the operation of law in terms of the ‘inclusive 
exclusion’ of the sovereign and homo sacer, follows Lacan’s male logic. Please see sections V and VI in 
the chapter on theory in this thesis. 
375 See Copjec, Imagine, p. 155 and Kenneth Reinhard, ‘Universalism and the Jewish Exception: Lacan, 
Badiou, Rosenzweig’, Umbr(a), (2005) 43-71, at p. 44. From now on, this source will be identified as 
‘Universalism.’ 
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‘particularised universalism’ finds expression in ‘sanctimonious Cromwell and his 
ironsides that put the women and children of Drogheda to the sword with the bible 
text God is love pasted round the mouth of his cannon’ (U, 12.1507-9).  Another 
example is presented in the form of ‘an illuminated bible, the volume of the word of 
God and the secret of England’s greatness, graciously presented to him [the Zulu chief] 
by the white chief woman, the great squaw Victoria’ (U, 12.1523-5).  Here, the 
promotion of God and the expansion of empire converge.  The imperialised and 
particularised universalism of the Christian God in the service of statism, colonialism 
and Eurocentricism is clearly a betrayal of St. Paul’s notion of universal love. 
In recent years, scholars have undertaken a sophisticated investigations of Jewish 
and Christian universalism in terms of subtraction rather than particularisation.376  
While the imperial, Pharaonic universalism is constituted on a privileged particularity 
of exception, the subtractive universalism in Judaism centres on the conception of the 
Jews as ‘remnants’377 of themselves.  The Jewish notion of universality does not 
appeal to ‘the possibility of becoming a totality’ through the postulation of all and 
exception, but to the logic of not-all, to the act of subtraction and ‘decompletion’ of 
the structure and subjectivity.378  Franz Rosenzweig, the interwar German-Jewish 
                                                     
376 The jargon ‘subtraction’ undoubtedly reverberates with Badiou’s prolonged discussion of the 
concept. See Badiou’s article ‘On subtraction’ in Theoretical Writings. 
377 Reinhard, ‘Universalism’, p. 67. 
378 Ibid., p. 67-8. 
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thinker, offers an influential interpretation of the tenets of Judaism in The Star of 
Redemption.  According to Rosenzweig, creation, revelation and redemption are 
made up of ‘three modalities of decompletion’: (1) the divine contraction to create a 
void, a nothingness prior to creating the world; (2) the subtraction of revelation in the 
gesture of electing contingently and arbitrarily a people as the chosen people; and (3) 
the neighbour love of redemption, which ‘grows according to the logic of not-all,’ as 
neighbour love means to love each person who happens to be my neighbour.  The 
chosen people are selected not by traits or characteristics but by a lack of 
particularities and by the Jewish people’s leap of faith in being faithful to the act of 
revelation.  As Copjec puts it, ‘the election of the Jews does nothing but deselect 
their particular characteristics.’379  In this light, the fact that Freud finds no particular 
reasons for Jewish election is actually a solution in itself, for the election actually 
originates out of nothing in particular.  This Jewish universalism devoid of 
particularities, as Freud remarks, helps Jews defy their miserable history and survive 
in diaspora, forcing them to ‘hold their own in commercial life’ and ‘make valuable 
contributions to every form of cultural activity.’380  The Jewish identity is sustained 
by the lack of particularities, and Judaism by the principle of immanent subtraction.  
When a nation inaugurates and manufactures its collective identity around 
                                                     
379 Copjec, Imagine, p. 156. 
380 Freud, SE 23, p. 91. 
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nothingness rather than around some national Thing, being ‘remnant’ to oneself 
actually resonates with ‘self-alterity’ in Valente’s discussion of Joyce’s 
‘transnationalism.’ 
The idea of ‘self-alterity,’ being a ‘remnant to oneself’ and a Jewish identity 
without particularities, also paves the way for an alternative critical appreciation of 
Bloom’s self-assertion of his ‘non-Jewish Jewishness.’  In confrontation with the 
accelerating anti-Semitism among the increasingly drunken barflies, Bloom finally 
gives up his self-restraint381 and sallies out his exhilarating yet perplexing list of Jews: 
‘Mendelssohn was a jew and Karl Marx and Mercadante and Spinoza. And the 
Saviour was a jew and his father was a jew. Your God […] Well, his uncle was a jew 
[...] Your God was a jew. Christ was a jew like me’ (U, 12.1804-9).  As Davidson 
notes, Bloom’s list challenges the assumption of an either/or conception of identity, 
and ‘Joyce’s joke is thus on the reader, not on Bloom.’382   In ‘Cyclops,’ the 
problematic list of names includes a non-Jew, an Italian Catholic (Mercadante), an 
assimilated, anti-Semitic Jew (Marx),  an unorthodox, excommunicated Jew 
(Spinoza), a Jew who works to mitigate anti-Semitism (Moses Mendelssohn), and a 
Jew who renounces Judaism, converting to Christianity (Felix Mendelssohn 
                                                     
381 For instance, when the Citizen says ‘Those are nice things coming over Ireland filling the country 
with bugs,’ ‘Bloom lets on he heard nothing’ (U, 12.1141-3). Similarly, when the Citizen continues to 
complain about letting in the Jews, Bloom acts on ‘letting on to be awfully deeply interested in 
nothing’ (U, 12.1161). 
382 Davidson, Construction, p. 219. 
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Bartholdy).383  In ‘Ithaca,’ Bloom evokes again the list of ‘examples of postexilic 
eminence,’ repeating some of the names appearing in ‘Cyclops’:  
Three seekers of the pure truth, Moses of Egypt, Moses Maimonides, author of 
More Nebukim (Guide of the Perplexed) and Moses Mendelssohn of such eminence 
that from Moses (of Egypt) to Moses (Mendelssohn) there arose none like Moses 
(Maimonides) […] Felix Bartholdy Mendelssohn (composer), Baruch Spinoza 
(philosopher), Mendoza (pugilist), Ferdinand Lassalle (reformer, duellist). (U, 
17.709-23) 
 Bloom’s list of Jews poses a challenge to critics who try to identify some affinity 
between Bloom and the men on the list.384 
Marx and Jesus are the two figures who elicit most reflection.  Marx’s alleged 
anti-Semitism stirs diverse criticism and dispute.  Davidson interprets it as an 
instance of Jewish self-hatred, taking it as ‘a result of the type of Jewish 
self-abnegation Bloom embodies.’385  The primary source for Marx’s anti-Semitism 
is his controversial article, ‘On the Jewish Question.’386   I briefly comment on this 
polemical piece here as a means to explore what Reizbaum dubs ‘the poetics of 
Jewishness’ in Marx’s theory and to evaluate the so-called anti-Semitism in Marx.  I 
take this short yet monumental text by Marx as a specimen which condenses the 
entanglement of modernity, capitalism and anti-Semitism.  In her book James 
Joyce’s Judaic Other, Reizbaum analyzes the discourse of anti-Semitism in terms of 
                                                     
383 Gifford, p. 378. 
384 As will be shown in a moment, Davidson and Reizbaum participate in the discussion of Bloom’s 
lists of Jews.  
385 Davidson, Construction, p. 219. 
386 Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question,’ p. 1-21. All quotations from this text are from the on-line 
Marx archive. Last accessed 20 April, 2012: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works> 
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the thematics and poetics of Jewishness.  The former roughly describes the 
stereotypes and clichéd conceptions of Jews circulating in society and culture, the 
latter the prevalent cultural discourse built on these thematics.387  ‘The Jewish 
Question’ is actually not merely the supposed problem caused by the Jews in society, 
but also the issue of the emancipation of the Jews. 
In the second part of the article, Marx offers provocative lines of argument, 
which appear to be a strange combination of sharp social, economic-political analysis 
and outrageous anti-Semitic remarks.  For example, Marx’s diagnosis of the problem 
of modernity is intertwined with anti-Semitic discourse:  
What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the 
worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money. Very 
well then! Emancipation form huckstering and money, consequently from practical, 
real Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time. In the final analysis the 
emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism [...] The 
Jew has emancipated himself in a Jewish manner, not only because he has acquired 
financial power, but also because, through him and also apart from him, money has 
become a world power and the practical Jewish spirit has become the practical spirit 
of Christian nations. The Jews have emancipated themselves insofar as the 
Christians have become Jews.388 
The god of practical need and self-interest is money. Money is the jealous god of 
Israel, in face of which no other god may exist. Money degrades all the gods of 
men--and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal self-established 
value of all things. It has, therefore, robbed the whole world--both the world of men 
and nature--of its specific value. Money is the estranged essence of man's work and 
man's existence, and his alien essence dominates him, and he worships it. The god 
                                                     
387 Reizbaum’s examples of the poetics of Jewishness are Freud, Nietzsche and Otto Weininger, p. 
51-88. However, without detailed analysis of Marx, Reizbaum regards Marx as anti-Semitic after 
quoting a line by Marx, ‘What is the object of Jewish worship in this world? Usury. What is his worldly 
god? Money’, p. 16. 
388 Marx, p. 18, original emphasis. 
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of the Jews has become secularized and has become the god of the world. The bill of 
exchange is the real god of the Jews. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange.389 
On the surface, in sentences like ‘Money is the jealous God of Israel,’ Marx 
ostensibly absorbs the anti-Semitic discourse prevalent in society, adopting 
uncritically the deep-seated denigration of the Jews, the Jewish conspiracy of world 
dominance, the stereotype of the Jews as usurers, and so on.  The problem of 
modernity is equivalent to the problem of Judaism, and indeed modernity faces a 
Jewish Question.  Nevertheless, upon closer inspection, this is arguably a trenchant 
social critique based on the poetics of Jewishness, which is itself an incorporation of 
the thematics of Jewishness into an economic-political analysis. 
The passage cited above reveals that there is a shift of emphasis from the 
characterisation of Jews as economic manipulators and conspirators of world 
dominance through economic monopoly to the way in which money itself dictates 
politics and culture.  Beneath the apparent stigmatising, racist jargon of 
anti-Semitism, Marx offers his own socio-economic observation and critique.  To put 
it succinctly, Marx identifies the social symptom of modernity and embarks on a 
critique of capitalism and the problem of human alienation as a product of commodity 
fetishism.  These social and economic ailments are what have been conveniently 
assigned to the figure of the Jew and the concomitant Jewish conspiracy theory in the 
                                                     
389 Marx, p. 19, original emphasis. 
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form of ‘Money’ being identified as a Jewish God, and huckstering as a typical Jewish 
enterprise.  As Žižek points out, ‘[t]he (anti-Semitic figure of the) “Jew” is not the 
positive cause of social imbalance and antagonism: social antagonism comes first, and 
the “Jew” merely gives body to this obstacle’ (PF, 76).  It certainly breeds the 
suspicion of Marx’s anti-Semitism for on the one hand he discloses the disease of 
modernity through his critique of capitalism in the name of Judaism, and on the other, 
he equates Judaism with capitalism without critical clarification.  This embroilment 
of modernity, capitalism and anti-Semitism was a global predicament in Joyce’s time.  
Joyce’s insertion of the name of Marx at this juncture in Ulysses is thus a perspicuous 
gesture encapsulating this embroilment.  The true locus of the emancipation of the 
Jews and of mankind is to work through the ideological fantasy of anti-Semitism and 
identify social antagonism as a symptom of modernity, rather than claim it as a result 
of the presence of the Jewish people. 
Let us return to the evaluation of Bloom’s self-assertion and self-identification 
through the list of prominent Jews.  Except for the non-Jew, Mercadante, these men 
are ‘converts, revaluers of the faith and apostates.’390  Reizbaum contends that Joyce 
employs this list because the men on ‘the list of assimilated, apostate, dissociated, 
convert Jews who are (mis)taken for Jews in and outside the novel,’ are thus 
                                                     
390 Reizbaum, p. 72. 
238 
 
 
‘ironically or not, like Bloom.’ 391   Bloom seems to fit into the category of 
treacherous, assimilated Jews in this ‘non-Jewish Jewishness,’ sharing the 
border-crossing quality of being simultaneously Jew and non-Jew.  The historical 
Jesus is a Jew, yet his revolution in faith inaugurates Christianity, rendering him a 
non-Jew.  As Reizbaum puts it, ‘Jesus is like Bloom in that he is a Jew and a 
non-Jew at the same time and therefore inevitably noble and ignoble, oppressed and 
martyred.’392  In other words, this line of interpretation holds that the list represents 
the historical fact of the blurring of being Jew and non-Jew at the same time.  To 
evoke Jesus, ‘your God’ as ‘a jew like me’ sounds particularly repugnant and irritating 
to the ears of the Citizen precisely because of the conflation in Bloom’s mouth 
between his God and his Other/the Jew.  The irony is evident when the Citizen 
threatens to ‘crucify’ ‘the Jew/other who dares to identify himself with his 
God’393—‘By Jesus, says he [the Citizen], I will brain that bloody jewman for using 
the holy man’ (U, 12.1811).  The irony of crucifixion is further highlighted when the 
Citizen attempts to attack Bloom with a biscuit tin after identifying Bloom as a 
mocked Messiah just moments before: ‘That’s the new Messiah for Ireland! says the 
citizen. Island of saints and sages!’ (U, 12.1642-3).  The crucifixion once suffered by 
the heretic and revolutionary Christ, described as ‘the first socialist’ (U, 18.178) in 
                                                     
391 Ibid., p. 16. 
392 Ibid., p. 73. 
393 Ibid., p. 73. 
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Bloom’s words to Molly in ‘Penelope,’ is now re-enacted humorously and ironically 
with the modern mocked Jew/Messiah in the hands of Christians for no other reason 
than his being, like Jesus, a Jew. 
Drawing inspiration from Freud’s point regarding the two modes of universality, 
I argue that Bloom’s assertion of his ‘non-Jewish Jewishness’ is not merely an 
acknowledgement of border-transgression, but a voiding act of the subtractive 
universality in Judaism discussed earlier.  ‘Non-Jewish Jewishness’ may be 
interpreted as an outcome of rendering vacant the particular contents which once 
occupied the category of the Jewish subject through subtraction.  Subjective 
destitution is precisely the act of subtraction required for the (re-)emergence of the 
voidness of subjectivity and for the renewal or reinvigoration of self-identity.  By 
means of the list of prominent Jews in ‘Cyclops’ and ‘Ithaca,’ it is as if Joyce is 
recapitulating the subtractive doctrine of Jewishness and Judaism and Freud’s 
observation that the Jews survive their dire situation of diaspora by dislodging 
themselves from the romanticisation of a national Thing to devote themselves to 
worldly achievements.  My method at this point is not to search in Joyce’s archive to 
unearth the textual sources of the Jewish elements in Joyce’s writings, or to distil the 
Jewish or Judaic elements among the texts Joyce once had at hand to see how he has 
incorporated, satirised or smelted these materials in his oeuvre.  That is to say, I do 
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not seek literary, philosophical or cultural intertextuality, or to further the strong claim 
that Ulysses and Finnegans Wake may be deemed Jewish texts.394 
Instead, taking note of the overlapping composition dates of the two authors’ 
works,395 I work on the basis that modernity at this stage faced the portentous crisis 
of the collusion between aggressive nationalism and rampant anti-Semitism in Europe, 
which, as history went, would later coagulate into the Nazi concentration camps and 
the catastrophe of the Holocaust.  Intellectuals like Joyce and Rosenzweig responded 
with perspicuous diagnoses of this malady, seeking a possible remedy in another kind 
of universalism, rather than the global expansion of imperial universalism.  They 
seek an avenue embodied in universal love and the famous commandment of 
neighbour love in the Judeo-Christian tradition which might serve to facilitate a 
genuine openness for being-together among neighbours.  Neighbour love of this kind 
works hand in hand with the subtractive principle of Jewish identity; as Rosenzweig 
states, the category ‘neighbour’ is an empty set stripped of essence or particularities: 
‘The effect of the love of “neighbor” is that “Anyone” and “all the world” […] belong 
together […] whoever be momentarily my neighbor represents all the world for me in 
                                                     
394 Just to give some examples, Ira B. Nadel’s Joyce and the Jews, Marylin Reizbaum’s James Joyce’s 
Judaic Other, Neil R. Davidson’s James Joyce, Ulysses, and the Construction of Jewish Identity, and 
Maren Linett’s ‘The Jew’s Text: “Shem The Penman” and “Shaun The Post.”’ James Joyce Quarterly, 
45.2, (2008), p. 263-80. 
395 At the end of August, 1918, Rosenzweig began writing The Star of Redemption. He entirely devoted 
himself to this book and finished the Star in the middle of February, 1919. Joyce, of course, spent a 
much longer time conceiving and composing Ulysses. By the time Joyce finished Dubliners, he started 
to conceive a story about a Jewish canvasser named Leopold Bloom. The title and basic premise in 
1914 would be incorporated into the writing of Ulysses. The work was completed in October, 1921. 
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full validity.’396  Neighbour love is thus an ‘ensouling proximity,’397 the opening of 
a new neighbourhood. 
By now, it should be clear that it is far from accidental that the parallel between 
symptomatic nationalism and neighbour love should appear in ‘Cyclops.’ The 
aspiration of universal love is invoked when poetic justice allows the survival of a 
mocked Messiah, embodied in Bloom, who advocates love in confrontation with his 
xenophobic fellowmen.  Love is manifested as the semblance of messianic hope of 
escape from the smothering enjoyment of ideological fantasies and stifling 
xenophobia in ‘Cyclops.’  Love is not a liberalist sentiment working as an 
accomplice to the rhetoric of tolerance in maintaining the status quo, but a 
de-activation of law at the structural level.  To put it another way, the structural 
breakthrough requires works of love.  Inspired by Lacanian ethics, I argue that the 
ethical call for neighbour love can function as a remedy to the symptomatic Irish 
Nationalism of Joyce’s time.  At this moment, it is only a semblance of messianic 
hope that is (re)presented.  However, it prefigures the action of neighbour love 
carried out by Bloom in the ‘Circe’ episode.  With a stroke of genius, ironically, the 
escaped Messiah, mocked yet saved by poetic justice is to truly become the Messiah 
himself by coming to offer his love to Stephen, who happens to fit into the category of 
                                                     
396 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption. Trans. William Hallo (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1985), p. 236. 
397 Santner, Neighbor, p. 109. 
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neighbour. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Subjectivity Under Construction: Messianism and Masochism in ‘Circe’ 
 
 
 
I. 
Taking seriously Lacan’s groundbreaking proclamation of Joyce’s unsubscription 
from the Unconscious and his concomitant artifice of a singular sinthome on 16 June 
1975 at the occasion of the fifth International James Joyce Symposium,398 my critical 
endeavour embarks on an experimental reading of the episode of ‘Circe’ in order to 
explore the possible consequences of how subjectivity embodied in an individualized 
sinthome may be invented through the process of constant unknotting/reknotting.  By 
putting to the test the Lacanian insight that Joyce’s sinthomatic subjectivity exceeds 
the classic clinical categories of neurosis, perversion, and psychosis, I propose to 
conduct a critical reading to see how a new subjectivity is manifested in Joyce’s text.  
There has been relatively little literary criticism that comments on sinthomatic work 
or claiming an artistic work to be sinthomatic, although some scholars’ disentangling 
of the complexity of Lacan’s theorization of the sinthome has made it relatively 
accessible to readers.  In this chapter, I will analyse the construction of subaltern 
subjectivity in ‘Circe’ by examining the juxtaposition of masochism and messianism 
                                                     
398 Jacques Lacan, ‘Joyce le Symptôme’, Le Séminare XXIII : Le Sinthome (Paris : Seuil, 2005), p. 161-9. 
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in this episode.  My purpose is to explore the ethical significance that might be 
derived from the bemusing (non)connection of these two absurd fantasies.  Going 
beyond the employment of Lacan’s theorization of sinthome in textual analysis, I 
venture into a critical assessment of the ethical potential and efficacy of the 
sinthomatic subjective construction.  I argue that a structural breakthrough inherent 
in true messianism is manifested through neighbour love as it is epitomized by 
Bloom’s rescue of Stephen at the end of ‘Circe.’  As a subaltern subject, whose 
structural status in hegemonic dictates of politics, culture, and sociality is reduced to 
that of abject or homo sacer, Bloom draws sources from culture and pastiche in the 
construction of an emergent subjectivity.  I will carefully examine whether the 
experimentation of the sinthomatic construction of subjectivity, as it is evidenced in 
the fantasmatic episodes of ‘Circe,’ truly invents a new structural stratification of 
subjectivity and an alternative libidinal organization.  As the analysis will show, 
pseudo-messianism and masochism should be opposed to true messianism manifested 
through neighbour love. 
It is well-known that, rather than applying the established psychoanalytic 
literature to psychoanalyse Joyce, Lacan’s encounter with Joyce is a much more 
complicated, exciting endeavour.  Psychoanalyzing Joyce in the classic Freudian 
sense was derided by Lacan himself for the encounter with Joyce had inspired him to 
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theoretical innovation.  Lacan had apparently encountered Mark Schechner’s Joyce 
in Nighttown in his research for the Seminar on Joyce and offered a scathing 
comment:  
Ulysses, let us approach it. That it can be analyzed is no doubt what is realized by a 
certain Schechner […] He imagines that he is an analyst because he has read a lot of 
analytic books. It is a rather widespread illusion, precisely among analysts. Then he 
analyses Ulysses. This makes an absolutely terrifying impression. Contrary to 
Surface and Symbol, this analysis of Ulysses is an exhaustive one because one 
cannot stop when one analyses a book. (XXIII, 71)399 
Commenting on Lacan’s ire for ‘wholesale psychoanalytic teachings’, Rabaté draws 
readers’ attention to Lacan’s ‘merit of “restraining himself”’ from analysing the whole 
novel by only tackling a few fragments.400  However, I wonder if Lacan’s ‘restraint’ 
is the true reason underlying his trivialisation of Schechner’s reading.  Given that 
Joyce’s project cannot be contained within the conventional thematics of castration 
and the Oedipal scenario, the interpretation of repression and the return of the 
repressed, it is arguable that Lacan’s suspicion against exhaustive psychoanalysing 
stems not from its wholesale scope but from the likelihood of its getting the overall 
picture of psychic structuration in Ulysses wrong.   
‘Circe’ is no doubt one of the most controversial, enigmatic, obscure, and 
                                                     
399 The original French text is as follows: ‘Ulysses, venons-en là, qu’on puisse l’analyser, car c’est sans 
aucun doute ce que réalise un certain Schechner […] Il s’imagine qu’il est analyste parce qui’il a lu 
beaucoup de livres analytiques. C’est une illusion assez répandeu, parmi les analystes justement. Et 
alors, il analyse Ulysses. Contraitrement à Surface and Symbol, cette analyse d’ Ulysses, exhaustive 
naturellement—parce qu’on ne peut pas s’arrêter quand on analyse un bouguin, n’est-ce-pas ?-fait 
une impression absolument terrifiante.’ I follow Cormac Gallagher’s translation with slight 
modification.   
400 Jean-Michel Rabaté, Jacques Lacan: Psychoanalysis and the Subject of Literature (New York: 
Plagrave, 2001), p. 167. 
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obscene chapters in Ulysses.  The reader is not merely perplexed by muddled 
incoherence, abrupt shifts of plot, and incomprehensible content but also confronted 
with the fact that critical interpretations are either blatantly contradictory or extremely 
unsatisfying.  One finds it hard to provide a thorough account to eliminate the 
difficulties and reconcile diversities.  Furthermore, the apparent obscenity in the 
form of psychodrama does not directly lead to the revelation of inner truth of an 
individual or collective Unconscious, but obfuscates and frustrates critics’ hysterical 
quest for meaning and interpretation.  As Thurston points out, what we encounter in 
Joyce’s writing, especially in ‘Circe’ and Finnegans Wake, is the moment ‘when a 
symptom is not a symptom,’ when Joyce manifests his ‘ex-hysteria’.401  The critical 
analysis of Joyce from a Lacanian perspective has to take as its point of departure a 
reading of Joyce as a work of ‘ex-hysteria,’ of non-neurosis and even as ‘ordinary 
psychosis.’ 402   In Le Sinthome, Lacan’s main thesis of the sinthome as the 
savoir-faire of one’s singular way of organising subjectivity and jouissance through 
self-naming can be encapsulated in the following two pivotal passages, which deserve 
to be cited at length:   
The hypothesis of the Unconscious, as Freud underlines, is something which cannot 
hold up except by supposing the Name-of-the-Father. Supposing the 
Name-of-the-Father, for sure, this is God. It is in this that psychoanalysis, by 
                                                     
401 Thurston, p. 190.  
402 This is a term devised by J-A Miller by following and developing the insight of Lacan’s topological 
thinking and pluralisation of the Name(s) of the Father. See Psychoanalytic Notebook 19: Ordinary 
Psychosis.  
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succeeding, proves that one can moreover do without the Name-of-the-Father. One 
can moreover do without it provided one makes use of it. (XXIII, 136) 
It is not God who has perpetrated the thing called the Universe. We impute to God 
what is the business of the artist, of which the first model is, as everyone knows, the 
potter […] He has moulded—with what, by the way?— this thing that is called, not 
by chance, the Universe. Which only means a single thing, which is that there is 
something of the One. Yadlun, but we do not know where. It is more than 
improbable that this One constitutes the universe. (XXIII, 64)403 
Lacan makes a significant clinical judgement that Joyce’s subjectivity is unsubscribed 
from the Unconscious, from which he launches an innovation in psychoanalytic 
theory by claiming that one may well go on to dispense with the Name of the Father 
on condition that one knows how to deal with it by inventing one’s own names in the 
place of the established Name of the Father.  Through the invention of alternative 
master signifiers, the subject may embark on the self-naming process, assuming and 
constructing a new singular universal.  The pot that Lacan evokes here reminds me 
of his comment in ‘On creation ex nihil’ in the Ethics Seminar, in which Lacan argues 
for the centrality of the notion of the creature and of the creator, ‘not only for our 
theme of the motive of sublimation, but also for that of ethics in its broadest sense’ 
(VII, 119).  Lacan’s postulation runs as follows: ‘an object, insofar as it is a created 
object, may fill the function that enables it not to avoid the Thing as signifier, but to 
                                                     
403 The original French text is as follows: ‘L’hypothèses de l’inconscient, Freud le souligne, ne peut 
tenir qu’à supposer le Nom-du-Père. Supposer le Nom-du-Père, certes, c’est Dieu. C’est en cela que la 
psychanalyse, de réussir, prouve que le Mom-du-Père, on peut aussi bien s’en passer. On peut aussi 
bien s’en passer à condition de s’en servir’ (XXIII, 136) ; ‘C’est pas Dieu qui a commis ce truc qu’on 
appelle I’Univers. On impute à Dieu ce qui est l’affaire de l’artiste, dont le premier modèle est, comme 
chacun sait, le potier. On dit qu’il a moulé—avec quoi, d’ailleurs ? ce truc qu’on appelle, pas par hasard, 
L’Univers. Cela ne veut dire qu’une seule chose, c’est qu’il y de l’Un, Yad’lun, mais on ne sait pas où. Il 
est plus qu’improbable que cet Un constitue l’Univers’ (XIII, 64). I follow Cormac Gallagher’s 
translation with slight modification.  
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represent it […] we are going to refer to what is the most primitive of artistic activities, 
that of the potter’, ‘the most primordial feature of human industry’, which ‘allows us 
to affirm unambiguously a human presence whenever we find it’ (VII, 119-20, my 
emphasis).  Pottery-making is paradigmatic of sublimation as artistic creation in the 
most fundamental and general sense of the term.404  At the most elementary level, 
sublimation as creation is not merely creation out of nothing, but also the creation 
of/around nothing itself simultaneously.  Lacan argues that the vase, as such, ‘creates 
the void and thereby introduces the possibility of filling it,’ that it is ‘an object made 
to represent the existence of the emptiness at the center of the real that is called the 
Thing, this emptiness as represented in the representation presents itself as a nihil, as 
nothing’ (VII, 120-1, original emphasis).  Lacan summarizes his point in a proverb: 
‘the vase is made for matter. Nothing is made from nothing’ (VII, 121).  Seen in this 
light, comparing Joyce’s artistic enterprise and subjective construction to God’s 
creation, Lacan holds that the savoir faire of one’s jouissance, the sinthomatic 
                                                     
404 Of course, there is a difference in Lacan’s comments on courtly love as a paradigm of sublimation 
in Seminar VII and the sinthome as a form of sublimation.  The Imaginary and narcissistic 
characteristics of courtly love are expressed in Lacan’s definition of sublimation at that stage.  To 
sublimate is ‘to elevate the object to the dignity of the Thing.’  Lacan deems courtly love conservative 
in his evaluation of it, regarding it to be ‘fundamentally narcissistic in nature’ in this elevation of 
certain objects to colonize das Ding (VII, 151).  In this vein, ‘[a]t the level of sublimation, the object is 
inseparable from the imaginary and especially cultural elabrations.  It is not just that the collectivity 
recognizes in them useful objects; it finds rather a space of relaxation where it may in a way delude 
itself on the subject of das Ding, colonize the field of das Ding with imaginary schemes’ (VII, 98).  
When I interpret Lacan’s association of sinthome with pottery-making, apparently it only points to the 
tarrying with the Real with indispensable symbolisation as a fundamental human psychic functioning.  
It is sublimation in its most fundamental, elementary level that Lacan discusses, not the elevation as a 
colonization of das Ding as in the case of courtly love. 
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working is by definition a form of creation ex nihilo.  Although this 
conceptualization may be a later development inspired by Joyce at the final stage of 
his career, it can also be viewed as a continuation of the notion of sublimation from 
his earlier period.  
Viewing the sinthomatic working as a new form of sublimation, I explore how 
one’s unsubscription from the Unconscious might take place and take form in actual 
psychic functioning, the organization of jouissance or subjectivity-in-the making.  
The focus of my interpretative effort would be better described as the unconscious of 
‘the textual subjectivity’ expressed through the writings of Joyce, which necessarily 
contains and exceeds the unconscious of the characters Stephen and Bloom.405  I 
propose that ‘Circe’ is a dramatisation of a textual subjectivity under construction.  
Put otherwise, I read ‘Circe’ as Joyce’s experimentation with the unconscious, with 
the re-structuration of subjectivity in terms of the (self-)naming and savoir-faire of his 
own jouissance.  Joyce invents his sinthome by way of drawing sources from culture 
and simultaneously making havoc with it by displacing, distorting, and dissolving 
those elements.  I thereby take the ‘nighttown’ episode to be the locus for the 
(re)presentation of the sinthomic repertoire of the textual subject established by Joyce 
                                                     
405 Shelly Brivic seems to resonate with the idea of textual subjectivity that I propound here when he 
agues for ‘the subject of Ulysses’ by pointing out that the relationship between the characters of 
Bloom, Stephen, and Molly may contribute to the subject of Ulysses; however, they do not constitute 
a fixed formula of son, father, mother, and so on, and this lack of link in conventional senses is itself 
part of the whole for the subject of Ulysses. Joyce through Lacan and Žižek, p. 139.  
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through writing Ulysses.  Many phrases, incidents, and characters appearing in the 
previous episdoes are recalled and rearranged in fantasies, or hallucinations in 
nighttown. I argue that a textual re-structuring of subjectivity, which traverses 
boundaries of those minds, actions, characters, time, space, memories, and realities, is 
under construction in the episode.  If composing Ulysses is intrinsically correlative 
with Joyce’s self-naming, his postulation and construction of life through work, the 
textual manufacturing of subjectivity is necessarily intertwined with the sinthomatic 
weaving.  I argue that as a consequence of the subject’s unsubscription from the 
established Name of the Father, the plural construction of the sinthome work through 
various signifiers.406  ‘Circe’ is precisely such a chapter in which readers encounter a 
showcasing of symptomatic/sinthomatic constructions, both at individual and 
collective levels.  In my reading of Joyce through Lacan, the inevitable question that 
necessarily ensues is how Joyce’s unsubscription from the Unconscious might be 
manifested in the subjective construction and the experimentation with sexuality, 
which are the two main foci in ‘Circe.’     
                                                     
406 Finn Fordham seems to resonate with my reading here when he hints at ‘the genesis of multiple 
personality,’ although his approach is not psychoanalytic but more akin to genetic criticism, focusing 
on the techniques of revision and composition. As Fordham puts it, ‘Drawn toward multiplicity in his 
methods of formation and in the content of his epic, Joyce would come close, however, to the 
fragmentation, both textual and personal, that he feared […] The life of writing can make and unmake 
the writers life […] In such complex interplay, any writing of fragmentation can suffuse the life itself, 
bringing it to the edge, and over the edge, into a state of fragmentation. It is sometimes argued that 
Joyce does teeter over the limit into fragmentation, personally and textually […] the genesis of 
fragmentation and of fusing. Placing such accounts together could contribute to a plural sense of the 
multiple personalities of the life of writing and the genesis of its multiplicities’.  Finn Fordham, 
‘“Circe” and the Genesis of multiple personality’, James Joyce Quarterly, 45.2-3 (2008), pp. 507-20 at p. 
518.  
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As Chieza puts it succinctly, ‘despite not being a psychotic, Joyce does not need 
to traverse any fundamental fantasy,’ and ‘[u]nlike neurotics, he is already separated 
from the Symbolic; instead, he needs to “create” his founding master signifiers.’407 
Chieza evokes Lacan’s theorization of Joyce’s sinthomatic invention as a means to 
interpret Artaud’s ‘cruel theatre.’  It is well known that, after Artaud’s hospitalization, 
Lacan made a wrong diagnosis by declaring that ‘Artaud is obssessed, he will live for 
eighty years without writing a single sentence, he is obsessed.’408  Instead, after nine 
years, Artaud emerges as a new subject, returning with a new name, as 
‘Artuad-le-Mômo’ by way of ‘continuously reshaping his “real name.”’409 Artaud 
claims himself to be ‘a.r.t.o,’ ‘embody[ing] his real letters, as Joyce is for Lacan the 
individual, ‘l.o.m. […] a structure which is that of the homo.’410  Artaud correctly 
identifies Lacan and classic psychoanalysis as ‘erotomania’ for he detects that 
psychoanalysis has mapped out the structural correlation between the Symbolic and 
the sexual, between thought/meaning and enjoyment, between master signifiers in 
patriarchy and phallic jouissance.411  Chieza interprets Artaud’s ‘cruel theatre’ as an 
artistic enterprise with the high stake of existential survival.  The theatre is ‘cruel’ 
because it is intrinsically connected with suffering in the sense that ‘[s]uffering qua 
                                                     
407 Chieza, ‘Lacan with Artaud’, p. 357.  
408 Jacques Lacan, ‘Lapsychanalyse. Raison d’un éche’, Aures Ēcrits (Paris: Seuil, 2001), p. 349. I follow 
Chieza’s translation here.   
409 Chieza, ‘Lacan with Artaud’, p. 360. 
410 Ibid., p. 360. 
411 Ibid., pp. 336-43. 
252 
 
 
anti-representation cannot be thought, it can only be lived.’412  Artaudian theatre is 
an effort to disengage from the ‘erotomanic’ present culture, to confront directly the 
Real suffering outside the regime of the historical Other, and to invent a new love 
other than that of historical sexuality.  Similarly, in ‘Circe,’ the subject in the making 
deals with primary masochism as the Real suffering in the sense of Artaudian theatre 
when s/he devises new organisation of jouissance and alternative psychic 
structuration through various master signifiers.    
In cases of normal neurosis, the law-giving authority, the master who names, 
gender identity and sexual relations are interwoven and correlated.  It is the lack in 
the Other that has undergone phallic signification, the nothingness that is signified in 
phallic terms.  Triangulation is introduced into the subject’s social/sexual relation 
with the Other simultaneously.  Hence, authority, sexuality, and identity are 
correlative in the problematic of symbolization, in the subject’s organisation of 
jouissance.   
As Verhaeghe puts it, ‘these contents are identical in neurosis: the father (“The 
Other of the Other does not exist”), gender identity (“The Woman does not exist”), 
and the relation between the genders (“The Sexual Relationship does not exist”).’413  
While the neurotic finds a solution ‘by way of the Imaginary,’ ‘through the 
                                                     
412 Ibid., p. 349. 
413 Ibid., pp. 436-7.   
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fundamental fantasy according to which she or he assumes a gender identity and a 
sexual relationship in accordance with conventional authority,’ a neo-subject 
unsubscribed from the Unconscious, from the traditional phallic signifiers, has to 
invent his/her own master signifiers as anchoring points and devise his/her own ways 
of organizing jouissance to deal with the ontological issues at the social, bodily, 
subjective, and sexual levels in his/her relationship with the Other.414    
 
 
II. 
Critics have called Bloom ‘Dublin’s Insignificant Other,’ ‘a Chaplinesque 
figure […] comically henpecked and cuckolded, a combination bound to inspire 
mockery,’ recognising his anguished no-man status as ‘an Irishman who is not a 
“true” Irishman, a father who is not a “true” father, a man who is not a “true” man.’415  
Throughout his one-day pilgrimage, Bloom is frequently confronted by his fellow 
Dubliners’ xenophobia, plagued by the apprehension of Molly’s adultery, haunted by 
Rudy’s death, and so on.  In a word, Bloom is an epitome of the collapse of the 
father.  ‘Circe’ depicts the red-light district of Dublin, where the troubled interiority 
of Bloom is acted out and worked through in the most naked and cruel sense.  He 
                                                     
414 Regarding the general conception of the subject in the making, one may find enlightening 
inspiration from the continuous theorisation dedicated to Jacques-Alain Miller’s notion of ordinary 
psychosis. Please see Psychoanalytic Notebook 19, especially Miller’s article, ‘Ordinary Psychosis 
Revisited’, in the same issue, pp. 139-67.  
415 Robert H. Bell, Jocoserious Joyce: The Fate of Folly in Ulysses. (Ithaca: Cornell, 1991), p. 41. Patrick 
McGee, Paperspace: Style as Ideology in Joyce’s Ulysses (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1988), p. 79. 
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comes to nighttown, ‘the brothel as the theatre,’416 where his innermost guilt and 
obscene fantasies are called upon and purged and he hilariously produces new 
identities as a secular messiah, as a ‘womanly man,’ or a martyr in the bedroom in his 
masochistic fantasy.  ‘Circe’ as a staged psychodrama offers a much more drastic 
confrontation with the Real, the direct working through of anguished fantasies, the 
experience of subjective destitution and creation ex nihilo.  Bloom’s embodied 
performance in an Artaudian cruel theatre can be cast in light of Lacan’s later 
theorisation of sinthome.  Miraculously, Bloom re-invents his own subjectivity 
‘chiefly as a survivor.’417  He even manages to offer neighbour love by coming to 
Stephen’s rescue in ‘Circe,’ and proposes step-fatherhood418 to Stephen in ‘Eumaeus’ 
(U, 16.1160-5). 
In this dream-like setting, Bloom and Stephen are not called upon to realise some 
wish-fulfilment.  Instead, they literally confront the traumatic repetition of their 
deepest nightmares, immersing in the pain in pleasure and the pleasure in pain.  In 
this episode, we encounter an overflowing of enjoyment, nonsensical and singular.  
Erotic enjoyment and deformed suffering are scattered around, all too fragmented, and 
                                                     
416 To borrow the phrase from Austin Briggs’s title, ‘Whorehouse/Playhouse: The Brothel as Theatre in 
the “Circe” chapter of Ulysses’, this essay basically traces modernism’s intricate relationship with the 
brothel in historical documentation and then hits upon Artaud’s notion of dream illusion and cruel 
theatre. Journal of Modern Literature, 26.1(2002), 42-57.   
417 Harry Girling, ‘The Jew in James Joyce’s Ulysses’, Jewish Presences in English Literature.  Eds. 
Derek Cohen and Deborah Heller (Montreal: McGill Queen’s UP, 1990), p. 109.      
418 Bloom’s desire to be a step-father, or more precisely to be a Stephen-father, has long been 
acknowledged by Joyce criticism. See Stuart Gilbert’s James Joyce’s Ulysses: A Study. 
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nearly devoid of coherence and meaning.  The subaltern subjects’ suffering and 
enjoyment are exposed and the question is raised as to how they would manage to 
survive.  In Stephen’s case, it is his mother’s death that motivates repetition 
compulsion.  The paternal tragicomedy in Stephen’s and Bloom’s versions and the 
sexual masquerades are certainly the major concerns of our discussion.  Paternity 
and sexuality are intimately connected.  The paternal metaphor functions as an 
operator to name the mother’s jouissance, which is a symbolic sleight of hand to 
protect the child from the jouissance of the first (m)Other, and a way of turning 
something impossible into something prohibited.  In other words, the anxieties and 
threat in the Oedipal stage actually come from the Mother, and the Father is called 
upon to ward off the mother’s jouissance.  Hence, ‘the father is a symptom for the 
son.’419  Stephen’s version of the tragicomedy of the paternal authority is derived 
from his intuition about fictionality of the Name of the Father.  In ‘Scylla and 
Charybdis,’ Stephen famously pronounces ‘A father is a necessary evil […] Paternity 
may be a legal fiction. Who is the father of any son that any son should love him or he 
any son’ (U, 9.823-46, my emphasis).  Stephen’s obsession mainly resides in his 
suspicion of the authority of the Name of the Father and the naming function and how, 
as a son, he might manufacture his own name and inscribe it in the Symbolic.  He 
                                                     
419 Paul Verhaerghe, ‘The Collapse of the Father and Its Effect on the Gender Roles’, in Renata Salecle 
(ed.) Sexuation (Durham: Duke UP, 2000), 131-54 at p. 135. 
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plays with the idea of whether the father names the son, or the son names the father, 
or the son fathers and names himself.  In the famous instance when Bloom proposes 
step-fatherhood to Stephen in ‘Eumaeus’, Stephen responds, ‘I suspect […] that 
Ireland must be important because it belongs to me’ (U, 16.1160-5).    
The inquiry into the relationship between the father and the son would be far 
from complete without reference to the symbolic underside and to the mother’s desire.  
In ‘Circe,’ Stephen’s trauma is condensed precisely into his encounter with the ghost 
of his mother and his guilt-ridden refusal to kneel down at his mother’s deathbed.  
The stage direction of this hallucination runs as follows: ‘Stephen’s mother, emaciated, 
rises stark through the floor, in leper grey with a wreath of faded orangeblossoms and 
a torn bridal veil, her face worn and noseless, green with gravemould. Her hair is 
scant and lank. She fixes her bluecircled hollow eyesockets on Stephen and opens her 
toothless mouth uttering a silent word. A choir of virgins and confessions sing 
voicelessly’ (U, 15.4157-62).  This uncanny presence of the mother is extremely 
anxiety-provoking.  Stephen’s response is worthy of analysis.  The Gothic element 
of the mother’s presence and her voice in silence signals the enigma of the Other, the 
inconsistency, the lack of the Other, a Real rem(a)inder of symbolisation.  Therefore, 
he finds this maternal voice as silence unbearable, beseeching for a definite answer, a 
symbolisation to break and soothe the overwhelming anxiety.  He says, ‘Tell me the 
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word, mother, if you know now. The word known to all men’ (U, 15.4191-2).  When 
the mother keeps on pleading for Stephen’s confession, Stephen perceives this as a 
phantom’s menace and defends himself by a physical as well as a psychical attack.  
‘He lifts his ashplant high with both hands and smashes the chandelier. Time’s vivid 
final flame leaps and in the following darkness, ruin of all space, shattered glass and 
toppling masonry’ (U, 15.4143-5).   
What Stephen is unable to confront is the nothingness of jouissance as the lack 
of the Other.  The over-proximity of the Other’s jouissance induces anxieties and 
fierce attacks.  That is to say, when the fantasy framework fails to sustain a proper 
organisation of the jouissance, the subject acts out his anxiety by destroõying the 
fantasy plane in the making.  It is arguable that Stephen’s action constitutes the 
so-called passage to the act for it implies ‘a withdrawal from staging, a cut where the 
story changes course.’ 420   In Seminar X on Anxiety, Lacan proposes the 
differentiation between acting out and the passage to the act (135-53).  If acting out 
always happens in transference, it is necessarily ‘addressed (unwittingly) to the 
analyst’ as ‘a protest against a faulty interpretation, or a failure on the analyst’s part to 
make an interpretation altogether.’421  Acting out is ‘a staging, a showing’ to the gaze 
                                                     
420 Robert Harari, Lacan’s Seminar On ‘Anxiety:’ An Introduction (New York: Other Press, 2001), p. 81. 
421 Ed Pluth, Signifiers and Acts, p. 100. 
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of the Other of ‘a repetition of an unconscious and a fantasmatic scenario.’422  What 
has become deaf to the ears of the analyst, the subject stages for the analyst as a 
protest.  As Pluth puts it, ‘whereas acting out is an enactment of a fantasy, a passage 
à l’acte seems to be a reaction to (and against) this fantasy, to this “scene” in which 
the subject maintains a desirable position for the Other.’423  When Stephen strikes the 
chandelier physically, he also attacks the fantasmatic scene psychically, destroying the 
staging and making himself fall out of the psychodramatic scene as well.  It therefore 
follows that the passage to the act is not yet an ethical act par excellence.  
I deliberately frame this episode as a curtailed fantasy in the making because it 
designates a similar situation to the dream of the burning child in Freud’s The 
Interpretation of Dreams.  In the dream, the father leaves the sick-bed of his son, 
after the son has died, to rest in the next room, and then suddenly wakes up with fright 
at the son’s reproach, ‘Father, can’t you see I am burning?’424  In interpreting this 
classic dream, Lacan argues that the father in the story wakes up from the kernel of 
the Real, the navel of the dream, for his dead son’s reproach carries the unbearable 
pain, debt, guilt, and jouissance (XI, 53-64).  Similarly, Huang Tsung-huei argues 
that Stephen’s relation with his dead mother in ‘Circe’ is ‘not unlike that between the 
                                                     
422 Harari, p. 81 and Pluth, p. 100. 
423 Pluth, p. 100.  
424 Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition of the Works of Sigmund Freud: V, p. 509. 
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grief-stricken father and the dead son.’425  Stephen breaks off and curtails the 
traumatic dream when he encounters his mother’s reproach: ‘Stephen, can’t you see I 
am suffering?’426  By applying Kristeva’s theorisation of abjection, Huang proposes 
that Joyce and his literary representative, Stephen, went into exile because they loathe 
something in Ireland more than Ireland, namely, the Mother figure, Mother Ireland, 
and the Mother Church, which together constitute an abject maternal presence.  
Joyce/Stephen plays the fort/da game with her, which is embodied in his distorted, 
detached yet clingy relationship with his mother and motherland.427  Stephen attacks 
the horror when encountering the abject figure of his mother, and his flight ‘from his 
mother […] is a flight from a confrontation he needs to make, from an ambivalence he 
needs to come to terms with’.428   
Bloom also suffers from his own version of the decline of the father.  He is a 
man of troubled legacy following the death of his son, Rudy.  He ponders, ‘I too. 
Last of my race. Milly young student. Well, my fault perhaps. No son. Rudy. Too late 
now. Or if not? If not? If still? He bore no hate. Hate. Love. Those are names. Rudy. 
Soon I am old’ (U, 11.1066-9).  Bloom is also plagued by his father’s suicide.  As 
Thurston points out, ‘the father’s suicidal act has to be excluded from the son’s 
                                                     
425 Tsung-huei, Huang, Genesis of the Subject as a Void: A Psychoanalytic Reading of James Joyce’s 
Ulysses (Taipei: NTU Press, 1999), p. 98.  
426 Ibid., p. 96. 
427 Ibid., pp. 69-130. 
428 McGee, p. 141. 
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experience and memory; its meaningless “nonsense” cannot be allowed to invade and 
despoil the space of subjective signification.’429  This trauma is highlighted in 
‘Circe’ in a ‘clownish or macabre-carnivalesque’ hallucinatory meeting of the father 
and son: 
RUDOLPH  What you making down this place? Have you no soul? (with feeble 
vulture talons he feels the silent face of Bloom) Are you not my son Leopold, the 
grandson of Leopold? Are you not my dear son Leopold who left the house of his 
father and left the god of his fathers Abraham and Jacob? (U, 15.258-62) 
In this incident, the paternal institution, the father’s function of naming, the father’s 
capacity for the ‘prescription of identity is no longer stable and authoritative.’430 As 
Thurston says, ‘the voice of the real father bears no more than a feeble trace of 
ancient symbolic mandate of the law; its insistent demand therefore amounts to a 
clownish or sinister parody of that sacred authority.’431 Moreover, throughout the 
episode, and the entire work of Ulysses, Bloom, together with other characters, is 
besieged by a brutish English imperialism in terms of linguistic and cultural invasion.   
Gibson carefully documents and analyses how the instances of British convention, 
references, manners, gestures, literature, and culture, are scattered around, invading 
and adulterating the consciousness and the Unconscious of the Dubliners in ‘Circe.’432  
Gibson proposes that Joyce employs techniques of parody and ‘Irishization’ of an 
                                                     
429 Thurston, p. 179. 
430 Ibid., p. 180. 
431 Thurston, p. 180-1.   
432 Andrew Gibson, ‘Strangers in my house, Bad Manners to Them: England in “Circe”’, in Andrew 
Gibson (ed.) Reading Joyce ‘Circe’ (Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993), 179-221.  
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English encroachment.  In other words, Joyce’s response to the English invasion can 
be thought of ‘carnivalistically rather than polemically’ and Joyce ‘deliberately 
trivializes the issues’ in ‘Circe.’433  Insightful as is his criticism, I would argue that 
Joyce’s dealing with identity crisis in terms of paternity, masculinity, sexuality, and 
national identity under the imperial rule far exceeds the notion and capacity of parody, 
Irishisation, and carnival.  
For instance, a severe identity crisis is epitomised in Stephen’s and Bloom’s 
hallucinatory encounter with Shakespeare: ‘(in dignified ventriloguy) ’Tis the loud 
laugh bespeaks the vacant mind. (to Bloom) Thou thoughtest as how thou wastest 
invisible. Gaze. (he crows with a black capon’s laugh)  Iagogo!  How my Oldfellow 
chokit his Thursdaymornun. Iagogogo!’ (U, 15.3825-9).  This passage also 
hilariously points to the implication that the distorted name itself is perhaps ‘an 
encrypted signature (I +ago, Latin for I act).’434  This literary act of naming is 
intimately correlative with the Lacanian notion of the ethical act, the subjective 
creation ex nihilo.    
Pressed with great tension, in ‘Cyclops,’ Bloom endeavours to scream out his 
Jewish identity, which, on the one hand, betrays the fogginess of his mentality and the 
handmade quality of his theory, and, on the other hand, reveals the merriment and 
                                                     
433 Ibid., p. 218 and p. 215. 
434 Thurston, p. 106. 
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inventiveness of his own version of the Jewish question.  Bloom bursts out, 
‘Mendelson was a jew and Karl Marx was a jew and Spinoza. And the Saviour was a 
jew and his father was a jew. Your God […] Well his uncle was a jew. […] Your God 
was a jew. Christ was a jew like me’ (U, 12.1804-9).  His remarks anticipate an 
individualised subaltern subjectivity later in ‘Circe.’  It marks Bloom’s new names, 
his sinthome—what he claims to be himself without the subscription to the Other, to 
the Name of the Father.  Arguably, it is Bloom’s ego functioning as the fourth ring 
for the reknotting of the other three registers of the Imagianry, the Symbolic, and the 
Real. 
 
 
III. 
In this section, I will explore ‘Circe’ by making a critical effort, firstly, to 
distinguish pseudo-messianism and messianism, and secondly, to argue not for the 
inherent link between masochism and messianism but to point out the possible ethical 
danger and potential in masochism’s (non-)relation to messianism proper. 
In his Joyce in Nighttown, Mark Schechner made a hasty claim that provides a 
psychologisation of the possible social-political reason underlying the link between 
masochism and messianism rather than giving a properly psychoanalytic reading of 
‘Circe’.  Schechner identifies the abrupt shift between the masochistic fantasy of 
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abuse and the messianic fantasy, remarking that this shift ‘may violate the 
conventional logic of dramatic development, but not the psycho-logic of primary 
process thought.  Masochism and messianism are intrapsychic patterns, and there is 
good enough reason to regard the former as a condition of the latter.’435  Schechner 
goes on to explain what he means by masochism as the condition for messianism, 
saying that ‘[i]f we consider the prevalence of messianic themes in nineteenth and 
twentieth-century Irish literature as a whole, and consider too the situation of cultural 
bondage and political impotence out of which they arose, we ought to see clearly 
enough the dependence of messianism upon castration and futility.’436  In other 
words, what Schechner proffers is a psychological motivation for messianism out of 
suffering, despair, and impotence, which is vaguely connected to the pain and 
humiliation contained in masochism.  
Schechner first gives a condensed summary of Bloom’s messianic fantasy, which 
begins with the grand speech of Bloom’s social reform agenda and his being hailed as 
‘emperor president and king-chairman’ (U, 15.1471).  The fantasy then abruptly 
breaks down with the incoherent accusations in the persecution of Bloom, the modern 
messiah.  In Schechner’s opinion, the persecution inflicted upon Bloom, his rise and 
downfall, is a paradigmatic storyline for the figure of the messiah, and ‘Circe’ repeats 
                                                     
435 Mark Schechner, Joyce in Nighttown: a Psychoanalytic inquiry into Ulysses (Berkeley: U of 
California Press, 1974), p. 109.    
436 Ibid., p.110. 
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‘the myth of the tragic savior, the drama of election and betrayal,’ which is a common 
fate that ‘Christ, Parnell and [Joyce]’ share.437  The connection between masochism 
and messianism that Schechner attempts to make lies merely in the correspondence 
between the suffering and downfall inflicted upon the Messiah and those portrayed in 
masochism.  As Schechner puts it, ‘His [Bloom’s] masochism mediates between the 
desire and the confirmation by calling down evidence of election in the form of 
imaginary punishment. The betrayal of the savior, and his final crucifixion are all part 
and parcel of the messianic dream […] The savior’s betrayal and apparent failure are, 
for him, the stamp and assurance of his divine election, his castration the proof of his 
election.’438 
Although Schechner dutifully cautions that ‘Christian humility is not quite the 
same as Bloomian masochism’ for ‘[t]he one aims at the enforcement of continence 
and discipline in the face of threat, the other at the achievement of orgasm,’439 he 
does not really explain the difference between Bloomian sexual masochism and 
martyrdom, affliction and humility in messianism and their possible connection.  
Instead, Schechner ends his comments with an equivalence between martyrdom in the 
bedroom and that of messianism, which appears more like a subterfuge to evade real 
argument than a cogent point.  According to Schechner, Bloom’s refusal to be a 
                                                     
437 Ibid, p. 143 
438 Ibid,. p. 145. 
439 Ibid., p. 147. 
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victim of violence in ‘Cyclops’ and ‘Circe’ is a ‘sign of his aversion to real martyrdom, 
however much it may appeal to him in fantasy.  A modern man, he is willing to settle 
for lesser martyrdoms of the bedroom.  A sensible man, he will settle for the lesser 
salvations a man may find on the beach, in the bath, or some other private place.’440  
It is quite obvious the so-called martyrdom in the bedroom and that of messianism are 
merely superficially linked by reference to the self-afflicted pain.  Moreover, it is 
unclear how a social-reform potential in messianism can be distilled from the blatant 
psychosexual nature in the masochistic fantasy deployed through the interaction 
between Bloom and Bella/Bello.  Even more striking and unconvincing is that 
Schechner argues for a ‘moral heroism by way of his psychosexual perversity.’441  
Given that Bloom’s socio-political messianic fantasy, in which he compares himself to 
Christ, eventually lapses into a psychosexual fantasy of masochism in terms of 
‘petticoat government,’ one wonders how Schechner’s proposal of ‘moral heroism' 
can really be sustained.  That is to say, we are in need of a viable alternative critical 
reading that can properly theorise the bewildering juxtaposition of messianism and 
masochism in ‘Circe,’ and account for how ethical significance may be found in 
Bloom’s so-called ‘moral heroism.’ 
Although, as Lacan points out, Joyce’s ambition as manifested in his work is not 
                                                     
440 Ibid., p. 148. 
441 Ibid., p. 102. 
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to be a redeemer (to the existent authority in decline) but to be God himself as an 
artist;442 the concept of redeemer, or the signifier of messiah, has been evoked in the 
(re-)construction of subjectivity of Bloom in ‘Circe.’  Stock references to 
messianism and masochism of the time of Joyce are vivid in ‘Circe,’ and are 
inextricably entangled at the very core of subjective (re)structuration at the most 
intimate socio-sexual-political fantasies.  Although the knotting of one’s sinthome 
through the invention of novel signifiers is built from the inconsistency of the Other 
and the unsubscription from the Unconscious, the reworking of subjective 
experimentation is largely established upon not merely the rewriting of characters and 
fragments from the previous chapters but also from materials in the cultural 
storehouse.  This should be taken into consideration in any critical appraisal of the 
ethical efficacy of sinthomatic (re)construction and experimentation, which I will 
pursue shortly.  Bloom’s allusion to the Messiah in ‘Cyclops’ prefigures the extended 
messianic fantasy in ‘Circe’.  In ‘Cyclops,’ the Citizen mocks Bloom, saying, ‘That’s 
the new Messiah for Ireland’ (U, 12.752); Bloom is again designated as ‘ben Bloom 
Elijah’ (U, 12.1916) in the final lines of the chapter.  In ‘Circe,’ Bloom seems to 
identify with Christ when he repeats Christ’s sentence from Luke 23:3, saying ‘you 
have said it’ (U, 15.1835) in reply to the query uttered by an anonymous voice, 
                                                     
442 Lacan remarks, ‘The artist [of A Portrait of the Artist] is not the redeemer. It is God himself as 
fashioner’. The French text runs as follows: ‘L’artiste n’est pas le rédempteur, c’est Dieu lui-même’ 
(XXIII, 80), my translation. 
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‘Bloom, are you the Messiah ben Joseph or ben David?’ (U, 15.1834).  In the 
meantime, the motif of the false Christ, of the pseudo-Messiah, and of Antichrist is 
invoked recurrently in ‘Circe.’  Bloom’s extended lecture and reform project is 
curtailed by various protesters, including the figure of Alexander J. Dowie, who 
attacks Bloom by uttering ‘[f]ellowchristians and antiBloomites, the man called 
Bloom is from the roots of hell, a disgrace to christian men’ (U, 15.1753-4).  
According to Gifford and Seidman, Alexander J. Dowie was a contemporary of Joyce, 
a Scottish-Austrian-American with a dubious reputation, who founded the church of 
Zion City and claimed himself to be ‘Elijah the Restorer,’ ‘the third manifestation of 
Elijah,’ and was accused of ‘misuse of funds,’ ‘injustice,’ ‘tyranny,’ and ‘polygamous 
teachings.’443  After Florry mentions, ‘Well, it was in the papers about Antichrist’ (U, 
15.2135), the newspaper boy announces the ‘Safe arrival of Antichrist’ (U, 15.2147) 
when Bloom finally meets Stephen in the brothel.  Recurrent references to the motif 
of Messiah and the pseudo-Messiah or the false Christ not merely reflect a prevalent 
cultural feature, but also serve to ignite the critical rumination on the possible 
distinction between pseudo-messianism and true messianism.  I offer my own 
reading as an explanation of this distinction in the following analysis.   
As critics have correctly identified, Bloom’s messianism/masochism is 
                                                     
443 Don Gifford and Robert J Seidman, Ulysses Annotated: Notes for James Joyce’s Ulysses (Berkley: U 
of California Press, 2008), p. 157. 
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‘secular.’444  Stimulated by Zoe’s encouragement, ‘[g]o on. Make a stump speech out 
of it’ (U, 15.1353), Bloom’s extended fantasy is an absurd mixture of critique of 
imperialism and capitalism (U, 15.1390-7), and utopian versions of social reform, 
which cover diverse concerns such as the construction of a tramline (U, 15.67-8): ‘the 
reform of municipal morals and the plain ten commandments.  New worlds for old. 
Union of all, jew, moslem, and gentile […] the universal language with universal 
brotherhood.  No more patriotism of barspongers and dropsical imposters. Free 
money, free rent, free love and a free lay church in a free lay state’ (U, 15.1685-1693); 
‘Mixed races and mixed marriage […] Liberty of Speech, Plural Voting […] Painless 
Obstetrics and Astronomy for the People’ (U, 15.1699-1710).  There are also 
prolonged passages of mocked coronation (U, 15.1398-1449), fragments of 
sinthomatic enjoyment, as ostensibly expressive in the ludicrous image of ‘a colossal 
edifice with crystal roof, built in the shape of a huge pork kidney, containing forty 
thousand rooms’ (U, 15.1548-9) as a symbol of ‘the new Bloomusalem in the Nova 
Hibernia of the future’ (U, 15.1544-5).  Moreover, Bloom’s downfall is staged as 
secular martyrdom with reference to Parnell—‘Lynch him! Roast him! He’s as bad as 
Parnell was. Mr. Fox’ (U, 15.1762)—and is framed in Biblical prose—‘And he shall 
carry the sins of the people to Azadel, the spirit which is in the wilderness, and to 
                                                     
444 Davidson, Construction, p. 221. 
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Lilith, the nighthag. And they shall stone him and defile him, yea, all from Agendath 
Netaim and from Mizraim, the land of Him’ (U, 15.1898-901).     
Commenting on the irony and mockery of Joyce’s arrangement of 
pseudo-messianism, Gibson reads the mock coronation as both a humour for Bloom’s 
laughable imagination and as a political critique of Griffith’s project in The 
Resurrection of Hungary.  As Gibson puts it, ‘[g]iven Griffith’s anti-Semitism, the 
irony here is precise: the Jewishness of Griffith’s Moses was purely Symbolic. Bloom 
is the obverse both of Griffith’s Moses and of his dignified, idealistic, statesmanlike, 
exemplary Hungarian hero.’445  Although the ostensible reference to the mocked 
Christ and false messiah can be regarded as another example of Joyce’s typical 
jocoserious enterprise, Cheng proffers a more straightforward reading and positive 
evaluation of Bloom’s messianic fantasy, in which the irony is superficially 
acknowledged and put aside.  Cheng’s attitude can be summarised as follows:  
the fantasies of ‘Circe’ now allow Bloom the psychological (and therapeutical) 
space by which to counter and refute all the Citizen’s innuendos and accusations, for 
in ‘Circe’ Bloom does imagine himself as just such a Messiah, come to institute the 
New Bloomusalem according to his ideals and in direct opposition to the Citizen’s 
agenda […] Interspersed with these suggestive if somewhat comic details are clearer, 
larger statements of Bloom’s utopian vision of the Nova Hibernia as an 
inter-heterogenious contact zone eschewing absolute hierarchies and 
homogenization of difference, in accordance with his earlier definition of ‘nation’ 
(‘the same people living in the same place’).446 
                                                     
445 Andrew Gibson, Joyce’s Revenge: History, Politics, and Aesthetics in Ulysses (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2002), pp. 120-1. 
446 Vincent Cheng, Joyce, Race and Empire, p. 219, 222. 
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Both analyses find support in Joyce’s text, but how Bloom might enjoy through 
this fantasy remains unclear.  Concerning the lengthy passages of 
(pseudo-)messianism, I would like to focus on the libidinal economy operative in 
Bloom’s self-appointed identity of a new master figure and in the bifurcated 
structuration of the sovereign and his subjects.  That the coronation passage is staged 
like a socio-political carnival and endowed with great excitement signals that Bloom 
derives enjoyment from being the center of fantasy.  The coronation is an occasion in 
which some action of symbolic significance and efficacy is accomplished through 
words, by which the symbolic mandate is assigned to a certain human bearer and 
authority and power imputed to him/her.  In J. L. Austin’s influential work, How to 
do Things with Words,447 what are famously called speech acts or performative 
utterances are neither true nor false for these sentences are not constative or 
descriptive statements but declarations and linguistic actions.  When performed in 
appropriate contexts or circumstances, performative utterances take symbolic effects 
and change the status of things in the world.  These performative utterances would 
not be capable of fulfilling their tasks were they not situated in authorised settings and 
symbolic contexts, which are themselves established according to specific 
socio-symbolic codes and endorsed by the authority of the law, the Symbolic Other.  
                                                     
447 J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
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In this regard, Austin’s speech acts may change things in the world without 
transforming the framework of symbolic rules and authority that underlie this world.  
In other words, a speech act may be a symbolic act but it is far from an ethical act in 
the Lacanian sense.  While Austinian speech acts may do things with words, they do 
not ‘change the subject.’448 Nor do they change the symbolic structure.  Austinian 
speech acts are ‘highly ritualized and codified,’ but Lacanian ethical acts defy 
pre-established codes, laws and authorities, exposing the inconsistencies of the Other.  
The Lacanian act must be signifying (doing something with words) the 
‘transformative’ and ‘transgressive.’449  Lacan emphasises that locomotion itself 
does not constitute an act; however, ‘if one day it amounts to crossing a certain 
threshold where I place myself outside of the law, my locomotion will have the value 
of an act.’450  While the Austinian performative utterances are enacted within the law, 
the Lacanian acts lies outside the law, and are boundary-crossing in essence.  
Furthermore, the transformative power of the Lacanian act on the subject is different 
from the Austinian speech act’s capacity of modifying things within the law.  The 
structuration of the subject can be punctuated by the enactment of the Lacanian act: 
‘the subject is, as subject, entirely transformed by the act’ and an act is ‘the 
inauguration of the subject as such, that is to say, from a veritable act the subject 
                                                     
448 Pluth, Signifiers and Acts, p. 101.  
449 Ibid., p. 102. 
450 Lacan, unpublished Seminar XV, 11/15/1976, qtd in Pluth Signifiers and Acts, p. 101. 
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arises differently […] its structure is modified.’451  A certain symbolic co-ordination, 
law, or unconscious fantasy underlies a subject prior to the act.  Undergoing the 
Lacanian act, the subject transgresses the previous symbolic framework and is entirely 
transformed to the extent that it is arguable that a new subject is emerging.  It is this 
dimension that is lacking in Austinian speech acts and the subject who enacts 
performative utterances.   
The coronation scene itself is a manifestation of an Austinian speech act par 
excellence.  Seen in this light, despite the liberalist agenda in the content of the 
lecture, it is arguable that Bloom is tightly contained in the established Symbolic 
order with his particular fascination with the prolonged, ritualistic performances, such 
as imitating the politicians’ shaking hands, kissing and embracing children and so on. 
The messianic fantasy also betrays Bloom’s obsession with titles, when the position of 
the sovereign is conferred upon him, ‘Lord mayor of Dublin’ (U, 15.1364), ‘sir Leo 
Bloom’ (U, 15.1382), ‘emperor-president and king-chairman’ (U, 15.1471), ‘Leopold 
the First’ (U, 15.1475).  The hybridity of these titles from different political systems 
and ideologies reveals that Bloom is eager to accumulate as many imaginary titles as 
he can, rather than subverting or challenging any political ideology or power of his 
day.  In the ritual of the mock coronation, traditional authority figures such as 
                                                     
451 Lacan, unpublished Seminar XIV, 2/15/1967 and 2/22/1967, qtd in Pluth Signifiers and Acts, p. 102. 
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bishops and archbishops, ‘the chief rabbi’ (U, 15.1423), ‘twentyeight Irish 
representative peers’ (U, 15.1416-7), and so on, are called upon to participate, lending 
their approval to Bloom.  In addition to titles bestowed upon him and streets  
named after him such as ‘Boulevard Bloom’ (U, 15.1386), Bloom is also preoccupied 
with decorating himself with insignias of imperial power—‘Bloom appears, 
bareheaded […] bearing Saint Edward’s staff, the orb and sceptre with the dove, the 
curtana’ (U, 15.1442-4).  The three items are all symbolic of English authority and 
carried before the English sovereign at his/her coronation.452  It is an egregious irony 
that a self-appointed Irish-Jewish Messiah still seeks English approval in support of 
his newly invented identity, which betrays the fact that, in this pseudo-messianic 
fantasy, the established ideology, authority and laws of the Symbolic Other are 
sustained and reinforced rather than breached or challenged.  
Moreover, Bloom’s (self-)assignation to the symbolic investiture of the sovereign 
also signals that the entire Symbolic structuration in the pseudo-messianic fantasy 
follows the Schmittian logic of the political theology of the sovereign, operating by 
the masculine logic of totality and exception.  As elucidated in Chapter One, 
Agamben launches a study of power situated ‘at the intersection between the 
juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models, arguing that ‘the production of the 
                                                     
452 Gifford and Seidman, p. 473. 
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biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.’453  The sovereign’s 
power to declare war, to demarcate the fine line of friends/enemies, his power to 
pronounce the state of emergency and the suspension of the law marks a ‘zone of 
indistinction’ of both the inside and the outside of the law, in which, ‘[t]he rule 
applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it.’454  It is the 
locus where law governs through power, violence, force, sovereign will and decision, 
rather than reason, normal regulation and positive law.  Agamben also argues for a 
structural parallel between the sovereign and homo sacer, who also occupies the 
position of ‘inclusive exclusion,’ of being included by exception and exclusion.455  
Simply put, homo sacer is characterised by a ‘ban’: ‘[h]e who has been banned is not, 
in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it, but rather abandoned to it, 
that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and 
inside, become indistinguishable.’456  Situated beyond both penal law and sacred 
sacrifice, homo sacer presents  
the originary figure of life taken into the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of 
the originary exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted 
[…] the sacrednesss of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely fundamental 
right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely both 
life’s subjection to a power over death and life’s irreparable exposure in the relation 
to abandonment.457 
                                                     
453 Agamben, Homo Sacer (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998), p. 6, original emphasis. 
454 Ibid., p. 18. 
455 Ibid., p. 21. 
456 Ibid., p. 71. 
457 Ibid., p. 83. 
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The sovereign Bloom addresses the crowd as ‘[m]y subjects!’ (U, 15.1504).  In the 
extension of constructing Bloom’s kidney-shaped edifice, brutality, destruction and 
death are vividly described: 
In the course of extension several buildings and monuments are demolished. 
Government offices are temporarily transferred to railway sheds. Numerous houses 
are razed to the ground. The inhabitants are lodged in barrels and boxes, all marked 
in red with the letters: L.B. Several paupers fall from a ladder. A part of the walls of 
Dublin, crowded with loyal sightseers, collapses. (U, 15.1550-5) 
In other words, the glory and power of the sovereign is erected at the expense of 
his subjects who are rendered to the status of homo sacer, exposed to the originary 
force of the sovereign power.  Joyce gives vivid expression to the creaturely imagery 
of homo sacer when he describes ‘the inhabitants are lodged in barrels and boxes, all 
marked in red’(U, 15.1553).  This figure of distorted, suffering neighbours are what 
Santner and Žižek have named as the creaturely, undead, inhuman dimension of law 
and human subjectivity, which is directly expressive of law’s ‘enigmatic and 
unnerving surplus of validity over meaningness,’ of ‘a chronic signifying stress’ 
secreted by the functioning of symbolisation.  Santner has drawn inspiration from 
Banjamin’s interpretation of Kafkaesque figures, such as ‘Odradek’ and ‘Gregor 
Samsa,’ as ‘a series of figures with the prototype of distortion: a hunched back,’458 
arguing for the creaturely figures as beings ‘distorted by a sort of cringe, as if the 
[signifying] stress […] had taken on direct, bodily form and intensity’ (N, 99).  The 
                                                     
458 Walter Benjamin, ‘Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death’, Selected Writings, vol 2, 
1927-34. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001), p. 807. 
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creaturely figures designate ‘the direct embodiment’ of the superegoic enjoyment, the 
originary testimony to the sovereign power, ‘the coming flesh of the “state of 
emergency” sociosymbolic meaning’ (N, 100).  In this light, Bloom’s 
pseudo-messianism is hardly ethically progressive but repeats the political theology of 
the sovereign, governing and distributing with a law built upon totality and exception.  
The sovereign is privileged on the basis of the fact that the oppressed is rendered into 
the substance of cringe, of the creaturely, of homo sacer.  Bloom, who is not 
regarded as a true father/son for the troubled legacy of his father’s suicide and the 
premature death of his son, nor taken as a true Irishman for his Jewish origin, or a true 
husband for the premonition of Molly’s adultery, has been reduced to the interstice in 
the socio-symbolic existence, situated at the polarity of homo sacer.  In the 
pseudo-messianic fantasy, by imagining himself to shift to the other topological 
polarity of the sovereign hardly changes the status quo, nor does it alter the 
underlying socio-symbolic framework, the operation of dominant ideologies or the 
distribution of enjoyment.  Embedded in Austinian speech acts, the secular Messiah 
enacts the role of ‘emperor-president and king-chairman’ (U, 15.1471) and 
perpetuates the socio-symbolic framework without achieving the truly ‘transgressive’ 
and ‘transformative’ ethical act in the Lacanian sense.    
In ‘Circe’, the pseudo-messianic fantasy ends abruptly with protests initiated by 
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‘the man in the Macintosh’, and followed by ‘Father Farley’ and ‘Alexander J Dowie’ 
and so on.  Bloom is soon proclaimed by ‘Dr Mulligan’ as ‘bisexually abnormal’, (U, 
15.1775) as ‘a finished example of the womanly man […] about to have a baby’ (U, 
15.1798-1810).  This incident is one of the most perplexing and enigmatic in ‘Circe’, 
and to tackle its complexity may go beyond the scope of the limited space here.  
However, in the current context of my discussion of subjectivity in the making, I will 
at least suggest that this is also a moment of idiosyncratic self-naming.  This 
incomprehensible master signifier indicates typical sinthomatic quality, which, to 
borrow Thurston’s words, is a ‘constitutive mark,’ unmasking ‘the untreatable 
singularity,’ ‘the untranslatable signature of a subject’s enjoyment.’459  It marks 
Bloom’s new name, his newly devised sinthome as an idiosyncratic way of organising 
his jouissance and a self-assignation of meaning and identity in the world.  Arguably, 
it structurally occupies the fourth ring, the individuated sinthome that knots the three 
other rings and keeps them from dissolution. 
 
 
IV. 
It is time to unravel the problematic perverse drama and masochism of ‘Circe’.  
                                                     
459 Although Thurston is referring to the general qualification of sinthome, not to the specific 
incidence of Bloom’s becoming ‘womanly man’, I think, his characterisation still applies. Thurston, p. 
196. 
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In ‘Circe,’ Joyce ushers in deformed figures such as ‘a pigmy woman,’ ‘a deafmute 
idiot with goggle eyes,’ ‘shapeless mouth’ and the spasms of ‘Saint Vitus’ dance,’ and 
follows this with a series of obscene masquerades, tortures, and the nightmarish 
repetition of deepest trauma (U, 15.25;14-5).  We should be cautious not to be too 
ready to celebrate the references to beastliness and the creaturely as a Bakhtinian 
transgression of the existing ideology or law.460  The creaturely figures undoubtedly 
designate the most pathetic abject.  Prostitution and the setting of the brothel present 
the most usual form of superegoic enjoyment as the underside of the law.  Abject and 
other forms of superegoic enjoyment as the underside of the law actualy underlyn and 
support the functioning of the law.  For instance, soldiers frequenting brothels may 
just be another code of behaviour to support a severe militant discipline.  The refusal 
of the secret code may just be even more threatening.  In the context of a discussion 
of the Jewish-Pauline state of emergency, as opposed to the Bakhtinian carnivalesque 
state of exception, Žižek argues that the latter indicates the period ‘when everyday 
moral norms and hierarchies are suspended, and one is encouraged to indulge in 
transgressions,’ while the former designates precisely the effort to ‘suspend the 
obscene libidinal investment in the Law, the investment on account of which the Law 
generates/solicits its own transgression’ (PD, 113).  In other words, what is really 
                                                     
460 Eric D. Smith offers a Bakhtinian reading of this chapter in ‘“I Have Been a Perfect Pig”: A Semiosis 
of Swine in Circe’, Joyce Studies Annual, 13 (2002), 131- 46. 
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suffocating and controlling, what really prevents people from freely enjoy themselves 
sexually or otherwise lies not in ‘the direct repression’ or ‘the so-called internalization 
of prohibitions, but the very excess of enjoyment coagulated into a specific formula 
which curves/distorts/transfixes our space of enjoyment, closes off new possibilities 
of enjoyment, condemns the subject to err in the closure of a vicious cycle …’ (N, 
175).  Similarly, the creaturely figures correlative with transgression in nighttown 
are not necessarily subversive to the law.  Rather, the creaturely figures need to be 
traversed if any critical or therapeutic potential embodied in these figures is to be 
released or effected.   
On the one hand, various sexual fantasies and masquerades are enacted.  On the 
other, the masochist tortures and traumatic scenes sometimes are carried out in such a 
fashion that they seem no longer to be contained in the fantasy plane, bordering on 
extreme cruelty.  Some critics come to identify ‘Circe’ as a kind of Artaudian theatre 
of cruelty, manifesting ‘the theatricality of the real and the reality of the theatrical.’461  
‘Circe’ stages the processing of enjoyment in the Artaudian theatre by way of various 
sinthomatic constructions and their vicissitudes.  Therefore, what readers 
encountered in ‘Circe’ should first be identified as ‘real masochism,’ ‘primary 
masochism,’462 dealing with the confrontation of the Real, the traumatic sufferings 
                                                     
461 Austin Briggs, p. 46. 
462 Regarding the interpretation of masochism in ‘Circe,’ critics have offered a variety of opinions.  
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and the attempt to make sense of these sufferings, and to the fundamental naming of 
one’s subjectivity.  In Seminar XXIII, Lacan himself addresses the issue of 
masochism in Joyce and in Bloom.  Unlike his usual equivalence of the author with 
Joyce’s main male protagonists, especially Stephen and Bloom, Lacan cautions his 
audience to be subtler on this matter, remarking, 
Masochism is not at all to be ruled out from the possibility of Joyce’s sexual 
stimulation. He insisted enough on it in the case of Bloom. But I will say that what 
is rather striking are the metaphors he employs. Namely, peeling off something like 
a fruit skin. He did not enjoy it on that occasion. It is something that is 
psychologically valid. He had a reaction of disgust […] Perhaps, after all, the 
beating disgusted him. He was, perhaps, not a true pervert. (XXIII, 149-151)463 
The act of beating that Lacan comments on here is a violent incident; Stephen was 
beaten up by his fellow students after his disagreement over their evaluation of certain 
poets.  What Lacan finds curious in this incident is that Stephen has experienced 
neither enjoyment nor the supposed affect of anger or hatred but disgust toward this 
event.  This betrays that Stephen has a peculiar relationship with his own body and 
                                                                                                                                                        
However, I shall argue in the following section that either the feminist critique or queer criticism are 
insufficient and confusing without taking into consideration the distinction between the perverse 
structure and the so-called primary masochism or real masochism.  Primary masochism is Freud’s 
term.  ‘Real masochism’ and its critical potential are described by Christoph F. E. Holzhey in his 
dissertation.  With lengthy evaluation of important theories on masochism including figures such as 
Freud, Laplanche, Bersani, and Deleuze, he insists that ‘different forms of masochism are based in a 
pre-discursive, universal phenomenon […].I will call this ‘real masochism,’ not in the sense of 
‘authentic,’’ but on the contrary, in the sense of the Lacanian register of the real ie. as that which 
escapes symbolization.’ Paradoxical Pleasure in Aesthetics: Masophobia, Sexual Difference, and E.T.A 
Haffmann’s Kayter Murr (New York: Columbia UP, 2001), p. 19. 
463 The French text goes as follows: ‘le masochisme n’étant pas du tout exclu des possibilités de 
stimulation sexuelle de Joyce, iI y a assez insisté concernant Bloom. Mais je dirai plutôt que ce qui est 
frappant, ce sont les métaphores qu’il emploie, à savoir de détachement de quelque chose comme 
une pelure, Il n’a pas joui cette fois-là, il a eu une réaction de dégoût. C’est là quelque chose qui vaut 
psychologiquement […] Peut-être qu’après tout, la raclée, ça le dégoûtait.’ I follow Cormac Gallagher’s 
translation with slight modification. 
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implies that Stephen (hence Joyce) is not a true pervert.  In the meantime, Lacan 
does not deny that in personal life and in his characterisation of Bloom, sexual 
practice takes on obvious masochism.  I find that Lacan’s comments suit my stance 
in this chapter as well.  Joyce seems fascinated by and apparently indulges himself in 
constructing a perverse, masochistic relationship with Nora.464  In the relationship 
between Bloom and Molly, masochism is as vivid as the biographical counterpart of 
the author.  However, on a broader view, the subjective structuration of Joyce cannot 
be interpreted within the confinement of perversion, or masochism in particular.  He 
is clearly beyond the scope of it.  I would like to point out that if readers take into 
consideration the various modes of sinthomatic construction via different master 
signifiers, such as in the case of ‘womanly man’ and secular Messiah, it is quite 
apparent that the subjective structuration of Bloom also exceeds masochism.  That is 
to say, masochism itself only constitutes an important aspect of the subjectivity of 
Bloom.465  
Masochism in ‘Circe’ has long been a site of fierce debate.  As David Cotter 
                                                     
464The letters between Nora and Joyce recorded their perverse, masochistic practices. For instance, in 
a letter dated 2 September, 1901, Joyce wrote to Nora, ‘Will you, dearest, take me as I am with my 
sins and follies and shelter me from misery. If you do not I feel my life will go to pieces. Tonight I have 
an idea madder than usual. I feel I would like to be flogged by you, I would like to see youreyes blazing 
with anger’ (SL, 166). See also note 546 in my following chapter on ‘Penelope.’   
465 On this point, my position is different from that of Frances L. Restuccia.  Restuccia identifies both 
real-life and literary masochism in Joyce through her reading of the corresponding masochistic 
elements, and arrangements in Joyce’s letters with Nora and in Joyce’s work, observing ‘a masochistic 
strategy within Joyce’s writing that enabled Joyce to work toward liberation from patriarchy, in 
particular Church patriarchy.’ See Joyce and the Law of the Father (New Haven: Yale UP, 1989), p. xii.  
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indicates in James Joyce and the Perverse Ideal, Joyce draws from the Victorian 
repertoire of a wide range of masochistic elements, such as Pageism, Lancelotism, 
forced feminisation, transvestism, rump presentation, cuckoldry, shame and disgust, 
the rites of becoming woman, animals, tools, objects, and so on.  The florid 
masochistic episodes find abundant expression in ‘Circe’ when Bloom is reduced to a 
servant or even a slave.  For instance, while recalling ‘[t]o be a shoefitter in 
Manfield’s was my love’s young dream,’ ‘Bloom, stifflegged, aging, bends over her 
hoof and with gentle fingers draws out and in her laces’ (U, 15.2811-4).  Pageism 
soon turns violent and egregious: ‘The nosering, the pliers, the bastinado, the hanging 
hook, the knout I’ll make you kiss while the flutes play like the Nubian slave of old’ 
(U, 15.2891-2).  Later, this passage even terminates with the imagination of lynching 
and cannibalism: ‘Very possibly I shall have you slaughtered and skewed in my 
stables and enjoy a slice of you with crisp and crackling from the baking tin basted 
and baked like sucking pig with rice and lemon or currant sauce’ (U, 15.2898-2901).  
It is noteworthy that, as the masochistic fantasy becomes intensified, the exchange of 
gender also occurs.  After Bloom mumbles, ‘Awaiting your further orders we remain, 
gentlemen,’ ‘Bella’ is transformed into ‘Bello,’ calling Bloom, ‘Hound of dishonor!’ 
(U, 15.2832-5).   
Some critics point to the cross-dressing and cross-gender performance in ‘Circe,’ 
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arguing that these gender identities constructed by costumes actually amount to a 
destructive move, revealing that sexuality is ‘always clothes-deep into the subjects,’466 
exploring an infinite play of signifiers in gender/sexual politics.  Others argue that 
under Bella/o’s domination, Bloom’s submission only temporarily deprives him of his 
patriarchal power, and his later beastification actually functions toward the recovery 
of his manhood and mastery.467  I find these interpretations problematic.  Firstly, 
although it appears transgressive on the surface, this gender-crossing, or sex-reversal, 
actually betrays quite a conservative nature because it perpetuates the binary 
distribution of existing signifiers of gender representation and gender stereotyping. 
Suzette Henke points out,  
the whoremistress acquires all the accoutrements of imperialistic power as soon as 
she dons male trousers and sprouts of a moustache. A ringmaster and tyrannous 
phallic mother, Bella/Bello demeans, humiliates, and tortures her obsequious victim. 
A battered Bloom succumbs to ritual degradation […] Both Amazonian woman and 
effeminate male, enacting transvestite and trans-sexual roles of Edwardian 
pantomime, are inscribed in a melodrama of sado-masochistic catharsis.468   
In her male incarnation, Bella/Bello becomes authoritarian and violently sadistic, 
torturing Bloom to the point of absolute alterity […] The new womanly man is 
reduced to the archaic subject-position of powerless womanly woman […] It is clear 
from role-reversals in ‘Circe’ that, in terms of cultural representation, female gender 
confers parodic marginality. Woman seems destined to play the part of l’autre, 
alienated other in the specular projections of the male libidinal imagination.469 
By putting emphasis on the fact that ‘the semiology of gender remains 
                                                     
466 Cheryl Herr, ‘One Good Turn Deserves Another: Theatrical Cross-dressing in Joyce’s ‘‘Circe’’ 
Episode’, Journal of Modern Literature, 11.2 (1984), pp. 163-76 at p. 175.  
467 Sandra M. Gilber and Susan Gubar, No Man’s Land: The Place of Woman in the Twentieth Century, 
vol.2: Sex Changes (New Haven: Yale UP, 1989), p. 336.  
468 Suzette Henke, James Joyce and the Politics of Desire (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 112. 
469 Ibid., p. 115. 
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unchanged […] in transvestite or trans-sexual guise’ and that ‘[e]ven the comedy of 
language cannot alter the binary codes of gender or the deeply embedded sex-roles 
inscribed in societal consciousness,’ Henke distils a different reading, detecting that 
this trans-sexual arrangement actually conveys ‘the pervasive cultural fear that 
woman, granted phallic authority, would persecute her mate with unbridled ferocity; 
and that man, bereft of the kind of patriarchal power […] would sink helplessly into 
sexual degradation’.470 In this regard, transgressive display/play of gender-crossing 
reveals a latent cultural fear shared by the dominant patriarchy rather than a release 
from the conventional gender distribution.  
Furthermore, there is a deeper libidinal structuration operative in masochism that 
needs to be addressed.  Nick Mansfield correctly analyzes masochism as an art of 
power.  The contract formed between Wanda and Saverin in Sacher-Masoch’s Venus 
in Furs and their performance clearly annihilates the desire of the Other, stifling 
others,’ his partners’, and women’s subjectivity.  Mansfield points out that 
‘[m]anipulating gender categories is one of its most important types of play, but the 
appropriation of or identification with the feminine on the masochist part is never at 
the expense of his masculinity, and is never simply undertaken because he 
understands femininity as more implicitly passive.’471  It is actually a ‘conservative 
                                                     
470 Ibid., p. 116.  
471 Nick Mansfield, Masochism: The Art of Power (Westpart: Praeger, 1997), p. xii.  
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formation,’472 merely a fantasy carried out by a total subject in the masochistic 
contract and rituals.473  Despite contending also that Joyce draws from cultural 
stereotypes and that the masochistic type of art is ‘masturbatory,’474 Cotter still 
celebrates ‘minoritarian becoming,’ 475  arguing for the ethics of escape and 
renunciation in terms of the Deleuzean Body without Organs.476  Since to degrade is 
to feminise in the current culture, the only way to avoid the constructed roles is to 
resist ‘the tyranny of the penis,’ and the masochist may ‘become woman, become 
minoritarian, and finally become nothing, and so everything.’477  As Serge André 
acutely points out when talking of male perversion, ‘[t]he man who gets himself 
humiliated, insulted, whipped, by his confederate is really seeking to take her place as 
the woman.  He offers himself as object in a typical masculine fantasy scenario only 
in order to experience the remaining jouissance not mastered by that fantasy.’478  
Perversion offers ‘a kind of mimetic caricature of feminine jouissance;’ the pervert 
‘slip[s] into the skin of this Other body, like a hand into a glove.’479  
To evaluate these criticisms by Cotter and Mansfield, I propose first to go back 
to the classic interpretation of the perverse structure, not merely the perverse traits, 
                                                     
472 Ibid., p. 51. 
473 Ibid., p.32-50. 
474 David Cotter, James Joyce and the Perverse Ideal (London: Routledge, 2003), p.143-9. 
475 Ibid., p. 147 
476 Ibid., p. 143-4. 
477 Ibid., p. 193. 
478 Serge André, What Does A Woman Want? (New York: Other Press, 1999), p. 270. 
479 Ibid., p. 270 and p. 272. 
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arguably inherent in all clinical categories, neurotic, psychotic, or perverse.  A 
structure signifies the relation between the subject and the Other.  The child’s 
dependence on the caregivers necessarily submits him/herself to the responses and 
demands of the Other.  The first Other’s jouissance, demands, and unconscious 
desires necessarily become complicated in the relationship between the subject and 
the Other.  It is arguable that the child might take interest in being ‘the phallicized 
object through which the mother fills her own lack.’480  The father’s intervention is 
never successfully assumed and is sometimes derided and delegated to an 
insignificant or impotent onlooker (of the mother/child relation).  Given that the 
father’s law is introduced to the child only through the mother’s discourses, it is the 
mother’s ambiguous reference, or equivocations of sexual differences, and the law of 
the father that makes the law of the father challenged and derided.  In the meantime, 
this equivocation takes effect only when it is confirmed by ‘the tacit collusion of a 
father who is willing to be deprived of his symbolic rights, and let the mother take 
over his words with all the ambiguity that this delegation implies.’481  However, it is 
crucial here to maintain the distinction between disavowal and foreclosure of the 
father’s law.  ‘The pervert’s mother does not “lay down the law” to the father; unlike 
                                                     
480 Verhaeghe, Normal and Disorder, p. 409. 
481 Joel Dor, Structure and Perversions (New York: Other Press, 2001), p. 111. 
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the psychotic’s “outlaw” mother’.482   
In consequence, the mechanism of disavowal is unable to produce sufficient 
separation.  The Symbolic law is not sufficiently registered in perversion.  In the 
normal neurotic structure, ‘[t]he symbolic father provides a rationale for any limit he 
places on the child’s behavior, and he too abides by the moral law, thus practicing 
what he preaches.’483  This rationale of the Symbolic is lacking or dwindling in the 
case of perversion, in which ‘the Other’s desire that is substituted for the law is a 
desire or will that eroticizes blame, punishment, humiliation and unequal distribution 
of power (originally between the child and the parent).’484  The child remains 
trapped as the Imaginary phallus for the mother, working hard to deny the Other’s 
desire and to secure this privileged position.  Verhaeghe argues that, without the 
proper mediation of the paternal metaphor, perversion is ‘ungendered;’ ‘[p]erversion 
is not about a male-female relationship, but about a mother-child relation.’485  Lacan 
repeatedly remarks that the pervert is reduced to the instrument of the Other’s 
jouissance.  In the face of this predicament, resulting from the insufficiency of 
paternal mediation, the pervert would try to reverse the passive position of the Other’s 
plaything to actively assume the instrumental position of the Other’s enjoyment by 
                                                     
482 Ibid., p. 111. 
483 Stephanie S. Swales, Perversion: A Lacanian Psychoanalytic Approach to the Subject (London: 
Routledge, 2012), p. 160. 
484 Ibid., p. 160. 
485 Verhaeghe, Normal and Disorder, p. 414. 
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means of defying the law, carrying out the individualised scenario through contract. 
The contract between the involved partners in perverse practice replaces the normal 
Symbolic law and discloses rigid characteristics to cancel out ambiguity and efface 
the Other’s desire.  Lucie Cantin comments on the contract between Wanda and 
Sacher-Masoch, pointing out that ‘[t]he contract regulates, defines, and formalizes the 
relation to the other. Things are said before they are done. The signifier compels and 
one must abide.’486  Cantin continues to argue that ‘once the contract is signed, the 
other as a subject is abolished, along with this desire and freedom […] the contract 
responds to the processing of the drive beyond the phallic effects, in a mechanical, 
action-reaction organ logic set in motion by the trait, the piece or the partial object 
that the other then supports.’487  Seen in this light, far from fulfilling the neurotic’s 
wet dreams of revolutionary transgression and limitless enjoyment, the perverse 
drama is often quite rigid and repetitive.488  To put it another way, in analogy to 
Agamben’s dialectic between the sovereign and homo sacer, the perverse subject 
dwells in a permanent sovereign ban by the phallic mother, and the entire perverse 
scenario is devised to discipline the creaturely being governed by this perverse 
sovereign ban.  
                                                     
486 Lucie Cantin, ‘Perversion and Hysteria’, in Willy Apollon, Danielle Bergeron, and Lucie Cantin (eds.), 
After Lacan: Clinical Practice and the Subject of the Unconscious (Albany: SUNY P, 2002), 155-79, at p. 
174. 
487 Ibid., p. 174. 
488 Ibid., p. 155-79.  
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With this in mind, let us return to our evaluation of the diverse critical responses 
to masochism in ‘Circe’ and examine some key passages regarding forced 
feminisation.  Bello commands Bloom:   
What you longed for has come to pass. Henceforth you are unmanned and mine in 
earnest, a thing under the yoke. Now for your punishment frock. You will shed your 
male garments, you understand, Ruby Cohen and don the shot silk luxuriously 
rustling over head and shoulders. And quickly too! [...] (points to his whores) As 
they are now so will you be, wigged, signed, perfumesprayed, recepowedered, with 
smoothshaven armpits. Tape measurements will be taken next your skin. You will be 
laced with cruel force into vicelike corsets of soft dove coutille with whale bone 
busk to the diamondtrimmed pelvis […] Martha and Mary will be a little chilly at 
first in such delicate thighcasing but the frilly flimsiness of lace round your bare 
knees will remind you […] Little jobs that make mother pleased, eh? And show off 
coquettishly your domino at the mirror behind closedrawn blinds your unskirted 
thighs and hegoat’s udders in various poses of surrender, eh? […] When you took 
your seat with womanish care, lifting your billowy flounces, on the smoothworn 
throne. (U, 15.2965-3017) 
It is quite obvious that the celebration of cross-dressing and transgender as 
subversive transgression is too hasty and does not really hold, because, strictly 
speaking, at the most fundamental level, perversion constitutes a mother-child relation 
as indicated above; that is, it is hardly a drama between man and woman but that of a 
child with unstable genderisation with a phallic mother.489 Although these lines show 
                                                     
489 Dor, in Part II and Part III of his Structure and Perversion, discusses the relationship or distribution 
of phallic attributes in women and men in different clinical structures, and in cases of homosexuality, 
lesbianism, transsexuals, and transvetism; those related categories which traditionally are assigned to, 
and border upon perversions. His insightful discussion, though far from exhaustive, indicates that the 
repertoire of cross-dressing and cross-gendering still centers around the distribution of phallic 
attributes and its deviation, and is far from a whole-sale structural innovation or revolution as some 
critics may want to celebrate.   
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clearly that ‘[w]omen are processed by men in ways that disguise and trammel them 
so as to reconstruct their sensory features,’ there flickers fragile ‘female awareness’ or 
‘feminist insights’490 embodied in sentences like ‘[a]s they are now so will you be.’  
On the other hand, this stereotyping of women, the stock, codified portrayal of 
women’s clothes, gestures, and actions is clearly a ‘typical masculine fantasy 
scenario’ enacted ‘only in order to experience the remaining jouissance not mastered 
by that fantasy.’491  This epitomises the pervert’s attempt to ‘slip into the skin of this 
Other body, like a hand into a glove.’492  Mansfield’s critique of the power relation 
and the total subject probably reveals more truth of the masturbatory nature of the 
perverse fantasy, staging, and drama as a means to quench the Other’s desire and to 
assume the status of the instrument of the Other’s enjoyment.  In this light, the 
masochistic elements that Joyce draws from the Victorian repertoire are far from some 
revolutionary liberation or experimentation of diverse sexuality.  The Bakhtinian 
carnivalesque state of exception is simply the superegoic underside of the law.  The 
rigid, perverse transgression is nothing but masturbatory.  While Cotter 
acknowledges the masturbatory nature of the perverse ideals in Joyce’s work and life 
in general and in ‘Circe’ in particular, he still advocates the ethics of escape and the 
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experiential value of minoritarian becoming by borrowing the Deleuzean conception 
of bodies without organs.   
My contention is that the masturbatory nature of perverse ideals functions in a 
similar way to that by which neurotics conduct masturbatory enjoyment and is far 
from subversive of the law.493  When an ethic ends up in passive escape to avoid the 
aggressive conventional roles of male domination, its efficacy is quite dubious and 
confined.  Because this fantasy scenario in perversion produces nothing new or 
subversive, it perpetuates the conventional categories and stifles the Other’s 
subjectivity when the whole perverse design strives to deny the Other’s desire and to 
instruct the Other on how to enjoy through contract.  The reference to Deleuze is far 
from accidental and reveals the problematic nature of the conception of bodies 
without organs with the possible kinship with superegoic enjoyment of ideology.494  
Hence, the enactment of perverse ideals is far from a satisfying ethical act.  The 
true ethical act lies in the recognition of the non-existence of the Other, the 
precipitation into new subjectivity, and the intervention of love as the suspension of 
fantasy and its concomitant superegoic transgression and enjoyment.  Dwelling and 
indulging in fantasy, be it neurotic or perverse, is nothing but the reification of 
                                                     
493 In Seminar XX, Lacan has devoted ample space to explain the masturbatory nature of desire and 
fantasy in his theorisation of sexuation.  
494 See Žižek’s evaluation of the two faces of Deleuze. One is truly revolutionary, the other ventures 
near to serving the superegoic enjoyment of ideology in Organs without Bodies.  
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enjoyment and continuous subscription to the Other.  That is to say, the messianic 
force to intervene and to change the status quo lies not in the ethics of escape as 
Cotter would believe, but in the ethics of the breakthrough.  Following this line of 
argument, even if we do not assign Bloom or Joyce with a stable, rigid perverse 
structure and remain faithful to our contention that he is beyond the clinical categories 
from the very beginning, the masochism enacted here, I  argue, can be 
conceptualised as a step prior to the miraculous ethical breakthrough that Santner 
outlines in his conception of neighbour love.495  The pervasive phenomenon of 
perverse elements and florid masochism in ‘Circe’ constitute another interpretation 
similar to Artaudian theatre.  It aims to contain primary masochism by way of 
actively assuming the position of passive victim or abject, which can function as a 
means of acquiring the minimal distance required for further liberation, and for a 
subjective formation and transformation.  As Žižek keenly points out,    
Paradoxically, such a staging is the first act of liberation: by means of it, the 
servant’s Masochistic libidinal attachment to his master is brought to daylight, and 
the servant thus acquires a minimal distance toward it […] When we are subjected 
to a power mechanism, this subjection is always and by definition sustained by 
some libidinal investment: the subjection itself generates a surplus-enjoyment of its 
own. This subjection is embodied in a network of ‘material’ bodily practices, and for 
this reason, we cannot get rid of our subjection through a merely intellectual 
reflection. Our liberation has to be staged in some kind of bodily performance […] 
this performance has to be of an apparently ‘masochistic’ nature; it has to stage the 
                                                     
495 See Santner’s extended argument in ‘Miracles Happen: Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Freud, and the 
Matter of Neighbor’, Neighbor, p. 76-133. 
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painful process of hitting back at oneself.496  
In this light, the ethics of escape is insufficient and the true ethical act of Bloom does 
not reside in his perverse becoming of the Other, the woman, the object, or the tools, 
but in his miraculous breakthrough of these suffocating fantasies and enjoyment, 
coming to Stephen’s rescue to manifest his neighbour love in the here and now.  I 
argue that the ethical potential advocated by Žižek can be seen in Bloom’s masochism.  
Cotter’s ethics of escape does not really explain the fact that Bloom himself is 
frequently rendered marginal in his social existence, exploited and humiliated at 
various points of his life.  It is arguable that the florid masochism itself has already 
functioned as a secondary mechanism in processing his status as abject, his perception 
of himself as homo sacer: ‘Justice! All Ireland versus one! Has nobody …?’ (U, 
15.3202).  I would like to call attention to the moments of masochism in which 
ritualised cuckoldry497 is intrinsically intertwined with Bloom’s ‘real life’ anxiety of 
Molly’s adultery in ‘Circe:’498  
                                                     
496 Slavoj Žižek, ‘An Ethical Plea for Lies and Masochism’, in Todd McGowan (ed.) Lacan and 
Contemporary Film (New York: Other Press, 2004), 173-86 at p. 183. 
497 I will return to the issue of cuckoldry in the next chapter on ‘Penelope’.  See also Janina Levin, 
‘Modern reinterpretation of the cuckold’, PhD thesis (Philadelphia, 2010).  
498 Owing to the space and focus of this chapter, I have no intention to explore fully or to exhaust the 
rich and complicated nature of masochism in ‘Circe,’ but merely attempt to confine my effort by 
pointing out what I think are the limits and critical potential of masochism which, I have found, is still 
missing from Joyce criticism.  See Brivic’s Joyce through Lacan and Žižek, in which Brivic devotes a 
chapter on ‘Circe’ to discussing shame as a key feature of masochism; Frances L. Restuccia, Joyce and 
the Law of the Father; James Davis, ‘Beyond Masochistic Ritual in Joyce and Deleuze: Reading Molly as 
Non-Corporal Body’, Joyce, ‘Penelope’ and the Body (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), pp. 171-88.  
Masochism has drawn recent critical attention as well from viewpoints other than the Lacanian 
perspective.  For instance, Thomas P. Baláz offers an understanding of masochism from the lens of 
object-relations psychoanalysis in his ‘Recognizing Masochism: Psychoanalysis and the Politics of 
Sexual Submission in Ulysses’, Joyce Studies Annual (2002), 160-91. See also Jennifer Burns Levin’s 
dissertation, ‘Literary Masochism and Representations of Sexualized Pain in the Modern Imagination’, 
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Boylan (tosses him sixpence): Here to buy yourself a gin and splash. (he hangs his    
hat smartly on a peg of Bloom’s antlered head!) Show me in. I have a little private 
businesswith your wife, you understand.  
Bloom: Thank you, sir. Madam Tweedy is in her bath, sir. (U, 15.3762-7) 
Molly’s adultery is staged and contained in Bloom’s participation as an impotent 
onlooker as well as a servant.  To codify a hurtful scene is already an attempt to 
contain and tame the Real.  Henke reads this incident as ‘an enactment of caricatured 
cuckoldry,’ in which ‘the timorous Bloom relives the pain of conjugal loss in the 
mode of voyeuristic farce.’ 499  As ‘playwright and participant,’ or as ‘the 
author/actor/director’ of the comedy of infidelity, Bloom ‘symbolically sutures the 
wound of cuckoldry by dramatizing marital transgression in the stylized frame of a 
turn-of-the-century peepshow,’ and hence gains ‘the gratifications of both aesthetic 
mastery and psychological catharsis.’500  Moreover, I would like to highlight that it is 
also by way of this masochistic staging that Bloom comes to recognise his 
contribution to cuckoldry: his libidinal complicity with the adultery between Boylan 
and Molly is also staged in his fantasy of serving the whole scene.  This 
acknowledgement of one’s own involvement and investment in the subjection to 
power and injustice, one’s enjoyment of shame and pain, constitutes the necessary 
step prior to the truly ethical breakthrough for future transformation.  Arguably, prior 
to Bloom’s act of neighbour love to intervene in the objectal dimension of the Other, 
the signifying stress contained in the formation of fantasy (N, 76-133), Bloom works 
through his subjection at the libidinal level in his masochism to break free from his 
own creaturely being, which exceeds social representations or ideological 
interpellations and is usually absorbed in supereogic enjoyment.  The subject’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ph. D. thesis (Irvine, CL, 2009), in which Bloom as ‘Mademoiselle Ruby, pride of the ring’ (U, 15.716) 
receives extensive study.     
499 Henke, Politics of Desire, p. 118. 
500 Ibid., pp. 118-9. 
295 
 
 
assumption of responsibility of one’s own being requires this suspension of the 
underside of supereogic enjoyment.  In the meantime, our neighbour love is realised 
only when we break free from both the Symbolic law and its fantasmatic thrall, 
constituting a suspension of suspension, responding to the testimony of the creaturely 
part of ourselves as well as to the creaturely figures of our neighbours, taking 
revolutionary action in the now time as the miracles of here and now.   
 
 
 
V.  
As demonstrated in my extended analysis of the libidinal economy of 
(pseudo-)messianism and masochism in ‘Circe,’ the subjective position in both 
fantasies still falls prey to the dialectical structuration of the law.   The law is 
operated with the polarity between the sovereign exception and the inclusive 
exclusion imputed to homo sacer.   In Bloom’s enactment of (pseudo-)messianism 
represented in his lecture of social reform, he occupies the structural locus of the 
sovereign; in the masochistic fantasy, Bloom is assigned to the opposite end of the 
homo sacer.  While, on the surface, in his hallucination of masochism and 
(pseudo-)messianism, Bloom seems to explore diverse roles and the concomitant 
experiences, these experiences and subjective positions themselves are but 
componants operative in the same structuration of the existing law.  With regard to 
the ethical efficacy, (pseudo-)messianism and masochism are equally powerless in 
subverting the law.  Is there any possibility of conceiving the space for the 
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extra-legal, which would suspend or deactivate the structural fixity at both psychic 
and collective-symbolic levels?  In recent years, scholars have devoted critical 
energy to delineating precisely such a space, where true messianism is claimed to be 
located.  As will be shown, the ethical act, the evental happening, and the 
truth-process converge in the manifestation of neighbour love.   
At the textual level, Joyce does not terminate his long chapter of ‘Circe’ at the 
moment of heightened enjoyment within the confines of his characters’ intensive 
indulgence in fantasies in nighttown.  On the contrary, in the last several hundred 
lines (U, 15.4241-4967), he introduces another dimension.  ‘Circe’ does not end 
abruptly at Stephen’s passage to the act, his violent yet impotent attack on the 
chandelier at the height of a ghastly, horrid fantasy, but shifts to an ethical act effected 
by the manifestation of neighbour love when Bloom finally and meaningfully engages 
in the young man’s life.  It is arguable that this is an example of ‘ethical violence’ or 
‘divine violence’ that Žižek advocated in the sense that it manages to end, to break up 
from the impotent violence and systemised violence embodied in the superegoic 
enjoyment as well, while Stephen immediately becomes the potential object/victim 
for the exploitation by Bella Cohen and violence by Private Carr and Private Compton, 
representatives of capitalism and British colonialism in this context.  Jettisoning 
entirely his role of bedroom martyr as a cringed, pathetic abject in the masochistic 
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fantasy, Bloom reverses the stereotypical submissive attitude and intervenes actively 
into Bella Cohen’s vicious attempt to overcharge Stephen (U, 15.4275-6) and her 
threat to summon the police (U, 15.4295) by hinting at his knowledge of ‘behind the 
scenes’ secrets: ‘[a]nd if it were your own son in Oxford? (warningly) I know’ (U15. 
4306).   More importantly, he comes to rescue Stephen when the latter is brutally 
humiliated and beaten.   
Žižek enlists the term ‘violence’ in his conception of the act for he intends it as a 
wake-up call from the insipid monotony that he thinks he has detected in the 
predominant agenda of multiculturalism and the concomitant emphasis on tolerance 
and difference.501 In Violence, Žižek concludes with a conception of violence that is 
capable of intervention into other forms of violence by drawing attention to Walter 
Benjamin’s definition of ‘divine violence’.  Although this ethical violence is baptised 
as ‘divine,’ it actually has nothing to do with the apocalyptic vision of the intrusion of 
external violence from above as exemplified by ‘today’s religious fundamentalists 
who pretend they are acting on behalf of God and as instrument of the Divine Will,’ or 
with the ‘idea of Judgment Day, when all debts will be fully paid and an out-of-joint 
world will finally be set straight’ (V, 158).  Benjamin wrestles painstakingly to devise 
a ‘divine’ violence beyond the violence of law as he articulates: 
                                                     
501 This is the underlying project in his article, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical 
Violence’, Neighbor, p. 134-90.  
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Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, mythic violence is confronted by the divine. 
And the latter constitutes the antithesis in all respects. If mythic violence is 
law-making, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the 
latter boundlessly destroys them […] If the former is bloody, the latter is lethal 
without spilling blood […] So neither the divine judgment nor the grounds for this 
judgment can be known in advance. Those who base a condemnation of all violent 
killing of one person by another on the commandment are therefore mistaken. It 
exists not as a criterion of judgment, but as a guideline for the actions of persons or 
communities who have to wrestle with it in solitude and, in exceptional cases, to 
take upon themselves the responsibility of ignoring it.502 
At stake in this passage is the difference between mythic and divine violence and 
the subjective freedom for intervention without the guarantee or support of the Other.  
Žižek accurately identifies the superficial parallel between the sovereign violence in 
law as mythical violence and the divine violence that is antithetical to law because 
both are involved with killing or violence regarded as neither a crime nor a sacrifice 
(V, 168).  But he soon distances the two for ‘mythical violence’ as law-making and 
law-preserving are a means in the service of power and law and sacrificial in nature, 
while ‘divine violence’ is ‘non-sacrificial and expiatory’ (V, 168).  Divine violence 
serves no higher force, intention or design but designates ‘just the sign of the injustice 
of the world, of the world being “out of joint”’ (V, 169).  Hence, it follows that 
divine violence is not an expression of divine omnipotence, nor that of the sovereign 
exception, but ‘a sign of God’s (the big Other’s) own impotence’ (V, 170, original 
emphasis).  Divine violence falls at the order of Event in the Badiouian sense; it is 
                                                     
502 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, Selected Writings, Vol. 1, 1913-26 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 1996), p. 249-51.   
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the subject’s solitary decision, ethical act, and evental intervention in response to the 
evental site of the Other’s inconsistency and, hence, ‘the subject’s work of love’ (V, 
172, original emphasis).  I would further argue that, although it appears provocative 
when Žižek invokes literal killing or murder in discussion, the true import does not 
reside in the spectacular quality of the act itself, but in the capacity of an ethical act to 
breach the operation of law and its underside, to transform the co-ordinates of 
libidinal structuration of the system.503  If an ethical act can be considered as ‘divine 
violence,’ it is divine only by virtue of its being extra-legal and violent by virtue of its 
breakthrough quality.  As Benjamin puts it in the above-quoted lines, ‘if the former 
[the mythical violence] is bloody, the latter [the divine violence] is lethal without 
spilling blood.’  It is only when the libidinal economy is substantially and 
structurally modified and reworked that the ethical efficacy of an act can be worthy of 
the name in a properly psychoanalytic sense. 
What is true messianism then?  Contemporary thinkers have turned to Pauline 
love in their attempts to theorise the breakthrough of the law and power modelled on 
the political theology of the sovereign, which works by the masculine logic of all and 
exception.  In his insightful reading of Paul’s letters as a messianic text, Agamben 
interprets the messianic calling as a vocation by virtue of the revocation of law, as a 
                                                     
503 Is not Žižek himself at various occasions in his works appealing to the notion that doing nothing 
sometimes is more radical than pseudo-action? 
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separation in terms of immanent division.504  The conception of the messianic 
vocation by virtue of revocation is of the utmost importance for our discussion here 
for it proposes the conception of rendering the law ‘inoperative’.505  Agamben 
focuses his interpretation on I Corinthians 7:17-22 and 7:29-32 in which Paul 
famously pronounces, ‘Circumcision is nothing and the foreskin is nothing […] let 
every man abide in the same calling’ and ‘time contracted itself, the rest is, that even 
those having wives may be as not having, and those weeping as not weeping, and 
those rejoicing as not rejoicing’ and so on.  Agamben regards this ‘as not’ by virtue 
of ‘revocation.’  As he puts it, succinctly, ‘[t]he messianic vocation is the revocation 
of every vocation’ and ‘the messianic nullification’ amounts to ‘deactivation, 
rendering ineffective’ of the status quo.506  This revocation can be viewed as a 
suspension, or de-animation of the current operation of libidinal economy of the law, 
a revocation of the difference between the circumcised and the foreskin.  Regarding 
the cut running through the division of identity, Agamben interprets it with the 
internal division effected by the so-called Apelles’ section or cut.  The fourth-century 
BC painter is said to be able to produce a fine line that cuts his rival’s line in two and 
Agamben utilises this example to articulate an immanent division that suspends the 
                                                     
504 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2005), p. 19-58. 
505 Ibid., p. 28. 
506 Ibid., p. 23, 25, and 28.  
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division of identities themselves.  Commenting on Paul’s pronouncement, ‘[n]ot all 
of those of Israel are Israel’, Agamben argues that  
Under the effect of the cut of Apelles, the partition of the law (Jew/non-Jew), is no 
longer clear or exhaustive, for there will be some Jews who are not Jews, and some 
non-Jews who are not non-Jews. […] He who keeps himself in the messianic law is 
not-not in law. The division of the law into Jew/non-Jew, in the law/without law, 
now leaves a remnant on either side. […] He who dwells in the law of the Messiah 
is the non-non-Jew.507   
The remnant status of the subject as a product of internal division that Agamben 
tries to conceptualise in the above passage should be opposed to the external division 
operative among a communitarian grouping or an identitarian differentiation.  The 
communitarian grouping operates by the masculine logic of all and the exception, or 
to put it in Schmittian terms, by an erection of totality built upon the limit-setting 
exception, while the conception of the remnant follows the feminine logic of ‘not-all’.  
Without the boundary-setting exception, there is no closure or totality, there is not-all.  
As a result, the subject is capable of dislodging from communitarian or identitarian 
closure of all and the exception, and of assuming his/her not-all remnant existence, 
which de-activates the inside/outside division of law in general and unplugs the 
particular identities based on the same masculine logic.  In other words, true 
messianism is extra-legal, aiming to render law inoperative and to extricate the 
communitarian closure inherent in law by introducing a remnant into every 
                                                     
507 Ibid., p. 50-1. 
302 
 
 
identity-making. 
It is this position of interpreting Paul’s messianic separation or self-division that 
has led Agamben to a scathing critique of Badiou’s book on Paul, which, according to 
Agamben, ‘tries to demonstrate precisely, how “a universal thought, proceeding on 
the basis of the worldly proliferation of alterities […] produces a Sameness and 
Equality” But is this really accurate? […] The messianic cut of Apelles clearly never 
adds up to a universal.’508  In an interview, Badiou directly answers Agamben’s 
explicit repudiation of his own reading of Saint Paul as the foundation of universalism.  
After acknowledging the difference between his own reading and that of Agamben, 
Badiou remarks that this difference actually does not constitute a contradiction for ‘in 
Paul, there is an interplay between separation and universalism.’509  Separation is 
actually inherently ‘necessary’ to Paul’s universalism ‘because we have separated 
ourselves from the old man,’ out of which emerges ‘a newness of life.’510  It is a 
division ‘internal to the subject’ between the old and the new, ‘between the power of 
death and the power of life.’511  What Badiou is referring to here is actually his 
powerful interpretation of the Pauline way of suspension of the vicious dialectic of 
law and sin through the fidelity to the Christ-event, i.e. through love. 
                                                     
508 Agamben, Remains, p. 51-2. 
509 Adam S. Miller, ‘An Interview with Alain Badiou: “Universal Truth and the Question of Religion”’, 
Journal of Philosophy and Scripture, 3.1 (2005), 1-5 at p. 2. 
510 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
511 Ibid., p. 3. 
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I fully endorse Badiou’s response to Agamben here, for Badiou’s conception of 
‘indifference’ carries the same emphasis on separation in terms of the internal division 
or immanent division that Agamben has endeavoured to distil from the figure of 
non-non-jew as an effect of the so-called Apelles’ cut.  Badiou’s universalism based 
on separation yet in excess of separation is best encapsulated in his conception of the 
eventual grace in the ethical formula of ‘not … but.’  Badiou condenses a great deal 
in the pivotal passages in explaining Paul’s sentence in Romans 6. 14, ‘for you are not 
under law, but under grace’: 
A structuring of the subject according to a ‘not … but’ through which it must be 
understood as a becoming rather than a state […] Law and grace are for the subject 
the name of the constituting weave through which he is related to the situation as it 
is, and to the effects of the event as they have to become. We shall remain, in effect, 
that an evental rupture always constitutes its subject in the divided form of a ‘not … 
but,’ and that it is precisely this form that bears the universal. For the ‘not’ is the 
potential dissolution of closed particularities (whose name is ‘law’), while the ‘but’ 
indicates the task, the faithful labor, in which the subjects of the process opened by 
the event (whose name is ‘grace’) are coworkers. (SP, 63-4)  
To put it succinctly, in ‘Circe,’ if, by staging the innermost masochistic psychodrama, 
Bloom achieves a therapeutic action of working through, which is similar to the 
mechanism and effect of the traversal of fantasy, it is arguable that Bloom has 
undergone a similar process of revocation from the previous libidinal investment and 
internal-division of his own subjectivity, and moved to what Agamben interprets as 
the messianic calling.  That is to say, Bloom is capable of breaking free from fixed 
psychic structuring, which is precisely a ‘no’ to the past and prepares a ground for the 
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‘but’ gesturing in the direction of a new, alternative ethical action and structural 
re-working both at the individual and intersubjective levels.    
Let us now dwell on Joyce’s depiction of the chaotic circumstances into which 
Bloom’s ethical act of neighbour love is enacted.  Several hundred lines at the end of 
‘Circe’ are devoted to portraying a prosaic nighttown farce.  It is a mundane episode 
in which a visit to the brothel by a group of males terminates with a drunken young 
man’s accidental attack on the lamp.  This incident triggers Bella Cohen’s greedy 
attempt to overcharge and Bloom’s argument with Cohen; the British soldiers seize 
the opportunity to harass people, provoking violence, and beat up Stephen; Bloom is 
opportunely present and offers Stephen timely protection and neighbour love.  The 
ending of ‘Circe’ starts from Stephen’s attack on the Chandelier with his ashplant.  In 
the beginning of ‘Circe,’ the ashplant once functioned as the young artist’s personal 
equipment, and proud symbol of rationality, learning and individuality when he enters 
into nighttown: ‘flourishing the ashplant in his left hand, chants with joy the introit 
for paschal time’ (U, 15.73-4).  A few lines later, Stephen utters, ‘(triumphanliter) 
Salvi facti sunt’ (U, 15.98).512  With this remark, Stephen ‘flourishes his ashplant, 
shivering the lamp image, shattering light over the world’ (U15. 99-100).  Whether 
Joyce intends Stephen’s gesture and chants to be serious or half-serious, half-mocking 
                                                     
512 Gifford and Seidman translates it as ‘and they are made whole [saved]’, p. 453.   
305 
 
 
is unclear.  But, reason seems aligned with Stephen’s ‘flourishing ashplant.’  This 
connection is echoed and parodied near the end of ‘Circe’ when Stephen again ‘lifts 
his ashplant high with both hands and smashes the chandelier’ (U, 15.4243-4).  In 
contrast with the image of shattering light, at this moment, it is darkness that has been 
brought to the world by the ashplant: ‘Time’s livid final flame leaps and, in the 
following darkness, ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry’ (U, 15. 
4244-5).  While Stephen loses his sobriety and poise, he also ‘abandon[s] his 
ashplant’ (U, 15.4255); it is Bloom who picks up the stick: Bloom says to Stephen, 
‘Come along with me now before worse happens. Here is your stick’, while Stephen 
replies ‘Stick, no. Reason. This feast of pure reason’ (U, 15.4732-5).  This can be 
interpreted as Bloom taking over the ashplant and the symbolic power with which is 
metaphorically endowed.  However, Joyce bestows on Bloom’s action with a 
symbolic meaning other than Stephen’s celebration of the power of pure reason.   
This mundane incident in a red-light district is mainly depicted in realistic mode 
in the form of dialogue and action.  In this realistic portrayal, clichéd lines are 
repeated by the characters, which immediately give rise to hallucinatory voices and 
imaginary, and more extended fantasies.  These fantasmatic digressions are 
generated metonymically, echoing an incident in reality, reflecting less the 
singularised or individualised desires than fantasies originating from the collective 
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Unconscious that, I argue, underlies the words and actions of the characters.  For 
instance, when Private Carr intends to provoke conflics and find excuses to insult, 
arrest, or attack Stephen by saying ‘(to Cissy) Was he insulting you while me and him 
was having a piss?’ (U, 15.4394), the image and voice of Lord Tennyson appear 
abruptly: ‘(gentleman poet in Union Jack blazer and cricket flannels, bareheaded, 
flowingbeared) Theirs not to reason why’ (U, 15.4396-7).  The line is from 
Tennyson’s ‘The Charge of the Light Brigade.’  The image of Tennyson is an absurd 
mixture or pastiche of Britishness, and his lines show the underlying code of British 
soldiers, who are the building block of violent Imperialism.  At other occasions, the 
image and voice of Edward VII (U, 15.4449-65) appear immediately after Private 
Carr remarks, ‘What’s that you are saying about my king?’ (U, 15.4448).  Edward 
VII is conjured up to witness the impending conflict between Stephen and the soldiers, 
remarking or chanting lines parodying a popular hymn: 
(slowly, solemnly but indistinctly) peace, perfect peace. For identification, bucket in 
my hand, Cheerio, boys. (he turns to his subjects.) We have come here to witness a 
clean straight fight and we heartily wish both men the best of good luck. Mahak 
makar a bak. (he shakes hands with Private Carr, Private Campton, Stephen, Bloom 
and Lynch). (U, 15. 4459-63) 
This appearance of Edward VII, of course, serves to indicate the imperial power that 
frames the entire episode of colonial violence; the line ‘peace, perfect peace’ derives 
from the title of a popular hymn composed by an English Bishop and poet513 and 
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certainly functions as a scathing critique of the British hypocrisy for the fight, which 
is anything but ‘a clean straight fight.’     
It has been one of the hallmark features in Joyce’s writings that clichéd lines are 
frequently evoked from the storage of language and culture as if our everyday usage 
of language is necessarily contaminated or corrupted by clichés and stereotypes.  
These clichés are not evoked voluntarily but intrude into dialogues and narratives, 
betraying the fact that the human subject is spoken by language.  There is something 
in language that exceeds the speakers’ conscious control and can be said to dictate the 
speakers.  Like parasites, language and culture live on human subjects, seep the 
vitality, imagination, and autonomy of human subjects.  Stereotyped images and 
clichés are not merely summoned in this context to give expression to what frames the 
violent colonialism and what underlies the code of imperial violence.  They are also 
conjectured by protagonists such as Bloom and Stephen in confrontation with the 
violence.  For instance, Stephen says to Private Carr, 
I understand your point of view though I have no king myself for the moment. This 
is the age of patent medicines. A discussion is difficult here. But this is the point. 
You die for your country. Suppose. (he places his arm on Private Carr’s sleeve) Not 
that I wish it for you. But I say: Let my country die for me. Up to the present it has 
done so. I didn’t want it to die. Damn death. Long live life. (U, 15.4469-75) 
There is apparently a thesis lying behind Stephen’s remarks.  The line, ‘[l]et my 
country die for me’ can be interpreted as another instance of Stephen’s declaration of 
independence from symbolic authority, a manifesto of his famous ‘Non Serviam’ (U, 
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15.4228).  Stephen’s weapon in the face of injustice is his cunning, his rhetorical 
power, and his witticism, which actually builds on the inversion of clichés.   
Another example can be found in Bloom’s appeal to the prostitute Cissy Caffrey 
to intercede and end the conflict between Stephen and the soldiers: Bloom says to her, 
‘Speak you! Are you struck dumb? You are the link between nations and generations. 
Speak, woman, sacred lifegiver!’ (U, 15.4647-9).  It is as if, in the midst of farce, 
chaos, male follies, and colonial violence, the only symbolic means that Bloom can 
employ is the evocation of a proverb-like clichéd utterance such as woman as ‘sacred 
lifegiver.’  Neither Stephen’s witticism nor Bloom’s references to idiomatic phrases 
help at all in the confrontation of colonial violence and everyday conflicts.  These 
clichés mark not so much the symbolic efficacy stored in culture and language but the 
impotence of words and ‘ancient wisdom’ in culture in the face of real-life drama and 
political violence in the mundane world.  In ‘Circe,’ what eventually and eventally 
takes effect to change the situation is the ethical intervention of neighbour love.     
In conclusion, ‘Circe’ does not end with masochism but with a working through 
by way of masochism and other perverse fantasies and practices.  I have read ‘Circe’ 
as a literary rendition, not of a traversal of the fundamental fantasy as in the case of 
neuroses but as a remarkable dramatisation of one’s own masochistic scenarios and a 
processing of masochism in order to open for sinthomatic re-formulations.  This is 
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an episode in which countless references to past episodes are recalled and reworked; it 
is an examination of memories, a reworking of the past, to face up unclarified debts of 
guilt, suffering and oppression.  It is a moment of working through fixed, reified 
sinthome in the direction of opening the possibility of reworking, reknotting, and 
restructuring.  Without the subscription to the traditional master signifiers, the 
sinthome is supposed to be individuated and singularised.  However, the sinthome 
itself risks reifying or solidifying into a stagnant entity or a strict form of drive 
formations, which might imprison the subject in draining configurations of psychic 
life.  Under such circumstances, is there still room for a subject to transcend and to 
renew his/her own sinthome, to assert freedom by applying a truly ethical act, to 
rupture the co-ordinates of life for innovation of a new neighbourhood, a new 
intersubjective relationship?  Does Joyce simply indulge himself in incessant 
(re)knotting of his own sinthomatic undertaking through his writing or does he insert 
inside it a semblance of hope for self–revolutionising, for subverting one’s own 
sinthome, a possibility for a real structural breakthrough of one’s sinthome?  My 
answer is positive.  The individualised/individuated master signifiers and the 
concomitant sinthome are still in need of the possibility for re-invention.  Epitomised 
in the example of Bloom, Joyce works out a textual subjectivity that is able to enact a 
breakthrough of one’s sinthome and engage in neighbour love and the restructuration 
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of intersubjective relationship ensuing the evental breakthrough.  Bloom not only 
comes to take responsibility for his peculiar drive formation at the most fundamental 
level but also triumphs to take responsibility for his neighbour in his rescue of 
Stephen.  Miracles really happen in the very manifestation of love.  
By examining the logic underlying the structure of perversion from a Lacanian 
perspective, the line of argument that puts emphasis on the celebration of 
transgression and the so-called perverse ideals is too ready to sacrifice subjectivity 
rather than an endorsement of the subject, although these perverse practices are 
claimed to defy and transgress the tyranny of norms in the experiments and 
proliferations of perverse ideals.  This line of criticism bypasses the entire scenario 
of working through, the subject’s recognition of the non-existence of the Other, and 
the subject’s ethical decision to take responsibility for his/her own enjoyment.  
Phrased otherwise, it actually bypasses subjectivity and the ethical dimension.  In 
this light, there is nothing ‘ethical’ in the perverse ideals, for, strictly speaking, that 
which is ethical, ultimately, is an evental act that opens a new possibility of 
possibilities, genuinely opening to the Real of the Other.  In the case of neighbour 
love, the ethical conduct of loving one’s neighbour restructures the relationship with 
the Other, opening a new neighbourhood.  While the perverse subject is busy with all 
the perverse ideals in manufacturing different forms of his/her own or his/her victims’ 
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creaturely being, the genuine ethical question to be raised is ‘why would you have to 
enjoy in this way again and again?’   My stance in this chapter has made it clear that 
one should not be too ready to accept a practice that simply encourages losing oneself 
in the fun house by reducing to a creaturely existence, be it a symptomatic or 
sinthomatic construction.  
In the process of performing the sinthome, as in the case of cuckoldry in the 
masochist fantasmatic scenario, Bloom comes to realise his own involvement in 
manufacturing and sustaining such a melodrama in his mind and in his real life, to 
acknowledge his own libidinal investment as a victim and betrayed husband, as 
oppressed and dispossessed.  In other words, the ethical potential in masochism 
resides in Bloom’s recognition of his contribution to his own sufferings as a way of 
organising enjoyment, his responsibility in the whole lot, the whole game, his 
sinthome and his wife’s adultery.  Would there be any difference if he were to take 
another action or attitude in the face of the impending adultery, or if he were to handle 
the relationship with Molly differently after the death of Rudy rather than indulging in 
the wounded doubt?  The compulsive characteristic in the sinthomatic practices is 
squarely observable, as in the cases of the neurotic symptoms and the perverse 
practices, which themselves equally cry out for re-invention.   
Before ending this chapter, I would like to dwell for a moment on the two ethical 
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moments in ‘Circe,’ and attempt to articulate the possible connection between (1) the 
ethical working through of masochism and (2) the true messianism manifested in 
neighbour love as an ethical act/breakthrough and a Badiouian Truth-Event.  As 
indicated above, this working through of masochism designates the necessary step 
prior to a miraculous ethical breakthrough.  In the context of commenting on Žižek’s 
tendency ‘to equivocate between the Lacanian act and the Badiouian event,’ Johnston 
points out one crucial incompatibility between the former and the latter.  Johnston 
argues that, at certain moments, Lacan acknowledges that ‘an act can be thought only 
after the (f)act,’ while on other occasions he appears to ‘problematize the very 
possibility of even an après-coup subjection of the act,’ suggesting that ‘such deeds 
cannot retroactively be recognized and comprehended by the subject created or 
changed by these same gestures.’514  That is to say, the entire fantasy enactment and 
working through may be unconscious and leaves no traces of memory on the part of 
the subject who has undergone such an act.  The drastic effect of transformation and 
the ensuing systematic reworking and symbolic restructuration may be so radical that 
the traversing/founding act itself, albeit indispensable and necessary in itself, becomes 
unrecognisable for the emergent subject and the new world.  In contrast to this 
conception of the Lacanian act, Badiou emphasises that ‘an event subsequently gives 
                                                     
514 Johnston, Transformation, p. 148. The resources of Johnston’s argument come from Lacan’s 
unpublished Seminar XIV (6/7/1967), (2/15/1967).  
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rise to a subject retroactively recognizing it and being able faithfully to elaborate the 
event’s truth consequences.’515  In Badiou’s theorisation, the subject is convoked by 
the evental happening and embarks on the truth process through his/her own fidelity 
to the event.  In other words, Badiou’s subject and truth are always post-evental and 
his account fails to take into consideration what Žižek calls ‘an event which succeeds 
through the self-erasure of its evental dimension.’516  The status of the fantasies 
portrayed in ‘Circe’ is unclear, whether they are conscious or unconscious, partially 
unconscious or not, individuated or intermingled with collective cultural unconscious 
of its time, or whether they belong to a specific character or the larger textual subject.  
Anyhow, it is arguable that, to a large extent, the acting out and working through of 
fantasies as unconscious discourses themselves is beyond the self-awareness of the 
subject and its happening comes under erasure after the event (of working through) as 
well.  However, it remains a crucial and indispensable act/event for the future 
happening/act/event.  The ethical effect of this indispensable act/event is to be 
detected in the subsequent transformation of intersubjective relationship and 
restructuration of neighbourhood.  
Scholars have tried to translate the Lacanian feminine logic of not-all into ethical 
responsibility to explicate the capacity of an ethical act to transform subjectivity and 
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intersubjective relationships in terms of set theory (N, 129).  As Santner puts it, 
‘there is no direct path from legal subjection to “not all”; “not all” only opens up 
through a traversal of the fantasy of exception, which in its turn sustains the force of 
the figure of legal subjection.  To put it differently, “not-all” is what you get with the 
traversal of fantasy.’ 517   The conception of a new being-togetherness, a new 
neighbourhood by virtue of Badiou’s conception of the generic open set built entirely 
upon the event of neighbour love and the persistent work of love, follows precisely 
the logic of not-all as a consequence of the traversal of fantasy, of the working 
through of various masochistic and pseudo-messianic fantasies in the specific case of 
‘Circe.’   
Reinhard enlists Badiou’s conception of a new neighbourhood to devise the 
imagination for the consequence of what he terms as the political theology of the 
neighbour (N, 62-7).  He hopes to derive the political consequences from Badiou’s 
conception of the generic set, ‘which is included in a situation without belonging to it, 
without being proper to it, or presented in it; that is, without being discernible in terms 
of the situation’(N, 62-3).  However, for Badiou, a truth process elaborates precisely 
on a generic set, which ‘although invisible and insignificant from the perspective of 
the situation, remain faithful to the event and testify to its truth’ (N, 63).  The 
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ethico-political consequence entailed is that neighbourhood as generic set may be 
established by way of fidelity to the event of neighbour love as ‘an infinite set of 
possibilities of social inclusion and association distinct from the principles of 
representation, equality, and totality, that determine the conceptual closure of the 
political theology of the sovereign’ (N, 63).  In a lecture, Badiou also calls for an 
idea of neighbourhood as an open set, which, by definition, means ‘there is no 
difference between it and what is interior to it’ (N,66).  Hence, a neighbourhood as 
an open set designates ‘a place, subset, or elements where there is no boundary, no 
difference between the inside of the thing and thing itself’ (N, 66).  Hence, in 
neighbourhood, there are no limits set up by exception nor by defining features; it is 
nothing but an open set of infinity sustained by a ‘decision,’ by an ethical act of love, 
‘that requires fidelity and work to remain open’ (N, 67).  This conception of 
neighbourhood as an open, generic set follows the feminine logic of not-all for the 
universality of love takes work to love one by one, not by the masculine logic of 
exception in which to love all (totality) operates by means of exclusion (some).  
Santner and Žižek echo this insight when they pronounce that the true ethical formula 
for love should be expressed in the double negation in the feminine formula of 
sexuation: ‘there is nothing for which I am not responsible’ as the counterpart of ‘I am 
not responsible for All’; ‘there is nobody I do not love’, in contrast to the masculine 
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conception of ‘I love you all’ on the basis that ‘I really hate some’ (N, 130, 183).  It 
is precisely for this reason that a single manifestation of love bears the capacity to 
transform both subjectivity and intersubjectivity and it must take incessant works of 
love to sustain, reinvent, and rework the new neighbourhood constructed through the 
event/act of love.  In a novel like Ulysses, which does not contain such spectacular 
actions and heroic adventures on a grand scale as its Homeric counterpart, the act of 
neighbour love does carry significant ethical weight because it changes the libidinal 
economy of the subject of the ethical act as well as the intersubjective relationship.  
In other words, the (non-)relationship between Bloom and Stephen is broken through 
and there is opportunity for a new neighbourhood in which alternative intersubjective 
relation can unfold.  How successful would the ensuing intersubjective relationship 
within the new neighbourhood be?  That is another question which requires further 
critical evaluation.                                                                             
Bloom’s act of neighbour love in coming to Stephen’s rescue marks a breach of 
his pain-afflicting and enjoyment-loaded fantasmatic fabric, where he has dwelled 
long, undeniably signalling a breakthrough of his own sinthome, which he has 
invented, inhabited and for which he has therefore been completely responsible.  
Such a breakthrough arguably facilitates subjective transformation and intersubjective 
re-organisation as exemplified in Bloom’s returning home with the slight yet 
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significant adjustment of asking Molly to prepare breakfast and the possibility for 
Bloom and Stephen’s dialogues in ‘Eumaeus’ and ‘Ithaca.’  In this regard, love in the 
form of Bloom’s neighbour love toward Stephen does assume the ethical status of an 
act, a constructive negativity for breaking through the status quo.  Bloom’s deeds 
assume a ‘no and but’ structure, which is paradigmatic of a Truth/Event in Badiou’s 
interpretation of Pauline love.  It is arguably a ‘no’ to the past sinthome and a ‘yes’ to 
a new intersubjective structuration.  Love assumes an ethical status, functioning as a 
turning point, a moment of breakthrough.  Love as an ethical act supplies momentum 
for a life-altering, structure-transforming movement, changing the relationship 
between the subject and the Other, inaugurating a new subject, and revolutionising the 
Other as well by gesturing to a new singular universal, a new formation of 
neighbourhood.   
As David Trotter accurately puts it, ‘[after Circe] the question we ask of Leopold, 
Molly and Stephen is not “Who are they finally?” but “What they might yet do for 
each other, in each other’s lives?”’518  Although, in ‘Eumaeus’ and ‘Ithaca,’ the void 
is keenly felt at the attempt of a new symbolic construction, and the impossibilities or 
failures of a sustainable relationship between Stephen and Bloom as father/son or of 
another nature yet to be invented.  The impossibilities or failures themselves also 
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Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), p. 93-4. 
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signal an on-going experimentation of a new possibility of being together, of a new 
neighbourhood in the Badiouian sense of an open, generic set as a manifestation and 
product demanding fidelity and works of love as a truth process.   
To conclude, this work of love can be interpreted as a realisation of messianism 
by virtue of Benjaminian conception of dialectic at standstill.  As Benjamin writes in 
the famous passage, 
it is not what is past casts light on what is present, or what is present its light on 
what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash 
with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectic at standstill. 
For while the relation of the present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of 
what has been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but imagistic. Only 
dialectical images are genuinely historical—that is, not archaic—images. The image 
that is read—which is to say, the image in the now of its recognisability—bears to 
the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is 
founded.519 
At the end of ‘Cyclops,’ Bloom is besieged by xenophobic violence while at the same 
time hilariously imputed as ‘ben Bloom Elijah’ (U, 15.1916).  In response to this 
missed opportunity for his fellow Dubliners to enact their neighbour love on himself, 
Bloom recognises the opportune occasion for his ethical act toward Stephen.  The 
continuity of historical linearity is interceded and the messianic time of now becomes 
possible precisely by this kind of recognisability for ethical responsibility and 
revolutionary intervention, which will consequently suspend the law/sin dialectic, 
transforming the subject undergoing the act, fissuring and restructuring the 
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co-ordinates of the status quo as well.    
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Chapter Five 
      
The Problematic Countersign: On Love and Sinthomatic Eroticism in ‘Penelope’ 
                    
           
                       ‘To know what your partner will do is not a proof of love.’  
~Jacques Lacan, Encore, p. 146 
                  ‘What makes up for the sexual relationship is, quite precisely, love.’       
         ~Jacques Lacan, Encore, p. 45  
 
I.                    
It is a commonplace in Joyce criticism that Joyce intends the final chapter of 
Ulysses to be ‘the indispensable countersign to Bloom's passport to eternity’ (LI, 160).  
This chapter purports an ethical evaluation of Joyce’s famous, or notorious, rendition 
of the problematic countersign by his modern Penelope, Molly Bloom.  It conducts a 
critical reading of Molly’s soliloquy by situating the episode in the ethical problematic 
cast through the prism of Lacan’s theorisation of sinthome, sexuality, and love in the 
later period of his career.  I take the case of Joyce’s rendition of this female 
countersign to be an opportunity not merely to show the ethical efficacy and limits of 
Joyce but also to investigate the theoretical issues inherent in Lacan’s conception of 
love, ethics, and sinthome.  Seen through a Lacanian lens, if we accept the aphorism 
of ‘there is no such thing as a sexual relationship’ (Il n’y pas de rapport sexuel), a 
theoretical issue that immediately follows would be this: what ethical consequences 
can be drawn from the non-existence of a sexual relationship?  In the meantime, 
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given that Lacan’s ontology of sexual difference is a world of distance from the 
premodern cosmology of the complementary masculine and feminine principles, a 
critical question thus emerges.  Why does Joyce find it necessary to construct a 
female ‘clou’ as a countersign to Bloom’s passage to eternity? 520   If Molly’s 
extended soliloquy does not contribute to the further development of plot in Ulysses, 
what makes Joyce deem this final construction or appropriation of the female voice to 
be indispensable?  I propose that, with the assertion of the non-existence of a sexual 
relationship, the ethics of the Real can be pursued in terms of an ethics of the 
sinthomatic eroticism and in the direction of love.  
As the title of the chapter indicates, I consider the status of ‘Penelope’ to be 
ethically problematic.  The problematic status of the countersign is to be explored 
firstly by way of an ethical evaluation of the sinthome as a (singularised) sexual 
relation and an investigation of Joyce’s belief in his sinthome.  Secondly, my ethical 
reading will be made from the perspective of the tension between, what I term, the 
sinthomatic eroticism and love as it is manifested in theory and in the specific text of 
‘Penelope.’  
 
 
                                                     
520 It is well known that in a letter to Frank Budgen dated 16 August, 1921, Joyce made clear that 
‘Ithaca’ ended the book, and that ‘Penelope’, with no beginning, middle or end, was the coda, while 
Molly was the ‘clou’ of the book (LI, 170). 
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II. 
 
Figure 4 
As extensively elaborated in Chapter One, Lacan’s maxim of the non-existence 
of a sexual relation can be explored in various ways.  To recall memory and facilitate 
the ensuing discussion, I offer a brief summary as follows, which might itself risk 
oversimplification owing to the limited space available to me at this juncture.  To put 
it succinctly, it can mean at least the disjunction between a man and a woman with 
regard to the Real of sexual difference, with regard to the structural void as the upper 
part of the chart of sexuation indicates (XX, 78, Figure 4).  It also designates the 
disparate ways of approaching and organising jouissance between those who take the 
feminine and masculine positions as the below part of the formula of sexuation shows 
(XX, 78, Figure 4).  The masculine logic is deployed through the dialectic between 
totality and exception.  That there exists at least one figure that is not subjected to 
the phallic function sets the limit of completeness, constituting a universe, a totality of 
a set of men who are subjected to the phallic function.  On the side of the feminine 
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logic, that there is no figure existent without submitting to the phallic function lifts the 
boundary setting and renders the set of women not-all, pointing to the direction of 
infinity.  The lower part of the formula of sexuation (Figure 4) deals with the 
masculine and feminine subjects’ relation to the Other, showing how he or she desires 
differently and organises his/her jouissance respectively.  While those who suppose 
the masculine position are related to the Other via objet a through the formula of 
fantasy $<> a, the feminine subjects are ‘twice’ coupled through the Other via the 
phallus and ‘tripled’ via S(the barred A), the signifier of the lack of the Other.521  To 
put it otherwise, ‘the feminine subject’s “other” relation to the Other correlates with a 
jouissance “beyond” the phallus, a jouissance that belongs to that part of the Other 
that is not covered by the fantasy of the “One”—that is, the fantasy sustained by the 
positing of the phallic exception.’522     
I will pursue Joyce’s writing of sinthomatic eroticism in the direction of Lacan’s 
further reflection on the non-existence of the sexual relation, which is encapsulated in 
another of Lacan’s famous proverb, namely, ‘There is such a thing as One (Y a 
d’l’UN)’ (Lacan, 5).  As Fink and Žižek point out, Y a d’l’UN and il n’y a pas de 
rapport sexuel must be juxtaposed.523  Harari interprets Lacan’s formulation of ‘there 
                                                     
521 Bernard, p. 172. 
522 Ibid., p. 172. 
523 Fink’s note 19 in his translation of Seminar XX, p. 5. Žižek’s explanation appears in Less Than 
Nothing, p. 57. 
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is One’ as ‘an intransitive psychical constellation,’ which means that ‘the One is all 
alone,’ not in the sense that it would be ‘a subjective or empirical solitude’, but ‘One 
as a psychical formation broken off from the Other.’524  Moreover, ‘One’ does not 
signal some ‘mythical encompassing One,’ but the One as ‘a “sinthome,” a kind of 
“atom of enjoyment,” the minimal synthesis of language and enjoyment, a unit of 
signs permeated with enjoyment (like a tic we compulsively repeat)’ (LN, 58).     
In alignment with the aphorism, ‘there is no sexual relation’ (il n’y a pas de  
rapport sexuel), in Seminar XXIII, Lacan continues to hold firmly that there is no 
equivalence between a man and a woman with regard to his/her partner-sinthome 
owing to the structural asymmetry between the positions of woman and man and the 
imbalance between two sexes with regard to the libidinal mechanism mediated by the 
phallic signifiers and intercepted by the mechanism of fantasy.  However, this 
imbalance needs to be recast in Lacan’s new conception of the sexual relation through 
the conceptualization of sinthome.  A key passage in Seminar XXIII deserves full 
quotation and careful unpacking, for I consider it to lay the ground for what I have 
termed as the sinthomatic eroticism: 
It is in the measure that there is a sinthome that there is no sexual equivalence, 
namely, that there is a relationship. In fact, if the non-relationship stems from 
equivalence, it is in the measure that there is no equivalence that the relationship is 
structured. There is then at once sexual relationship and non-relationship. Insofar as 
there is sinthome, there is relationship. That is to say, it is from the sinthome that the 
                                                     
524 Harari, pp. 224-5. 
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other sex is supported […] If a woman is sinthome for every man, it is quite clear 
that there is a need to find another name for what is involved in the case of a man 
for a woman; since iprecisely the sinthome is characterized by non-equivalence. One 
may say that man is for a woman anything you please-- an affliction, worse than a 
sinthome. You may well articulate it as you please, a devastation even. But, if there 
is no equivalence, you are forced to specify what is involved in the sinthome. (XXIII, 
101, my emphasis)525 
The basic tenets of Lacan’s position at this moment can be interpreted as follows.  
First, there is sexual relation only if there is sinthome, and the sinthome creates not 
merely a new subject but also the Other sex.  It has been a fundamental thesis of 
Lacan’s return to Freud that Lacan rewrites the Oedipal scenario with the functioning 
of the Name of the Father as a paternal metaphor.  The Name of the Father 
designates the Desire of the Mother.  Metaphorisation is necessarily involved with 
substitution, allowing ‘the emergence […] of the signified for the subject,’ indicating 
a ‘creation of meaning.’526  In Lacan’s opinion, Joyce has disinvested from the 
Unconscious, which means that he can dispense with the Name of the Father on 
condition that he knows how to invent his own.  Harari interprets this insight as an 
                                                     
525 The original French text goes as follows: ‘Dans la mesure où il y a sinthome, il n’y pas équivalence 
sexuelle, c’est-à-dire il y rapport. En effet, si le non-rapport relève de l’équivalence, c’est dans la 
mesure où il n’y a pas équivalence que se structure le rapport. Il y a donc à la fois rapport sexuel et il 
n’y a pas rapport. Là où il y rapport, c’est dans la mesure où il y a sinthome, c’est- à-dire où l’autre sexe 
est supporté du sinthome […] Si une femme est un sinthome pour tout homme, il est tout à fait clair 
qu’il y a besoin de trouver un autre nom pour ce qu’il en est de l’homme pour une femme, puisque le 
sinthome se caractérise justement de la non-équivalence. On peut dire que l’homme est pour une 
femme tout ce qui vous plaira, à savoir une affliction pire qu’un sinthome. Vous pouvez bien l’articuler 
comme il vous convient. C’est un ravage, même. S’il n’y a pas d’ équivalence, vous êtes forcés de 
spécifier ce qu’il en est du sinthome.’  I follow Cormac Gallagher’s translation with slight 
modification. 
526 Harari, p. 239-40.  It is well known that Lacan gives a pseudo-mathematical formulation of 
metaphorisation as follows: NF/DM X DM/XNF/Signified to Subject.  NF stands for the Name of the 
Father; DM stands for the Desire of the Mother.  Once as numerator and once as denominator, the 
Desire of the Mother is reduced and hence leads to the Name of the Father’s capability to provoke a 
certain X as the signified.  This is one of the basic linguistic operations whereby meaning is produced 
thorough metaphorisation/substitution.   
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invention of an ‘unconditioned’ Name of the Father through the mechanism of 
suppletion.  It is a Name of the Father ‘unconditioned’ by the Desire of the 
Mother.527  I take it to mean that the Name of the Father is dislodged from the 
attempt for a substitution of the Desire of the Mother.  Instead, the newly invented 
names are designed to name the void and nothing more, which is the establishment of 
the fourth ring as a suppletion to bind together the three registers of the Real, the 
Symbolic, and the Imaginary in Lacan’s later topological thinking.  What Lacan 
finds in Joyce’s suppletion through the sinthome is a dislodging of the normative and 
nominative function of the Name of the Father.528  As Lacan summarises this point 
succinctly, ‘[t]he father—as a name and he who names—is not the same thing.  The 
father is that fourth element […] without which nothing is possible in the knot of the 
symbolic, the imaginery and the real’ (XXIII, 167).529  In this light, without the 
support of the traditional regulation of sexual difference mediated by the authority of 
the Name of the Father, how would the non-rapport of sexual relation be (re)instituted 
or negotiated privately by the involved parties?  This is precisely Joyce’s question, 
which he answers by his sinthome, exploring his existential and ethical questions by 
his experiment and construction with the woman in his life.  Together with this 
                                                     
527 Ibid., p. 239. 
528 Ibid., p. 237.  
529 The French text is as follows: Le père comme nom et comme celui qui nomme, ce n’est pas pareil. 
Le père est cet élément quart […] cet élément quart sans lequel rien n’est possible dans le nœud du 
symbolique, de l’imaginaire et du réel.’  
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experiment is his investigation and representation of manhood, femininity, women’s 
images, women’s sexuality, and so on.  This is why, although ‘Penelope’ does not 
contribute further to the development of plot, it is indispensable for the 
inter-sinthomatic eroticism under construction in Ulysses. 
To put it more precisely, in Verhaeghe and Declercq’s terms, sinthome has 
‘creative effects’: ‘the jouissance of one’s own drives creates the “Other gender.”’530  
In my opinion, this conceptualisation of partner-sinthome, or sinthomic-partner, marks 
out both the ethical merit and limit of sinthome.  The self-invented sinthome 
deserves the credit for maintaining the recognition of the non-existence of the Other 
and for authoring one’s own sexual rapport by way of the creative savoir-faire of 
one’s jouissance.  Verhaeghe and Declercq explain this point as follows: ‘this [sexual] 
Other is a fiction, but it is a fiction that does not turn the subject into a dupe because 
he has created by himself, based on his particular way of jouissance, [in which] a 
particular signifier […] knots the three registers of the Real, the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary into a particular sexual rapport.’531   
However, assessed from the viewpoint of intersubjectivity, this could also signify 
that ‘there is both sexual relation and non-relation.’532  The question or paradox of 
the potential non-relation or ‘non-reciprocity’ in the newly conceptualised sinthome as 
                                                     
530 Verhaeghe and Declercq, p. 74.  
531 Ibid., p. 74. 
532 Harari, p. 207. 
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sexual rapport calls for further elucidation, to which I will return later.  For the time 
being, the non-reciprocity can be understood to be directly derived from the sexual 
non-equivalence.  The lack of equivalence of sexual positions necessarily entails the 
lack of interchangeability between a man and a woman with respect to the sinthomatic 
sexual relation.  Although Lacan is comfortable in asserting that, for every man, his 
woman can function as his sinthome, the asymmetry of sexual positions and libidinal 
organisation as outlined in the formula of sexuation leads Lacan to coin feminine 
jouissance in different terms such as ‘ravage’ or ‘devastation’ rather than her man as 
her sinthome.533  Nevertheless, as Harari traces the development of Lacan’s thinking, 
it is evident that Lacan soon altered his position.  While presenting a talk on July 9, 
1978, Lacan demonstrates a clear discrepancy: ‘So much so that I consider you all out 
there, insofar as you are, you have every Jack as sinthome his Jill. There is a 
he-sinthome and a she-sinthome.’534  On the basis of the structural non-existence of   
a sexual relation or the sexual non-relation, Lacan has proposed in the final stage of 
his career that sinthome is all that is left for sexual rapport.  Moreover, this ‘repaired’ 
sexual relation should be ‘an intersinthomic relation;’ ‘in other words, each individual 
supports the “remaining,” bound sexual relation in accordance with one’s sinthomic 
                                                     
533 Ibid., p. 207. 
534 Qtd in Harari, p. 209. 
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incarnates.’535  
Upon closer scrutiny, I would like to emphasise here, there is ambiguity in the 
above-mentioned ‘intersinthomic’ sexual relations.  On the most optimistic level, the 
intersinthomic sexual relation can signify that there is a corroboration of sinthomatic 
working between joint parties and hence an intersinthomatic relation points to the 
direction of an intersubjective relation at work, which is an operation deemed as a 
recognition of the subjectivity of the Other.  However, it can also mean that despite 
the he-sinthome and the she-sinthome being equally feasible, the involved parties may 
indulge in constructing his/her own sinthome, living in/as his/her own sinthome in 
their intersinthomic sexual relations without truly recognising the subjectivity and 
ontology of the Other.  In the following analysis of Joyce’s case, an ethical 
evaluation of Joyce’s particular sinthome will necessarily lead to an examination of 
whether or not sinthome allows room for the subjectivity of the Other.   
 
 
III. 
That we are able to evaluate Joyce’s sinthomatic eroticism as a sexual relation 
through Ulysses is precisely because, as an artificer of his jouissance, his writing and 
                                                     
535 Ibid., p. 209. 
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sinthome-making are intrinsically connected.  To grasp this insight properly, the 
writing of sexual relation in/by Joyce must be read in parallel to Joyce’s writing as his 
sinthome.  As I argued in the chapter on ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ Joyce’s construction 
of sinthome through writing does not follow the reflection/imitation model between 
life and work.  Hence, the conflation between Joyce, real-life persons and main 
characters in Lacan’s theorisation, which easily arouses qualms among critics, should 
not be taken as an expression of naïve intentional fallacy.  Instead, as Lacan himself 
claims, he does not approach Joyce’s work as a literary critic, but as a psychoanalyst, 
to see how at certain moments his literary endeavour corroborates his existential 
writing of sinthome.536  Looking awry at the relationship between life and work, it is 
arguable that Lacan unwittingly provides a new theory for literature, while devising 
an innovation in psychoanalytic theorisation on sinthome and the pluralisation of the 
Name(s) of the Father.  My Lacanian reading is still a literary critical effort and 
certainly does not try to psychoanalyse Joyce through the text of Ulysses but to 
observe and explore ‘Penelope’ as part of his sinthomatic work and to evaluate the 
ethical limit and consequences from such a sinthomatic elaboration.  In a similar 
vein, Parveen Adams points out that Joyce does not relate to Nora in the Encore 
model.  That is, Joyce does not approach Nora in terms of fantasy by putting her in 
                                                     
536 Lacan says, ‘Je ne suis pas un universitaire, contrairement à ce qu’on me donne du professeur, du 
maître, et autres badinages. Je suis un analyste’ (XXIII, 163). 
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the position of object a.537  Instead, Joyce ‘repeats the problem in the real of his 
writing,’ ‘relat[ing] to Nora through his écriture,’ ‘lov[ing] Nora with his 
sinthome.’538  Lacan himself draws attention to the peculiar intimate relationship 
displayed in the Nora letters.  Lacan marvels at the relationship between Joyce and 
Nora and names it ‘singular’ or ‘curious’: 
The love letters of Nora, what do they indicate? […] what is this relationship to 
Nora? Curious [singular] thing, I will say that it is a sexual relationship; even 
though I say that there are none such. But it is a funny sexual relationship […] the 
fact is that the gloves that are at stake are not completely innocent; the inside-out 
glove is Nora. This is his way of considering that she fits him like a glove […] For 
Joyce, there is only one woman. She is always based on the same model and he only 
puts her on like a glove with the most reluctance. It is only, this is tangible, by the 
greatest disparagement that he makes Nora into a chosen womn. Not alone must she 
fit him like a glove but she must squeeze him like a glove. She is absolutely useless. 
It even gets to the point that […] every time a kid is born […] it creates a drama, 
[because] it was not foreseen in the programme. (XXIII, 83-4)539 
Nora is claimed by Lacan to be useless; nevertheless she sustains an essential function 
in Joyce’s construction of a curious, singular sexual relation with her.  Adams 
interprets this enigmatic utterance by Lacan, remarking that Nora has the function of 
                                                     
537 Parveen Adams, ‘The Sexual Relation in James Joyce and in Cronenberg’s Crash’, Psychoanalytic 
Notebooks, 13(2005), 131-45 at p. 137. 
538 Ibid., p. 139-40. 
539 The original text goes as follows: ‘Les lettres d’amour à Nora, que nons indiquent-elles? […] 
Qu’est-ce que c’est donc que ce rapport de Joyce à Nora ? Chose singulière, je dirai que c’est un 
rapport sexuel, encore que je dise qu’il n’y en ait pas. Mais c’est un drôle de rapport sexuel […] les 
gants dont il s’agit ne sont pas complètement innocents. Le gant retourné, c’est Nora. C’est sa façon à 
lui de considérer qu’elle lui va comme un gant […] Pour Joyce, il n’y a qu’une femme. Elle est toujours 
sur le même modèle, et il ne ‘s’en gante qu’avec la plus vive des répugnances. Il est sensible que ce 
n’est que par la plus grande des dépréciations qu’il fait de Nora une femme élue. Non seulement il 
faut qu’elle lui aille comme un gant, mais il faut qu’elle le serra comme un gant. Elle ne sert 
absolument à rien. C’est tout à fait net dans leurs relations, au point que […] chaque fois que se 
raboule une gosse […] ça fait une drame, c’était pas prévu dans le programme.’  I follow Cormac 
Gallagher’s translation with slight modification. 
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‘binding the other three rings together, pointing out that Nora “kept him together.”’540 
However, that Nora is Joyce’s sinthome does not mean that ‘because he has Nora that 
there is the ring of sinthome;’ ‘rather it is the other way round;’ ‘[i]t is through his 
écriture that he can have Nora.’541  In this regard, Joyce does not endow his relation 
with Nora with the sinthome as predicate; instead, the sinthomatic eroticism is his 
writing of the sexual relation.  As Adams puts it, ‘Nora is the fourth ring of sinthome 
that ties the other three rings together and thus that Nora “kept him together.”’542  
The soliloquy of ‘Penelope’ bears remarkable resemblances to Nora’s style of letter 
writing.543  Brenda Maddox, in her Nora: The Real Life of Molly Bloom, carefully 
examines the similarities and discrepancies between the fictional character and the 
real-life figure.544  That the parallel or correlation between the textual analysis and 
biographical facts has long drawn strong interest in Joyce scholarship seems to prove 
that Lacan’s insight into the intricate relationship between literary writing and 
ontological construction stands soundly. 
In her comments on Joyce’s ‘performativity’ derived from the Nora letters, Van 
                                                     
540 Adams, p. 140. 
541 Ibid., p. 140. 
542 Ibid., p. 140. 
543 Ibid., p. 140. 
544 As Maddox points out, Joyce never said that Nora is Molly Bloom, and the birthplace and physical 
figures are not quite the same between Nora and Molly.  Joyce also derives the features of Molly 
from other females in his life.  For instance, the dark hair comes from Amalia Popper, his Triestine 
pupil and the famous ‘Yes’ is derived from Nora’s friend Lilian Wallace.  In the meantime, Nora is 
present in female characters other than Molly, such as Bella Cohen, Anna Livia Plurabelle, and so on. 
Nora: The Real Life of Molly Bloom (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), p. 198-210. 
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Boheeman-Saaf gives an illustration of how the writings of sinthomatic eroticism 
work.  The topological knotting of subjectivity and literary working are interwoven, 
and the jouissance of writing and the writing of jouissance are correlative in Joyce’s 
experimentation of sexual relation.  It has been acknowledged that Nora contributes 
‘not only to the style, but also the substance’ of the writing of ‘Penelope.’545  The 
correspondence between literary masochism and real-life masochism can be traced in 
Ulysses and the obscene letters.546  Reviewing the correspondences between Joyce 
and Nora in December, 1909, Van Boheeman-Saaf argues that these letters mark an 
‘event,’ a juncture of ‘an irreversible change’ in Joyce’s life and work.547  The link 
between the ‘new, intersubjective experience’ and ‘the act of writing to the drive’ 
inaugurates ‘a significant event in Joyce’s aesthetic development,’ by which Joyce’s 
fiction moves ‘away from mimesis to an ever more performative and rhythmic 
style.’548  Van Boheeman-Saaf observes in these letters sources not only for the 
dialectic of the virgin-whore, which is generally accepted as a feature of Stephen’s 
                                                     
545 Maddox, p. 104. 
546 See Frances L. Restuccia, Joyce and the Law of the Father. Restuccia traces the correspondences 
between perversion in real life and literature, pointing out the parallel perverse practice of drawer, 
glove and fur fetishism, flagellation in sexual practices, and so on.  For instance, following in Severin’s 
footsteps, Joyce attempted to transform Nora into a Venus in Furs. Joyce hopes to bring Nora ‘a 
splendid set of sable furs, cap, stole, and muff’ (SL, 172), ‘a grey squirrel cap with violets at the side 
and a long broad flat stole of grey squirrel and a beige granny muff of the same on a steel chain, both 
lined with violet satin’ (SL, 176).  In ‘Circe’, fetishism and flagellation are vividly transplanted from 
literature and real-life masochism.  ‘The Venus in Furs figure multiplies. Bloom has craved and hence 
undergone degrading cruelty at the hands of various “phallic women”: Mrs Yelverton Barry, Mrs. 
Bellingham, Mrs. Mervyn Talboys, Circe or Bella/Bello, and Molly among others’, Restuccia, p. 133.  In 
the case of Joyce, the writings he reads, writes and practices are intimately connected.  
547 Christine Christine Van Boheemen-Saaf, ‘The Nora Letters as a Source of Joyce’s Performativity’, 
James Joyce Quarterly, 45.3-4 (2008), 469-479 at p. 469. 
548 Ibid., p. 469.     
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attitude toward women, but also for a style characterised by the dichotomy between 
‘the intensely lyrical and the brutally direct, the aestheticizing and the obscene,’ by 
‘the alternation, oscillation, or modulation between contrary moods, two polarized 
registers of imagery, between lyricism and naturalism, idealization and 
objectification.’549  Tracing the development of Joyce’s letter-writings and literary 
oeuvre, Van Boheeman-Saaf not only detects the metamorphosis of the style of the 
love-lust letter into the performativity of hallmark features in his literary work but 
also shows how Joyce begins to launch erotic experimentation with Nora and seeks 
‘full control of the writerly scenario’550 by instructing Nora to ‘write to me letters 
even madder and dirtier than mine to you’ (SL, 189).  The performative characteristic 
should be highlighted for these letters are not representations of sexual desire but an 
exploration and construction of sinthomatic eroticism.  As Van Boheeman-Saaf puts 
it,  
This is not writing as the act of exchanging information, nor is it a simple 
supplement to the absence of the physical presence of the other.  It is writing that 
grows increasingly performative, circular, and addressed to the self, breaking 
through the oppositional framework of inside-outside, sender-receiver that supports 
traditional thought. As an exploration of the nature and limits of the bond that ties 
Joyce to Nora, the letters proved transformative because they let him discover a 
style of writing that is always addressed both to an Other as well as to the self, while 
driven by the oscillating pulsation of the drive.551 
The letters can be viewed as Joyce’s way of littering his jouissance through letters.  
                                                     
549 Ibid., p. 472. 
550 Ibid., p. 476. 
551 Ibid., p. 477. 
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In this light, these letters are both ‘performative’ and ‘transformative’ in that writing 
filters and reshapes drive, sexuality, and subjectivity.  Arguably, this can be taken to 
exemplify how life and work intermingle and to show how sinthomatic eroticism is 
constructed through writing and how writing is Joyce’s sinthome.        
How would the lack of sexual relation be felt and dealt with and what specific 
form would the intersinthomatic relation manifest in Joyce’s text?  The sinthomatic 
eroticism may take various forms but, most obviously, it centres on the issue of 
in/fidelity.552  Lacan suggests that Exiles exemplifies the in/fidelity complex in 
Joycean sinthomatic eroticism.  He puts it as follows:   
                                                     
552 Of course, the scope and complexity of Joyce’s sinthomatic eroticism far exceed the issue of 
infidelity and venture into the representation of women’s image, women’s sexuality, the construction 
of the body, and so on, as the large bulk of Joyce criticism has revealed.  In the initial project of this 
chapter, I intended to include in the ethical evaluation of Joyce’s sinthomatic eroticism an investigation 
of how Joyce’s representations of these issues in ‘Penelope’ are distinct from the representations in 
the established patriarchal culture, and on how modernism negotiates for a future other than 
convention.   A large amount of criticism on ‘Penelope’ can be taken to show how individualised 
sinthome has provoked collective reflection and evaluation on how reactionary and progressive Joyce’s 
peculiar construction of eroticism is.  For instance, earlier criticism devotes abundant energy to 
discussing the symbolic and realistic representation of Molly and attempts to evaluate how 
progressive or reactionary Joyce’s representation of women is as exemplified in Molly Bloom.  The list 
is long.  For a summary of this division of reception of Molly, see Bonnie Scott’s Joyce and Feminism 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984) and Mark Schechner’s Joyce in Nighttown, p. 197. 
The archetypal or symbolic construction of ‘eternal feminine’ certainly draws sources from culture. 
Despite diverse critical evaluation, I take it as a rather conventional representation for it reflects 
nothing but the collective fantasy and shows the limits of Joyce’s sinthomatic eroticism.  The critical 
tendency of analysing a realistic Molly is suggestive less of Joyce’s utter incapability of offering a 
realistic portrait in his female characterisations than of his dramatisation of women characters being 
reflected in deep-seated stereotypes or symbolism stored in the treasury of culture.  It exposes that 
realistic representation does not necessarily catch the so-called authentic reality but is entangled with 
the conventional discursive network.  For instance, see Elaine Unkeless, ‘The Conventional Molly 
Bloom’, Women in Joyce (Chicago: U of Illinois Press, 1982), pp. 150-68.  More recent criticism draws 
inspiration from cultural criticism or contemporary theories to investigate how Molly’s self is 
determined by the reproduction, negotiation, partial success and resistance toward the dominant 
discourses of gender, class, patriarchy, colonialism, and consumption of her time.  See Richard Pearce 
(ed), Molly Blooms: A Polyloque on ‘Penelope’ and Cultural Studies (Madison, WI: U of Wisconsin Press, 
1994).  Critics well versed in Derrida, Deleuze and others explore how the construction of the body in 
‘Penelope’ illustrates modernism’s exploration of bodily representations.  See Richard Brown (ed.), 
Joyce, ‘Penelope’ and the Body (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006).   
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Exiles is truly an approach to something of the symptom. The central symptom, for 
sure, is constituted by the deficiency proper to the sexual relationship […] 
Non-relation means that there is no reason why he should take a woman, among 
others, to be his. A woman among others is also one who has a relation with any 
other man whatsoever. And it is indeed this any other man whatsoever that is at 
stake in the character that he imagines […] and the one woman in question, who is 
none other than Nora. (XXIII, 70)553 
Cuckoldry has been a recurrent motif in Joyce’s oeuvre.  The repetition itself can be 
viewed as Joyce’s attempt to accommodate his fundamental question of sexuality 
afresh in new styles and new storytelling to render it less traumatic, more bearable.   
Comparing the two versions of cuckoldry in Exiles and ‘Circe’, Henke states, ‘[t]he 
seriously embattled scenario of Exiles is here replayed as Commedia del’Arte.’554    
The sexual non-relation points to the matter that ‘there is no science of love, no 
formula of it’555 and that although there are ‘biological bodies of different genders, 
and signifiers related to sex: man and woman, father and mother,’ and signifiers of 
‘sexual ideals, such as “virgin,” “whore,” “wife,” and so on,’ ‘[n]one of these 
inscribes the object which would annul the sexual lack,’ or ‘compensate for the hole’ 
in structure.556  Moreover, ‘[g]iven that the appropriate partner for jouissance is 
lacking, a symptom puts in place something else, a substitute, an element proper to 
                                                     
553 The orignal text is as follows: ‘Exiles, c’est vraiment l’approche de quelque chose qui est pour lui le 
symptôme. Le symptôme central, bien entendu, c’est le symptôme fait de la carence propre au rapport 
sexuel […]Le non-rapport, c’est qu’il n y a vraiment aucune raison pour que, une-femme-entre-autres, 
il la tienne pour sa femme. Une-femme-centre-autres, c’est aussi bien celle qui a rapport à n’importe 
quel autre homme. Et c’est bien de ce n’importe quel autre homme qu’il s’agit dans le personnage 
qu’il imagine, et pour lequel, à cette date de sa vie, il sait ouvrir le choix de l’une-femme en question, 
qui n’est autre que Nora.’ I follow Cormac Gallagher’s translation. 
554 Henke, p. 118. 
555 Copjec, ‘Gia Savoir Sera’, p. 122. 
556 Colette Soler, ‘Literature as Symptom’, qtd in Ellie Ragland-Sullivan and Mark Bracher (eds) Lacan 
and the Subject of Language (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 216.   
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incarnate jouissance.’557  There is no sexual relation; however, there is the writing of 
sinthomatic eroticism as a substitute ‘to incarnate jouissance,’ as a newly-invented, 
individualised sinthome-partner.  The central question of the lack of sexual relation 
is encapsulated in a staging of a possible adultery between Bertha (wife) and Robert 
(friend) when Richard (husband) deliberately puts Robert in front of his wife to ask 
his wife to free herself for possible adultery.  Ragland-Sullivan is accurate in arguing 
that ‘Richard sees the sexual relations in the realm of the Real, not the Symbolic,’ for 
Exiles ‘is a paradox concerning a would-be adultery to be committed by a woman 
who is not married to her husband in the Symbolic (legally, so to speak).’558  I take it 
to mean that Ragland-Sullivan finds that, technically or legally, there is no obligation 
of fidelity and therefore no question of adultery between an (un)lawful husband and 
wife.  In this regard, Joyce, in Exiles, does not tackle a Symbolic fiction of marriage 
and adultery, but a sexual relation in the Real level, at the level of jouissance.  It 
follows that ‘the problematic at issue here not only concerns the mere restrictiveness 
of social norms but also a genuine confusion on the character’s part’ about sexual 
difference, ‘about a question that would not trouble a normative person, like Robert, 
for whom a man is a man, a woman is a woman.’559  That is to say, Richard aims to 
                                                     
557 Ibid., p. 216. 
558 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, ‘Psychosis Adumbrated: Lacan and Sublimation of the Sexual Drive in Joyce’s 
‘‘Exiles’’’, James Joyce Quarterly, 29.1 (1991), 47-62 at p. 56. 
559 Ibid., p. 57. 
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explore a woman’s relation to sex and love and how it might differ from a man’s, and 
investigate issues such as the role a woman’s adultery would play in affecting a 
relationship, and so on.  Joyce’s manoeuvre in Exiles is less a social critique 
advocating free love than a writing of sinthomatic eroticism, an attempt at prescribing 
a script for a possible adultery, a sinthomatic dramatisation of infidelity, to render the 
lack of harmonious sexual relation less disruptive, less traumatic, and less 
unpredictable.  By devising a contrived scenario of adultery, Joyce creates a play of 
infidelity that turns a possibility into an imagined reality, even necessity and duty to 
betray.  With an artistic sleight of hand, Joyce attempts to confront the anxiety over 
the partner’s freedom to choose love objects by turning this possible condition for 
infidelity into a command for adultery.  
In ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ Stephen’s private theory of Shakespeare, as John 
Eglinton mocks, has been deployed as ‘a French triangle’ (U, 9.1065).  Stephen’s 
theory is centred on the notion of paternity as ‘a legal fiction’ (U, 9.84), built ‘upon 
the void,’‘[u]pon incertitude, upon unlikelihood’ (U, 9.842).  Recognising the 
fictional status of the Father’s name, Stephen’s theory gestures toward self-naming in 
the direction of positing a singular universal: ‘he was and felt himself the father of all 
his race, the father of his own grandfather, the father of his unborn grandson’ (U, 9. 
868-9).   The specific form of the singular universal that Stephen develops in his 
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Shakespeare theory is a peculiar writing concerning the issue of (the non-existence) of 
sexual relation.  Stephen contrives an idiosyncratic theory of Shakespeare by 
drawing sources from biographical episodes and detecting the parallel themes in 
literary texts, arguing that ‘the theme of the false or the usurping or the adulterous 
brother or all three in one is to Shakespeare […] always with him’ (U, 9.997-9).  
These motifs resonate throughout Shakespeare’s life in the adultery of his wife Anne 
Hathaway and his daughter Susanna, and in his works, including The Tempest, Hamlet, 
Othello, Cymbeline, and so on.  Simply put, Stephen sees that Shakespeare creates a 
world, exemplified in Othello, in which ‘he is bawd and cuckold. He acts and is acted 
on. Lover of an ideal or a perversion, like José he kills the real Carmen. His 
unremitting intellect is the hornmad Iago ceaselessly willing that the moor in him 
shall suffer’ (U, 9.1021-4).    
As Christine Froula rightly points out, Stephen is ‘[h]ardly the disinterested 
literary biographer.’560  Through this peculiar theory of Shakespeare, ‘in a strategy 
that combines self-legitimation with cultural analysis, Joyce projects upon 
Shakespeare a daring explosion of Ulysses, elucidating in his poems and plays the 
sexual dialectic that shapes Ulysses’ artistic economy.’561  The sexual dialectic is that 
between the ‘immateriality’ or ‘insubstantiality’ of paternity posited in masculine 
                                                     
560 Christine Froula, Modernism’s Body: Sex, Culture and Joyce (New York: Columbia UP, 1996), p.  
107. 
561 Ibid., p. 106. 
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culture ‘as an intrinsic wound/void/loss’ and the masculine cultural imagination that 
‘casts all women as potential “whore” by virtue of their material connection to 
children’ and the suspicion of potential infidelity.562  In this vein, Froula discloses 
that, in the face of the non-existence of sexual relation and the potential inadequacy of 
naming by the paternal authority, masculine culture has rendered fathers as potential 
cuckolds and mothers as possible whores.563  Following this line of reasoning, the 
term ‘whore’ is less about prostitution than about adultery since whore is paired with 
cuckold.  Froula further points out that Joycean artists, including Shakespeare, 
Richard, Stephen, and, of course, Joyce himself, desire this ‘wound,’ ‘actively court a 
wound,’ which is ‘inflicted by an adulterous woman,’ scheming to ‘dramatize’ wound 
by way of ‘contrivance.’ 564   Hence, the melodrama of infidelity of 
Richard/Bertha/Robert repeats in Ulysses as that of Bloom/Molly/Boylan.  As Froula  
discloses, ‘[t]he triangle that appears to thwart his desire in reality serves it, providing 
both the “wound” he needs to write and a model of the world of sexual betrayals he 
incorporates and gives birth to by writing.’565  Seen in this light, ‘[r]ather than love, 
the Joycean artists sacrifice the real lover to an imaginary one,’ ‘empty[ing] out the 
historical world and incorporate[ing] it within,’ ‘turn[ing] his wound into mock 
                                                     
562 Ibid., p. 108-110, original emphasis.  
563 Ibid., p. 110. 
564 Ibid., p. 111. 
565 Ibid., p. 114. 
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self-tormenting psychodrama to fuel an art that aspires to contain the entire world in 
it.’566  The symptom manifested in these texts is a self-willing suffering, a writing of 
sinthomatic eroticism.  Although Joyce does not follow the mechanism of fantasy 
that Lacan elaborated in the Encore seminar, in his writings of sexual relation, his 
version of sinthomatic eroticism displays a similar self-serving quality evident in the 
operation of sexual desire and fantasy.  This reading should throw light on the nature 
and the necessity of a female countersign to ‘Bloom’s passport to eternity.’  If, in 
‘Circe,’ Bloom enacts his cuckoldry fantasy, in ‘Penelope,’ Molly is designed to stage 
her own version of whoredom as adulterous wife to complete the Joycean sexual 
script of sinthomatic eroticism, in which a curious marriage and an odd sexual relation 
is manufactured and sustained despite the staging of adultery.   
Molly is clearly aware of the position she has been put into by her husband’s 
clandestine desire and practical design when she says, ‘can you feel him trying to 
make a whore of me what he never will’ (U, 18.96-7).  She is proud of her 
knowledge of the perverse desires and idiosyncratic preferences of her husband when 
she boasts, ‘what a madman nobody understands his cracked ideas but me’ (U, 18. 
1406-7).  The cuckold/whore fantasy certainly is prominent in the peculiarity of their 
marriage.  Molly is aware that the affair with Boylan is not merely a product of her 
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own pursuit of desire and sexual gratification, and that Bloom clandestinely plays a 
role in this adultery script, which in turn serves Bloom’s own desire mechanism.    
Bloom has helped to facilitate Molly’s affair with Boylan; Molly suspects that this is 
the reason why Milly was sent away to study photography: ‘all the same on account 
of me and Boylan thats why he did it Im certain the way he plots and plans everything 
out’ (U, 18.1007-9).  Molly also surmises that her adultery with Boylan functions to 
fulfil the scenario of Bloom’s fantasy of having an affair with a married woman which 
he dares not commit: ‘no hed never have the courage with a married woman thats why 
he wants me and Boylan’ (U, 18.1253-4).  This melodrama of adultery serves 
Bloom’s desire as Molly notices: ‘I suppose it was meeting Josie Powell and the 
funeral and thinking about me and Boylan set him off well he can think what he likes 
now if thatll do him any good’ (U, 18.168-71).     
Joyce’s ambition for a peculiar sinthomatic eroticism intrudes into the private 
recess of his modern Penelope’s fantasies.  Instead of suppressing female desire and 
lust outside marriage by presenting a virgin/wife image that serves the dominant 
patriarchy, Joyce’s endeavour is to imagine and to accommodate possible scenarios of 
female fantasy and desires in Molly’s sexual relations with other men.  This 
endeavour marks both the ethical merits and limits of Joyce’s sinthomatic enterprise 
in ‘Penelope.’  If the moral codes of ancient Greek patriarchy necessarily require the 
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impeccable chastity and impervious fidelity of the wife, any potential female 
deviation can only be repressed into denied fantasies or violently suppressed in reality 
by the slaughters in Homer’s version.  In stark contrast, Joyce’s modern rendition 
allows room for female desire even in the form of adultery and makes it culturally 
imaginable and representable.  In this regard, Joyce at least should enjoy the praise 
that Ulysses problematises the issue of infidelity.  By way of making a cuckold the 
mock-hero of his modern epic, Joyce attempts to ‘subjectify’ what normally is 
reduced to a derided, degenerated object and endows a cuckold with the status of hero 
in novelistic endeavour.  As Janina Levin points out, Joyce ‘sees the most potential 
in the cuckold’s marginality and tries to establish it as a viable subject-position.’567  
Michael Mason provides a similar observation, claiming that cuckoldry and heroism 
are not incompatible in the eyes of Joyce and that Joyce creates a new type of hero in 
European Literature.568  The subject-position of Bloom’s version of cuckoldry is 
further problematised by Joyce when ostensible masochism is involved.  Bloom is 
hardly a ‘suffering martyr’ for ‘if he tolerates his wife’s infidelity, he also enjoys it; he 
even facilitates it by staying away from home.’569  ‘[T]he conflict’ between the threat 
of indignity and the revelation of unconscious desire’570 is evident in Ulysses, which 
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poses the question of the subject’s responsibility at the level of libidinal economy.  In 
a similar gesture, Joyce also attempts to ‘subjectify’ the wife/whore as the counterpart 
of the husband/cuckold.   Despite the debate over Joyce’s appropriation of a female 
voice, ‘Penelope’ apparently gives room for Molly, the modern Penelope, to invoke 
and select her own suitors within a limited scope, and endows her with the right to kill 
them in her own fantasies.  By taking into consideration female subjectivity in terms 
of desires and fantasies, and by representing the libidinal economy that is operative 
both in the pair husband/cuckold and wife/whore, Joyce renders what had previously 
been severely stigmatised and repressed.   
However, upon closer scrutiny, the merits of Joyce’s representation of 
sinthomatic eroticism may appear limited and the celebration of the autonomy of 
female desires and female subjectivity may be seriously undermined.  As will be 
demonstrated, this female countersign is rather problematic for Molly’s desires, 
enjoyment, fantasies, and choices are socio-culturally and libidinal-economically 
conditioned.  As Froula observes, Bloom’s simultaneous presence and absence is 
encrypted in Molly’s sexual fantasy of adulterous lust.  For instance, ‘I wish some 
man or other would take me sometime when he is there and kiss me in his arms’ (U, 
18.104-5, emphasis added).  This fantasy is staged for the gaze to provoke the 
jealousy and desire of an estranged husband.  In her wild sailor fantasy, Bloom is 
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paradoxically felt through his absence:    
of course a woman wants to be embraced 20 times a day almost to make her look 
young no matter by who so long as to be in love or loved by somebody if the fellow 
you want isnt there sometimes by the Lord God I was thinking would I go around by 
the quays there some dark evening where nobodyd know me and pick up a sailor off 
the sea thatd be hot on for it and not care a spin whose I was only do it off up in a 
gate somewhere (U, 18.1407-1413, emphasis added). 
This fantasy can be taken as direct evidence of Molly’s lust-desire as a counterpart to 
her reflection just a few lines earlier on the male freedom for casual sex, which enjoys 
more tolerance in society and culture: ‘they can pick and choose what they please a 
married woman or a fast widow or a girl for their different tastes like those houses 
around behind Irish street no but were to be always chained up theyre not going to be 
chaining me up no damn’ (U, 18.1388-91).  However, readers should not celebrate 
this wild fantasy as recognition of women’s freedom for free love/sex and so on.   
As is apparent in the passage, Molly’s boredom and desperation are vivid and she 
clearly longs for someone that she really wants but who is not there.  Froula 
identifies this fellow to be Bloom, ‘whose perverse passion, as she [Molly] well 
knows, she best stands to awaken by acting the whore;’ Froula keeps on contending 
that ‘[i]ndeed this sailor fantasy would seem […] to be of collaborative authorship: 
the “great Suggester Don Poldo” [i.e. Bloom] has, after all, exhibited her photograph 
provocatively to [other] sailor[s].’571   
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What is even more remarkable is that Bloom’s interference with the adultery of 
his wife/whore takes into consideration the arrangement of a selective distraction for 
the post-adultery wife/whore.  It is of course Stephen who is selected to fulfil this 
task.  In the female countersign, the husband’s selection successfully arouses Molly’s 
interests, which are made obvious in her fantasy about playing a role in Stephen’s life: 
‘I can tell him the Spanish and he tell me the Italian then hell see Im not so ignorant 
what a pity he didnt stay’ (U, 18.1476).  Molly also fantasises an affair with the 
would-be young poet: ‘Ill make him feel all over him till he half faints under me then 
hell write about me lover and mistress publicly too with our 2 photographs in all the 
papers when he becomes famous O but then what am I going to do about him though’ 
(U, 18.1363-7).  Furthermore, the sinthomatic erotic script of cuckold/whore is 
carefully completed with an imagined procedure for reunion.  In ‘Penelope,’ the 
adultery with Boylan is rendered much less threatening to their marriage when it 
seems to function as a backdrop for Molly to arouse the sexual interest of her husband 
again.  Underneath Molly’s ‘wayward desire’572 and sexual confidence lies her 
desperate attempt to win Bloom back sexually: 
Ill just give him one more chance Ill get up early in the morning […] Ill throw him  
up his eggs and tea […] Ill put on my best shift and drawers let him have a good 
eyeful out of that to make his micky stand for him Ill let him know if that’s what he 
wanted that his wife is fucked yes and damn well fucked to up to my neck nearly 
not by him 5or 6 times handrunning theres the mark of his spunk on the clean sheet 
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I wouldn’t bother to even iron it out that ought to satisfy him […] Ive a mind to tell 
him every scrap and make him do it in front of me serve him right its all his own 
fault if I am an adulteress as the thing in the gallery said […] Ill tell him I want to 
buy underclothes then if he gives me that well he wont be too bad […] Ill let him do 
it off on my behind provided he doesnt smear all my all my good drawers [...] Ill 
wipe him off me just like a business his omission then Ill go out Ill have him eying 
up at the ceiling where is she gone now make him want me that’s the only way (U, 
18.1497-1540). 
It is arguable that Molly remains a faithful wife while she busies herself with 
playing the whore for Bloom.  I agree with Froula that ‘her [Molly’s] sexual life 
involves not play but playacting of a script shaped by her husband’s desire.’573  For a 
woman who cannot even afford to buy underclothes by herself, and who schemes for 
her husband’s favour through sex, what Molly does is ‘neither free nor play but a 
highly determined (socioemotionally as well as socioeconomically) form of sexual 
labor.’ 574   Despite being ‘a desiring subject,’ Molly’s ‘social, economic, and 
emotional motives’ drive her to conform to ‘Bloom’s perverse erotic script.’575  
Henke also points out that Molly’s sexual practice follows Edwardian sexual 
scripts.576   Unkeless has argued that Molly typifies the conventional image of 
women with confining concerns, physical narcissism, anti-intellectuality, passivity, 
the lack of ambition in career, and so on.577  The representation of Molly seems to be 
quite conventional both at the social and sexual levels, and the interrelation of the 
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double constriction of the social and the sexual should not fail to strike the reader.  
While contemporary critics detect Molly’s boredom, her despair as a lower-middle 
class wife with limited choices and her playacting of an imposed erotic script, it is 
unclear whether Joyce intends this description of Molly to be a socio-cultural 
criticism or if the portrayal is merely a peculiar eroticism that Joyce draws from 
culture and real-life experiences.   In my opinion, it is certainly a highly 
idiosyncratic sinthomatic eroticism that Joyce attempts to forge through the female 
countersign.  However individualised this representation of sinthome may appear, it 
still draws inspiration from the time and culture of the composer, and, to a large extent, 
it does not go very far from his culture.   This seems to disclose one of the limits of 
Joyce’s sinthomatic eroticism.  There is ambiguity in this portrait of a modern 
Penelope.  One the one hand, Molly’s narrowness and pettiness may be taken as a 
social critique in which Joyce attempts to portray how women under such conditions 
might enjoy and negotiate their desires.   On the other hand, Joyce seems to enjoy 
his sinthomatic eroticism through writing such women who fall prey to and 
collaborate with the confining social, economic, and emotional conditions.  That is 
to say, Joyce comes near to the social symptoms while he constructs his sinthomatic 
eroticism.         
Lacan famously titles Seminar XXIII as Joyce le sinthome to emphasise the 
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singularity of the being of Joyce.  Joyce does not have his sinthome as a predicate or 
trait, Joyce is his sinthome; his sinthome is his signature, his name and being.  Joyce 
as his sinthome is the product of his know-how to organise his jouissance in the face 
of the consequence of his unsubscription from the Unconscious, of his foreclosure of 
the Name of the Father.  It is under such circumstances that the peculiar nature of his 
sinthomatic eroticism should be appreciated.  That is, the sinthomatic eroticism 
should be differentiated from such neurotic symptoms as the return of the repressed 
anxiety and desires.  Froula implicitly presupposes that Joyce still partakes in the 
authority of the Name of the Father despite Joyce’s diagnosis of its hidden fear, 
fantasy, and enjoyments.  That is why Froula finds Joyce dangerously close to the 
dominant patriarchy in the sexual dialectic of cuckold/whore and painstakingly 
attempts to draw the fine line to distance Joyce from conventional patriarchy.  Froula 
calls Joyce’s endeavour a ‘cultural analysis,’578 arguing that ‘Joyce devoted himself 
to a “modern” art of self-portraiture that required him to incorporate and dissect his 
culture in and as himself, and, in the Library, Stephen obliquely presents himself as 
cultivating what he diagnoses as the necessary “wound” of gender in order to 
create.’579  Froula’s interpretation implies that Joyce still subscribes to the Name of 
the Father, falling into the categories of neurosis or perversion.  She actually 
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employs ‘plot and perversity’ as the title for her reading of Ulysses.  However, she 
seems to hesitate to declare Joyce’s belonging to the clinical structure of perversion as 
straightforwardly as Restuccia did in her book, Joyce and the Law of the Father.  
Despite my admiration for Froula’s analysis, her attempt to save Joyce from his 
closeness to the cultural malady of the perverse sexual dialectic of 
cuckoldry/whoredom is a little far-fetched, and appears more like a critic’s desperate 
gesture of saving the canonised work and an acclaimed master by projecting a 
position wiser than that which the artist really takes.  Froula contends that, while 
Joyce ‘dissects the fetishized opposition [of cuckold/whore] that underwrites his 
culture, he buys into the economy of […] that same sexual dialectic.’580  However, 
the psychodrama Joyce produces ‘puts the reader in the analyst’s position’581 for the 
cultural malady.  Froula’s criticism suggests that it is the reader/the critic who is to 
detect the cultural disease while the author comes too close to cultural malady.   
Strictly speaking, the sexual dialectic of cuckold/whore that Froula indicates is the 
underside fantasy of the Symbolic law, in which the potent Name of the Father ideally 
should be able to adequately name the Desire of the Mother.  It is the underside, 
repressed fear of deficiency of this naming and symbolisation that gives rise to the 
cultural fantasies of infidelity, adultery, and so on.  That this cultural underside 
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fantasy is termed by Froula as the dialectic of cuckold/whore is of no small 
significance for it betrays moral judgement already.  Cuckoldry implies humiliation 
in the sense of failing the task of assuming masculinity endowed by the authority of 
the Name of the Father, while whoredom denies female autonomy as desiring subjects 
and describes a deviation from the normative fidelity prescribed for women/wives.    
It is quite telling that there is no specific term to name the female counterpart who 
suffers the betrayal of her husband.  The coupling of cuckold/whore is a by-product 
and underside repressed fantasy of patriarchy.       
One of the key features of sinthome as an outcome of the foreclosure of the 
Name of the Father is that repression and the return of the repressed do not work.  
Joyce’s unsubscription from the Unconscious leads him to maintain a peculiar relation 
to his sinthome.  While symptoms such as the expression of the return of the 
repressed are unconscious formations produced by the mechanism of condensation 
and displacement, the sinthome as the outcome of the cancellation from the 
Unconscious remains unconscious to its author-subject.582  Paraphrasing Lacan’s 
ideas, Harari says, ‘it [sinthome] cannot be situated in the unconscious, but the subject 
remains unconscious of it […] a man of savoir-faire did not know that he was making 
the sinthome.’583  Moreover, in the practice of wordplay and nameplay as one of the 
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famous illustrations of Joyce’s sinthomatic writing, Joyce constructs his sinthome by 
quasi-automatic writings, in which jouissance and signifiers penetrate each other, and   
enjoyment and meaning are intertwined.  At this stage of his career, Lacan no longer 
conceives the Real and the corroboration of the Symbolic and the Imaginary in a 
dialectical way.  Instead, in sinthomatic writing, in writing as sinthome, the Real and 
the Symbolic coalesce.  To extend this insight on wordplay to a general conception 
of sinthome, this writing as direct working on jouissance is the process of constructing 
law and subjectivity.  Law does not function with its excluded, repressed underside 
enjoyment.  There is no repression and the return of the repressed.  The intrinsic 
connection and concoction of law and enjoyment is sinthomatic working itself.  In 
this light, there is no hidden secret to be unearthed and worked through.  On the 
contrary, there is law, subjectivity, and sexual relation under construction in an 
individualised sinthomatic fabrication.  Joyce enjoys through his writing for he is in 
the process of writing the script of his enjoyment, his sexual relation.  He tries to 
symbolise the Real through the making of his sinthomatic eroticism.  Moreover, just 
as the neurotic believes in his/her symptom and stakes his/her being, Lacan argues 
that, although Joyce does not know what he is doing with his sinthome, he believes it 
and lives with/in it.  This leads to the fact that his enterprise of sinthome does not go 
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very far.584  This betrays another limit of Joyce’s sinthome.  Not merely does the 
sinthomatic eroticism not go very far from the repressed fantasy of the traditional 
patriarchy, the structural function of sinthome and Joyce’s belief in it is not very far 
from the role played by neurotic symptoms.  In commenting on what Joyce does 
in/with Exiles, Harari remarks that Joyce commits ‘the act of imagining—and why not: 
desiring—that his wife Nora is betraying him;’ ‘[i]t is as if he wishes to have a kind of 
absen[ce], but simultaneously knowing, witness.’585  By way of such a manoeuvre, 
‘Joyce’s desire to decipher his own enigmas does not take him very far […] because 
he believes in his sinthome; and due to this belief, he is not greatly interested in 
resolving the enigmas.’586    
One of the consequences of this ‘not very far’ is the repetitious and constricting 
characteristic that can be detected in the specific version of Joyce’s sinthome.  In 
Adams’s eyes, Joyce’s writing of sexual relation through his sinthome does not 
constitute a truly intersinthomatic construction.  There is no reciprocity in this 
sinthomatic eroticism.  Instead, ‘[i]t is she alone who is tailored to fit.’587  As 
Adams has pointed out, the sexual relation between Nora and Joyce is ‘de facto not 
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authority for the meaning of the enigmatic troubling symptoms.  
587 Adams, p. 140. 
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reciprocal.’588  Adams even claims that it is the non-reciprocity of Joyce’s sinthome 
in his relationship with Nora that once blinded Lacan to insist on the non-symmetry 
between man and woman in sinthome and to fail to conceive inter-sinthome for some 
time.589  In other words, the sexual relation is simply Joyce’s sinthome, but not vice 
versa.  The sinthomatic sexual relation that Joyce builds up with his wife makes him 
extremely dependent on Nora, but Nora maintains her own ‘independent spirit.’590  
While in the sinthomatic erotic script, Molly corroborates the cuckold/whore fantasy 
by committing adultery, Nora, in reality, complains and refuses it.591  Joyce himself 
seems to be aware that his writing is after all his own partner-sinthome and that his 
partner may not share the same sinthomatic construction and find the imposition of 
his sinthome a prison house from which the female subjective desires to break free.  
In the female countersign, Joyce inserted a line to express Molly’s protest: ‘Oh 
Jamesy let me up out of this pooh sweets of sin’ (U, 18.1128-9).     
Nora’s defiance and Molly’s protest betray that, although sinthomatic working 
bears the ethical merits of establishing a sexual relation on the basis of the 
                                                     
588 Ibid., p. 141. 
589 Adams says, ‘But if the sexual relation is at the level of the real how indeed can we talk of men and 
women? How did Lacan fail to see this, given that he elucidated in respect to Joyce, his sinthome and 
Nora. Perhaps Lacan’s blindness stems from the fact that the relation between Nora and Joyce is de 
facto not reciprocal. Emprically, it remains asymmetrical. That’s what Lacan picks up on when he asks 
what the man could be for the woman but can’t answer the question’.  Ibid., p. 141.  
590 Maddox, p. 374. Maddox observes, ‘Nora is not important because she belonged to Joyce, because 
in reality she never belonged to him. She was the stronger of the two, an independent spirit who had 
far greater influence on Joyce than he had on her.’  
591 Joyce once attempted to ‘manipulate the disobliging historical Nora into becoming the 
nightmare-woman of his dreams, while she […] complained to Frank Budgen, “Jim wants me to go 
with other men so that he will have something to write about.”’ Froula, p. 111.   
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inconsistency or non-existence of the Other, Joyce’s version of sinthome risks being 
equally masturbatory and self-serving.  Just like the functioning of fantasy in the 
normal neurotic case, Joyce’s sinthomatic eroticism is also incapable of recognising 
the subjectivity of the Other, failing to establish a truly subject-to-subject relationship.  
As Véronique Voruz brilliantly puts it, ‘cancelling one’s subscription to the 
unconscious is not a sign of love;’ ‘if, following the example of Joyce, to reduce the 
symptom to its core articulation is the way to learn how to live without the Other, it is 
nonetheless only the starting point of knowing how to live with the other.’592  Strictly 
speaking, Voruz proffers this insight in a different context other than the sinthomatic 
construction of sexual relation, but her perceptive viewpoint still applies to the 
non-reciprocal sinthomatic eroticism in Joyce.  In discussing the wordplay, the 
incessant sinthomatic working as a savoir-faire of jouissance with lalangue, Lacan 
has come to realise the limitations of sinthome when he observes ‘circularity’ in the 
writing of Finnegans Wake, ‘since already its last word can but attach itself to the first, 
the the on which it terminates, by agglutinating itself to the riverrun on which it 
returns’ (XXIII, 168-9).593 
The limitation of ‘circularity’ that Lacan identifies signals that Joyce’s 
                                                     
592 Véronique Voruz, ‘Acephalic Litter as a Phallic Letter’, in Luke Thurston (ed) Re-Inventing the 
Symptom, p. 128 and 132.  
593 I follow Voruz’s translation here, qtd in ibid., p. 131. I quote the original French passage in full here 
as follows, ‘comment le dire fini, puisque déjà son dernier mot ne peut se rejoindre qu’au premier, le 
the sur lequel il se termine se racolant au riverrun dont il se débute, ce qui indique le circulaire?’. 
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sinthomatic writing, or better Joyce’s writing as his sinthome, has become a 
self-engendering, self-propelling, self-serving writing machine, which serves the 
artist’s existential purpose in an endless circular fashion.  This perennial writing for 
seventeen years serves the artist’s ‘artificial narcissism,’ which ‘has alienated him to 
his reflection in the shimmering Other,’ and Joyce is ‘condemned to eternal 
self-identity.’594  The same solipsistic tendency is observable in Joyce’s relation with 
women, as Lacan accurately detects,  
[Joyce] knew very well that his relations with women were merely his own song. He 
tried to situate the human being in a way that has the sole merit of differing from 
what has been asserted about it previously. But in the end, all that, it’s the same old 
story, it’s the symptom. What I’m the most inclined to say, is that this is the human 
dimension proper. That’s why I spoke of holy Joyce-the symptom 
[Joyce-le-sinthôme], like that in a single trait.595 
The sinthomatic eroticism in terms of a cuckoldry/whore dialectic, which has been 
respectively named by Brivic and Froula, is clearly Joyce’s symptom and not Nora’s, 
who is secondarily enlisted to offer her countersign like Molly in Ulysses.  Joyce’s 
sinthomatic eroticism perpetuates ‘eternal-identity.’  Lacan had first been startled by 
Joyce’s artifice of sinthome by way of his knowing how to do with jouissance without 
the support of the Other.  This shares one of the basic tenets of the ethical act of 
psychoanalysis in terms of the recognition of the inconsistency of the Other.   
However, Lacan also gradually realises the ethical limitation of sinthome for it does 
                                                     
594 Voruz, p. 133. 
595 Jacques Lacan, ‘Geneva Lecture on the Symptom‘, qtd in Voruz, p. 133. I also follow Voruz’s 
modified translation.  
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not constitute a true recognition of the Other (sex).  What would be the ethical 
paradigm that can work to exceed the confinement of sinthome and gesture toward a 
true subject-to-subject relationship in psychoanalysis?  The answer that 
psychoanalysis can offer is love.596  I will turn to the theorisation of love by Lacan 
and Badiou and explore an inherent tension between sinthomatic eroticism and love in 
Joyce in the ensuing section.  
 
 
III.    
It may seem out of the ordinary to make Lacan a theoretician of love, 
and not of the subject of desire. It is however from the angle of the 
innovations in thinking which deal with it, that his undertaking is an 
event and a condition for the renaissance of philosophy. I moreover 
know of no theory of love having been as profound as his since Plato’s. 
       ~ Alain Badiou, Manifesto of Philosophy, p. 82.  
   
At the risk of oversimplification, the core essence of Lacan’s Encore can be 
viewed as encapsulated in the two related aphorisms, ‘there is no sexual relation’ (il 
n’y a pas de rapport sexuel), and ‘What makes up for the sexual relationship is, quite 
precisely, love’ (XX, 45).  As demonstrated in the previous section, Joyce’s 
sinthomatic eroticism comes close to a similar danger in the operation of desire and 
fantasy in that it risks being non-reciprocal and constricting, stifling the wide range of 
                                                     
596 Voruz comes to a similar insight when she argues for a move ‘from the impasse of the symptom to 
love,’ p. 132-5. 
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possibilities as well as the subjectivity of the Other.  As Lacan perceptively puts it, 
although sinthomatic eroticism excels in forging the knowledge of the partner, ‘[t]o 
know what your partner will do is not a proof of love’ (XX, 146).  If the 
compensation that Lacan aims at is not the illusory imaginary love of union or fusion 
as a covering up of the non-existence of sexual relation, then how would a genuine 
love appear?  As I proposed in the opening chapter, my intention in this thesis is to 
foreground the ethical space of love.  Situated at the impossibility of the sexual 
relationship, a genuine love worthy of its name must emerge from this negativity of 
the Real impasse as something positive and affirmative, while simultaneously 
transcending the representation of the Imaginary/Symbolic coordinates.  That is to 
say, a genuine love must be a Real act and an intersubjective relationship.  Lacan 
himself gestures toward this line of reasoning. 
Before I further my reading of Joyce’s endeavour in the direction of the tension 
between love and sinthomic eroticism, I would like to evoke again Lacan’s definitions 
of contingency (‘to stop not being written,’ ‘cesse de ne pas s’écrire’), necessity (‘it 
doesn’t stop being written,’ ‘ne cesse pas de s’écrire’), and impossibility (‘it doesn’t 
stop not being written,’ ‘ne cesse pas de ne pas s’écrire’) (XX, 94).   The complexity 
of the idea merits long quotation:  
I incarnated contingency in the expression ‘stops not being written.’ For here there 
is nothing but encounter […] it is owning only to the affect that results from this gap 
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that something is encountered […] which momentarily gives the illusion that the 
sexual relationship stops not being written […]The displacement of the negation 
from the ‘stop not being written’ to ‘doesn’t stop being written,’ in other words, 
from contingency to necessity—there lies the point of suspension to which all love 
is attached. All love, subsisting only on the basis of the ‘stops not being written,’ 
tends to make the negation shift to the ‘doesn’t stop being written,’ doesn’t stop, 
won’t stop. Such is the substitute that—by the path of existence, not of the sexual 
relationship, but of the unconscious, which differs therefrom—constitutes the 
destiny as well as the drama of love. (XX, 145) 
In this rich and condensed passage, a lot of points require further explanation and 
elaboration.  Owing to the space and focus of this chapter, what should be 
emphasised here is that the non-existence of sexual relation, and the lack of ratio or 
formula for sexual relation, necessarily suggests that love might be understood in the 
direction of contingency and encounter.  The chance encounter of pure contingency 
inaugurates the process of love, which turns into necessity, into incessant writing.  
Lacan also ventures concepts such as ‘courage,’ ‘recognition,’ and truly 
intersubjective relation, which betrays not merely the fragile nature of love but also 
opens up the ethical dimension in love.  As Lacan puts it,  
There is no such thing as a sexual relationship because one’s jouissance of the Other 
taken as a body is always inadequate—perverse, on the one hand, insofar as the 
Other is reduced to object a, and crazy and enigmatic, on the other. Isn’t it on the 
basis of the confrontation of this impasse, with this impossibility by which the real 
is defined, that love is put to the test? Regarding one’s partner, love can only 
actualize what, in a sort of poetic flight, in order to make myself understood. I called 
courage—courage with respect to this fatal destiny. But is it courage that is at stake 
or pathways of recognition? That recognition is nothing other than the way in which 
the relationship said to be sexual—that has now become a subject-to-subject 
relationship, the subject being but the effect of unconscious knowledge—stops not 
being written (XX, 144, emphasis added). 
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I take Lacan to mean that there is a surplus in the very contingency of an 
encounter itself, which exceeds the work of fantasy although it is not entirely 
independent of it.  This contingency of the Real encounter enlists courage as a stake 
in love, which simultaneously discloses that love without the underlying Symbolic 
formulation, without the guarantee of the Other, is built solely upon this very fragility 
of the subject’s courageous undertaking.  Moreover, when Lacan shifts emphasis 
from courage to recognition, he transforms an ethical question of subjective courage 
into an ontological recognition of intersubjective relations.  In the meantime, the 
subject-to-subject relation as the outcome of ontological recognition bears undeniable 
ethical significance because the subject no longer reduces the other to objet a, 
transcending the mechanism of desire that Lacan names as ‘masturbatory’ or 
‘perverse’ throughout the seminar.   
This condensed passage is of vital importance to interpret Lacan’s dictum of love 
as compensation for the lack of sexual relation.  Alain Badiou establishes his 
theorisation of love on Lacan’s conception of the non-existence of sexual relation and 
the concomitant compensation of love.  His proposition of love as a generic process 
of truth and the conception of love as a scene of Two clearly bear witness to the 
influence of Lacan.  The evental happening of love can be regarded as a 
philosophical variation of Lacan’s notion of the contingency of love as an encounter; 
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the idea of love as the scene of Two resonates with Lacan’s proposal of a 
‘subject-to-subject relation.’      
Mathematical ontology and an ethics that is derived from and congruent with 
such a rigorous ontology have been two principle pillars of Badiou’s philosophical 
edifices, although his writings encompass a much more complex medley.  Badiou 
famously argues for four truth procedures, which include that of politics, of art, of 
science, and of love at various points in his works.  Art, politics, and science clearly 
fall into the public and collective domains, whereas love is certainly experienced 
privately; however, it is ‘an individual experience of potential universality’ (PL, 17).  
In a terse essay, named ‘What is Love?’, Badiou claims that ‘love is by no means 
given in the immediate consciousness of loving subject,’ proffering ‘an axiomatics of 
love’ by which ‘it is necessary to keep the pathos, errors, jealousy, sex and death at a 
distance’ (W, 266).597  Badiou aims at formulating the structure of love rather than 
describing the ethos and passion of a loving subject.  Like the rest of other truth 
procedures, love is deployed by Badiou through the dichotomy of being and event.  
Badiouian truth is always subtractive truth.  With his uncompromising proclamation 
of atheism, the point of departure is a system not authorised by God.  For Badiou, 
                                                     
597 For a more detailed account of the reasons underlying Badiou’s de-psychologisation of love by way 
of mathematisation of love, see Carlos Gómez Camarena, ‘Je Te Mathème! Badiou’s 
De-psychologization of Love’, Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8 (2010), 153-78.  
http://www.discourseunit.com/annual-review/, last accessed 1 October, 2012. 
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ontologically speaking, this means, at the most fundamental, ‘the One is not’ (E, 25).  
As Badiou puts it, ‘[t]he multiple “without one”— every multiple being in its turn 
nothing other than a multiple of multiples—is the law of being’ (E, 25).  On the 
ontological level, there are myriad ‘presented multiplicity[ies],’ each of which can be 
counted as a ‘situation,’ a ‘place of taking place’ (B & E, 24).  In the book, Ethics: 
An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, he furnishes one of his chapters with the title, 
‘the Ethic of Truths,’ with its emphasis on singular truths rather than the truth in 
general (E, 40-57, my emphasis).  Badiou pronounces adamantly, ‘if there is no 
ethics “in general,” that is because there is no abstract subject, who adopts it as its 
shield’ (E, 40).  In Badiou’s conception, the void or hole is situated, and the event is 
a break incalculable and irreducible to the site of the event.  The truth and the subject 
are singular and event-induced.  For a truth procedure to be initiated and developed, 
‘something extra,’ ‘something that cannot be reduced to its ordinary inscription in 
“what there is”’ must happen (E, 41).  This ‘something extra,’ ‘this supplement’ is 
what Badiou designates as ‘event’ (E, 41).  Roughly speaking, in Badiou’s edifice, 
along with the dichotomy of being and event is that of knowledge and truth.  
Concomitantly, a further dichotomy is operative in Badiou’s distinction between what 
he calls ‘some-one,’ ‘an animal of the human species,’ a kind of ‘particular multiple’ 
within the designation of the power of established knowledge and the ‘composition’ 
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of the ‘subject’ as ‘a point of truth’ (E, 44).  Badiou encapsulates his points as 
follows: ‘since a situation is composed by the knowledges circulating within it, the 
event names the void inasmuch as it names the not-known of the situation […] the 
fundamental ontological characteristic of an event is to inscribe, to name, the situated 
void of that for which it is an event’ (E, 69).  Moreover, through the evental 
happening and the truth construction around the naming of the event, a transforming 
agenda is inaugurated, and wholly new arrangements, permutations, and 
restructurations are set in motion.   
In the case of love, ‘knowledge is the present condition’ of each person, while 
love as a chance encounter ‘pierces a hole within the certainty of the present life 
conditions.’598  Buttressed by Lacan’s theory of the lack of sexual relation, the being 
or the situation whose void that will function as the evental site for love to emerge is 
the disjunction of two sexuated positions, ‘man’ and ‘woman.’599  Badiou further 
argues that, ‘since the situation alone is insufficient, it requires supplement.  Not by a 
third structural position, but by a singular event. This event initiates the amorous 
procedure, we will call it an encounter’ (W, 267).  An encounter supplements the 
void of the situation, inaugurates a generic truth procedure.  The declaration of the 
                                                     
598 Gómez Camarena, p. 165. 
599 Ibid., p. 167.  To save Badiou from the possible charges that his model shows preference for the 
mainstream heterosexuality, Gómez Camarena adds a bit of sophistication to the disjunct positions 
between two sexes by saying that ‘[t]his two is the precise split between man and woman—the sexed 
couple that is not necessarily hetero-sexed; that is to say, the disjunction between two subjects.’ 
Original emphasis.   
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truth through the announcement of ‘I love you’ names this evental happening, 
‘induces the subjective activation,’ the enactment of the fidelity of this truth.  The 
disjunction is ‘radical’ and hence there is no third position to reconcile it.  The truth 
of love initiated by the supplementary event of encounter is thus ‘transpositional,’ 
‘subtracted from every positional disjunction’ (W, 269).  The truth of love for 
Badiou is the construction of the Two, the scene of Two, ‘the possibility of the 
immanent two in the corrosive exteriority of sexual non-rapport’ (ST, 45).  The 
notion of ‘immanent two’ is of utter importance to Badiou when he strives to 
distinguish love from the couple.  The couple is what appears to the third party, and 
therefore ‘completely exterior to the Two of disjunction,’ which establishes itself 
solely on the courageous commitment and fidelity to the truth of the evental encounter 
of love (W, 271).  Badiou further explains,  
This stage of the two is not a being of the Two, which would suppose three. This 
stage of the Two is a work, a process […] The Two is the hypothetical operator, the 
operator of an aleatory inquiry of such a work or such a track […] the 
event-encounter occurs only in the form of its disappearance or eclipse. It is fixed 
only by a nomination, and this nomination is a declaration, the declaration of love. 
The name which declares is drawn from the void of the site from which the 
encounter draws the bit-of-being [peu d’être] […] love is interminable fidelity to the 
first nomination (W, 272). 
That love as the construction of the scene of Two marks out its emergence from 
the nomination of the encounter-event, which itself supplements the sexual 
non-rapport and discloses the ‘dis-relation [dé-rapport]’ between desire and love (W, 
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273).  However, the dis-relation between desire and love does not mean that love can 
disregard the dimension of desire, of sexuality totally, for ‘the disjunction is 
simultaneously its material and its obstacle’ (ST, 45).  While sexuality deployed 
through the mechanism of desire and fantasy is ‘narcissistic,’ ‘love reaches out toward 
the ontological;’ ‘love focuses on the being of the other, on the other as it has erupted, 
fully armed with its being, into my life thus disrupted and re-fashioned’ (PL, 21).  
The construction of Two is an outcome of ontological recognition of the other as well 
as a new ontological construction, which alters, restructures the life and world of the 
two subjects.  This ontological construction of love supplements ethically the 
non-reciprocity of the fantasy/desire mechanism as well as sinthomatic eroticism, 
which as my analysis in the previous section has shown becomes non-reciprocal.  I 
propose to name this dis-relation as a tension between love and sinthomatic eroticism, 
which I analyse in the ensuing paragraphs as the conclusion to this chapter.  
Although it remains unclear what happened on 16 June, 1904, 600  Joyce 
transcribes the personal and the private into the public and the Symbolic by making 
the events of his masterpiece unfold on this day, marking it on the territory of world 
literature.  By doing so, I argue, Joyce raises the singular to the universal while in 
the meantime embarking on a work of love, inaugurating the writing of a work of art 
                                                     
600 It is usually supposed that Nora and Joyce met on this day. However, the nature and details of their 
meeting remain unclear.  Maddox records a dialogue between Herbert Gorman and Joyce, ‘Q: Why 
did you pitch on June 16, 1905 for Bloomsday? Was it the day you met Nora? A: Reply later,’ p. 27.  
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incited by the pure accident of the love encounter.  Ample space has been devoted to 
exploring the idiosyncratic content and peculiar construction of sinthomatic eroticism 
between Bloom and Molly.  The real life relationship between Joyce and Nora is 
reflected in the literary text; striking similarities and parallels between the literary text 
and real-life incidents can be readily detected.   
In contrast to the overflowing enjoyment and sinthomatic eroticism evidenced in 
the monologue of the loquacious modern Penelope, a glaring absence of love shines 
through darkly in this episode.  Phrased otherwise, in the midst of a garrulous 
soliloquy about mundane details, egregious boredom and confinement in the 
household, and ubiquitous references to past and present erotic fantasies and sexuality, 
love makes itself present by its blatant absence.  Love marks a void in this marriage 
in the current representation of Molly’s countersign, except that from this very 
conspicuous void arises an image of utopian plenitude and full-spirited memory of 
love from the youthful days.  It may appear like a longing for an irrevocable loss that 
signals an escapism.  It is also arguable that such a noticeable contrast can certainly 
lend solid support for a realistic or naturalist interpretation for a bleak view of reality 
in marriage besieged with various troubles.  I find resonance in Henke’s 
interpretation of this incident in terms of a link between the motif of ‘return’ and 
nostalgia.  According to Henke, ‘Bloom obsessively tries to go back to that far-off 
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time of his inaugural love-making with Molly on Howth to reclaim a world and place 
of amorous satisfaction, of erotic origins dissociated from the subsequent trauma of 
filial loss and paternal failure.’601  Moreover, that both Bloom and Molly dream of 
returning to the same amorous inaugural point signifies that ‘they are always already 
locked in a passionate embrace phantasmatically inscribed in the textual unconscious 
of Joyce’s swirling, circular discursive matrix.’602  There is no doubt that Joyce puts 
weighty emphasis on the representation of the fragment of love from his distant youth.  
In ‘Lestrygonians,’ triggered by the taste of ‘glowing wine’ and its connection with 
the ‘[s]un’s heat,’ Bloom recalled a secret memory of love, which, to put it 
humorously, figures as a primal scene between Bloom and Molly.  The monumental 
status of this memory merits quotation at length:  
Hidden wild ferns on Howth below us day sleeping: sky. No sound. The sky […] 
Pillowed on my coat she had her hair, earwigs in the heather scrub my hand under 
her nape you’ll toss me all […] Ravished over her I lay, full lips full open, kissed 
her mouth […] Joy: I ate it, joy. Young life, her lips that gave me pouting. Soft warn 
sticky gumjelly lips. Flowers her eyes were, take me, willing eyes. Pebble fell. She 
lay still. A goat. No-one. High on Ben Howth rhodedendrons a nannygoat walking 
surefooted, dropping currents. Screen under ferns she laughed warmfolded. Wildly I 
lay on her, kissed her: eyes, her lips, her stretched neck beating, woman’s breasts 
full in her blouse of nun’s veiling, fat nipples upright. Hot I tongued her. She kissed 
me. I was kissed. All yielding she tossed my hair. Kissed, she kissed me.                                   
Me. And me now.                                                                                                                
Stuck. The flies, buzzed. (U, 8.899-918) 
‘Penelope’ terminates with Molly’s reminiscence, which echoes the passion, 
                                                     
601 Henke, p. 123. 
602 Ibid., p. 125. 
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sensuality, sexuality, and love in Bloom’s memory, yet answers Bloom’s pensive 
retrospection on the sharp contrast between the dreary humdrum of the present and 
the bright past with a life-asserting, love-confirming, sorrow-comforting ‘yes’ in her 
female countersign. The passage is of pivotal significance: 
The sun shines for you he said the day we were lying among the rhododendrons on 
Howth head in the grey tweed suit and his straw hat the day I got him to propose to 
me yes first I gave him the bit of seedcake out of my mouth and it was leapyear like 
now 16 years ago my God after that long kiss I near lost my breath yes he said I was 
a flower of the mountain yes so we are flowers all a womans body yes that was one 
true thing he said in his life and the sun shines for you today yes that was why I 
liked him because I saw he understood or felt what a woman is and I knew I could 
always get around him and I gave him all the pleasure I could leading him on till he 
asked me to say yes and I wouldnt answer first only looked over the sea and the sky 
I was thinking of so many things he didn’t know of Mulvey and Mr. Stanhope and 
Hester and father and old captain Groves and the sailors playing all birds fly […] 
Gibraltar as a girl where I was a Flower of the mountain yes when I put the rose in 
my hair like the Andalusian girls used or shall I were a red yes and how he kissed 
me under the Moorish wall and I thought well as well him as another and then I 
asked with my eyes to ask again yes and then he asked me would I yes to say yes 
my mountain flower and first my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going 
like mad and yes I said yes I will yes. (U, 18.1571-1659) 
Vivid, colourful images from that particular date and specific locus of Howth are 
evoked with equal emphasis on the memorable kiss, proposal, and commitment with a 
slight yet important difference.  Joyce has encrypted details of Molly’s calculation, 
petty manipulation and schemes at the height of courting with her recollection of 
Molly’s series of objects of desires.  What has been described as ‘all yielding’ in 
Bloom’s version is further certified and substantiated by Molly’s approving, 
corroborating, myriad ‘yes.’  Most important of all, this is the moment, the hidden 
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memory and intimate ritual that declares the truth of the evental happening of love 
and that acknowledges the creation of the scene of the Two, à la Badiou.  This is one 
of the essential indispensable pillars of Molly’s countersign, not merely in terms of 
participating in the construction of sinthomatic erotic practices but also with regard to 
the assertion of her subjectivity.  To repeat Lacan’s comment in the Encore Seminar, 
‘to know what your partner will do is not a proof of love’ (XX, 146).  Lacan correctly 
assigns love to the domain of intersubjectivity while enjoyment is always potentially 
masturbatory, advocating a subject-to-subject relationship in love.  Although it is 
arguable that intersinthomatic practices may open avenues for intersubjective 
engagement and investment in sinthomatic eroticism, love points to another form of 
intersubjectivity than sexuality that can hardly be ignored, diluted or neutralised.   
The clear contrast between the tedious present and the shining past and between 
the gross construction and negotiation of sinthomatic eroticism and the absence of 
love may render the youthful distant memory nostalgic and illusory.  It may appear 
as a luminous fragment of a remote, inaccessible past that an estranged couple 
desperately cling to.  However, if we take into consideration Badiou’s theory of love 
as a truth process and the construction of two out of the impasse or impossibility of 
the sexual non-relation, it is arguable that the mutual faithfulness toward the memory 
of bountiful affirmation, passion, and commitment may amount to a possibility for 
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renewing the relationship rather than a covering up of the impasse of a dying marriage.  
In a similar vein, I argue that nostalgic, ephemeral, and utopian as this fragment of 
memory may appear, it actually marks out and embodies the eternity of the Real idea 
of love.  This episode from the past with unabashedly fantasmatic colouring is a 
fragment of truth, a Platonic Idea of the Real.  It is of ultimate irony, if not blatant 
oxymoron, to claim an Idea to be of the Real register, granted that, from a Lacanian 
perspective, the incongruity between the Symbolic and the Real is a basic premise.   
In what sense would an Idea, which is apparently a naming process, a Symbolic 
construction, be designated as Real?  As a Lacanian thinker, we can rest assured that 
Žižek intends the idea to belong to or to derive from the register of the Lacanian Real.  
Žižek invokes Lacan’s double characterisation of the Real.  Žižek summarises the 
two Real(s) of Lacan as follows: the Real as the ‘over-abundant obscene-morbid 
vitality of the primordial Flesh,’ ‘the Real in its most terrifying imaginary dimension, 
the primordial abyss which swallows up everything, dissolving all identities’ must be 
opposed to ‘the Real of pure virtual surface, the “incorporeal” Real,’ ‘the Real of pure 
appearance which is the truth of the Platonic Idea’ (LN, 61-2).603  It is in the context 
of attempting an interpretation of some fragments with strong fantasmatic quality in 
cinematic renderings that clearly encapsulate ‘the eternal Real’ that Žižek first invokes 
                                                     
603 In this context, Žižek’s conception of a Real Idea is a result of the convergence of Lacan, Badiou, 
and Deleuze. For a detailed account, see Less Than Nothing, p. 23-78.  
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this idea of the Real. The Real Idea designates ‘not the hidden reality beneath 
appearances,’ ‘nothing but the very form of appearance, this form as such,’ ‘the 
supra-sensible’ of ‘appearance as appearance’ (LN, 31).  It is the Real as minimal 
difference, as pure difference, as incorporeal, supra-sensible nothingness on the 
surface that is the true locus of the production of the Idea as the Real, as the naming 
of the True-Event, as the forcing of something new into the Symbolic at its most 
fundamental level.   
I argue that the fantasmatic episode that both Bloom and Molly recall and invoke 
as a proof of their bind, their being a subject of love in the scene of Two, is precisely 
‘the eternal Real’ that Žižek has strived to expound.  It is nothing from the 
perspective of outsiders, but from this nothing, this void, emerges truth for the 
engaged subjects who embark on the truth process of love.  The fantasmatic quality 
with affective intensity in Joyce’s characters’ memories betrays the fact that it is not 
just a speck from the distant past, but a truth embodied in eternity.  If the declaration 
of truth names the evental happening of a love encounter and announces the 
constitution, not of the couple as two physical entities but the singular subject of love 
comprised of the Two, there must be a certain supra-sensible Real Idea of eternity in 
the declaration that the subject of love can return to carry out the fidelity as works of 
love.  The Howth episode is squarely such an eternal idea of Real as the 
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Truth-declaration of the evental happening of love.    
It is this monumental point of the eternal truth-declaration that constitutes the 
scene of Two, and this creates the platform for the sexual difference to manifest itself 
and for the possibility of exploration and fabrication of sinthomatic eroticism.  It is 
through this evental truth of eternity that the subject of love enacts his/her fidelity.  
The truth-declaration of the Real idea is ‘eternal’ in the sense of immanent 
transcendence.  The ideas of transcendence and eternity should not appeal to an 
otherworldly authority, but be realised in the time frame of here and now.  As Badiou 
claims, in The Praise of Love, ‘I love you’ always heralds ‘I’ll always love you’ (PL, 
47).  What is ‘assumed within the declaration’ is ‘an anticipation of eternity;’ ‘it is in 
effect locking chance into the framework of eternity’ (PL, 48).  Love is such a 
‘subjectively powerful experience’ that ‘you attempt a declaration of eternity’ (PL, 48).  
Chance/contingency is transformed into eternity/necessity through the declaration.  
According to Badiou, this is what love is: ‘the problem then resides in transcribing 
this eternity within time;’ ‘a declaration of eternity to be fulfilled and or unfurled as 
the best it can be within time: eternity descending into time’ (PL, 47). 
The Howth memory is the point of eternity of immanent transcendence, a 
nomination of the evental happening of the love encounter, which calls for fidelity to 
the declaration and construction of the scene of Two.  Love is essentially ‘atheist’ in 
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the sense that ‘the Two never pre-exists its process’ and that love demands to 
‘redeploy’ life arrangements from the angle of the two and to re-address itself time 
and again in the face of challenges in life from the points of Two (PL, 50-2).  This is 
why love is a process, a duration, a work of love in Badiou’s edifice.  
In ‘Penelope,’ there is a tension between love as an eternal idea of Real, as a 
point of truth-declaration and the gradually reified sinthomatic eroticism.  In the 
female countersign, Joyce’s endeavour is mostly channelled to contrive a female 
collaboration at the level of sexuality through drawing a representation of concrete 
actions and fantasies of his modern Penelope to render the sinthomatic eroticism 
complete.  As my analysis has shown, this sinthomatic eroticism has considerable 
ethical limits when it becomes non-reciprocal and fails to sustain fully a 
subject-to-subject relationship, or to maintain a scene of Two properly.  However, 
Joyce also inserted in passing the flickering of the semblance of hope to breach the 
reification of sinthomatic eroticism that still exists at the moment of Molly’s protest: 
‘Oh Jamesy let me put of this pooh sweets sin’ (U, 18.1128-9).  By invocating the 
declaration of the evental truth, the eternal Idea of Real, which turns the contingency 
of the love encounter into a necessity, Joyce signals that what is truly at stake in the 
female countersign lies elsewhere than the construction of a complementary view of 
sinthomatic eroticism and instead gestures toward love as a construction of the scene 
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of Two.  The invocation of the declaration of eternity, which inaugurates the 
truth-procedures of love, resuscitates the subject-to-subject relationship and recalls the 
life-altering moment at the existential level.  The recollection does not dwell on 
nostalgic indulgence but demands a re-invention of love, which, as Badiou interprets, 
is itself ‘a re-invention of life’ (PL, 33).  What is fundamentally demanded in the 
female countersign is not merely the female ‘yes’ toward the sinthomatic erotic 
writings, but the ‘yes’ as the assertion of subjectivity, which is indispensable for the 
construction of love as a scene of Two in the first place.  ‘Bloom’s passport to 
eternity’ is countersigned by Molly’s participation in these two senses.   
I argue that returning to the point of the nomination of love when the scene of 
Two has first been constructed also enlivens the tension between sinthomatic 
eroticism and love in a productive way.  In Badiou’s edifice, the truth-procedures 
inaugurated by the evental happening do not merely restructure the co-ordinates of 
life but also enact the process of ‘forcing,’ which is originally a concept derived from 
Paul Cohen’s set-theory.  As Badiou puts it, ‘[f]orcing is the point at which a truth, 
although incomplete, authorizes anticipation of knowledge concerning not what is but 
what will have been if truth attains completion’ (TW, 130).  Love’s capability of 
re-deploying various aspects of life could be regarded as a kind of ‘forcing’ of the 
truth.  However, Badiou warns readers of the limit of forcing, arguing that ‘[t]here is 
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a point that is unforceable […] unnameable,’which, in psychoanalysis, is the domain 
of enjoyment (TW, 132).   
Badiou calls for a respect for the Real in the face of the forcing of naming with 
regard to sexual difference.  Badiou articulates this ethical respect for the Real by 
way of curbing the power of forcing in the following way: ‘[f]or if what is not named 
is unique, not being named functions as its proper name […] love of the generic [truth] 
[is] in essence, the love of the unnameable […] For where truth is concerned only by 
undergoing the ordeal of its powerlessness do we discover the ethic required by 
assuming its power’ (TW, 134-5).  Badiou further portrays an ethical movement 
deployed through the oscillation between the power of truth and its powerlessness in 
the face of the Real, the unnameabale, signalling an ethical effect achieved not merely 
by the love of generic truth, but also by the love of the unforceable, of the unnameable. 
As Badiou puts it,  
No matter how powerful a truth is, no matter how capable of veridicality it proves to be, 
this power comes to falter upon a single term, which at a stroke effects the swing from all- 
powerfulness to powerlessness and displace our love of truth from its appearance, the love 
of the generic, to its essence, the love of the unnameable […] the love of the unnameable 
lies beyond even the generic, and it alone allows the love of truth to be maintained without 
disaster or or dissolution coming to effect the veridical in its entirety. For where truth is 
concerned, only by undergoing the ordeal of its powerlessness do we discover the ethic 
required for assuming its power (TW, 134-5). 
Badiou seems to argue that the forcing of the truth necessarily reaches an impass, an 
unforcible point of the unnameable.  However, this powerlessness should not be 
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taken as failure of the truth procedures, but a structural point that can save the truth 
procedure from its ‘disastrous desire for complete constructibility’ (TW, 135).  In 
Badiou’s passage, I find a theory of an ethical effect, which is accomplished through a 
productive tension between the truth and the Real, between the naming of the truth 
and the unnameable, between the forcing of the power and the powerlessness of the 
unforcible.  However, it remains unclear how this productive tension may operate in 
reality.  Is there a general formulation for the working of the tension between the 
truth and the unnameable?  Or should the way the tension may unfold be situated 
and case-specific?  I leave the answers open for future reflection.  At this juncture, 
my attempt is to analyse the case of ‘Penelope’ and see how the tension operates and 
achieves an ethical effect.  As the following analysis will demonstrate, my critical 
endeavor in this project is not merely an application of theory to textual analysis, but a 
fruitful encounter between theory and literature.  Badiou’s theory may shed light on 
my interpretation of Joyce and at the same time the particular case of ‘Penelope’ may 
also add a subtle novelty to the theoretical conception of the tension between truth and 
the unnameable.     
In the case of love, the unnameable is the Real of sexual difference.  Peter 
Hallward attempts to interpret the danger of extreme forcing in the following way: 
‘love is threatened by a terrible danger or “evil”— the conversion of its own 
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axiomatic subjectivity into a definitive objectivity.  The danger threatening every 
love is that the medium of disjunction might itself be named and objectified, defined 
and thus turned into a force of fusion […] the subjects of love must not attempt to 
know their disjunction. A unity of fusion, “the romantic idea of full, fusional love, 
under the purified sign of the One, is exactly the Evil of love.”’604   
Although Joyce does not fall prey to the romantic illusion of the One, his writing 
of sinthomatic eroticism forces into the Real of sexual difference in the attempt to 
construct the sexual knowledge of the Other to the extent of risking life-constricting 
non-reciprocity, which is an imposition that stifles the subjectivity of the Other.  The 
truth procedure inaugurated by the declaration of love embodied in the Howth 
memory constructs the scene of Two and opens space for the experimentation of the 
sinthomatic eroticism, which, I argue, can be taken as a concretization of truth, or in 
Hallward’s words, a ‘conversion’ of an ‘axiomatic subjectivity into a definitive 
objectivity.’ The forcing of truth takes the detour of sinthomatic eroticism in its 
operation.  The sinthomatic eroticism becomes suffocating when it becomes 
non-reciprocal and effaces the subjectivity of the Other.  The closure of reified 
sinthomatic eroticism demands to be breached and renewed again.  It is in this regard 
that Badiou proposes that ‘sexual pleasure is the unnameable of love. Love as a 
                                                     
604 Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject of Truth (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 190-1. 
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subjective or generic procedure may eventually rename everything in its shared 
situation—except its unnameable medium itself.’605  It is love as the construction of 
the scene of Two that makes possible the forcing and the writing of the 
(inter)sinthomatic eroticism.  However, this forcing itself reaches an ethical limit, a 
structural impasse.  In ‘Penelope,’ this impasse of the unforcible, the resistance of 
the unnameable finds expression in Molly’s protest against this closure of sinthomatic 
eroticism—‘Oh, Jamesy let me up out of this pooh sweets of sin’ (U,18.1128-9).  
Molly’s defiance signals that her sexuality and the Real of sexual difference exceeds 
the confinement of the sinthomatic eroticism and her concomitant subjectivity can not 
be merely reduced to a sinthomatic-partner.  This incident provides an example to 
the productive tension between (the truth concretized in the form of) the sinthomatic 
eroticism and the (unforcible/unnameable) Real.  
Moreover, in the case of ‘Penelope,’ the productive tension between truth and the 
unnameable finds another expression in the tension between sinthomatic eroticism 
and love.  This adds a nuanced twist to Badiou’s theorization of the relationship 
between truth, forcing and the unnameable.  To breach the closure of the sinthomatic 
eroticism, love plays a crucial role here.  The invocation of the memory of the 
declaration of love and the construction of Two, which is itself the reminder of love as 
                                                     
605 Ibid., p. 191. 
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the subject-to-subject relationship, may function to revive such an ethical respect for 
the Real as well as a re-invention of the sinthomatic eroticism in the direction of 
exploring new possibilities of collective sinthome.  The tension between the 
sinthomatic eroticism and love thus poses an ethical question regarding the way in 
which the human subject can tarry ethically with the negative with regard to 
subjective and intersubjective responsibility.  In this light, Badiou’s proposal for the 
respect for the unnameable should be appreciated in correlation with the respect and 
construction of the subject-to-subject relationship.  The Real in excess of the 
sinthomatic manufacturing and the recognition of the Other’s ontological being is 
intimately intertwined.  The respect for the Real and the maintenance of a 
subject-to-subject relationship is ultimately reciprocated.  In ‘Penelope,’ in spite of 
the flickering invocation of the distant memory of the declaration of love, love’s 
ethical import and impact on the possible re-invention of the writing of sinthomatic 
eroticism can be profound.    
The productive tension between the unnameable Real and the forcing of truth is 
enacted through the truth of love’s capacity to re-energize the reified sinthomatic 
eroticism.  Between love and sinthomatic eroticism, the ethical potential of the Real 
apparently lies on the side of the truth of love.  I think the reason resides in that love 
as a truth procedure has already contained a respect for the Real of the Other, a 
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respect for the subjectivity of the Other in its construction of a subject-to-subject 
relation, in the establishment of a scene of Two.  When it manifests ethically, love is 
a Real act as well as an intersubjective relationship.  This is the truth of love.  In my 
analysis of ‘Penelope,’ by identifying a productive tension between love and  
sinthomatic eroticism, I slightly modify Badiou’s theorization of truth, forcing and the  
unnameable, re-deploying the tension between the truth and the unnameable in terms 
of the tension between the Real of the inaugural truth of love and the sinthomatic 
eroticism as a reified form of truth. 
In conclusion, I interpret ‘Penelope’ as a female countersign to ‘Bloom’s 
passport to eternity’ (LI, 160) in two senses.  First, based on Lacan’s theorization of 
the non-existence of a sexual relation and the concomitant conception of the sinthome, 
I have argued that ‘Penelope’ can be viewed as Joyce’s experimentation of a peculiar 
(inter-)sinthomatic eroticism.  Molly as Bloom’s sinthome-partner is indispensable in 
offering her participation in the construction of the (inter-)sinthomatic eroticism.  
However, this female countersign in terms of sexuality and sinthomatic eroticism 
appears problematic because its ethical merits are limited.  Although the sinthomatic 
eroticism is ethical in the sense that it recognizes the inconsistency of the Other, 
Joyce’s rendition of sinthomatic eroticism remains problematic in that the presentation 
of women and sexuality appear quite conventional and that the sinthomatic eroticism 
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is non-reciprocal and stifles the subjectivity of the Other.  
Secondly, by way of Badiou’s account of love as a truth-procedure and a 
construction of a scene of Two, I have contended that the female countersign is 
necessary in that Molly’s ‘yes’ is an assertion of subjectivity, which is indispensable 
for the construction of love as an intersubjective relationship.  Finally, I have also 
argued that there is a productive tension between love and sinthomatic eroticism in 
that love is capable of breaking through the closure of reified sinthomatic construction, 
re-inventing sinthome and restructuring life and intersubjective relationship.  
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 Conclusion 
  
 This thesis explores Joyce’s aesthetic enterprise in Ulysses from the perspective 
of ethics.  The initial interest in ethics at the intersection of literature, psychoanalysis, 
and philosophy has necessarily led to the entwinement of ontology, epistemology and 
ethics.  In my study of Joyce, I find that the imaginative process by which the 
subjective and the collective come to negotiate with memories and experiences,  
exploring and experimenting with viable alternative futures, has always been 
intricately aligned with ways of being, knowing, responding and acting.  The 
cadence of radical change and fundamental transformation of the world is inherently 
correlative with the ontological question of subjective re-structuration, with the 
ethical responsibility toward the Other and the world, and with representation and 
discursive practices. Joyce’s ambition to make the academics busy for several 
centuries is not merely an artist’s hubris but is of existential concern.   In writing 
Ulysses, what is at stake is the subjectivity of the writer as well as the emergent 
subjectivity of the subaltern, ‘the uncreated conscience’ (P, 390) of the Irish race as 
exemplied in the textual subject of Ulysses.  The aesthetic experiment at the level of 
representation is correlative with the ontological transformation through the process 
of self-naming, of devising a self-invented sinthome.  Moreover, love understood as 
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an ethical, Real act and an intersubjective relationship assumes a productive 
relationship with the sinthome and contributes to the ethics of subaltern subjectivity.     
If Gayatri Spivak famously asked, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ in her seminal 
essay, it should be clear by now that my answer to this question is a critical but 
emphatic ‘yes.’  While I in no way mean to cancel out or belittle Spivak’s profound 
insight into the existential and representational dilemma faced by the subaltern, the 
ethics of subaltern subjectivity that I make a case for in this thesis point, in many 
respects, to an opposite position and to an alternative approach.   The main 
argument of Spivak in her influential text, also expounded in many of her other works, 
is that the subaltern, whose status remains problematic, can hardly speak as a result of  
imperial/colonial ‘epistemic violence,’606 with a particular emphasis on the denial of 
independent subjectivity of the native subaltern women and on the inherent 
heterogeneity of the subaltern per se.  As Spivak puts it, ‘[b]etween patriarchy and 
imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman 
disappears, and not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the 
displaced figuration of the ‘‘third-world woman’’ caught between tradition and 
modernization.’607   Such a predicament has led Spivak to proclaim that ‘[t]he 
subaltern cannot speak,’ and ‘[t]here is no virtue in global laundry lists with woman as 
                                                     
606 Spivak, ‘Subaltern’, p.76. 
607 Ibid., p.102. 
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a pious item.’608 
Despite this dismaying picture of the subaltern’s situation, I detect a semblance 
of hope in Spivak’s comments on the suicide of Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri at the end of 
the article.   Bhaduri, a young woman of sixteen or seventeen years old, took her 
own life at her father’s Calcutta apartment in 1926.  Aware of the fact that her death 
might be attributed to a scandalous pregnancy, Bhaduri waited for her period to arrive 
before hanging herself.   Her suicidal act remains perplexing because of the way in 
which it defies the social code regulating female suicide in India.  Nearly ten years 
after her death, it was disclosed that she was involved with rebellious groups devoted 
to the armed struggle for Indian independence.  After finding herself incapable of 
carrying out an assassination that had been assigned to her and aware of the ‘the 
practical need for trust,’609 she took her own life.  Spivak correctly and compellingly 
interprets Bhaduri’s fatal act as ‘an unemphatic, ad hoc subaltern rewriting of the 
social text of sati-suicide.’610  That is to say, in the absence of diction, concepts, and 
other means of representation for the female subaltern subject in the established 
societal framework, Bhaduri’s suicide can be understood as a desperate way of 
navigating the interstices of discourses by means of a ‘physiological inscription of her 
                                                     
608 Ibid., p. 104. 
609 Ibid., p.103. 
610 Ibid., p.104. 
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body.’611 
The prevailing patriarchal, mythological, and nationalist discourses of her time 
left no room for Bhaduri to articulate her desires, her being, her subjective position.  
Confronted with the impossibility of subaltern representation, Bhaduri did not merely 
attempt to embody the negativity of the system but also carefully conducted her death 
by negating the existing socio-cultural codification of the act of female suicide itself.   
As Spivak explains, her gesture defies ‘the interdict against a menstruating widow’s 
right to immolate herself.’612 There is an ambiguous yet desperate effort to articulate, 
to assert one’s own voice at the interstice of representation, which fissures, ruptures 
and renders open the apparently seamless dominant discourses.  It is in this regard 
that I argue for a semblance of hope for the excluded, silenced subaltern to 
(re-)introduce her/his own voices and existence even in Spivak’s epistemological 
approach to discursive analysis.  In short, albeit negatively, the subaltern does speak, 
voicing her/himself, asserting her/his existence from the gap, the void in the dominant 
existing socio-cultural discursive field.  What is important to emphasize here is that 
the representational system is breached precisely through the interstice of discourses, 
from the void of the socio-symbolic network, and the previously inaccessible, 
un-represented, subaltern Other comes to make a presence, represents him/herself 
                                                     
611 Ibid., p.104. 
612 Ibid., p.104. 
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obliquely.  What has been conceived of as an impossibility—the subaltern’s inability 
to speak—becomes thinkable, becomes possible.  However, although I find that 
Spivak does insinuate a semblance of hope at the end of her article, she fails to 
explore further and articulate fully the ethical potential of such an event, as 
paradoxically encapsulated as it might be in a deliberate act of suicide. 
Spivak’s deconstructivist-discursive analysis is broadly in line with 
Derridean-Levinasian ethics, whose agenda is based on conceptualising and 
interrogating the answerability of an ethical call, an impossible demand issuing from 
the radical Other, the subaltern Other included, toward the self, who is implicitly 
supposed to be the centre, if not the standard.  Two consequences follow from such a 
stance.  First, the ethical weight falls inevitably on the self’s unshakable 
responsibility toward the ethical demand of the irreducible Other, toward the radical 
Otherness or alterity that resists assimilation and identity.  Secondly, this 
inaccessible, irreducible otherness is simultaneously mysticised and 
transcendentalised. 
The discursive impasse, the impossibility of representation that confronts the 
subaltern subject as diagnosed by Spivak therefore signifies a structural void.  In 
Lacanian psychoanalytic terms, this structural void of course corresponds to the 
concept of the Real.  There is no doubt that Spivak works in line with 
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Derridean-Levinasian ethics when it comes to recognising the Real of the structural 
void from an epistemological and phenomenological perspective.  However, what 
my project has sought to demonstrate is that psychoanalysis can make a vital 
contribution in conceptualizing the Real of this structural void from an ontological 
angle.  More specifically, the Real of the structural void is built into the 
establishment of subjectivity and the fabrication of the socio-symbolic edifice at the 
same time.  The silence, anonymity, invisibility and unrepresentability of the 
subaltern as identified by Spivak at the discursive epistemological level is not merely 
an inherently foreign otherness, but also an otherness internal to the subject 
him/herself.  It is a nothingness built into the subject and the Symbolic Other 
ontologically.  The subaltern’s unrepresentability should not be mysticised as some tr 
anscendentalised, unreachable otherness, which erects an unsolvable ethical 
impossibility.  The subaltern subject, as I have demonstrated, is not located 
completely outside the socio-symbolic order, outside the law and so on.  Rather, the 
subaltern occupies a position of inclusive exclusion—precisely what Agamben 
identifies in his conceptualisation of homo sacer.  The subaltern’s anonymity and 
exclusion is included within the Symbolic order at its blind spots, and helps to 
constitute the structural void around which the Symbolic establishes and sustains 
itself.  In Lacanian parlance, working from an ontological perspective, this 
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epistemological unintelligibility is embodied in the non-existence or inconsistency of 
the Other and the subject’s consequent drive-formation of the subject by way of 
inclusive exclusion. 
Fully endorsing the fundamental psychoanalytic insight that there is a correlation 
between the intra-subjective and intersubjective domains, I have proposed an 
alternative ethics which more fully explores how the subaltern subject claims and 
asserts his/her own subjectivity, how his/her own existence is voiced, how his/her own 
being in the world is renewed and restructured in a single move via subjective 
transformation and cultural innovation/revolution.  Moreover, and as a consequence 
of this, radical change and lasting re-construction on a large collective scale (the 
social, the cultural, and the Symbolic) can be sustained and made to flourish only by 
way of profound, structural transformation at the level of subjectivity.  That is what 
underlies my somewhat audacious claim that subjective transformation and cultural 
innovation/revolution can and should be accomplished in a single move.  In the 
meantime, this claim is supported and framed by my utilization of Lacan’s topological 
thinking, which motivates my emphasis on the ontological transformation, the 
restructuration of subjectivity, the re-organisation of one’s own jouissance and the 
reknotting of the psychic structure, and a profound re-arrangement of the self/Other 
relation.  In this light, what is perceived as ethically impossible at the 
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epistemological level becomes both ethically possible and workable at the ontological 
level.  An ontological restructuration thus opens up the possibility of transforming 
the dominant ethical and epistemological repertoire and reconfiguring the Symbolic 
co-ordination. 
A universalist ethics shifts the ground of the ethical investigation by giving back 
subjectivity and ethico-political agency to the subaltern, by allowing the subaltern to 
take the position of the self in relation to the world he/she inhabits.  Despite 
occupying a marginalised, exploited, silenced, even victimised position, the subaltern 
is still fundamentally a human subject, inevitably endowed with drive (the 
re-organisation of which, as I have argued, can become the source of ethical 
engagement).  To grant the subaltern subject selfhood, to shift the responsibility back 
to the question of subjective reconstruction, does not lead to a denial of the Other.  
On the contrary, by fully acknowledging the inconsistency of the (Symbolic) Other, 
the ethical process of self-naming gestures toward the possibility of the singular 
universal, inventing new master signifiers and hence rewriting the Symbolic 
framework that mediates and co-ordinates the self/Other relationship.  Moreover, my 
conceptualisation of love as an ethical act in the Lacanian sense and my application of 
love as a truth procedure in Badiouian terms represents an attempt to delineate the 
unfathomable impact that love can have on the transformation of both subjective and 
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intersubjective planes. 
Finally, I must address an issue which might be raised with regard to my 
advocacy of a universalist ethics for the subaltern subject.  The question can be 
phrased in these terms: How does the particularity and otherness respected and 
celebrated by multiculturalism and Derridean-Levinasian ethics figure in relation to a 
universalist ethics claimed by Badiou to be ‘indifferent’ to all minoritarian identity 
and communitarian markings (SP, 23)?  Is the universalist ethics of subaltern 
subjectivity that I have proposed a strange mixture?  Would this mixture attract 
criticism from both parties?  Badiou and Žižek’s reservations about the 
multiculturalist emphasis on difference and the plurality of identity politics and their 
polemics against the Derridean-Levinasian respect for otherness can be summarised 
as follows.  Badiou holds that differences are an expression of the status quo, the 
situation as it is, and are therefore not to be maintained.  Rather, differences should 
be the subject of ethical or political intervention.  The rhetoric of respect for 
otherness and differences risks becoming nihilistic (in the sense that ethics may be 
inaugurated by treating human subjects as potential victims).  Moreover, there is also 
the danger of producing incessant differences based on communitarian identities that 
can be readily absorbed by the logic of equivalence that defines global capitalism. 
In this light, arguing for an ethics of subaltern subjectivity does not mean 
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automatically granting the subaltern subject any ethical significance because of 
his/her underprivileged position, victimhood, or estrangement from dominant 
discourses.  Instead, the ethics of subaltern subjectivity acknowledges that the 
subaltern occupies an evental site in the structural void and thus grants the subaltern 
subject agency— the capacity of ethical action in a Lacanian sense and fideltity to the 
event in Badiou’s diction.  Strictly speaking, it is only when a subject, subaltern or 
otherwise, makes an ethical act or embarks on truth procedures that he/she becomes 
an ethical agent.  It is in this regard that an ethics of subaltern subjectivity 
participates in the universalist ethics, which is an ethics of working through the 
singular universal and universal(isable) singularity.  Granting the subaltern subject 
ethical agency does not mean shifting all of the ethical responsibility back to the 
dispossessed and demanding a kind of heroism on the part of the victim, as Ruti 
suggests.613 Anyone who arises from his/her ordinary situation, who recognises the 
event, who declares the truth and maintains fidelity to the truth qualifies as an ethical 
agent.  It is the shift in perspective to approaching ethics ontologically rather than 
epistemologically and discursively that supports the idea that subjective 
transformation and cultural revolution are correlative, and that the subjective and 
                                                     
613 Ruti makes scathing comments on Badiou and Žižek’s valorization of ‘the immortal’ and heroism, 
saying that their attitude constitutes ‘a virulent aversion for the victimized that routinely shits the 
emphasis from what the victimisers do to how the victimized handle their lot.’ She also continues to 
point out that ‘[a]lthough the goal of such pronuncements is to empower us so that we do not hand 
over our agency to others, they can also easily be (mis)used to evade responsibility for intensely 
insensitive or abusive behaviour.’ Ruti, p. 209. 
392 
 
 
collective changes are structurally intertwined.  It is only through this proposition 
that it becomes possible to endow the subaltern subject with ethical agency, despite 
the subaltern’s socio-cultural unintelligibility. 
In this project, I devoted Chapter One to mapping out the development of ethical 
paradigms in Lacan’s long career, critically evaluating the ethical efficacy of Lacan’s 
conceptualisation of the following: (1) the ethical act as pure desire, (2) the end of 
psychoanalysis as the traversal of fantasy, (3) the Not-All logic of the Other and 
sexuation informed by set theory (4) the end of psychoanalysis as the identification of 
one’s sinthome/symptoms, and the theorisation of the sinthome as sublimation in the 
topological thinking of his later work inspired by Joyce’s writings.  Furthermore, I 
also sought to foreground the place of love in Lacanian psychoanalysis and to 
elucidate how love manifests itself ethically.  I propose in this current project that for 
love to be ethically manifested, it must consist of an intersubjective relationship and a 
Real act which acknowledges the non-existence of the Other and the concomitant 
subjective responsibility.  Love and the ethics of subaltern subjectivity are the two 
pillars of my thesis, which do not merely motivate my critical readings of Ulysses, but 
also frame and drive my evaluation of Lacanian theory and Joyce criticism, especially 
with regard to the question of the ethical efficacy of the sinthome as exemplified in 
the case of Joyce’s sinthomatic writings, and with the focus on the issues of the 
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structural place and the ethical efficacy of love.   
In my reading of ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ I argue that Joyce, through Stephen’s 
idiosyncratic theory of Shakespeare, articulates his artistic ambition as a work of/for a 
singular universal, endeavouring to transform the human subject by way of writing a 
book of himself, and of making a self out of writing.  Stephen’s speech in the Library 
deals with the problem of paternal deficiency and the necessary fiction of legality, the 
establishment of the Symbolic, broaching the author’s God-like ability to create ex 
nihilo by writing life into work and creating a life out of writing.  I read this peculiar 
theory of Shakespeare’s work through Lacan’s conception of the subject’s 
unsubscription from the Unconscious and the consequent construction of the 
sinthome— exploring how the subject may author his/her world, producing his/her 
proper name in the world of literature, which is a process of writing the singular 
toward the [Symbolic] universal.  I describe this sinthomatic artistic work as a 
process of self-naming, a process which repairs the structural dissolution caused by 
the deficiency of the-Name-of-the-Father, re-constructing and re-weaving the 
unchained knots of the three registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real.  
In this regard, treating Joyce’s artistic work-as-sinthome harbours existential 
significance, as it is less a work which represents or reflects life than a life and a self 
created through writing.  Joyce is his writing and his subjectivity relies on his work 
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of art and his being a writer.  
In ‘Scylla and Charybdis,’ Joyce encrypts his artistic ambition in Stephen's 
peculiar Shakespeare theory.  Through a Lacanian lens, the private theory of 
Shakespeare could be interpreted as a self-reflexive literary manifesto of 
work-as-sinthome.  After delineating Joyce’s project in this light, my textual 
analyses of Ulysses in the ensuing chapters were centered on the investigation of how 
the sinthome is developed and exemplified in the text.  In my reading of ‘Cyclops,’ I 
interpret the chapter’s rhetorical excess as an incidence of symptomatic nationalism 
and argue that Joyce achieves an aesthetic working through of symptomatic 
nationalism via a dialectic of realistic narrative and rhetorical excess.  Joyce's 
narrative experiment is triple-layered: (1) realistic representation, (2) excessive 
narrative interpolations that threaten/destablise realistic representation, and (3) the 
implosion of rhetorical excess as it runs out of control.  I read this triple-layered 
narrative manoeuvre in terms of Lacan’s theory of the look and the gaze, of fantasy 
and the traversal of fantasy.  When realistic representation lapses into rhetorical 
excess, the reader is led into Irish nationalism in the form of ideological fantasy.  
However, the ‘rhetorical excess’ tends to run out of control, not simply with regard to 
the realistic mode of representation, but also in relation to the fantasised rhetorical 
excess itself.  Rhetorical excess implodes from within and shatters the closure of 
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enjoyment in the fantasised world established by the excess.  The burst of laughter 
caused by the implosion of the drunkenness of the text effects the breakthrough 
moment when the fantasy is breached, and the symptom is worked through.  
Secondly, I suggest that it is far from accidental that symptomatic nationalism is 
juxtaposed with neighbour love in ‘Cyclops.’  Inspired by Lacanian ethics, I argue 
that the ethical call for neighbour love can function as a remedy to symptomatic 
nationalism.  The aspiration of universal love is not merely palpable but arguably 
secured and praised when poetic justice allows for the survival of a mocked messianic 
figure (embodied by Bloom), who advocates love in confrontation with his 
xenophobic countrymen.   
I read the problematic chapter of ‘Circe’ as a sinthomatic work in which 
subaltern subjectivity is constructed through an incessant process of unknotting and 
reknotting.  In addition to the experimental reading of ‘Circe’ as a sinthomatic work, 
I also offer an original theoretical contribution by venturing an ethical evaluation of 
the sinthome through textual analysis of the fantasies of messianism and masochism, 
along with the act of neighbour love.  By means of an analysis of the libidinal 
economy, I argue that the pseudo-messianism as expressed in Bloom’s lecture on 
social reform still assumes the male logic of totality and exception, the dialectic of 
law and transgression, and that it can hardly be viewed as ethical.  It is only through 
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the act of neighbour love that true messianism is made explicit.   
With a stroke of genius, Bloom, the mocked messiah in ‘Cyclops,’ comes to 
rescue Stephen at the end of ‘Circe.’  Bloom manifests neighbour love toward 
Stephen in a real ethical act, remedying the missed opportunity in the final scene of 
‘Cyclops’ in which Bloom’s fellow citizens have failed to act as neighbours.  The 
messianic ‘time of now’ (in a Benjaminian sense) comes into being via this kind of 
recognition of ethical intervention, which consequently transforms the subject taking 
part in the act, fissuring and restructuring the co-ordinates of the status quo as well as 
the subject him/herself.  Through works of love, a new neighbourhood, conceived as 
an open, generic set in the Badiouian sense, comes into being.  Love as an ethical act 
is a life-altering, structure-transforming movement, reconfiguring the relationship 
between the subject and the Other, gesturing toward a new singular universal, a new 
formation of neighbourhood.  Moreover, ‘Circe’ does not terminate with the 
indulgence of an idiosyncratic sinthome, but the moment when the sinthome is 
breached by the ethical act of neighour love, which opens for the further renewal and 
reinvention of the sinthome and the intersubjective relationship.  
In my examination of ‘Penelope,’ the problematic status of the countersign is 
explored first by evaluating the ethical efficacy of the sinthome as a sexual relation in 
Lacanian thought, and second through examining the tension between what I termed 
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sinthomatic eroticism and love.  First, I fully acknowledge the merit of sinthomatic 
eroticism as a repairment of the non-existence of sexual relation in its capacity to 
maintain the recognition of the non-existence of the Other and of authoring and 
forging one’s own sexual rapport by way of the self-invented savoir-faire of one’s 
jouissance.  However, upon closer scrutiny, although the sinthomatic eroticism that 
Joyce endeavours to construct through the female countersign is highly idiosyncratic, 
the images of Molly with her pettiness and narrowness and the triple constriction of 
the economic, the social and the sexual remain quite conventional.  It is arguable that 
this version of sinthomatic eroticism is derived from the culture and society of its 
author without much distance or modification, and Joyce seems to enjoy his sinthome 
through writing such conventional women who suffer with and corroborate the 
existing social, economic and emotional confinement.  The sinthomatic eroticism 
that Joyce presents in ‘Penelope’ does not stray very far from the social symptoms of 
his time.  This marks one of the limits of sinthomatic eroticism. 
Moreover, this sinthomatic eroticism mainly centres on the motif of in/fidelity, 
which is a recurrent theme in Joyce’s texts.  By devising a contrived scenario of 
adultery, Joyce attempts to offer a sinthomatic dramatisation of infidelity in order to 
render the absence of a sexual relationship less traumatic and more bearable.  It is an 
artistic sleight of hand that transforms a possibility into an imagined reality, even a 
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necessity to betray one’s partner.  This self-serving, self-engendering sinthomatic 
eroticism provokes Molly’s protest and Nora’s defiance both inside and outside 
Ulysses, and clearly does not constitute a truly inter-sinthomatic construction, or 
genuine reciprocity.  This exposes the serious ethical limitation of the sinthome as it 
is incapable of effectuating a true recognition of the Other. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, it must therefore be highlighted that this 
ethical limitation of the sinthome poses a major theoretical challenge. In the sixties, 
Lacan conceptualises the end of psychoanalysis in terms of the traversal of fantasy, 
and as the identification of the sinthome later in the seventies, and claims that Joyce 
would not gain much from psychoanalysis for he has gone ‘straight to the best thing 
one can expect at the end of analysis’ (XVIII, 113).  What, then, can psychoanalysis 
do with the limitations of the sinthome?  Answering ‘nothing’ immediately seems to 
be problematic but is also, arguably, a feasible response.  Indeed, the psychoanalytic 
notion of working through is primarily concerned with ‘traversal,’ ‘negation,’ and 
‘disinvestment.’614  As Pluth puts it, ‘an act would entail a dissolution of the subject 
of fantasy, and its replacement by a new subject.  But what, if anything, does an act 
do to something like a sinthome? Nothing at all.’615  Under such circumstances, can 
the sinthome possibly be renewed or re-invented, and a subject re-structured?  This is 
                                                     
614 Pluth, Signifiers and Acts, 160. 
615 Ibid., p. 160-1. 
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the underlying issue behind the question that I posed in the previous chapter: ‘[w]hat 
kind of ethical paradigm could be used to exceed the confinement of the sinthome and 
work toward a true subject-to-subject relationship?’ 
In reply to this issue, I identify a productive tension between love and 
sinthomatic eroticism in ‘Penelope.’  In sharp contrast to the humdrum reality of 
boredom and confinement facing the estranged couple, a luminous memory of passion 
and commitment on Howth is evoked by both Bloom and Molly.  I read this 
fragment as an embodiment of the eternity of the Real idea of love and as a testimony 
to the declaration of love inaugurating the truth-procedures required to construct 
Badiou’s scene of Two.  Although Joyce’s creative energy is largely devoted to  
constructing a female countersign to collaborate in sinthomatic eroticism, he also 
leaves room for a female ‘yes’ as an assertion of subjectivity, which is essential in the 
construction of love as a scene of Two in the first place.  Moreover, the invocation of 
the memory of the declaration of love which inaugurates the construction of the scene 
of Two may function as a reminder of love as a subject-to-subject relationship.  This 
recognition of the subjectivity of the Other harbours the potential to re-invent the 
sinthomatic eroticism, to explore new possibilities of being together, to carry on a 
constant work of love.  In the productive tension between love and sinthomatic 
eroticism, I thus detect love’s capacity to break through the structure and to renew 
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(inter-)sinthomatic construction.   
In conclusion, what should be emphasized here is that the significance of the 
above argument should be explored and appreciated as part of a larger landscape.  
My critical endeavour does not merely aim to offer an original reading to explain the 
enigma of the seeming absence of love in the midst of an overfluence of sexuality in 
the episode of ‘Penelope,’ but also seeks (1) to intervene into Lacanian theory with 
regard to the ethical evaluation of the sinthome and of love, and (2) to explore love’s 
impact on the ethics of subaltern subjectivity.  As I have demonstrated in Chapter 
One, Lacan devised different ethical paradigms throughout his long career, which end 
with the conception of sinthome in the last stage of his work.  This later construction 
of sinthome as an ethical paradigm has led some Lacanians to conclude that 
psychoanalysis can not go further than the sinthome in the theorization of ethical act.  
For instance, Miller and Pluth seem to support this point and take the sinthome as the 
last word that Lacan has offered on the question of ethical paradigms and claim that 
psychoanalysis can do nothing to the sinthome.616  Moreover, it should be rightly so 
from a psychoanalytic perspective.  Is the sinthome the final word in ethics?  My 
stance is that it is hardly the case because love can function to break through the 
(inter-)sinthomatic construct and the status quo, restructuring subjectivity, renewing 
                                                     
616 Ibid., p. 157-63. 
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the sinthome, and re-energizing the inter-subjective relations.  Seen in this light, love 
is an ethical act, working constantly and continuously to renew the sinthome and goes 
further than the sinthome’s capacity of individualized self-naming and the inventive 
organization of jouissance in the direction of truly recognising the Other and 
establishing inter-subjectivity.  Love enriches and broadens the conceptualization 
and scope of what can be considered ethical.  This insight can be generalized and 
marks one of my contributions in this project in the broader field of psychoanalysis in 
addition to a case study of Ulysses.   
Moreover, the powerful impact that love has effected on renewing the sinthome 
(erotic or otherwise) also signals that the ethics of subaltern subjectity should be 
pursued not merely through self-naming and the construction of individualized 
sinthome, or through love independently, but should be explored by way of the mutual 
workings of love and sinthomatic construction.  In ‘Penelope,’ there is a productive 
tension between love and sinthomatic eroticism.  In my readings of ‘Circe’ and 
‘Cyclops,’ the impact of love on the symptom/sinthome is also palpable.  Neighbour 
love is characterized by the capacity of breaking through and renewing both structure 
and the status quo, be it symptomatic nationalism or sinthomatic work in terms of 
Bloom’s idiosyncratic mixture of masochism and messianism.  Furthermore, the 
ethical act of neighbour love arguably operates with the necessary recognition of the 
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Real of the Other, and the acknowledgement of inter-subjectivity because neighbour 
love can undermine the position of inclusive exclusion that the subaltern subject has 
been assigned to in bio-political domination.  Neighbour love as an ethical act is 
therefore inherently intersubjective and opens the possibility for new possibilities at 
the collective level, inaugurating the re-arrangement of a new neighbourhood, which 
is a new way of being together.  The case studies of three episodes of Ulysses point 
to a more general insight that both love and the sinthome are indispensable in the 
ethics of subaltern subjectivity, and the productive tension between love and the 
sinthome also contains ethical significance.   
 Lacan’s encounter with Joyce has proved to be a fruitful one in psychoanalysis.  
While my reading of Ulysses is inspired by Lacan, the research goals of my 
dissertation do not dwell on an application of Lacanian theory in analyzing a 
modernist manifesto, but attempt to explore how literary works can contribute to and 
inspire the theoretical construction and transformation of psychoanalysis, ethics, 
politics and post-colonial studies.  The specific fruit of a theoretically-minded textual 
analysis can also lead to a more generalized insight in psychoanalysis and the ethics 
of subaltern subjectivity.   
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